

Dialogue in Difficult Times: The Cases of Northern Ireland and the Philippines

Roundtable Meeting, Ankara, Turkey
4th March 2017

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Abbreviations

BIC	British-Irish Council
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
HD	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
ICG	International Contact Group
IFI	International Fund for Ireland
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party

Foreword

In the contemporary context, conflict in any part of the world is increasingly becoming the responsibility of the international community. Each transgression against human rights and humanitarian protection ultimately weakens the system that protects us all. As such, the role of third parties to provide assistance during peace processes has grown in significance following frequent deadlocks in intra-state conflicts. By providing an inclusive platform for dialogue during conflicts, the Democratic Progress Institute (DPI) aims to bridge the gap between the various actors in a conflict and build ground towards peace. DPI's activities and research aim to promote peace and democracy building, via structured public dialogue, in which all stakeholders in the conflict are provided with the opportunity to come together and draw on comparative experiences. As part of its ongoing programme, DPI conducted a roundtable in Ankara, on 4th March 2017, to discuss how to deal with a peace process during difficult times.

This report details the discussions experienced during DPI's roundtable in Ankara. This inclusive roundtable was a timely and necessary meeting given the ongoing conflict in the region; it was the first event organised by DPI in Turkey since the failed military coup d'état of 15th July 2016, and the State of Emergency which is currently in place. In light of these events, the theme of this conference was the cruciality of dialogue during difficult times, drawing on the experiences of Northern Ireland and the Philippines. Speakers included implementers of the Good Friday Agreement such as the chair of the Police Foundation, Sir Bill Jeffrey, and former Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dermot Ahern. Meanwhile, Eurasia Regional Director at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, David Gorman, outlined his experience in the Philippines peace process. During the roundtable, these key actors from both peace processes met with a diverse group from Turkey's political and cultural spectra, including chief advisors to the president and prime minister, members of parliament from each of the main political parties, academics, and civil society representatives.

The roundtable explored the experience of peace processes in dealing with the setbacks and challenges in Northern Ireland and the Philippines. Through analysing the lessons learned from the peace process of the two countries, the engaging discussions emphasised the significance of building trust and confidence on all sides, the role of third parties, and the importance of maintaining dialogue throughout the process. This roundtable report aims to provide a true and thoughtful account of the international experiences discussed in the hope that they can shed some light on how to deal with obstacles facing peace processes.

I would like to express my gratitude to our distinguished speakers who generously gave their time and provided insightful, honest and constructive accounts of their experiences. I would also like to extend my thanks to our participants who provoked engaging and important discussions, and came together with a common aim for a peaceful future. Finally, I would like to thank Zoya Javed, who greatly contributed to this report.



Kerim Yildiz
Chief Executive Officer
Democratic Progress Institute



Speakers and participants at Sheraton Ankara, Turkey, following the roundtable discussion on the peace processes of Northern Ireland and the Philippines

Opening Speech: Kezban Hatemi¹



Council of Experts member, Kezban Hatemi

Kezban Hatemi: Dear guests, a very warm welcome to our first roundtable meeting of the year. First of all, I would like to mention that our guests from Northern Ireland and the Philippines will transfer their valuable experiences through their talks. I would also like to welcome our intellectuals, lawyers and diplomats, and civil society members who came from within Turkey. As a member of DPI's Council of Experts, I would just like to say a few words on this organisation. DPI is a civil society organisation that is based in London. The most important function of this institution is to contribute to the construction of international peace. Given this core function of DPI, and its aim of helping similar institutions worldwide, it is indeed a very valuable and unique NGO.

I would like to emphasize the features of this institute that many of you may already be aware of. We have experts and intellectuals within this institute. I would like to talk about why I have joined DPI. We all have some prejudices against each other, perhaps

¹ *Kezban Hatemi holds an LL.B. from Istanbul University and is registered with the Istanbul Bar Association. She has worked as a self employed lawyer, with Turkey's National Commission to UNESCO as well as a campaigner and advocate during the Bosnian War. She was involved in drafting the Turkish Civil Code and Law of Foundations as well as in preparing the legal groundwork for the chapters on Religious Freedoms, Minorities and Community Foundations within the Framework Law of Harmonization prepared by Turkey in preparation for EU accession. She has published articles on human rights, women's rights, minority rights, children's rights, animal rights and the fight against drugs. She is a member of the former Wise Persons Commission in Turkey, established by then Prime Minister Erdoğan, and sits on the Board of Trustees of the Technical University and the Darulacaze Foundation.*

through alternative interpretations of each other's history. However, DPI eliminated the prejudices that I used to hold - the majority of them - I say the majority of the prejudices since unfortunately it is very difficult to get rid of all the false historical accumulation. Bearing this in mind, DPI's commitment to broadening bases and providing an inclusive platform for dialogue has been impactful even from my personal experience.

Among our valuable guests, we have Dermot Ahern who worked as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Republic of Ireland. Mr. Ahern talks about incredibly important issues and his insight will be of immense value. The peace process in Northern Ireland, whether it fits into our own context or not, still provides an important example for us to heed. We must remember that a single formula that will establish peace does not exist, however, we are obliged to take advantage of the following: negotiations, operating mechanisms, and the mistakes that were made in other international examples. Thus, these examples are crucial to be able to understand and comprehend the best practices for the peace process. Despite Northern Ireland still experiencing obstacles, from our last visit, we noticed that they are persevering to maintain peace as well as constructively sharing their experience.

Mr. Ahern has usefully reminded us that peace is made between those who are distrustful of one another, who resent one another, and who have been hurt; you must have dialogue with your enemies. It is crucial to have a channel of dialogue between opposing sides in order to eliminate misconceptions and further hostility. As such, our work at DPI is to ensure dialogue as well as political negotiations between all sides of the conflict. We believe that these complex problems can be overcome through humanitarian dialogue. We have learnt that having empathy towards and humanising each side is a critical requirement in the peace process.

On behalf of DPI and myself, thanks very much for your contribution and for the discussions that you will provoke.

SESSION ONE

Moderator Address: Professor Dr. Sevtap Yokuş²



*Council of Experts member, Professor
Dr. Sevtap Yokuş*

Prof Dr. Sevtap Yokuş: Welcome. Before we proceed with the talks by our speakers, I would like to talk briefly about DPI, why it undertakes such tasks and what the purpose of the Institute is.

Given that I have been working with DPI from the beginning and have participated in almost all the meetings, I feel that I can properly address the purpose of DPI. Initially, DPI had some talks at the beginning of the peace process but soon realised the necessity of a scientific basis and framework for peace processes. These discussions raised a number of questions, namely, what does a peace process entail, what examples can we draw from, and what issues did other countries experience during their peace processes? These questions demonstrated a gap in understanding the

² Professor Dr. Sevtap Yokuş is a Professor of Law at the University of Kemerburgaz, Istanbul, Turkey. She holds a PhD in Public Law from the Faculty of Law, Istanbul University, awarded in 1995 for her thesis which assessed the state of emergency regime in Turkey with reference to the European Convention on Human Rights. She is a widely published expert in the areas of Constitutional Law and Human Rights and has multiple years' experience of working as a university lecturer at undergraduate, postgraduate and doctoral level. She also has experience of working as a lawyer in the European Court of Human Rights. Since 2009 she has been contributing to the ongoing work to prepare a new constitution in Turkey.

peace process which DPI aimed to fill. Through visits to many of the countries that have gone through the resolution process, and by listening to the people who have experienced it first hand, DPI formulated a comparative method. As such, I believe that these comparative experiences have led to many of DPI's successes. For instance, various circles in Turkey who were unable to even greet one another, were brought together by DPI's comparative studies and initiatives. Whilst once these groups were hostile and antithetical, they now began to work together, and bring forward ideas towards a betterment of relations and solutions. These kinds of studies and visits began to be seen as an opportunity towards solutions. This is an extremely critical element of a peace process. Did we talk about Turkey? Not at all. Whenever we have visited a country or whenever we have convened in Turkey, we did not talk about Turkey at all. However, while we were talking about the examples from other countries, we would naturally be inclined to reflect on some of these facts in the Turkish context. Rather than talking about Turkey directly, we instead emphasise the lessons learned from other resolution processes.

As an academic, I believe DPI was my second PhD. We have seen and learnt from very valuable examples from other peace processes. For example, the Irish example is highly important for us since Ireland used a different approach, which we will hear about in detail. They have developed some quite technical methods for their peace process which progresses step by step, stage by stage. Through this reasoning, they have developed some methods which have in turn resulted in further lessons learned. They also established some principles for the process which must be observed by all involved. In terms of the benefits of such methods, it is through the establishment of some ground rules which can essentially aid in the advancement and success of the process. Northern Ireland was, therefore, the best example in this sense. They have turned conflict resolution into something of a scientific field.

The Philippines has also been exciting for me since it is a process that has been accompanied by legal and constitutional procedures. The emphasis on law meant that basic laws and a framework law needed to be prepared in order to advance through the process stage by stage. I have come across something very different in Colombia. For instance, the president of Colombia, Santos, is a very determined leader; his determination has been one of the principles. Essentially, having determination in the peace process is one of the main principles.

We have also carried out some discussions about the comprehensiveness of peace processes. One such important lesson for us has been the significance of including all sections of society in the process. Furthermore, these comparative experiences enlightened us of the similarities and differences of our unique contexts. Whilst at times

we felt that the other experiences were foreign to us and their methods irrelevant to our context, at other times we were able to see the similarities. On one topic, however, we were very certain; in almost all of the mistakes made, we have seen some similarities. Although the methods are not directly adoptable, particularly since every peace process is unique, the mistakes are interestingly very similar. In light of this, we need to avoid such mistakes. This will be elaborated on further throughout the course of the conference.

With reference to learning, DPI's studies have done an extremely important job. Moreover, DPI has also played a crucial role in terms of bringing everyone together. Though admittedly we may be going through difficult times, we must persist and at least be able to listen to one another. We hope that such discussions and work will continue.

We will now proceed to hearing about the other examples that have also been going through the same paths. Please let me welcome the first speaker, David Gorman. Thank you very much, the floor is yours.

David Gorman³

Lessons Learned from the Philippines Process: How to get the process back on track after experiencing setbacks



Guest Speaker, David Gorman

David Gorman: Good morning to everybody and thanks very much for inviting me for today's event. I am the regional director for the Eurasia region for a Swiss NGO, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. While previously part of the International Committee for the Red Cross, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue was established as a separate organisation following calls to the Red Cross to be more involved in a political rather than humanitarian capacity. We now work in 36 conflicts around the world and predominantly play two or three roles. One is directly mediating conflicts when national or international actors require a neutral, small third party mediator. On other occasions, we assist and complement the official negotiations in many countries, including the Philippines.

I will begin with a brief background on the Philippines and then talk about the peace process itself. As the two hosts have mentioned, every situation is unique so I do not want to give the impression that what was done in the Philippines would necessarily

³ *David Gorman is the Eurasia Regional Director at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. He joined the NGO in 2000 and is currently leading the Eurasia Programme. He has over 20 years of experience in the field of peacemaking and peacebuilding. David started his career in the Middle East, and then worked for not-for-profit organisations on a wide range of conflicts around the world. During his career, he has been based in the Philippines, Indonesia, Liberia, Bosnia as well as the West Bank and Gaza. David was also featured in the award winning film 'Miles and War' and has published several articles on mediation.*

work here. However, having been involved in 15 or so mediation initiatives around the world, from Africa and Asia to Europe, there are many things you can draw out from a process from other places that you might find useful. Certain techniques that you might find appropriate and relevant. I hope that from today's presentation on the Philippines experience, you will be encouraged to either avoid that situation or see if it provides an opportunity that could help the situation here.

Context

The Philippines itself is the tenth largest country in the world with a population of about 100 million people. It is split into three main parts: Luzon in the north, the island group in the middle known as the Visayas, and Mindanao - the large proportion of land in the south. Mindanao itself is divided between a Muslim community of about four million, and a growing Christian community of about 20 million or so. The abundance of natural resources in the area, particularly copper, has only added to the challenges since there were disputes over this issue in the peace talks. The conflict in Mindanao was not a small conflict; 150,000 people were killed throughout that 30 year period. It was a conflict that involved many international actors, particularly Saudi Arabia, Libya and Malaysia – all which have played a role at one time or another, in supporting the insurgencies back in the '70s. In fact, one of the main insurgent groups, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the Philippines has observer status in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).⁴ It is one of the few non-state groups that has this representation in the OIC. It is a conflict that is largely historical as it can be traced back 100 years to the American occupation of the Philippines. It also has an ethnic element to it due to the Moro ethnic group, a religious component with the Islamic movement in the South, as well as an autonomous aspect whereby the Moros are seeking autonomy. Furthermore, this conflict has drawn in many of the regional states and international terrorists, as is evident from the Al Qaeda presence in Southern Mindanao and surrounding islands, and is a conflict where there is an intermittent peace process.

Besides this complex context, I believe that this conflict has been difficult to completely resolve for several reasons. Firstly, the majority of Filipinos often do not see the benefits of a peace process with Mindanao; they deem them as an armed group down in the southern regions of the country which has caused many problems but which do not directly affect them in the North. What is more, there is a lot of historical baggage that adds to this sentiment since those in the North hold serious prejudices against the Moro

⁴ Formerly known as the Organisation of Islamic Conference, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is an association of 56 Islamic states promoting Muslim solidarity in economic, social, and political affairs.

Muslim people. A case in point is that many Filipino children who reside outside of Mindanao are often told a bedtime story whereby the Moro Muslims will come and get them if they do not go to sleep. This ingrained prejudice as well as a lack of a strong constituency in the rest of the Philippines who support or even see the necessity of a peace agreement with armed groups has ultimately been one of the biggest obstacles.

Secondly, in terms of the political landscape, the Philippines is rather fractured and many of the political parties have serious armed elements to them. As a consequence, there are numerous groups in Mindanao who are competing with political armed groups. Although the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) are the two major political armed groups, they are limited to a number of 10 to 15 thousand fighters at most and mainly have small arms. On the other hand, the political families who run the political operations in the south have just as many fighters amongst themselves and often own a larger amount of armaments as opposed to the political armed groups. Subsequently, there is a very complicated political situation whereby the rebel groups who are part of the peace talks, do not necessarily always represent all the people in the area and are engulfed in internal battles with other political factions in the south. As the contours of the settlement start to take shape, the public are largely aware that the solution process will consist of some degree of autonomy for the southern regions which may be part of a larger federal solution. Nonetheless, numerous questions persist: *who will be part of the peace process? Who will represent the people? What will be the exact legal and political elements that will anchor that arrangement?*

Obstacles during the Diplomatic Stage

The focus of my talk will be the period between 2002 and 2012 which was characterised by sporadic talks. From 2006, my colleagues and I would often meet with one of the rebel factions, the MNLF, in Mindanao to work out small ceasefires. Whilst larger political processes persisted, on many occasions we were also working on smaller ceasefires with the different factions that were operating in the region. However, a pivotal opportunity for a larger deal arose in 2008 when a comprehensive agreement was drafted. This was arranged behind closed-doors and had very little inclusion of people from outside the talks. The Malaysian government facilitated the process despite being perceived as lacking impartiality. In actuality, the Malaysian government acted more as a power broker since it had been involved in supporting the MILF against the Philippines in the past. Yet it was felt that the involvement of the Malaysians was necessary in this peace process since they could best control and influence the MILF. As such, I had been advising the Malaysian facilitator through the process behind closed-doors and had suggested that the process needed to be opened up to international and civil society elements in order to buttress the peace process and

ensure that the agreement would have credibility and wide spread support, both nationally and internationally. Unfortunately, the two parties went ahead and signed this very far-reaching agreement, though when they were on their way to the signing ceremony in Putrajaya, Malaysia, two governors in the south of the Philippines had made a case for a motion to the supreme court to put an injunction on the signing of the agreement.⁵ The press secretary of the Philippines president had consequently issued a statement stating that the government would no longer sign the agreement since the supreme court had weighed in. The heavy presence of the international community, most of the major missions to Manila, the two parties, and local and international media at the signing ceremony was testament to what would have been a historic moment. Following this event, violence engulfed the south of the Philippines and resulted in hundreds killed, and 7000 displaced within a week. Though these clashes received minimal international attention it was a major catastrophe in South East Asia since the agreement was viewed as the best opportunity to put one of the largest insurgent conflicts in the area to rest.

This setback was something that we could never have anticipated, and was evidenced by the fact that the Malaysian facilitator had no concerns even two-days before the agreement. The point being, there is always a black swan in any peace process; it cannot be anticipated and it is almost impossible to plan for. Although this was a very unique intervention that halted the peace process, it speaks volumes on peace processes today whereby the legal aspect is of exceptional significance and must not be underestimated. Successful agreements are no longer achieved through closed-door agreements between two parties, they must be supported by a legal framework.

⁵ *Ruling G.R. 183591 (The Province of North Cotabato v The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain)*



David Gorman discussing his experiences during the peace process in the Philippines

Recovering from Setbacks

In spite of this unfortunate setback, the two parties, the Malaysian facilitator and I met in the afternoon to start planning for the new phase of the process. In light of the earlier hindrance, we decided that although the substance of the new agreement was going to predominantly be the same, it needed a new architecture, packaging, involvement of people and international and national actors. It is noteworthy that whilst on one level the process fails, particularly when viewing the narrative of media outlets, an enormous amount of work can be done behind the scenes in order to prepare for the new phase of the peace process. Based on the lessons learned from what had and had not worked in the previous agreement and by setting out the workable substance and process, we were able to quickly work out the next steps. On substantive issues, it was decided that top international experts on constitutional issues, Disarmament, Demobilisation and

Reintegration (DDR),⁶ power and resource sharing, and governance should be brought in since they could best advise on these issues from their experiences in other peace processes. Their involvement not only added a level of credibility and creativity that was necessary, but also brought in a degree of trust that enabled both parties to work with them comfortably. This included experts from Northern Ireland, namely, Gerry Kelly from Sinn Féin and Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's advisor in Northern Ireland, who were very much involved in helping the two parties.

Lessons Learned for the new Process

The process itself, however, was the aspect that required the most attention. Firstly, we worked bilaterally with each party to identify confidence-building measures and to build trust. An example of such work included helping each side to avoid issuing statements which would further complicate the situation. For instance, Jonathan Powell⁷, Gerry Kelly⁸ and I unequivocally advised the Philippines cabinet not to issue conditions on the rebels that were not going to be met, since it will ultimately lock in these conditions and mean that the peace process will not be renewed. As such, engaging with the parties to firstly assist in avoiding further issues that would be difficult to overturn later was an initial step. The next step was to help the parties identify small issues to build trust, whether building trust with the other party, or with the public on the other side. This was a two-pronged approach whereby the parties worked on what could be done publicly and privately to reach an agreement.

Secondly, we identified shared visions from the parties on where the process would lead. From the failure of the previous agreement, we learned that it was the ambiguity of the last agreement that was a major impediment to the process and led to its eventual defeat. Questions were rightfully raised on what the solution would look like in practice and how it was to be implemented. At the time, it seemed appropriate to have an ambiguous agreement in order to have an agreement at all, however we soon realised that we needed a clearer agreement and understanding of what the solution would look like regardless of the difficulties that it will cause. As a result, we began to get into the final status arrangements and outline what Mindanao would look like in 2016 and 2017.

⁶ *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) is a programme for ex-combatants in post-conflict contexts. It has become an integral component of post-conflict peace consolidation as it contributes to security and stability and has been featuring in the mandates of peacekeeping missions over the past 20 years.*

⁷ *Jonathan Powell is founder and CEO of Inter Mediate, an NGO working on conflict resolution in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. He was appointed as the UK Official Envoy to Libya by Prime Minister David Cameron in 2014, and from 1997 he was also Chief British Negotiator on Northern Ireland.*

⁸ *Gerry Kelly is an Irish republican politician who played a leading role in the negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement. He is currently a member of Sinn Féin's Ard Chomhairle (National Executive) and a Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly (MLA) for North Belfast.*

This consisted of questions on issues such as elections, the DDR programme and what it will involve, and what would happen to the fighters. Such discussions and questions allowed people to envision what might be over the horizon and assist in clearly laying out the roadmap and sequencing of next steps to achieve that vision. The issue of legality was critical here since we needed to ensure that we avoid repeating the previous mistake. On the other hand, I believe that this led us to overcompensate with a large presence of lawyers who led the first round of talks. Albeit useful, the negotiations should not have been led by the lawyers. The emphasis on the legal element cost the process six months as the lawyers battled each other on the nitty-gritty details, and on how the law should be interpreted and applied to any type of agreement. This essentially undermined the political agreement. We accordingly began to roll back the lawyers which allowed the political elements to take over.

On the political side, we started to look at how to bring in the members of parliament who had been opposed to the agreement, local governors who had challenged the agreement, and how to engage more effectively with the public. It was also important to address how to maintain linkages and channels of communications between the two sides who had once again become hostile. As a matter of fact, even during the most difficult times, the militaries on both sides were still exchanging messages back and forth in a bid to avoid a more volatile situation. It must be noted that neither side was disadvantaged by the continuation of some degree of communication, but rather both sides possibly benefited from it. We also looked at how to engage with spoilers and develop public relations strategies and devise a new architecture to buttress the process, both internationally and locally. The first step was bringing in the international actors to create a new architecture and to be able to better address some of the substantive issues from international experiences. This included vice presidents, former UN envoys, chief of staff to presidents and prime ministers from South Africa, Indonesia, Northern Ireland, UK, Sudan, New Zealand, Canada, Spain, as well as Zimbabwe and the Palestinian Territories. The frequent involvement of the internationals provided them with a greater understanding of the issues and led to the development of personal trust between some of the party members on both sides.



Norway's Ambassador to Turkey, Vegard Ellefsen, and member of DPI's Council of Experts, Hanne Melfald

International Contact Group (ICG)

It was critically important that even during the most difficult times in the conflict, some degree of joint ties was maintained among security forces. It must be mentioned that this cooperation was in most part due to a mutual commitment to undermine the terrorist elements and other criminal third party spoilers in the region. The use of back-channel communications helped to rebuild the process which now moved along much faster. We were able to go back and forth and work on a number of preliminary arrangements, one of which was to strengthen the peace architecture by creating the International Contact Group (ICG). This group is distinct from other international groups that are involved in a peace process; we were there in an advisory capacity to both parties, we had no military role or enforcement mechanism. Instead, we played a very low-profile role whereby we never issued any public statements though we did attend all the talks and went back and forth between the two parties. This role made the rebels feel more comfortable with the process since there was now an impartial and stronger international presence. The

Philippines government also had more confidence in the process since it was felt that the other countries that were now involved would be more supportive of an agreement that would reinforce the territorial integrity of the Philippines.

Establishing the ICG was a long task in itself as it required us to go back and forth between the two parties and identifying who should be involved. After much deliberation, it was decided that the ICG would comprise of four countries: Saudi Arabia; Turkey; Japan; and the UK. Each was chosen for specific reasons. The UK was picked for a number of reasons, for instance, because it has a member at the United Nations Security Council, does not hold any particular issues in the Philippines which would make it partial one way or another, and because of its European status which stands for European values of democracy and human rights. Saudi Arabia's previous support of the rebels, and being the country in which the OIC is based had meant that it was selected by the MILF in particular. Japan was another country that was chosen since it is a big international actor in the region which is seen as a body that can influence the Philippines government and which has contributed greatly in terms of assistance. Finally, Turkey was chosen since it was felt by the Philippines that Turkey was experiencing similar circumstances and one which would unequivocally support its territorial integrity while also being able to pressure the MILF due to its Muslim identity.

Besides these four countries, the ICG was also composed of four NGOs, including the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue which played the role of the coordinator. The other three NGOs each played different roles, including one focusing on process and the other on more substantive issues. It was a wonderful and constructive initiative despite encountering its own difficulties. It is inevitable that with the involvement of too many internationals who each have their own interests at stake makes managing the process more difficult. In light of this, I believe that the ICG architecture was appropriate since it consisted of actors who were predominantly non-partisan; all were neutral, wanted peace, supported the general contours of the agreement and were there to provide the necessary advice and support. In parallel to this initiative though separately, they also recreated a monitoring operation in the south which was an unarmed international body that consisted of active military from several countries, namely, Norway, Malaysia, Japan and Indonesia. They were each distinct as they had a separate mandate to us, and they reported through to their own structures that liaised with the security forces of the two parties. In addition to monitoring the security elements, they were also responsible for overseeing the humanitarian and economic development pillars. Given that immediate successes and tangible results on the ground are difficult to find, having these other operations in place was crucial for building confidence in the peace process.

Additionally, the parties themselves made the process more inclusive by broadening their delegations and adding members of parliament and government line agencies. The involvement of these technocrats who could provide their expertise on issues such as decentralisation, DDR and constitutional issues was highly beneficial. It was realised that a considerable amount can be achieved ahead of a peace agreement through regionalisation and operationalisation. Most importantly, the parties each conducted mass community consultations to educate the public on the peace process, and ask for their input and opinions which ultimately resulted in greater public support.



David Gorman presenting his experiences in the Philippines peace process

Common Principles

Another example of the cooperation between the parties is evident in the ways that they agreed on a number of principles. At times when an agreement could not be reached on the details of the roadmap, the parties often could agree on general principles which provided an anchor to the process and demonstrated good will. For instance, international humanitarian law and civilian protection were such principles that both

parties agreed on from the outset. These initial points of compliance paved the way for further cooperation. Principles of subsidiarity as the basis for a solution for the issue of autonomy, and the need for a national law with local provisions, were further points of agreement. The need for a robust parliamentary draft law that could pass the supreme court was in the interest of both parties. On this issue, former deputy minister in Canada George Anderson, asserted that devolution does not simply end with an agreement or a law, but rather is a continued process with varying degrees of devolution or centralisation. The key is developing mechanisms that can legally and politically steer the ongoing negotiation which will inevitably continue past the final agreement. The agreement will provide the contours but will also need to provide the mechanisms that will allow the conversation on issues such as devolution and regionalisation to continue.

Importantly, both parties agreed on the cruciality of a transitional body in order to build capacity and oversee the transition process. Quite understandably there was limited human resources to immediately implement an agreement, technocrats to verify the details, security provisions to integrate all the combatants, and judges to deal with all the amnesty issues. For this reason, a phased period whereby capacity is built-up and laws are developed to understand how the various elements of the agreement will be implemented is essential. This joint transitional body from the two parties was, therefore, established and dealt with preparing elections, developing the DDR program, and working out amnesty provisions. In terms of the issue of autonomy within the Philippines peace process, the presence of a transitional authority was vital to be able to responsibly proceed with the devolution process. Such collaborations and points of agreement inevitably strengthened the peace process.

Key Elements of the Process

- 1) Asymmetrical relationship: Distinct from the other regions and local governments, the relationship between the Philippines government and the Bangsamoro Government is asymmetric. The central government recognises the Bangsamoro identity and their aspiration for self-governance.
- 2) Use of plebiscites: Public approval was a vital part of the process especially for matters such as that on territory.
- 3) Normalisation: Ensuring the decommissioning of combatants was another major part of the agreement and drew from methods used in the the Northern Ireland peace process, such as police reform.
- 4) Legally Binding: It was necessary for the agreement to be within the constitutional framework and be supported by the legislature.
- 5) Exit agreement: This could only be signed off by all the parties once it was agreed that it could be finalised.

Q&A

Prof Dr. Sevtap Yokuş: Thanks very much David, that was very interesting and insightful. You covered many important points and most certainly demonstrated the significance of persevering through the inevitable difficult stages of peace processes. I also wanted to remind our participants today that each of you play a highly valuable role in the process since you may have a catalysing effect in overcoming the issues we are experiencing.

David, I have two questions for you. I understand that you were in an award-winning documentary which delved into the Philippines peace process, how do you think this impacted the process? And secondly, our underlying concern is directly related to the topic of this conference, what are the methods you used to reinitiate dialogue and negotiations during periods of crisis?

David Gorman: The documentary *'Miles & War'* was initially made as an intellectual exercise to try and better convey the process of mediation and negotiations. Making it into an international documentary, which was shown at numerous film festivals and garnering a larger audience than we were originally targeting, demonstrated the high public interest in peace processes. What made this documentary unique was the level of camera access into parts of the negotiation process. We realised that whilst there is a need for confidential negotiations, there is also a need for public engagement in the peace process.

To answer your second question, we always maintained a line of communication, mostly between the military. This was never made public but was proven extraordinarily useful in order to ensure a degree of understanding between the two sides. Furthermore, third parties play a key role during difficult times since it is within the remit of their role to go back and forth to convey messages to avoid worse situations. This has often meant that even with the disputes, we could get back on track with the negotiations much faster.

Participant: Hello, thank you DPI for inviting me here. The classical model of negotiation that we have witnessed for many years around the world unfortunately delays the achievement of the solution since we often see decades of negotiations with limited results. From your experience, should this existing model be reconsidered? Furthermore, do you believe that direct dialogue between both sides, without the interference of national or international entities would help? Would this direct dialogue make the parties feel more conscious of their responsibilities?

David Gorman: To be sure, and to be absolutely clear, these long negotiation processes are extraordinarily painful. These constant meetings going over the same things, hearing the same arguments, hearing the same narratives are not worth continuing the negotiations just for the sake of negotiations. As the mediator, you become tired, cynical, sceptical, and irritable. If you could have a quick negotiation and the parties could work it out themselves, that would definitely be the preferable option. If we had a model that could do that, I guarantee we would definitely implement it. Unfortunately, that is not the case. You often find that at the beginning or from the outside perspective it may seem simple, however unfortunately, it becomes much more political wrangling as they start to get further into the tough decisions that need to be made that will require sacrifices from the different sides. It becomes much more drawn out as you go along. Secondly, a much more inclusive process is advantageous. A parliamentary process as well as a referendum are important components here. In preparation for the referendum, the Philippines had countless public consultations which was greatly beneficial for the success of the process. Social media has been a whole new phenomenon in the realm of peace processes and has proven to be a powerful influencer. In the Philippines example, we suddenly had people in the room whose affiliations we did not know and who could influence the negotiations through their tweets and blogs. This whole new social media concept complicated things immensely on how to deal with this constituency. In order to have the total buy-in to pass the agreement politically, legally and publically, you are required to engage with all the different elements of society to make sure that when you are ready to cross the finish line, all these other boxes are ticked. We do not strive to draw out these negotiations. Thirdly, we believe it is crucial to ensure that the two parties are the ones who are driving the process, particularly since they should be accountable, responsible, and carry the duty to implement it. On occasion, the third party takes on too much of a role. There are three or four roles of the mediator: observe the talks; facilitate them; resolve the disputes; and as the arbitrator. In most peace talks, third parties do all of those aspects. Rarely, do you want to arbitrate unless the parties specifically ask for this. It has to be demand-driven based on the parties wants.



Prof Dr. Sevtap Yokuş with speakers Dermot Ahern and David Gorman

Participant: The speaker mentioned that NGOs assumed an important role in the peace process. Were they Filipino NGOs, or were they international NGOs as well? What kind of roles did they assume?

David Gorman: We have been seeing a greater involvement of civil society, and national and international elements. There is a need for non-state actors to be more engaged these days since they have the ability to engage with communities more effectively than state actors can. Upon the request of both parties, four international NGOs were involved in the process: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; Conciliation Resources; Asia Foundation; and Muhammadiyah. We all served a different function. We worked on the process and we facilitated the whole contact group. The national NGO is very complicated. On the one hand, they needed to be a part of the process at a certain time. On the other hand, we needed to clarify what their role was, who they represented, and whether others agreed that they should represent them. This inevitably became very complicated and a more divisive issue. Eventually, they were

invited to certain rounds, though rather than attending as a group, they attended as individuals who offered their expertise. Although we never quite dealt with this issue properly, there is a huge role for civil society in the process. It may not be in the Track One⁹ negotiations, but it is necessary in the Track Two.¹⁰ We often say there are two parts to the process; the first part is the peacemaking and the other is the peacebuilding. They each somewhat balance each other out and reinforce one another. Sometimes one is more important than the other. In the early days, I think the peacemaking, or the negotiations, was much more critical because we needed to get the parties to the table. The peacebuilding part became much more important later on since we needed to develop programmes, such as: reconciliation; economic development; humanitarian assistance; human rights; and even issues on governance. The peacemaking can only go so far without the peacebuilding that should follow to support the agreement. I live in Cyprus, and one of the things that strikes me about Cyprus is that there has been no reconciliation. An analogy I like to use in the Cyprus context is that when the parties were ready for the peace talks they got in the car, they turned on the ignition, but no one had been maintaining that car. So, there was very little understanding about what the peace process was going to do, and there was very little public engagement on both sides. The education system had not been developing a generation of individuals to understand the other side. Essentially they started the car, but there was no gas and no maintenance so they couldn't go anywhere.

Participant: You mention the limitations of the facilitator groups, and have even mentioned that it can be redundant, or it can assume a negative role in the peace process. At this point the parties should take one step back to reevaluate. Do you think that we need an international mediator committee in Turkey? What would be your suggestion?

David Gorman: I do not want to suggest anything for Turkey because I can only speak about the peace processes in other countries which I have been involved in. However, firstly there are studies that depict that every successful peace process in the last 50 years has involved at least some type of third party actor, whether local or international. Secondly, the type of third party is also a factor that should be considered carefully. For instance, there are many peace processes that have very light and anonymous third party involvement which might consist of someone shuttling back and forth to help a negotiation. We are involved in many confidential processes in other parts of the world. National actors can also serve as a third party. As mentioned in my talk, third parties

⁹ *Track One diplomacy can be defined as official, government diplomacy that occur inside official government channels.*

¹⁰ *In contrast to Track One diplomacy, Track Two diplomacy is the practice of non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals, sometimes called 'non-state actors'.*

can serve a number of roles: one, to get things going where there is limited or hostile communication; two, to provide structure to the process whereby smaller tasks such as arranging the agenda and ground rules can be completed; third, they can take up minute-taking duties and provide light facilitation. They can also provide a degree of impartiality, and more effectively frame the issues and soften the message from one party to another so that the interactions can be more constructive. Evidently there are various ways that a third party can assist at different phases of the process. Though as aforementioned, this needs to be demand driven. Furthermore, the third parties role does not always stay the same throughout, as the process evolves, so does the role of the third party.



Member of CHP Party Assembly, Gülseren Onanç and British Diplomat Najma Bouakaze-Khan

Participant: We have a tendency to base our discussions on the issues surrounding the main actors such as the Kurds, Turks, the state and the organisations. However, there are increasing concerns and hesitations of the third parties who are not brought

into the agenda. In the Philippines context, what was the place of the Christians? What was their political status and influence?

David Gorman: There are different types of third parties: the criminal terrorist elements that both parties secretly worked together to combat; and the political third parties which were largely Christian who felt that they were not going to benefit from the solution. I have found that in many peace processes, the two parties tend to be consumed with those in the room that they forget that there is often a majority on the outside who can be very influential. It is, therefore, a high priority to engage other communities and gain their support, buy-in, and input into the official and unofficial talks. Although it is not possible to get total buy-in, it is possible to keep the majority of them silent, perhaps even some in favour.

Participant: We have a communication problem in Turkey. While the Kurdish public opinion uses a vertical method of informing, Turkish public opinion uses the horizontal process so that it is person to person. This creates asymmetry in communication. Did you experience such types of communication faults within the Philippines between the different sections of society?

David Gorman: It is frustrating because the MILF would have a vertical structure whereby they would have back-room negotiations with the rebel side. Whereas the government required consultations with the Ministry of Transport or Finance, Members of Congress and/or the local governors. As such, there were very asymmetrical types of processes which were extremely frustrating for the MILF, though it was necessary. As a result, we spent a lot of time advising the MILF to be patient and that it is essential to have support from all aspects. Accordingly, the transitional body was created to give the MILF a role and capacity to be more constructive in the implementation. This in turn made them realise how difficult the process can be.

Participant: We agree with the necessity of the third party support however, Turkey has a general distrust of third parties and international mediators. Did you face this distrust against international mediators in the Philippines, if so, how did you overcome it? If it is such an exhausting job, what is the motivation?

David Gorman: We were created largely because the international community was not able to effectively respond to the issues in Bosnia, Rwanda and others. As such, there was a gap in the market there where the international community saw a need for third parties who would be better able to provide the necessary assistance.

On your first point, Indonesia is an example of where an international presence was not wanted. Instead, Timor was involved but rather unfavourably. So, the Indonesian government set some rules for us once they agreed on involving third parties, particularly, that it could only be very light facilitation. This meant that we were not mediators, rather, we were facilitators and we could only facilitate when asked to do so. We were not to speak to any media or civil society, and we could only take on a minute-taking role. Eventually they began to trust us and saw that we were not spies and did not try and undermine the integrity of the country. We were then asked to go and sell the agreement to the Acehnese because they did not have any credibility to do it. Indonesia, is therefore, an example of where it started slow and was made clear what the points of reference were, which was useful for us too to know what our limits were.

Participant: In conflict resolution especially when the weapons are silent and the parties are speaking with each other, there is a period of time with a lack of conflict and this dialogue penetrates into the social sector. In Turkey we have had about two years of this period without any conflict, and there was even widespread support. It was disrupted and a much more violent, heartbreaking and destructive period ensued. The reality is that both parties made some errors, perhaps this was due to a lack of capacity, not being able to reach similar conclusions, or perhaps there was a gap in terms of expectations. Both parties should self-reflect and accept responsibilities for their shortcomings. How can we create such a ground where the parties are critical of the past errors, which they can then learn from?

David Gorman: The field transitional justice which deals with amnesty, justice and reconciliation. This is a critical part of the process nowadays. You cannot have a peace agreement where those who have committed grave errors can just walk away. Bill and I were talking earlier today about the huge international dimension now for when crimes are committed and what that means for parties internationally and the ramifications of that. So there is a part for transitional justice and that includes public apologies. There was a significant moment in the Philippines when the President apologized. There is vast literature on the subject matter and how to do it right. Secondly, when both parties feel more comfortable with each other and the process then they will start to admit their shortcomings.

Prof Dr. Sevtap Yokuş: Thank you for all your questions and thanks David for your insightful answers. This was a very interesting Q&A session indeed.

SESSION TWO

Sir Bill Jeffrey¹¹

The Choreography of the Peace Process: conflict resolution during difficult times



Guest speaker, Sir Bill Jeffrey

Prof Dr. Sevtap Yokuş: We have attached great importance to today's event as it is the first meeting since the failed military coup d'état of July 15th 2016. In the peace and solution process, we aim to provide a platform for all political actors and therefore, hope that today's meeting will prove to be constructive. As we move into the second part of the session, I want to remind you that the Northern Ireland example is very important when delving deeper into the topic. Our next speaker, Sir Bill Jeffrey has supported the Good Friday Agreement in the Northern Ireland Office and advised Tony Blair on issues regarding security and intelligence. We are extremely honoured to have someone of his calibre within the field of conflict resolution here with us today. I would like to invite him to take the floor.

¹¹ *Sir Bill Jeffrey is a former British civil servant with extensive experience in Government and Parliamentary relations. Bill was a senior official in the Northern Ireland Office working exclusively on the peace process, supporting the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. He joined the Home Office in 1971 and was the Political Director at the Northern Ireland Office (1998-2002), in support of Prime Minister Tony Blair and successive Northern Ireland Ministers. He was also director general of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (2002-2005), and joined the Cabinet Office in 2005 as Security and Intelligence Coordinator where he was the Prime Minister's principal advisor on security, intelligence, and counter-terrorism strategy. He is currently a Chair of the independent policing think tank, the Police Foundation.*

Sir Bill Jeffrey: Thank you very much and good afternoon. It really is a pleasure and a privilege to be here, and grateful to DPI for organising this. As mentioned, my background has been in the Civil Service in the UK. I normally make it a practice not to share a platform with politicians but it is a great pleasure to be doing so with former minister Dermot Ahern this afternoon. I hope that between us we can demonstrate that the British and the Irish are still capable of working together despite some recent events. I have taken a great interest in other conflicts and have spent time in Colombia, and from these I have reached a conclusion that no two conflicts are the same, there are always some lessons to be learned from experiences elsewhere, as was demonstrated by David this morning. However, they need to be treated with caution and need to be approached by people, like myself, with a degree of humility.

Context

I will start by giving you a brief history of the Northern Ireland context. The Northern Ireland dispute has historically been partly about the role of Britain in Ireland, and partly about communal and national identity in the island of Ireland. Its roots are in the distant past and some would say that it goes back as far as the 12th century when the English first stepped foot on the island of Ireland. There was a succession of rebellions against British rule in Ireland from the 16th century onwards culminating in the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin, the centenary of which was celebrated last year. Together with a very long tradition of political nationalism, this led first to the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, and then after the fierce civil war, to the establishment of the modern Irish state in 1937. Neither of these included what is now Northern Ireland.

To understand why, you need to consider the demographic and religious makeup of Ireland. The majority of the island as a whole are Catholic and their instinct is Irish nationalist, but between the 16th and 18th centuries, there was a very substantial settlement of Protestants mainly from Scotland. This was partly as a result of normal migration pressures, and partly as a matter of government policy in the North East. Their descendants are the majority in this part of Ireland, they tend to feel British, most of them favour to continue to be part of the United Kingdom and they are usually referred to as Unionists. The minority in Northern Ireland are Catholics, most although not all of them, favour the creation of a united Ireland and are usually described as nationalist or republicans. When the Free State was established in 1922, the Northern Irish parliament, which was dominated by the Unionists, successfully partitioned Northern Ireland to remain in the UK. When the independent state of Ireland was established in 1937, it therefore excluded the six northern counties. This remained controversial for years on both sides of the border.

Nationalists on both sides continued to agitate for a united Ireland during that period. The government in Northern Ireland, with an inbuilt Unionist majority, tended to operate in such a way to discriminate against and disadvantage Catholics politically, and on employment, education, and other areas. A combination of nationalist sentiment and political grievances about discrimination led to the civil rights movement in the 1960s and the rise of the provisional IRA. Between the late '60s and the late '90s, there was a period known as '*The Troubles*' in which several thousand lives were lost, many more were injured. These were significant numbers in a population of only 1.6 million people. There are very few on both sides of the border who are untouched by personal and family tragedy. There is a very strong security reaction to that involving the British army. In 1972 and for many years after, Northern Ireland was ruled directly from London. From the '70s onwards, there was a succession of attempts to broker a solution, with a growing acceptance by the two governments that it was a problem they shared and one they had to address together. These were unsuccessful, in part due to unionist reluctance to share power with nationalists, but also because as the terrorists' campaigns continued, and the political process did not include representatives from the armed groups. The breakthrough came with the agreement reached in Belfast, known as the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. It did not solve everything, it took over 10 years to implement fully, and as recent events have shown, Northern Ireland is by no means politically settled or reconciled. Nonetheless, it was a turning point and it continues to bring relative peace to Northern Ireland after decades of instability.

Lessons Learned

There are a number of lessons which I drew from the Northern Ireland peace process which may be of relevance elsewhere. The first, and in some ways the most obvious lesson, is the importance of political leadership. You can have the best staff working on the solution but it will not be fruitful without the involvement of the essential leadership that only politicians can bring. In our case, we were lucky because over the key period between 1997-2007 there was continuity at the highest level both in London and Dublin. Former Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern built a relationship of trust, they were willing to take risks for each other, and for two busy prime ministers, they devoted an extraordinary amount of time to the most difficult times of the process.

The second point is the importance of strategic patience. Essentially, methods such as taking the long view, not being discouraged by setbacks, and waiting for the moment when conditions were right to make an essential move forward were particularly useful before the Good Friday Agreement. However, in the years following the agreement when the long dispute on the decommissioning of IRA weapons and the reluctance of the unionists to share government with Sinn Féin until weapons were given up, brought the agreement down. When I left the Northern Ireland office in 2002, the political institutions created by the agreement had just collapsed over that very issue. There had

been a succession of almost unbelievable incidents involving Sinn Féin or the IRA including the discovery that the IRA had been supplying arms to the FARC in Colombia, and a bank robbery which was attributed to the IRA. It appeared as though it would take a very long time to restore these political institutions. I felt an echo of this when David spoke about the Supreme Court undermining the agreement and I came to the same conclusion as he did, that when those sort of things happen, it is important to get the process restarted with a new energy, and if necessary, to look again at the paradigms within which it is operating. Tony Blair's *'Fork in the Road'* speech essentially said to militant republicans, Sinn Féin and behind them the IRA that there is a fork in the road here and that they either have to decide to continue as an effectively capable terrorist organisation or wind down and embrace completely constitutional means. Accordingly, even when things look tough, strategic patience is of the essence.



Sir Bill Jeffrey discussing the lessons learned from the Northern Ireland peace process

Thirdly, if circumstances allow it, there is merit in reaching a political agreement that deals comprehensively with the issues in dispute. The Good Friday Agreement embodies an understanding of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland that it will remain in the UK unless the majority of people vote in a referendum to make it part of Ireland. If there is such a vote, then the two governments will respect it and implement it. However, it all provided for an elected assembly, a devolved power sharing executive with both Protestant and Catholic nationalist and unionist traditions represented, the development of stronger north-south and British-Irish institutions, human rights reforms, provisions to ensure equality and non-discrimination, creation of police service, the normalisation of security, the decommissioning of weapons, and the early release of prisoners. Having the advantage of having a broad canvas of issues of that sort firstly means that there is more room for tradeoffs, and secondly, assuming that it is broadly politically balanced, there is a greater chance that it will pass the test of time and meet with public approval. Moreover, the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 was a somewhat precursor to the Good Friday Agreement as it since it included power sharing elements and other similar themes, for instance, an understanding that Northern Ireland can only become part of the united Ireland through the consent of its people. The north-south dimension was developed not without controversy by the two governments in the 80s and 90s. For this reason, a former leader of the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) famously described the Good Friday Agreement as Sunningdale for slow learners; it came 25 years later and had many of the same elements as the original. When you have a situation where there is a clear outline of an agreement, it becomes very important to have a process by which that agreement can be put in place. You can have an outline settlement with widespread support, but unless there is an agreed means by which political negotiations are going to take place to deliver it, then it is unlikely to materialise.

This brings me to my fourth point, which is related to timing and the handling of terrorist organisations such as the IRA. The Good Friday Agreement is as powerful as it is largely because it brought relative peace to Northern Ireland. It did so by involving the IRA's political representative Sinn Féin, and the involvement of smaller loyalist groups fully in the process. In Sinn Féin's case, it is the largest nationalist party involved in the government of Northern Ireland. Martin McGuinness of Sinn Féin was Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland's executive which is remarkable if you look at it from a historical perspective whereby a former IRA commander plays a significant part in a UK institution. However, that has only happened because over time the leadership of militant republicanism, both the IRA and Sinn Féin, had become convinced that objectives cannot be achieved by military means and that pursuing a political approach will be a better course of action. This, however, was only possible because our security forces, with great support from Dublin, had become incredibly successful at infiltrating

and neutralising the IRAs threat. As such, my fourth point really has two points: timing is everything, and when there is an opportunity to draw militant insurgents into conventional politics, it should be taken; and also that politics and security are not alternatives or in conflict, as some of our experience in Northern Ireland suggests, disproportionate security responses can definitely make matters worse by increasing support for the terrorists among their natural constituency. But Effective well targeted security force work can create the conditions in which political progress becomes possible.



Former AK Party MP Mehmet Tekelioğlu, Deputy Parliamentary Group Chairman of CHP Levent Gök, Head of MAZLUMDER Ahmet Faruk Ünsal, Prof Dr. Sevtap Yokuş

My fifth point is about the importance of keeping lines open and personal relationships intact even when things are at their most difficult. For Much of the '70s and '80s at the height of the IRA campaign, there were unacknowledged contacts between British officials and senior members of the IRA which helped to build confidence on both sides. In the period where I was involved between 1998 and 2002, there were adversaries

along the way, but it was precisely at those moments of difficulty that it was most important to sustain existing relationships, build new ones and keep talking.

My sixth point is on conditionality, by which I mean the need for care in setting conditions, which if not met can delay or derail the process. The best example of this in the Northern Ireland context is a long running argument on the decommissioning of the IRAs weapons. In the run up to the talks in the mid '90s, the then Conservative government of John Major attempted to insist that the IRA hand over its weapons before Sinn Féin can be admitted into negotiations. This was never likely to happen. There was uncertainty of the outcomes of the talks. It was only after the election of Tony Blair in 1997 that a more realistic criterion of evident commitment to peaceful means was devised and Sinn Féin became full participants of the talks. The decommissioning issue assumed even greater significance after the agreement had been reached. It committed the parties to use their best endeavours to secure the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, however, the trouble was that the paramilitary groups themselves were not a party to the agreement. Sinn Féin took the literal view; they were not the IRA and were using their best endeavours and therefore if weapons were not decommissioned, it was not consistent with their agreement. The unionists were unwilling to share the government with a party whose paramilitary associates still held an arsenal of weapons and in the period between 1998 and 2002, we were stuck on that point. There was a succession of efforts to break the deadlock, some more successful than others. It was only in 2007, with the effective disbandment of the IRA putting their weapons beyond use, that the new arrangements for governments was established on a more stable basis. The weapons issue, as will be clear, proved exceptionally difficult in Northern Ireland. On one level it was argued by some to be a distraction, once disposed weapons can always be replaced if there is a will to do so. My own view is that it was a mistake of the Major government to try and make decommissioning a precondition of participation in the talks. But then after the agreement had been concluded and Sinn Féin's actual participation in government became the issue, decommissioning became a proxy for the much bigger question of whether the IRA was really out of business which had to be confronted before the agreement could move forward.

Finally, just a word on international facilitation of peace talks, I have to say that on the British side at least, the same was not true as the Irish. We were always weary of the formal international mediation or the involvement of international organisations in attempting to find solutions in Northern Ireland. However, the experience of using respected international figures, US Senator George Mitchell as facilitator of the negotiations between the two governments and the Northern Irish parties, was extremely positive. As was the involvement informally of friendly countries with an interest in peace in Northern Ireland, notably the USA and EU partners. What Mitchell and colleagues did was to provide an independent element and they were sufficiently

authoritative as individuals for the parties to respect them and for there not to be the need for the government. They operated, in a sense, as a convening power often chaired the meetings and exercised a very positive influence indeed.

Conclusion

The conclusion I draw from this is that it is possible to marshal weighty international support for a peace process without necessarily formally internationalising that process. The obvious question is, where Northern Ireland actually stands now, and that is not an easy question. In many respects, when considering the lessons that can be drawn from this, it is still a working progress. There are new threats to the continued operation of the institutions established by the Good Friday Agreement. For one thing, power sharing, although it is important in itself to build trust and confidence, requires a measure of consensus between the two principal parties - at the moment the Democratic Unionist party and Sinn Féin, which has proved difficult to achieve. Sinn Féin withdrew from the executive a few weeks ago. The elections that took place on thursday in Northern Ireland, in my view, have not changed the political landscape dramatically and I would be surprised if effective devolved government was restored quickly¹². Therefore, we are in a difficult period. The UK's decision to leave the EU does not help, but neither do the people of Northern Ireland, perhaps unsurprisingly given the history of suffering and conflict, who are still divided by religion and politics with different views of the past. They relish the peace but they are some way from being internally reconciled. Though I still remain optimistic. The agreement of 1998 is still the only viable way forward, the British and Irish governments are as committed as ever. From all experiences in the world, is that the wounds of conflict run very deep and take a long time to heal.

¹² *Northern Ireland Assembly election, 2nd March 2017*

Dermot Ahern¹³

Conflict Resolution During Difficult Times: The Northern Ireland peace process



Guest speaker, Dermot Ahern

Prof Dr. Sevtap Yokuş: Thanks very much, Sir Bill. During the negotiations of the Northern Ireland peace process, Dermot Ahern undertook very important roles. He has held positions at the UN and in the European Council, and is the former Foreign Minister of the Irish Republic. As we have heard, these issues in Northern Ireland have not been completely resolved, however, Dermot's talk will demonstrate the importance of persisting through difficult times of the peace process. The floor is yours.

Dermot Ahern: I want to thank Bill and David for their very interesting contributions, I want to particularly thank DPI for organising this event. I have been attending similar events organised by DPI for a number of years and always find them very constructive and interesting.

The conflict

¹³ Dermot Ahern is a former Irish Member of Parliament and Government Minister and was a key figure for more than 20 years in the Irish peace process, including in negotiations for the Good Friday Agreement and the St Andrews Agreement. He also has extensive experience at EU Council level, including as a key negotiator and signatory to the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties. In 2005, he was appointed by the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to be a Special Envoy on the issue of UN Reform.

I am described as a former Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Justice, I started off as a lawyer but moved into politics. I come from a hometown that is halfway between Dublin and Belfast on the island of Ireland. I have often said that in any normal society and particularly on a small island, a town that is halfway between two centres of population would prosper properly, unfortunately my town has been badly affected by the conflict. In the early '20s, our country was split which caused a civil war. Ultimately following this event, two major parties including mine which was anti-partition, and the other which agreed with the demarcation, arose.

Between the '70s and '90s, 3500 were killed and many more were maimed in Northern Ireland. To date, the scars of those atrocities still resonate with people and still remain. In 1972, '*Bloody Sunday*'¹⁴ happened when people were on a civil march, 14 innocent citizens were murdered by the British army. As mentioned in David's talk, apologies are vital in a peace process, yet it took at least 30 years for the British Government through David Cameron to launch an official apology and to announce it in the House of Commons for the incidence. Following this, in 1979 18 British soldiers were killed in one of the most dastardly attacks on the British army in Northern Ireland. We had tit for tat murders. People from outside Ireland initially thought it was a religious war with Catholics against Protestants. Although this was not the case, there was to a certain extent an overlap of unionism and nationalism. There was a correlation between Protestants and Catholics but it was not a religious war in itself, it was largely about identity and territory of the country. In 1993, the Greysteel massacre occurred where loyalist paramilitaries went into a pub and murdered eight people. That was in response to a bombing that took place by the IRA the previous weekend. We had the issue of the hunger strikers in 1981 where ten republican prisoners died after going on hunger strike and were ultimately became perceived as martyrs. For most of my adult life, we have been living in conflict so we are grateful to have relative peace now. My hometown was used as a bolthole by the British army to go into the north and launch attacks. Indeed, my town changed as a result of the peace that was obtained from the Good Friday Agreement. In the early '70s, Margaret Thatcher infamously referred to my home town as 'El Paso' or abandoned town. However, Bill Clinton's visit to my town in 2000 was a pivotal moment as he announced in front of 60,000 people that, as a result of peace, Dundalk was a boomtown. That illustrates exactly how the change has taken place.

Difficulties during the negotiations

I was first elected in my early 20s to local politics and then in my early 30s, I was elected into the Irish parliament in which I served for 25 years. Within my first year there, I was asked by the then Prime Minister, Charles Haughey, to attend a small

¹⁴ Also referred to as the Bogside Massacre which took place on the 30th of January 1972 when British soldiers shot 26 unarmed civilians during a peaceful march against internment.

delegation made up of one of his advisors and one other member from my party to meet with Sinn Féin. Similar meetings continued and included Gerry Adams and other representatives. The meetings were quite surreal in that they were private and would be detrimental if the facts of the talks taking place were made public. Nonetheless, they were intriguing talks because we were trying to see if there was any possibility where we could get them to go down the political route rather than a military route. We were trying to suggest to them that you cannot bomb people into a united Ireland. They interestingly used the talks in the beginning to build a pan-nationalist front that the Irish government itself and the main nationalist constitutional party the SDLP would become a very strong force in order to negotiate with the British government. We saw that as a trap and resolutely decided that we were not going to go down that route.



Dermot Ahern talks about his experiences during the Northern Ireland peace process

One of the issues during that talk was that around those talks, huge horrific events were taking place. On a Sunday night, a bomb explosion had taken place in Ballygally where eight British soldiers had been blown up, and we were meeting the people the next day.

We had personal difficulties meeting these people but one of the things we ultimately agreed was the very fact that we were meeting to try and prevent these incidents from taking place. Therefore, throughout these negotiations which continued for many years sporadically with republican, nationalist, terrorist and with loyalist unionist terrorists, we always had to swallow extremely hard and redouble our efforts.

We came to having a number of mantras; prominently, the absence of talks equals no peace, and that the absence of talks means that it will allow those opposed to the process to take advantage. Similar to the example of the Philippines, ours was led by the top, the civil servant, clergy, and community leaders.

The Good Friday Agreement

The Good Friday Agreement was a result of painstaking and difficult negotiations due to a number of disappointments and roadblocks along the way. Although British and Irish negotiators were involved, I firmly believe that it was a result of third party involvement, namely, the US and the EU. This involvement brought the situation to a larger audience and essentially resulted in greater pressure towards a peaceful solution.

When Ireland joined the EU along with Britain in 1973, it then became an equal partner at the European table with equal votes. Prior to this accession, it was deemed as a thorn in their side. Indeed the Americans, EU, British and the Canadians formed the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) which provided much needed financial help to Northern Ireland and the six southern counties. The International Fund for Ireland was set up very early on in the process whereby financial aid was put up to help build up relationships between communities across Northern Ireland and in the southern border counties. One of the most significant European act following the Irish accession was the removal of military presence along the border. The necessity for demilitarisation was not just for the border areas but indeed also for Northern Ireland.

An element within the Good Friday Agreement which was notable was the importance it placed on public perception and approval. It was a constitutional imperative that Ireland had territorial claim to Northern Ireland as was evident in the Republic's constitution. This, unsurprisingly, was a major bone of contention to those in Northern Ireland who wished to remain as part of the United Kingdom. However, as part of the agreement and as an extremely significant concession, we accepted to do away with our constitutional claim to Northern Ireland. Furthermore, it was only through a referendum in which the people of Northern Ireland expressed that they wished to be part of a united Ireland that it would be implemented. This was also a major concession. On the other side, the Good Friday Agreement put in place a number of cross border bodies which dealt with benign issues such as tourism. Nonetheless, these were important since they gave the Republic the opportunity to have a cross border aspect with Northern Ireland.

The referendum on both sides of the border was passed very easily, particularly in the Republic. However, it is important to note that agreements are only as good as the paper they are written on, but it is the working out, implementation and the monitoring of it that is vital. Regarding the decommissioning of arms, we put in place an international panel to oversee it. The Unionists convinced the British government that before any talks that would take place, they wanted a symbolic handing over of a bullet to signify that they are giving up arms. But, when things were getting more difficult, they moved the goalpost and wanted full detailed and verified decommissioning. As aforementioned, political support is absolutely vital. We had a generation of particularly good politicians in Northern Ireland. Unfortunately, one of the downsides of the peace process is that the parties in the middle, the centrist parties, suffered badly at the polls. At many stages of the process, the parties wouldn't even stand in the same room as the Irish government, such as the DUP. That's how toxic the situation was in the early stages, however, we persevered.

Lessons Learned

One of the most prominent lessons that I learned and find notable is the cruciality of tying up any loose ends when implementing a peace agreement. The Good Friday Agreement overlooked the issue of policing which was a major issue since it was generally accepted that the police Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)¹⁵ was, to a certain extent, a sectarian police force which could rouse the divisions once again.

While every peace process has its own unique features, over the years I have found that there were principles going right through most of these peace processes that had a resonance with those in Ireland and had similarities to the ways in which we adapted to the situation in Northern Ireland. when I was in foreign affairs, I set up a conflict resolution unit in the department in order to give some of the expertise and know-how that we had which we successfully transported to places like East Timor.

Turkey, my heart goes out to you. I would not underestimate your geopolitical position. It is an extremely pivotal country between east and west, and that is something that is accepted by the major powers. I do think that you need to get outside involvement, as an honest broker and oversight. The EU have many issues on their doorstep but they have their heart for turkey. Nonetheless, I do believe that having an outside international focus is extremely important.

¹⁵ *The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was the police force in Northern Ireland from 1922 to 2001. It was replaced by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in 2001.*

I want to thank you and wish you well. I think it is highly significant to get this opportunity. Thank you to DPI for hosting this conference.

Prof Dr Sevtap Yokuş: Thank you very much. I have met Dermot many times and have listened to his talks on numerous occasions and each time, I learn a different dimension and aspect. Generally, I feel more hope after hearing your talk.

Q&A

David Gorman was unable to attend this session

Prof Dr. Sevtap Yokuş: We would like to collect your questions for the last session.

Participant: Esteemed minister, thanks very much. I agree with Dr Sevtap Yokuş, each time you show us a new and different dimension. In our previous visit to Ireland for an activity, I must admit that I was concerned by the fact that the gates were locked after certain hours in Belfast, as a sort of undeclared state of emergency, and the presence of peace walls. It clearly demonstrated that Protestants and Catholics are still separated. Were there any regulations in the last '*Stormont House Agreement*'¹⁶? Has there been any change or improvement?

Dermot Ahern: The peace walls were put in place to keep the communities apart, to stop one community from attacking the other. Unfortunately, that is the consequence of decades of violence and reprisal murders. No, there has not been any improvement. While the Good Friday Agreement was a great, it put in place a forced partnership government, not a democracy like we have in the republic. They follow '*The D'Hondt system*'¹⁷, which is part of the agreement and is the stepping stone before they have full democracy. Part of the issue of the devolved government is that quite a lot of issues are still dealt with in London rather than in Belfast. They are not the author or their own destiny. As I mentioned earlier, one of the difficulties of making an agreement is leaving loose ends. One of the loose ends that we made in the '*St Andrews Agreement*'¹⁸ is that we dealt with the policing issue which had not been dealt with in the Good Friday Agreement. However, we did not deal with a number of other issues. This includes the issue of flags and emblems, the Irish flag and the Union Jack and when they could be flown, and the Irish language issue. For instance, about two years ago, a number of around 10,000 people descended on the streets of Belfast and brought it to a halt following the decision by the nationalist majority and local authority to not fly the Union Jack on city hall. As such, unfortunately you still have the physical barriers, so you can imagine the barriers that still exist in people's minds.

¹⁶ *The Stormont House Agreement, published on 23 December 2014, was an agreement reached between the British Government and Northern Ireland's political leaders. It provided a new approach to some of Northern Ireland's most difficult and contentious identity issues, including flying flags, parades, and the legacy of The Troubles. Besides the identity issues, the agreement confronted the Northern Ireland's economic matters, such as welfare reform and corporation tax.*

¹⁷ *The D'Hondt system is a highest averages method, a type of proportional representation method, used for allocating seats. In Northern Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement stipulated that the D'Hondt system would be more appropriate for a divided society as it would ensure cross-community representation.*

¹⁸ *The St Andrews Agreement of 2006 was an agreement between the British and Irish governments and Northern Ireland's political parties in regards to devolution and power-sharing in the the province.*

Sir Bill Jeffrey: With the benefit of hindsight, we might have paid more attention to social reconciliation in the Good Friday Agreement. It is still a very divided society and the peace walls are still there. While they were originally there for defensive purposes, they now essentially exemplify its dividedness, and until there is something closer to social reconciliation between the two parts of society, it is hard to be optimistic about the politics. I think that the peace is relatively secure, it is the politics that is more difficult. On that, the pressing thing about the results of the election on Thursday is that although the two moderate parties, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the SDLP, campaigned in the election on the basis that they were more likely to govern together effectively, since they agreed with each other on more, by contrast the DUP and Sinn Féin agreed with each other on almost nothing. That pitch by them was not successful. The DUP and Sinn Féin consolidated their position as the largest parties. I do not think that the politics is going to actually change in ways to improve the governance of Northern Ireland unless there is more progress made with reconciliation between the two communities. It is hard to feel very optimistic about that. However, on the question on whether the peace will hold, I do feel optimistic.



The roundtable conference on Dialogue in Difficult Times

Participant: You have said that there are 14 million people with Irish ancestry living in the United States, that there have even been some presidents with the same ancestry and the Irish community has large economic power in the country. Therefore, the U.S. intervention in the conflict in their own homeland made a significant contribution to the solution process. In relation to the Kurdish problem here, the lack of this opportunity has been a major impediment. Secondly, going back to Northern Ireland, I am aware that there are loyalist protestant migrants who are of Scottish origin. Given the friction between the UK and Scotland, what would be the impact on Irish citizens of Scottish origin if Scotland decides to leave the UK?

Dermot Ahern: I will leave the second question to Bill since he is of Scottish origin. In relation to the first question, there is a very strong Irish community in America. When I was Foreign Minister, I used to go to Washington to lobby U.S. senators and congressmen and women about undocumented illegal Irish immigrants living in America. We estimated that we only had 50,000 illegal Irish immigrants in America. The Irish lobby groups from across the country all came together and held a meeting in Washington to highlight the issue of immigration reform. Senator Ted Kennedy and John McCain from both sides of the House were also negotiating this. With only 50,000 illegal Irish immigrants as an issue, five out of a hundred senators turned up. On the other hand, the Mexican's who have 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. subsequently held a similar meeting to which only one senator turned up. That led to the charge by the Mexicans that there was a race issue involved in the whole issue of immigration reform, that the senators were essentially allowing white Irish to remain but not the Mexican's. But it illustrated, to me, how strong the Irish lobby is, maybe not as strong in recent times because of the political changes in the U.S. From your own point of view, I could not say much on U.S. involvement but I do know that the U.S. had a strong interest particularly in your potential accession to the EU. Given the issue of accession and now the issue of migrants from Syria, I do think that the EU should be more involved in your peace process.

Sir Bill Jeffrey: On Scotland, I think there is an issue here. There was a referendum a year ago about becoming independent from the rest of the UK, the majority voted to remain. However, Brexit has somewhat changed the dynamics of that. I do not think that the opinion polls suggest that Scottish opinions have changed much, but the fact that the Scottish public voted to remain in the EU has made it politically very sensitive. The First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, is at the risk of boxing herself into a corner if she does not get what she wants from the British government in terms of a soft deal with a lot of trade access. She may need to call for a further referendum of Scotland but how that will go will be hard to call. If it did lead to Scotland breaking off from the UK, which I personally think is unlikely, there is no doubt that it would have implications in

Northern Ireland. Even if only culturally since a lot of Northern Ireland unionists feel very comfortable in Scotland for obvious reasons, if the union that they attach so much importance to is breaking up, then maybe that does change things. However, I find that very hard to call. There are two strands of political unionism: one wishes that Northern Ireland was completely a part of the UK and this strand would be most damaged by a Scottish exit; but the other has always favoured something more of a self-governing Northern Ireland. This is where the DUP have tended to be, in fact. I have a feeling if Scotland leaves, the pressure would increase for Northern Ireland to become more of a self-governing entity. That is just speculation but it is my own personal opinion.

Dermot Ahern: Our prime minister has been in Brussels this week and did refer to the Good Friday Agreement in the context of Brexit. As part of the negotiations, he mentioned that the whole principle behind the Good Friday Agreement was based on something that goes back to the 1980's called the 'totality of relationships'. This refers to the relationship between the two communities in Northern Ireland, between unionists and nationalists, between north and south, as well as east and west or between the UK and Ireland. So the Good Friday Agreement was based on that totality of relationships being seamless. In fact, a number of the institutional bodies, such as the British-Irish Council (BIC)¹⁹ was created under the Good Friday Agreement. Undoubtedly, Brexit will unfortunately sunder elements of this relationships due to the dramatic changes. As someone from the border area, Brexit to me is an absolute disaster. Although our prime minister made remarks about the Good Friday Agreement, I would not think that the Scots leaving would have major implications.

Participant: I have two questions. As far as I can understand, Northern Ireland's problems are not completely solved. Despite the Good Friday Agreement, the two communities are still experiencing a kind of friction and tension. In spite of power-sharing mechanisms, the problem remains unsolved. In light of this, do you think the quality of democracy played a role in it? If you had a different type of democracy, for instance more participatory and more local democracy instead of the representative democracy, would it be more beneficial? Secondly, with reference to the economy, the parties in the Northern Ireland problem were nationalistic and the societal division can also be attributed to religion. As individuals who know both the communities, do you think that it has something to do with the inequality of income? Do you feel that the economic aspect played a part?

¹⁹ *The British-Irish Council is a Ministerial Council bringing together Ministers from the UK and Irish Governments, the Devolved Administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales and the Isle of Man Government, Government of Jersey and Government of Guernsey. For more information, please refer to www.britishirishcouncil.org/*



Participants during the mid-morning break: CHP MP Şenal Sarıhan, Former AK Party MP Abdurrahman Kurt, Former HDP MP and Mayor of Ağrı Sırrı Sakık, Senior Journalist Oral Çalışlar, AK Party MP Adnan Boynukara

Dermot Ahern: One of the things that used to intrigue me when I met with Sinn Féin representative and representatives of the loyalist community, who were not as politically organised, they all had their grievances about the social deprivation in the working class areas. That was something that united them even though they were sworn enemies. But there was always a resonance and understanding that despite the huge investment from the UK - since much of the economy is largely propped up by the UK government - it would not have the same economy that we currently have. I am not sure how you would cure the quality of democracy. At one stage, we had a Sinn Féin representative who referred to the 'Armalite and ballot box strategy'.²⁰ This was a frightening concept

²⁰ 'The Armalite and ballot box strategy' was a strategy pursued by the Irish republican movement in the 1980s and early 1990s whereby elections in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland were contested by Sin Féin, while the IRA continued to pursue an armed struggle against the British Army, RUC, and loyalist paramilitary groups.

for anyone who is a constitutional politician or a human being, in my view. But that was said very early on, and for years after there was always a suspicion. So the good faith within a negotiation is not always complete. I am not sure about the quality of democracy. However, the representatives and people we were trying to get on the political path were the representatives of a sizeable proportion of people whether we liked it or not. So I am not sure how you could bypass them and go on the local level because they each represented both local and national politics.

Sir Bill Jeffrey: I think there are three points there. Your first point really is that this peace process that led to the Good Friday Agreement is still not solved years later. However, I believe that these processes continue because they are intended to resolve long-term very deep seated animosities, hatreds and grievances which require a long time. Some of the baggage of history would prove very difficult to put behind you. On your second point, I agree with Dermot, I don't think we had much of an option in the Good Friday Agreement but to create the democratic institutions that were there. This was in part due to the purpose being to bring people into politics who had previously been outside it, but mainly because the previous state of affairs involved a simple majority democracy in which the unionists dominated and discriminated against the nationalists. Therefore, the agreement aimed to ensure that that would not happen again. So we were inevitably driven towards a form of government in which both traditions were represented. Whether it would help to make it more localised, I am not sure, since on the local level we have the same system and in local councils there is effectively a proportional representation arrangement that can lead to one party dominating, though that is very unlikely. I think that there is a dilemma here, if you embark on a process that is intended to ensure a protagonist, both or all involved in government, then makes it harder to govern afterwards. There is no getting away with that. On the economy, yes I agree, I think living standards come into this. I think that it is notable that the DUP and Sinn Féin get their support principally from people on the lower end of the income spectrum. Furthermore, real sectarianism, as opposed to discreet sectarianism, is more evident among the working classes, not to say that it does not exist further up the spectrum, but income distribution affects all politics. My own view is that the key to this lies in the people themselves and we will have a more effectively working system of government when the public do not just default to the extremes every time an election comes along.

Participant: Does the development of democratic principles and human rights processes have a direct effect on the solution process? Is the solution process possible without democracy?

Sir Bill Jeffrey: Firstly, I think the human rights and equality dimension of the agreement was one of the most important because it was a guarantor for nationalists that they would have an equal place in society. These requirements are enforced, we now have a police service that commands the support of both sides of the community. Democracy, I believe is essential, I cannot envisage a truly successful process that did not involve democratic institutions. The interesting point behind your question was the kind of democratic institutions that we have ended up with in Northern Ireland, are they likely to be successful or a failure in the long term. This is difficult since we did not have much alternative but to construct them like that. Though that does not make things easy. However, I have no doubt that you can not do this without democracy.

Dermot Ahern: I don't really have much to add to that. You have to remember that when Sinn Féin and the IRA started out first, the cry was "Brits out", it was on the wall and everywhere you went in nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. Then on the other side you had unionists and loyalists who did not want anything to do with the southern state or united Ireland. Although it previously existed, the Good Friday Agreement put in place an Anglo-Irish secretariat which really grated with the unionists, even the mild unionists, as it created the opportunity for the Irish government to have a say in Northern Ireland affairs. There was actually an office in Omagh in Northern Ireland which has been manned to this day by civil servants, I believe, from the republic who would negotiate with the British government and with the local authorities in Northern Ireland on behalf of nationalist people who felt that they were not getting a fair crack at the whip. As we said earlier, the genesis of The Troubles was the winner take all situation, that the unionists dominate democracy until the early '70s or late '60s, and then you have the civil rights with 'one man, one vote'. Similarly to the African American's in the U.S., there was a time when nationalist Catholics did not have the right to vote if they did not own a certain amount of land. Of course, Catholics were generally on the lower end of the the economic scale, so they were unable to vote. There was blatant disrespect against Catholics. However, one of the benefits of the agreement was that outside influence, such as the Anglo-Irish secretariat, could often intervene and resolve local issues quickly. This was when democracy in Northern Ireland was still in its infancy, it must be said, but that was the first acknowledgment in fairness to the British, that we did have an interest in Northern Ireland because they couldn't trust the unionists to govern. The Good Friday Agreement, subsequently put in place a forced democracy, that I wouldn't regard as a democracy, but it forced these people around a table whether they liked it or not, in order to run their own affairs more effectively.



Prof Dr. Sevtap Yokuş and Austrian Ambassador to Turkey, Klaus Wölfer

Participant: Of course wars are highly destructive, however, we know that peace as well as war has a price. It is not only the concessions given by mutual parties. When a process is starting, in order to compensate for all the suffering, peace should have an economic price as well. My question is related to the finance of peace and refers to Northern Ireland's peace process, both republic and the central government in London, the EU, perhaps even the U.S. What were the economic contributions, how was peace funded and financed? I'm not sure, but perhaps even the concept of funding peace is incorrect.

I also have a question for Sir Bill Jeffrey that we need to elaborate on. We should learn a lot from two things, one of which is devolution. The UK parliament had issued two laws about devolution and some of the powers had been given to Northern Ireland's

parliament and government there too. Can you tell us the various stages of this, was it difficult to pass this law? Secondly, upon our visit to parliament in Belfast, we witnessed firsthand that the two parties who have been hostile to one another are utilising power sharing methods and governing Northern Ireland. After understanding the role of the UK, I had numerous questions. Is there a type of tutelage regime? Can we call it a political tutelage and do you think that tutelage is a challenge before a real solution? Or is it tutelage at all?

Dermot Ahern: I refer to the price of peace, huge funding was put in. The International Fund for Ireland was put in place in the early '80s which recognised the six northern counties and six in the south who were the beneficiaries of the funds that were contributed to by America, the UK, Canada, the EU and a few others. Subsequently, a lot of what it did was mainly across community, particularly bringing children together and away from the walled streets of Belfast to bring them to nice surroundings, in the republic or indeed in the UK or America. They were very successful but more needed to be done. The EU contributed hugely; we have PEACE Programme - PEACE I (1995-1999), PEACE II (2000-2006), PEACE III (2007-2013), and now PEACE IV (2014-2020).²¹ For about two decades the EU has funded significant follow on from the type of funds that were given by the International Fund for Ireland. But by and large it did that cross community work to try and build. There is still a lot to be done, it must be said. However, the difficulty with Ireland at the moment is, and we recognise this, that the focus has gone off Ireland, and to a certain extent we now have to deal with that. One of the last things that my government did, even though our budget was contracting, was committing to somewhere in the region of 400 million Euros at the time, in 2009-2010, towards the building of infrastructure in Northern Ireland which we justified on the basis that it was an economic necessity for a good route from a location in Northern Ireland down into the republic. Indeed one of our counties, the most north west county, the only way you could really get to it was either by air or through Northern Ireland. Again we justified the building of roads and part funded it by the British and Northern Ireland's government. You can take it that the governments came up to the plate, and indeed the EU, and to a lesser extent the U.S.

Sir Bill Jeffrey: On the financing of peace question, I agree with what Dermot says about the importance of EU funding in the last few years. The British government has made some statements about its readiness to replace that after the UK leaves the EU but that will need to be watched. The underlying reality, though, is that although it is in a better state than it was, Northern Ireland's economy is not one that in itself generates

²¹ *The peace process in Northern Ireland has been receiving financial support from the EU since 1989, through both EU regional policy and EU contributions to the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). Subsequently, the PEACE Programme followed the recommendations from a special Commission Task Force.*

streams of income that will support the level of public services that are required. So through a combination of EU money and UK subvention, in addition to the tax that can be raised in Northern Ireland, the public services in Northern Ireland are funded. As such, there still are substantial transfers.

On devolution, you asked if it was hard to pass the laws on it. The answer is not really because it all took place in the late '90s when the then government was introducing devolved arrangements for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Interestingly and entirely on the British model, all three systems are completely different from each other and indeed different from the system in England. Thus, it is a very asymmetrical devolution, though they were all part of a parliament around 1999, and they all provide for very substantial self-government in relation to domestic issues. The whole of health, education, and the main social services are in the hands of devolved administrations in Belfast and Cardiff. So I don't know if that counts as tutelage or not but it is a system in which if the Northern Ireland economy revived a bit, the 2008 recession certainly did not help, and if the political parties in the assembly found it easier to agree with each other, there could be a very substantial measure of self government. It would be possible for the province to build a future, but it is difficult for all the reasons that we have been discussing.

Participant: In the most optimistic moment in the peace process in Turkey, 80 per cent of society supported the peace process and believed that it would happen. However, we soon became aware of significant issues which could impede any progress, namely, the issue of the fighters. The ethnic and cultural problem and division had ultimately created an armed group, or the fighters. Although the state was close to a resolution on numerous occasions, it would still collapse when questioning what will happen to those who have been fighting for over 30 years. We have heard the following, for example, the best solution is to let them go and live in another country. Bülent Arınç, deputy prime minister at the time, said the harshest word as he insisted that they should “get the hell out of our country”. In light of this, we have felt that the government will not find a real solution and we will be stuck. In Northern Ireland's case, when the issue of the fighters arose and was brought into the agenda, what was the state's approach? Secondly, although this question is not for today, I believe this day will come. Should we start preparing from now? In your case, did you foresee the emergence of such a situation and did you feel the need to get prepared for it?

Dermot Ahern: The most difficult and, I have to say, for me distasteful thing that we had to do was to accept that prisoners would be released from prison under the Good Friday Agreement. People who carried out some of the most dastardly events in our history were let out and walked the streets and indeed an industry built up afterwards to

do with prisoners rights and being reintegrated into society at home. To be honest I don't want to comment on your own circumstances, you know better than I do, but in Ireland if someone was to say to some of these people to get the hell out of there, as far as they're concerned, they're Irish and they want to remain there as it's their homeland. So at least no one made that demand. But in my latter years as a politician I used to have to go to election counts and I would see people organising and orchestrating the checking of votes for Sinn Féin, some of whom to me were despicable people who had been let out under the Good Friday Agreement. And this was mostly exclusively republican or nationalist prisoners who had been let out. It was a very hard pill to swallow for people like me who lived in the republic. You can imagine what it was like for people of the unionist community, who some of these people carried out atrocities against their community. You ultimately question why it is not finalised. It's not finalised because those things have still left a huge scar amongst people in a very small society where everybody knows everybody. The American, Irish, and British government, and the EU were forcing members of the unionist community to sit down with former terrorists in government and that's what has happened. Each one of those unionist ministers in some shape or form has had somebody who was murdered or maimed by the very organisation that they are sitting in government with today. That's how intriguing it is for us to know that we now have peace and we are extremely thankful for it. And as we say it's not all doom and gloom, it is highly unlikely that we will ever see us going back to war. That is not to say that there is not a huge body of work to solve a lot of those ongoing reconciliation issues. In my view it will take generations unfortunately because we're that type of people that we do harbour grievances into the next generation and beyond.

Sir Bill Jeffrey: What happens to the fighters, I agree with what Dermot has just said, on the extent to which politicians had been able to put the past behind them to the extent of working with people on the other side is one of the more encouraging aspects of this, but it took a long time to get that going. One of the beneficial side effects of it taking a long time was that there was a period of years during which the active members of the IRA gradually concluded that the war was over and started taking up other things. Not all the things were legal, it has to be said, but I think most of the taxis in Belfast are now driven by former members of the IRA, or so it's said. The big issue though as we were discussing this morning, is the process of transitional justice and our version of that was the provision in the agreement that required that anybody who was a member of a paramilitary organisation, which had embraced exclusively peaceful and democratic means, would be released and serve no more than two years of their sentence. As Dermot said, some of these people had committed some of the most appalling murders. So it was controversial and was one of the reasons why it was so long before unionists were even willing to sit down in government with Sinn Féin. I think

that David Gorman made an interesting point on the norms of international justice which now require a degree of attention to victims rights which make the making of deals like these very difficult. We settled in the Good Friday Agreement on a two year maximum that terrorist prisoners will serve as part of the negotiations, without if I'm honest, attention on how it will be received in the Hague or anywhere else. We were mostly concerned on how it will be received in the United Kingdom and among unionists in Northern Ireland. But these days, the internationalisation of justice and the emphasis that is placed on victims rights means that, the Colombian's for example, have had to devote enormous efforts to devising transitional justice arrangements that they believe are likely to be legal proof in the international court. In some ways, it is not a very encouraging message but I think in some ways this peace making business has actually gotten harder in the last 10 or 15 years than when we did it.



Prof Dr. Erol Katirciođlu and Former MP and Prof Dr. Ufuk Uras

Participant: In conflict resolution, it is clear that there are two sharp and rigid sides, but there are also people who are not from those rigid sides, although they were still close to those poles. Were their mutual relations with their counterparts sometimes harmful for the negotiations? I am referring to the sections of society who although are not members of these extreme sides, are able to manipulate the negotiations due to their closeness to the parties. Did this occur?

Secondly, as you have mentioned, there are always ups-and-downs in these processes. However, in a collapsed negotiation process, have you ever seen one of the parties, particularly the state party, creating a new counterparty against itself? Do you think that this could prevent the solution process?

Dermot Ahern: In Northern Ireland, you have two extremes or communities - nationalist and unionists - and then you have those in the middle who just want to get on with their lives and do not have any political aspirations. Unfortunately, it is polarised and was demonstrated yesterday when the votes were counted and you saw the two extremes get the bulk of the votes yet again.²² There are now even middle class nationalists voting for Sinn Féin who would never have voted for Sinn Féin, and the DUP who get a lot of votes from right across the spectrum. But I can't say that there is much of a middle ground in the north, you are either one or the other, you can even tell by the surnames of people. A lot of it goes back to the 1600's when history shows that quite a lot of people were planted by the then British system into the good land of Northern Ireland. So unfortunately there is not really a middle ground, and if there is then it is maybe people who do not want to know, who switch off politics, and probably don't vote. New party - no, there isn't manipulation, parties come and go. We have had green parties, not for profit parties. Similarly to America where you are either a republican or a democrat, we are either nationalist or unionist. And yet when you have polls about united Ireland, you will find a lot of nationalists saying they do not want a united Ireland, and you might get unionists saying that it may happen in the future so you may as well have it now, but by in large it is completely diametrically opposed and in between they do not meet.

Sir Bill Jeffrey: I agree that the center is weak in Northern Ireland politics, that the instinct is to be attracted to the extremes. In terms of where your question started, the people who may not be exactly in either party but are nonetheless influential. In many parts of Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin had a strong natural constituency which supported them throughout the process and did exercise democratic pressure, likewise the unionists. So where the public are in their voting habits and instinctive political support does affect the outcomes. Just to anecdotely pick up on what Dermot said, I grew up in

²² Referring to the Northern Ireland Assembly election, 2nd March 2017

Glasgow where there has been a lot of reverse immigration from Northern Ireland and the republic of Ireland and there are echoes of the same dispute. I could tell in a much more mixed society which side of the great divide neighbours, colleagues and friends came from simply by looking at their surnames or listening to their voices. So it is quite powerful.

Have we ever seen a government party creating opponents? No, I agree with Dermot, we haven't. Although, I would say that the Irish government selflessly allowed Sinn Féin to gain ascendancy in Northern Ireland in a way that did not necessarily suit its subjectives in its own territory.

Participant: Mine will be a small comment. In all the meetings on this topic in which we have participated there is a topic that was addressed. The relationship between democracy and peace, sometimes it is presented as a conflict between democracy and peace. Some people say that there cannot be peace without democracy. Frankly, I don't agree with the judgement that there can't be any peace without democracy because historical experiences clearly show that this is not the case. For example, in South Africa, Nelson Mandela and de Klerk when they were to undersign a peace agreement, they were not democrats at all. They have been transformed into democrats afterwards. Or Sinn Féin when it was undersigning the Good Friday Agreement, they were enlightened overnight and became democrats. This can happen on the way. If we can say that, peace can only happen as long as we have all the conditions of democracy, then there cannot be any progress. I think this formula is wrong. Secondly, democracy is not a stop, like you can become a democrat by fulfilling certain conditions, it is not a destination that you will achieve one day. You need to completely develop your democracy in line with the development in your society. I believe it is completely mistaken to establish such a correlation between peace and democracy. An example from our visit to Northern Ireland, we noticed that there is segregation between Protestants and Catholics. This is a problem that can only be solved through peace, it is a problem of the democratisation of society, so we have to establish a correct relationship between peace and democracy.

Participation: I would like to make a short contribution. We are talking about the other experiences but we always come back to the issue of our own problem. In order to be able to provide a healthy analysis, it is better to identify two different stages. First, a statement was made in 2013, the main grounds of which was getting out of the country and decommissioning. They were the two main topics, and they were not realised. Then the second stage began with the 28th February declaration, the grounds for this declaration was that the organisation declared that they want to put an end to the armed struggle that was declared against the Turkish government. I think you can see the huge difference between these two and I think these were the most concrete

expressions of the willingness of the Turkish government to put an end to the conflict. I think that was a very meaningful position. During this time, the topic of what will happen to these people, there were some very detailed studies, at the time I was working in the Ministry of Justice and we had reviewed the Northern Ireland process in all its details, its hows, its whys and we were trying to prepare the ground for the peace process. It cannot be explained through the attitude of the deputy prime minister of the time as you said. I know there was detailed study in our Ministry of Justice. And when it comes to other issues, there were some mistakes in our assumptions, in the stories that we have created, what happened so that this process came to an end, I believe there are some assumptions and confusions here. If you would like to understand how this process came to an end, you can refer to the 28th February declaration, and 22 March or April declaration. We are going to chronologically look at the statements that were delivered within these two days and we could clearly see this. This is my suggestion. I believe we must have a wider perspective.

Participant: In the long years of the peace process in Ireland, what was the role and strength of the media, was it useful, were there any harmful parts of the media, especially did you utilise the cinema industry? The film sector is the strongest means of communication, it is durable, it provides a documentary element and has a strong impact. Did you benefit from this? I would like to emphasise that we should also make a greater use of the cinematography sector.

Dermot Ahern: Firstly, I think that it is good that we are able to have such discussions because at least you are talking across the table. As I said earlier, you agree to disagree, but we have to respect each other's view point. Just to come back to the point of peace without democracy and democracy without peace, I don't disagree with what you say, we don't have full democracy in Northern Ireland across the system, but thankfully we have peace. That is why it is not a fulfilled peace. I totally agree with you in relation to education, that is one of the big failures in Northern Ireland. I had many a discussion with leaders of my own church, the Catholic church, as to why they are or were implacably opposed to the integration of education. Only to find that when I talk to the non-Catholic religions, at least Christian religions, they are equally implacably opposed to integration. In my view, if you are going to change the whole mindset of people in Northern Ireland into the future, the only way you will do it is through the children.

Was the media helpful? The media was helpful in that we have a free media and during very difficult times they chose not to make news or take capital based on the difficulties on our government's efforts. We also had a bipartisan approach in our parliament, it has to be said. Generally speaking if one party or the other were on opposite sides in the

civil war in the '20s, we have matured enough now to know that any efforts that were made by the government at the time with the British government and others to bring peace to Northern Ireland, the opposition in our parliament did not take advantage of our difficulties, which were quite significant difficulties at times. But the media, as I said, were helpful. The movie industry is non-existent in Ireland, they do make films in Ireland. Leading figures in the media would not have been involved, and in quite a number of occasions they would have known about secret talks that were going on but would not have made it public which was extremely helpful.

Sir Bill Jeffrey: Quick final word. On the media, we had the same experience as Dermot describes in the UK and indeed in Northern Ireland itself. The UK may be well known to be more than ready to exploit any political weakness but I can think of occasions, particularly in Northern Ireland where journalists knew about developments which would have been very embarrassing if they had come into the public domain and would have threatened the success of the peace process. And because these journalists themselves believed in it, they did not publish which may or may not have been a good thing but they certainly helped the eventual outcome. The thing we could not ignore if we were doing it now, is social media, and I guess any contemporary peace process needs to be right in amongst that in a very big way.

In regards to peace versus democracy, I don't completely agree that what we have in Belfast now is not democracy, it is democracy with a single constraint which is the product of the situation in which we are operating, namely, the forced participation of political representatives from both sides of the community. The real casualty at the moment, to my mind, is not democracy, it is good government because having a forced coalition means that not that much government gets done.

Prof Dr. Sevtap Yokuş: Let me conclude then. Thank you very much, especially all the speakers and participants. Let me remind you that we are well aware of their importance. I would just like to quote Yilmaz bey who said "do not wait for the glass to be half full. Even if you see a few drops, it means that there is water in the glass." Even if we cannot cherish our hopes for the solution process, we have reasons to keep them reserved and one day we will come back.

Concluding Remarks: Esra Elmas



Head of Turkey Programme,
Esra Elmas

Esra Elmas: I just wanted to say a few words to express my appreciation, as well as Kerim's, for your attendance in large numbers.

Thank you all of you for participating and contributing to a highly constructive and beneficial event. DPI has two main models for engaging in peace discussions: roundtables in Turkey and Comparative Study Visits abroad, which focus on comparative international experiences. We usually do not discuss the internal politics in Turkey directly, but while learning from other examples, we keep Turkey in mind. As academics, politicians, civil society, journalists and other type of actors, you all have an important stake in this process. Regardless of how we go about it, we all want peace. We can be on opposing sides of the argument, but we are working towards the same goal. So on behalf of DPI, thank you to everyone who has contributed to the success of this event.

Over the past five years, I have learned a lot from our work at DPI. I have learned to listen to the other side's arguments even if it is totally the opposite of mine. As I am

doing this, I am thinking of that person's motivation and resourcefulness for peace, I try to find the things we agree on more than the ones we disagree. Even under the most difficult circumstances, when one is engaged in a peace process, one has to be patient and constructive. Of course, one meeting doesn't change everything but it plants seeds in our minds. I think that the main lessons of comparative study visits are that there are other examples that Turkey can learn from and secondly, that any conflict can be solved. Stakeholders in a peace process have various reasons to want peace. Some ask for peace for political reasons, some look for its economic benefits and some others want it just to have a better daily life. There is no hierarchy when it comes to the importance of these reasons. All of them are valuable and legitimate at the same time and as different as they come, but fundamentally they are united by their desire for peace, which is important and uplifting. We have learned a lot from a difficult peace process such as the one in Ireland and the Philippines, and the understanding that even the most complicated conflict can be solved is inspiring. The comparative cases have changed our minds, the things we have taken for granted. For instance, when we first saw The Peace Walls in Belfast, it was out of the 'ideal' or the 'imagined' picture of peace that we had in minds and we could not associate a wall for peace. But then we realized that, maybe it is not the so called ideal, but if a wall is required to prevent the conflict, if peace needs that wall to stay, then there can be wall of peace, if there is an ideal, it is the peace and saving the peace. So continuous comparative study visits provided us with a gradual knowledge on conflict resolution.

Thank you very much for your contribution, participation and questions. Let's give a round of applause to all the organisers, interns, and speakers and interpreters. We were honored to have such outstanding speakers as David Gorman, Sir Bill Jeffrey and Dermot Ahern.

Executive Summary

Following the Chatham House rules, this report details the discussions that took place during the 4th March Ankara Roundtable which was organised by DPI. The event was held at the Sheraton Ankara Hotel and was attended by a diverse group of people from Turkey's political and cultural sectors. This included chief advisors to the president and prime minister, members of parliament from each main political party, academics, and civil society representatives, as well as a number of ambassadors and EU representatives. The conference featured three notable speakers, namely David Gorman, Sir Bill Jeffrey and Dermot Ahern, who each respectively played a significant role in the Philippines and Northern Ireland peace processes.

Given the attempted military coup d'état in July 2015 and the State of Emergency which was declared as a result, this roundtable was the first event since these precarious developments in Turkey which aimed to put the peace process back on the agenda. Participants engaged with the subject matter through the insightful and honest accounts from the speakers on the experiences of the Philippines and Northern Ireland's peace processes. Although the speakers themselves did not directly discuss the internal issues of Turkey, it was evident that the participants drew parallels with Turkey during the Q&A sessions. Interestingly, a particular area of interest during one of the Q&A sessions was the role of third parties in the peace process and how this aspect can be implemented in the context of Turkey.

With reference to press coverage, in the week after the roundtable in Ankara several news articles were published about the event highlighting its. Moreover, since Twitter is the most relevant social media platform for DPI, Twitter analytics show that tweets on the event made 68719 impressions. This media engagement further illustrates the public interest in this extremely relevant and timely event.

Overall, the Ankara roundtable was received very positively with participants stating that they found the conference highly beneficial and constructive. This information was gathered not only verbally, but also through a questionnaire which was distributed at the end of the event which reflected a positive reception.

Appendix

Participants

- **Abdurrahman Kurt** - Former AK Party MP & Deputy Chairman of AK Party Responsibility for Civil Society and Communication
- **Adnan Boynukara** - AK Party MP
- **Ahmet Özmen** - Chairman of Diyarbakır Bar Association
- **Ahmet Türk** - Mayor of Mardin & Former HDP MP
- **Ahmet Faruk Ünsal** - Chairman of MAZLUMDER & Member of Wise People's Committee
- **Alper Görmüş** - Journalist & Columnist at Serbestiyet
- **Aşkın Asan** - Rector of Avrasya University & Former Deputy Minister of Family and Social Policies
- **Ayşegül Doğan** - TV Programmer at IMC TV
- **Brendan Ward** - Ambassador for the Republic of Ireland to Turkey
- **Calin Ionut Ungur** - Deputy Head of Division Turkey at EC European External Action Service
- **Chris Cooter** - Ambassador for Canada to Turkey
- **Christian Berger** - Ambassador for the EU to Turkey
- **Cornelis van Rij** - Ambassador for the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Turkey
- **Demet Sabancı** - Co-founder of Densa Holding
- **Elke Merks Schaapveld** - The Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
- **Erol Katircioğlu** - Lecturer at Marmara University & Executive Board Member of Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
- **Gülseren Onanç** - Member of CHP Party Assembly
- **Hanne Melfald** - Project Manager at Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue & Member of DPI Council of Experts
- **Havva Kök Arslan** - Lecturer at Hacettepe University
- **Jennifer Anderson** - The Embassy of the United Kingdom
- **Kadir İnanır** - Actor & Member of Wise People Committee
- **Kezban Hatemi** - Lawyer, Member of Wise People's Committee & Member of DPI Council of Experts
- **Klaus Wölfer** - Ambassador for the Republic of Austria to Turkey
- **Laki Vingas** - Chairman of Yeniköy Panayia Greek Orthodox Foundation
- **Levent Gök** - Deputy Parliamentary Group Chairman of CHP
- **Mehmet Tekelioğlu** - Former AK Party MP
- **Mehmet Emin Ekmen** - Former AK Party MP & Member of Wise People's Committee
- **Najma Bouakaze-Khan** – The Embassy of the United Kingdom

- **Nazmi Gür** - Former HDP MP
- **Neşedil Akkerman** - The Embassy of the United Kingdom
- **Oral Çalışlar** - Columnist at Daily Posta & Member of Wise People's Committee
- **Osman Baydemir** - HDP MP for Şanlıurfa, Spokesperson for HDP & Former Mayor of Diyarbakır
- **Özlem Zengin** - Chief Advisor to the President & Former Chairwoman of AK Party İstanbul Branch's Women Unit
- **Öztürk Türkdoğan** - Chairman of Human Rights Association (IHD) & Member of Wise People's Committee
- **Semanur Sönmez** - TV Programmer at Ülke TV
- **Sevtaç Yokuş** - Law Professor at Kemerburgaz University
- **Tessa Nerini** – The Embassy of Swiss Confederation to Turkey
- **Şenal Sarıhan** - Republican People's Party (CHP) MP for Ankara
- **Ufuk Uras** - Lecturer at İstanbul University & Former MP for Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)
- **Vahap Çoşkun** - Professor of Law at Dicle University
- **Vegard Ellefsen** – Ambassador for the Kingdom of Norway to Turkey
- **Yılmaz Ensaroğlu** - Chief Advisor to Prime Minister & Member of Wise People Committee
- **Sırrı Sakık** - Former MP from HDP and Mayor of Ağrı

Speakers

- **David Gorman**
- **Sir Bill Jeffrey**
- **Dermot Ahern**

DPI Board & Council of Experts



Kerim Yıldız (Chief Executive Officer)

Kerim Yıldız is an expert in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, international human rights law and minority rights, having worked on numerous projects in these areas over his career. Kerim Yıldız has received a number of awards, including from the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights for his services to protect human rights and promote the rule of law in 1996, and the Sigrid Rausing Trust's Human Rights award for Leadership in Indigenous and Minority Rights in 2005. Kerim is also a recipient of the 2011 Gruber Prize for Justice. He has also written extensively on international humanitarian law, conflict, and various human rights mechanisms.



Nicholas Stewart QC (Chair)

Nicholas Stewart, QC, is a barrister and Deputy High Court Judge (Chancery and Queen's Bench Divisions) in the United Kingdom. He is the former Chair of the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales and Former President of Union Internationale des Avocats.



Prof Penny Green (Secretary)

Professor Penny Green is Professor of Law and Globalisation at Queen Mary University of London, UK, and Director of the [International State Crime Initiative \(ISCI\)](#), UK. She joined Queen Mary University in

September 2014 following seven years as Professor of Law and Criminology at King's College London, UK. Professor Green has published widely on state crime, state-corporate crime, natural disasters, Turkish criminal justice and politics, transnational crime and asylum and forced migration.



Priscilla Hayner

Priscilla Hayner is co-founder of the International Center for Transitional Justice. She is a global expert on truth commissions and transitional justice initiatives and has authored several books on these topics. She is former consultant to the Ford Foundation, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and numerous other organisations.



Arild Humlen

Arild Humlen is a lawyer and Director of the Norwegian Bar Association's Legal Committee. He is widely published within a number of jurisdictions, with emphasis on international civil law and human rights, and he has lectured at the law faculty of several universities in Norway. Arild is the recipient of the Honor Prize of the Bar Association of Oslo for his work on the rule of law and in 2015 he was awarded the Honor Prize from the international organisation Save the Children for his efforts to strengthen the legal rights of children.



Jacki Muirhead

Jacki Muirhead was appointed Chambers Administrator at Devereux Chambers, London, UK, in November 2015. Her previous roles include Practice Director at FJ Cleveland LLP, Business Manager at Counsels' Chambers Limited and Deputy Advocates Clerk at the Faculty of Advocates, UK.



Prof David Petrasek

Professor David Petrasek is Associate Professor at Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, Canada. He is former Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of Amnesty International. He has worked extensively on human rights, humanitarian and conflict resolution issues, including for Amnesty International (1990-96), for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (1997-98), for the International Council on Human Rights Policy (1998-02) and as Director of Policy at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2003-07).



Antonia Potter Prentice

Antonia Potter Prentice has wide ranging experience on a range of humanitarian, development, peacemaking and peacebuilding issues. She has lived and worked extensively in, and on, conflict and post-war environments; increasingly specialised in women's empowerment she has worked directly with women and peace process actors in countries including Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal and Philippines, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Yemen, and at the global policy level. She has also published widely on these topics. Antonia co-founded the Athena Consortium as part of which she acts as Senior Manager on Mediation Support, Gender and Inclusion for the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and as Senior Adviser to the European Institute for Peace (EIP).

Council of Experts



Bertie Ahern

Bertie Ahern is the former Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of Ireland, a position to which he was elected following numerous Ministerial appointments as well as that of Deputy Prime Minister. A defining moment of Mr Ahern's three terms in office as Taoiseach was the successful negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998. Mr Ahern held the Presidency of the European Council in 2004, presiding over the historic enlargement of the EU to 27 member states. Since leaving Government in 2008 Mr Ahern has dedicated his time to conflict resolution and is actively involved with many groups around the world. Current roles include Co-Chair of The Inter Action Council; Member of the Clinton Global Initiative; Member of the International Group dealing with the Conflict in the Basque Country; Honorary Adjunct Professor of Mediation and Conflict Intervention in NUI Maynooth; Member of the Kennedy Institute of NUI Maynooth; Member of the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin; Member of the Varkey Gems Foundation Advisory Board; Member of Crisis Management Initiative; Member of the World Economic Forum Agenda Council on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution; and Senior Advisor to the International Advisory Council to the Harvard International Negotiation Programme.



Dermot Ahern

Dermot Ahern is a former Irish Member of Parliament and Government Minister and was a key figure for more than 20 years in the Irish peace process, including in negotiations for the Good Friday Agreement and the St Andrews Agreement. He also has extensive experience at EU Council level, including as a key negotiator and signatory to the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties. In 2005, he was appointed by the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to be a Special Envoy on the issue of UN Reform.



Prof Mehmet Asutay

Professor Mehmet Asutay is a Professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic Political Economy & Finance at the Durham University Business School, UK. He researches, teaches and supervises research on Islamic political economy and finance, Middle Eastern economic development and finance, the political economy of Middle East, including Turkish and Kurdish political economies.



Ali Bayramoğlu

Ali Bayramoğlu is a writer and political commentator. He is a columnist for Al-Monitor. He is a member of the former Wise Persons Commission in Turkey, established by then Prime Minister Erdoğan.



Prof Christine Bell

Professor Christine Bell is a legal expert based in Edinburgh, Scotland. She is Professor of Constitutional Law and Assistant Principal (Global Justice) at the University of Edinburgh and a Fellow of the British Academy. She is an expert on transitional justice, peace negotiations, constitutional law and human rights law. She regularly conducts training on these topics for diplomats, mediators and lawyers, and has been involved as a legal advisor in a number of peace negotiations.



Cengiz Çandar

Cengiz Çandar is a senior journalist and columnist for Turkish newspaper *Radikal Daily News*. He is an expert on the Middle East and former war correspondent. He served as special adviser to former Turkish president Turgut Ozal.



Andy Carl

Andy Carl is an independent expert on conflict resolution and public participation in peace processes. He believes that building peace is not an act of charity but an act of justice. He co-founded and was Executive Director of Conciliation Resources. Previously, he was the first Programme Director with International Alert. He is currently an Honorary Fellow of Practice at the School of Law, University of Edinburgh. He serves as an adviser to a number of peacebuilding initiatives including the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative at the Graduate Institute in Geneva and the Legal Tools for Peace-Making Project in Cambridge, and the Oxford Research Group, London.



Prof Salomón Lerner Febres

Professor Salomón Lerner Febres holds a PhD in Philosophy from Université Catholique de Louvain. He is Executive President of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and Rector Emeritus of Pontifical Catholic University of Peru. He is former President of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru. Professor Lerner has given many talks and speeches about the role and the nature of the university, the problems of scholar research in higher education and about ethics and public culture. Furthermore, he has participated in numerous conferences in Peru and other countries about violence and pacification. In addition, he has been a speaker and panellist in multiple workshops and symposiums about the work and findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru.



Prof Mervyn Frost

Mervyn Frost is Professor of International Relations in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, UK. He was previously Chair of Politics at the University of Natal, Durban, South Africa and was President of the South African Political Studies Association. He is an expert on human rights in international relations, humanitarian intervention, justice in world politics, democratising global governance, the just war tradition in an era of New Wars, and, ethics in a globalising world.



Martin Griffiths

Martin Griffiths is a senior international mediator and Executive Director of the European Institute of Peace (EIP). From 1999 to 2010 he was the founding Director of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva where he specialised in developing political dialogue between governments and insurgents in a range of countries across Asia, Africa and Europe. He is a co-founder of Inter Mediate, a London based NGO devoted to conflict resolution, and has worked for international organisations including UNICEF, Save the Children and Action Aid. Martin has also worked in the British Diplomatic Service and for the UN, including as Director of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (Geneva), Deputy to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (New York), Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Great Lakes, Regional Coordinator in the Balkans and Deputy Head of the Supervisory Mission in Syria (UNSMIS).



Kezban Hatemi

Kezban Hatemi holds an LL.B. from Istanbul University and is registered with the Istanbul Bar Association. She has worked as a self employed lawyer, with Turkey's National Commission to UNESCO as well as a campaigner and advocate during the Bosnian War. She was involved in drafting the Turkish Civil Code and Law of Foundations as well as in preparing the legal groundwork for the chapters on

Religious Freedoms, Minorities and Community Foundations within the Framework Law of Harmonization prepared by Turkey in preparation for EU accession. She has published articles on human rights, women's rights, minority rights, children's rights, animal rights and the fight against drugs. She is a member of the former Wise Persons Commission in Turkey, established by then Prime Minister Erdoğan, and sits on the Board of Trustees of the Technical University and the Darulacaze Foundation.



Dr Edel Hughes

Dr Edel Hughes is Senior Lecturer at University of East London, UK. Prior to joining the University of East London, Edel was awarded an LL.M. and a PhD in International Human Rights Law from the National University of Ireland, Galway, in 2003 and 2009, respectively. Between 2006 and 2011 she was a Lecturer in Law at the School of Law, University of Limerick, Ireland.



Prof Dr Ahmet Insel

Professor Ahmet Insel is a former faculty member of Galatasaray University in Istanbul, Turkey and Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne University, France. He is Managing Editor of the Turkish editing house Iletisim and member of the editorial board of monthly review Birikim. He is a regular columnist at Cumhuriyet newspaper and an author who published several books and articles in both Turkish and French.



Avila Kilmurray

Avila Kilmurray is a founding member of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition. She was part of the Coalition's negotiating team for the Good Friday Agreement and has written extensively on community

action, the women's movement and conflict transformation. She serves as an adviser on the Ireland Committee of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust as well as a board member of Conciliation Resources (UK) and the Institute for British Irish Studies. She was the first Women's Officer for the Transport & General Workers Union for Ireland (1990-1994) and from 1994-2014 she was Director of the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, managing EU PEACE funding for the re-integration of political ex-prisoners in Northern Ireland as well as support for community-based peace building. She is a recipient of the Raymond Georis Prize for Innovative Philanthropy through the European Foundation Centre.



Prof Ram Manikkalingam

Professor Ram Manikkalingam is Visiting Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands. He is serving as Senior Advisor to the President of Sri Lanka. He is an expert on issues pertaining to conflict, multiculturalism and democracy, and has authored multiple works on these topics. He is founding board member of the Laksham Kadirgamar Institute for Strategic Studies and International Relations, Colombo, Sri Lanka.



Bejan Matur

Bejan Matur is a renowned Turkey-based author and poet. She has published ten works of poetry and prose. In her writing she focuses mainly on Kurdish politics, the Armenian issue, minority issues, prison literature and women's rights. She has won several literary prizes and her work has been translated into over 28 languages. She was formerly Director of the Diyarbakır Cultural Art Foundation (DKSV).



Prof Monica McWilliams

Professor Monica McWilliams is Professor of Women's Studies, based in the Transitional Justice Institute at the University of Ulster, UK. She was the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission from 2005 to 2011 and responsible for delivering advice on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. She is co-founder of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition and was elected to a seat at the Multi-Party Peace Negotiations, which led to the Belfast (Good Friday) Peace Agreement in 1998.



Hanne Melfald

Hanne Melfald worked with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for eight years including as the Senior Adviser to the Secretariat of the Foreign Minister of Norway before she became a Project Manager in HD's Eurasia office in 2015. She previously worked for the United Nations for six years including two years with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan as Special Assistant to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. She has also worked for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Nepal and Geneva, as well as for the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration. Hanne has a degree in International Relations from the University of Bergen and the University of California, Santa Barbara, as well as a Master's degree in Political Science from the University of Oslo.



Roelf Meyer

As Chief Negotiator for the National Party Government, Roelf was intimately involved in the settlement of the South African conflict. Together with his counterpart Cyril Ramaphosa, Chief Negotiator for the African National Congress (ANC), Roelf negotiated the end of apartheid and helped pave the way to the

first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994. After the elections, Meyer continued in his post of Minister of Constitutional Affairs in the Cabinet of President Nelson Mandela. Roelf was chair of the South African Defence Review Committee (2011 to 2014), and is an active consultant on peace processes, having advised parties in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Burundi, Iraq, Kosovo, the Basque Region, Guyana, Bolivia, Kenya, Madagascar, and South Sudan.



Mark Muller QC

Mark Muller QC is a senior advocate at Doughty Street Chambers (London) and the Scottish Faculty of Advocates (Edinburgh). He specialises in public international law and human rights. He has many years' experience of advising on conflict resolution, mediation, ceasefire and power-sharing and first-hand experience of a number of conflict zones, including Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq and Syria. Since 2005 he is Senior Advisor to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Beyond Conflict and Inter Mediate. He is also a Harvard Law School Fellow and former Chair of the Bar Human Rights Committee and Head of Rule of Law for the Bar Council. He is the founder of Beyond Borders – a Scottish initiative dedicated to fostering peace and international understanding through cultural dialogue. He currently acts as Senior Mediation Expert for the Standby Team of Mediators of the UN Department of Political Affairs.



Giles Portman

Giles Portman is an experienced British and EU diplomat, having worked for the UK Foreign Office in Brussels, New York, Prague and as Deputy Head of Mission in Ankara; and for the EU's External Action Service as an Adviser to the High Representative, Head of Division for Turkey and Eastern Neighbourhood strategic communications adviser.



Jonathan Powell

Jonathan Powell is founder and CEO of Inter Mediate, an NGO devoted to conflict resolution working in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and Asia. He was appointed as the UK Official Envoy to Libya by Prime Minister David Cameron in 2014. Jonathan was Chief of Staff to Tony Blair from 1995 to 2007, and from 1997 he was also Chief British Negotiator on Northern Ireland. From 1978 to 79 he was a broadcast journalist with the BBC and Granada TV, and from 1979 to 1994 a British Diplomat.



Sir Kieran Prendergast

Sir Kieran Prendergast served in the British Foreign Office, including in Cyprus, Turkey, Israel, the Netherlands, Kenya and New York. He was later head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office dealing with Apartheid and Namibia. He is former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. He was also Convenor of the Secretary General's Executive Committee on Peace and Security and engaged in peacemaking efforts in Afghanistan, Burundi, Cyprus, the DRC, East Timor, Guatemala, Iraq, the Middle East, Somalia and Sudan.



Rajesh Rai

Rajesh Rai was called to the Bar in 1993. His areas of expertise include Human Rights Law, Immigration and Asylum Law and Public Law. He is Founding Director of HIC, a community centred NGO based in Cameroon, and of Human Energy (Uganda) Ltd. He was previously Director of The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI). He lectures on a wide variety of legal issues, both for the Bar Human Rights Council and internationally in India, Africa, Asia and the USA.



Sir David Reddaway

Sir David Reddaway works as an adviser, board member and consultant in the private and university sectors. He is a Member of the Council of Goldsmiths' College, London University, and Clerk of the Goldsmiths' Company since January 2016. He previously served as British Ambassador to Turkey and to Ireland; High Commissioner to Canada; UK Special Representative for Afghanistan; and Charge d'Affaires in Iran, where he had first worked during the Iranian Revolution. He has also worked in Argentina, India and Spain. He was a Fellow at Harvard University and a volunteer teacher in Ethiopia. He read History at Cambridge and Persian at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.



Prof Naomi Roht-Arriaza

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Catherine Woollard

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