



Language policy in conflict resolution

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Introduction

Differences of language and linguistic identity within a single nation-state have often been sources of friction and outright conflict between communities; and where language groups cross nation-state borders, the problems of minorities have sometimes become the reason or pretext for wars between sovereign states. This article offers three concise case-studies of very different situations within Europe where the measures adopted in respect of language have had some success in bringing an end to conflict and preventing its recurrence.

Although in each case I need to summarise the historical events and political pressures which brought the parties to the negotiating table, my main focus will be on the choices then made and the linguistic measures adopted as part of the eventual settlements: between German and Italian speakers in the South Tyrol in Italy; between Finnish-speakers and the minority of Swedish-speakers in the whole of mainland Finland; and the arrangements made for the Irish and Ulster-Scots languages in Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. I have not, except in passing, dealt with other minority languages on the same territories, notably Ladino in South Tyrol and the Sami languages in Finland.

All the policies discussed fall within that middle-ground which rejects the all-or-nothing positions which have produced conflict: on the one hand state policies of discrimination against the minority languages and assimilation of the minority population;

on the other, the policies of secession or redrawing of boundaries advocated by some minority movements as their only strategy for survival. Discussion on this middle-ground may involve constitutional matters at central, regional and local government levels, the definition of territories in which rights apply, the place of languages in education, public administration and the media, the linguistic consequences of both economic development and underdevelopment; and sometimes decisions on what may seem minute details which nevertheless have a bearing on the equal status and equal treatment of linguistic groups.

This short article can do no more than select some of the main features of the respective linguistic settlements, selected for their comparative and contrastive interest.

South Tyrol

Historical background and roots of conflict

South Tyrol (Südtirol in German, Alto Adige in Italian) is the mainly German-speaking province of Italy which lies to the south of the Alpine watershed which forms the present-day boundary between Austria and Italy. As the German name indicates, the area has strong historical and cultural links with the Tyrol area of Austria, and before the First World War the two formed one unit within the Austro-Hungarian empire. At the end of that war South Tyrol was ceded to Italy whose Fascist government from 1922

onwards imposed extremely oppressive linguistic policies which nevertheless failed in their aim of Italianizing the German-speaking population. In 1934, with the deliberate intention of diluting the linguistic character of the area, Mussolini established an industrial zone near the provincial capital Bolzano/Bozen and brought in an Italian-speaking population which today accounts for a quarter of the province's total of just over half a million people.

At the end of the Second World War, South Tyrol was again awarded to Italy on terms agreed between Austria and Italy in the "Paris Treaty" which was annexed to the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947. The treaty offered a degree of autonomy to the German-speaking province of Bozen/Bolzano (that is to say, South Tyrol), a range of linguistic rights for German-speakers, and a power-sharing provincial government based proportionately on the ethnic composition of the elected provincial parliament. All this was a great advance on the pre-war situation, but it was phrased in rather vague and general terms and left many questions unanswered - the full text of the treaty runs to no more than 400 words. This led to repeated disagreements over how phrases were to be interpreted and whether they were being implemented in accordance with the document's intention.

The autonomy promised for the Province of Bozen/Bolzano turned out to be subordinated to the powers of the Region of Trentino/Alto Adige of which it forms part. That region consists of two provinces and has a total population in which Italian-speakers

predominate. Moreover the Province could only appeal to Italy's Constitutional Court with the consent of the Regional Government which effectively prevented it from contesting what it regarded as restrictive interpretations of the treaty's wording. The provincial government had no legislative powers and few resources compared to the regional government and could do little to stem emigration of the local population, or conversely influence central government investment in the province which was often accompanied by further immigration of Italian-speakers.

Unsurprisingly, linguistic and economic discontents led to campaigns to detach the province of Bozen from the larger region, while some wished to reopen the question of reunification with Austria. Throughout the 1950s there was sporadic violence against property, sabotage, bombs and eventually loss of life. In 1960 the Austrian Government referred the question of South Tyrol to the United Nations which then asked the parties concerned to resume negotiations on the implementation of the Paris Treaty.

This negotiation involved the Italian and Austrian governments as well as the local parties and it took nine years before agreement was reached on a package of 137 detailed measures which both clarified and added to the measures in the 1948 Statute. Furthermore, because it was recognized that some of the measures could not be introduced overnight there was an 18-stage timetable for implementation. A new Statute of Autonomy was adopted in 1972, and it was 1992 before the Austrian Government was

able to declare that the measures were working satisfactorily and that the dispute with Italy over its treatment of the South Tyrolers was over. A further Statute was adopted in 2001 but the essential groundwork for the present settlement was laid down in 1972.

Major features of the language settlement

The principle of ethnic proportionality within the Provincial Government was already a feature of the 1948 settlement. In 1972 that principle was applied to virtually all public services. Since the new Statute also transferred very extensive legislative and administrative competencies from the Regional to the Provincial Government, this meant that the rule of proportionality would affect some 35,000 public servants of all grades in posts that had historically been filled mainly by Italian-speakers. A period of thirty years was set for staged implementation of this policy so as to avoid compulsory redundancies.

Proportionality necessarily requires that everyone in the Province declare themselves as belonging to one of the province's three ethnic/linguistic groups – Italian, German or Ladino. This is done at the time of the national census which occurs every ten years, and the affiliation chosen cannot then be changed until the next census. Outsiders who belong to none of the three groups are asked to attach themselves to their *preferred* group. A person's affiliation is then used not only in respect of public service employment and political representation. It also decides, for example, which school

system a child will attend and is also used in the allocation of municipal housing.

Another provision affecting employment is that everyone recruited into the public service has to have a certificate of bilingual competence in German and Italian. This is obtained by examination, and a higher level of competence is required for appointment or promotion to higher grades. This guarantees citizens the right to deal with virtually all public authorities in their own first language. Complex arrangements are in place for court proceedings, and include provision for interpreters where needed, but judges must have bilingual competence and the bilingual certificate is also required as a qualification for jury service.

There are three school systems - for German-speakers, Italian-speakers and Ladino-speakers respectively. Each system is controlled by its own school board. Italian is taught in the German system whose overall language of instruction is German, and the converse is true of the Italian school system. Ladino children when they reach secondary school are taught mainly in both German and Italian but with Ladino as an auxiliary language.

The 137 measures in the package go into a great deal of detail and were not introduced without controversy. The separation of the linguistic groups for many purposes in parallel institutions may not appear conducive to social harmony, but it establishes large social spaces where speakers of each language group can feel at home and

that their language is secure. The system appears to have worked well - perhaps because it goes hand in hand with power-sharing at the political level and a requirement for a consensus of the language groups at that level on most important issues, including budgets. The quotas, the bilingual qualifications, and the minute codification of language parity lets each language group know exactly where it stands and gives people from both groups a stake in the province's bilingualism. As the American poet Robert Frost wrote: "Good fences make good neighbours".

The open borders of the Schengen area have facilitated contacts with the Austrian Tyrol, but at the same time the South Tyrol has developed its own differentiated bilingual and bicultural character. The very high degree of autonomy which it enjoys has strengthened its identity within Europe and helped it become one of the European Union's most prosperous regions. Younger Italian-speakers, who are perhaps third generation South Tyrolers, today often identify strongly with their province. While a recent unofficial poll taken in a time of economic recession showed that just over half the German speakers would still make secession and reunification with Austria their first choice, this is not the most pressing political issue. Nevertheless it is a reminder that no settlement is for ever or should be taken for granted.

Periods of economic difficulty can easily resurrect old divisions; furthermore, many of the fields which language laws seek to regulate are themselves changing fast due to globalization,

privatization, technological developments and the spread of international languages. For example South Tyrol had to vary some of its employment rules when a number of public utilities were privatized. The relationship of majorities and minorities needs constant monitoring and periodic renegotiation in the light of changing factors, and such a mechanism exists in the case of South Tyrol.

In 1992 a Standing Committee representing the three language groups was put in place to examine in a continuous ongoing process all questions that affected the cultural, social and economic development of the three language groups. This group has direct access to the Italian Council of Ministers and can make proposals for further changes to the Statute of Autonomy to meet changing needs.

Finland

Historical background and the roots of conflict

Finland as a sovereign state is barely a century old. From 1809–1917 it enjoyed substantial autonomy within the Russian Empire and before that was for centuries under Swedish rule. There were Swedish-speakers in Finland at least as far back as the Middle Ages and they continued to form the ruling class during the period of Russian administration, though always a numerical minority among the Finnish-speaking population. Today, the Swedish-speaking population of Finland numbers some 290,000, around

5.5 percent of the country's total population. The figure represents a decline from 11 per cent in the early twentieth century, but recently the numbers appear to have stabilized.

Of the total Swedish-speaking population, twenty-five thousand live on the Åland Islands close to the Swedish mainland where they form over 90 percent of the population. These islands have their own very special history and are sometimes described as self-governing within Finland. They enjoy a degree of autonomy unparalleled anywhere and certainly repay study by anyone interested in models of autonomous government. This article, however, will be concerned with the very different linguistic arrangements for the rest of Finland. Here the Swedish-speakers are most densely concentrated along the west coast in Ostrobothnia but also have a strong presence in rural and urban settlements along the south coast.

Many of the leaders of the cultural and political awakening of the Finnish people in the nineteenth-century came from the Swedish-speaking upper class. Several learnt Finnish and gave their names Finnish forms so as to identify and more effectively lead the majority of the population. Another section of the same upper class stressed its own Swedish-language identity but also adopted a nationalist stance vis-à-vis the Russian empire. An ideological conflict became something much worse when independence was declared in 1917 in the middle of a world war and with the Russian Empire imploding.

The Finnish war of independence turned into a brief but savage civil war in which the Reds were supported by Russian revolutionary soldiers and the Whites by the German army. Although the civil war was fought on class lines there was a strong overlap with language since the Finland-Swedes dominated among the upper classes, and the headquarters of the Whites was in Swedish-speaking territory. The civil war, which the Whites won, left bitter memories throughout the nineteen-twenties and 'thirties, but equally there was a strongly felt need for national reconciliation and compromise. This was the atmosphere in which the language settlement was achieved, and revised many times during the decades that followed.

It is worth noting that the majority of Swedish-speakers throughout continued to identify with Finland as a whole rather than with Sweden or with one part of Finland's territory, and the two language groups united to fight in defence of Finland's independence during the 1940s, which cemented national unity. So, although the Swedish-speakers are undoubtedly a minority, they are not a typical cross-border minority. And unlike many other minorities their status is high - for both economic and historical reasons; they can be seen as founding partners in the Finnish state, rather as the idea of two founding nations has been devised to validate the special status of the English and French languages in Canada.

Finnish-speakers have in general been passively supportive of the language settlement. Many of them live far from any Swedish-

speaking community and meet the other language mainly as a compulsory school subject. However, among them there has always been a strand of opinion which regards the language settlement as too generous to the Swedish-speaking minority and too expensive. This is the view taken by the Finn's Party (sometimes referred to in English as "True Finns") which in the recent period of economic recession has seen a spectacular rise in its support. In the 2015 Parliamentary election it achieved 17.7% of the votes, becoming the third largest party by votes and the second largest party by seats. What was widely regarded as an exemplary language settlement is now again being put in question.

The linguistic policy of the Finn's Party is to make the teaching of Swedish optional rather than compulsory in Finnish-language education, so as to make space for the teaching of English and other commercially useful languages; and to reduce expenditure on bilingualism and replace it with multilingualism, effectively demoting the status of Swedish to that of just another foreign language in Finland. It is of course true that bilingual policies everywhere involve considerable extra costs, but then so does linguistic conflict have costs of a potentially more serious kind.

Major features of the language settlement

The founding constitution of Finland (July 1919) states that the national languages of Finland are Finnish and Swedish, and that the public authorities shall provide for the cultural and societal needs of both language groups on an equal basis. This seems a fairly all-

inclusive statement yet it is sometimes argued that because it does not specify certain things (e.g. compulsory learning of the other national language at school) there is no constitutional requirement for such a policy. But the drafters of the Constitutional Act had the foresight to specify that the detail of language rights should be enshrined in a Language Act. In fact Finland has passed several acts relating to language, specifically in 1920, 1921, 1922, 1928, 1935, 1949, 1951, 1962 and 1975. The most fundamental is the 1922 *Language Act* which was amended in 1931, 1935, 1975 and 1982. That Act remained in force until 2003, when it was replaced by the new *Language Act* of January 1, 2004.

This act relates mainly to the spheres of central and local government including prisons and the defence forces (where it is stipulated that there should be at least one Swedish-speaking military unit) but refers to a whole raft of other legislation outside the Language Act which has a bearing on language in fields such as education, broadcasting, culture and health care. A recent Language Skills Act specifies the language skills required for certain posts in public employment.

An important requirement of the Language Act is that in each electoral period of four years, the Government should report to Parliament on the implementation of language legislation, linguistic rights and other linguistic matters. This continuous and detailed monitoring and adaptation of the legislation to meet current needs can be seen as a strength of the Finland model. To amend a

constitution is usually a difficult and laborious undertaking. It is best for a constitution to stick to general principles, but only if that constitution can be supplemented by detailed linguistic legislation, and that legislation can be monitored and adapted to changing circumstances.

Finland (if we set aside the Åland Islands) is a unitary state but also a highly decentralized one. Central government delegates extensive powers, including powers of local taxation, to 350 municipalities. These are fundamental to the implementation of linguistic policy because each one is classed by central government every ten years as either unilingual or bilingual. Bilingual municipalities are in turn classified according to which of the two language groups forms the majority within them. In a majority Swedish bilingual municipality the bilingual signage will appear with Swedish first while the converse will be true of bilingual municipalities which have a Finnish majority.

The categorization of the municipality will determine what level of service citizens can expect to get in their first language. In dealing with a state authority and a bilingual municipality everyone has the right to use Finnish or Swedish. The authorities, moreover, must arrange for a person to be *heard* in his or her own language, Finnish or Swedish, which may seem to follow naturally, but is an important stipulation. The Spanish Constitution, in contrast, gives citizens the right to use Catalan, Basque and Galician in their respective territories when dealing with the authorities, but at the

same time places on them the obligation to understand Castilian Spanish, which can mean that the authorities can use Castilian in any hearing, effectively negating the meaningful exercise of the citizen's right to use his or her language. This has been the source of much friction.

The whole system in Finland depends, as in the South Tyrol, on the self-definition of individuals as belonging to a given linguistic group. A municipality is bilingual if the official statistics show that the minority comprises at least eight per cent of the population or at least 3000 persons. It becomes unilingual if the proportion of the minority decreases below six percent or 3000 persons. Many aspects of linguistic practice are driven from the grass-roots up: state authorities must correspond with a given local authority according to that municipality's linguistic category. A state organization which groups several municipalities will be categorized linguistically starting from the designations of the municipalities which it serves, and will use the language of the majority within its official district as its internal working language.

A relatively small proportion of Finland Swedes live in unilingual Swedish municipalities, but the great majority live in one or the other category of bilingual municipalities. The great majority of the country's municipalities are unilingual Finnish and only some 17,000 Finland-Swedes live in those areas. Because so many Finland-Swedes today live in bilingual communities it is not surprising that intermarriage between the two language groups is becoming

more common. The children of such marriages increasingly enter Swedish schools however, which requires them to be registered as belonging to the Swedish-speaking group.

One unique feature of the institutional and linguistic landscape in Finland is the *Folktinget*, the Swedish Assembly of Finland. Its task is to safeguard the Swedish language and the interests of the Swedish-speaking population. If that were a full definition it would resemble many organizations in other minorities. What is unique about the *Folktinget* is that it is an assembly elected by Swedish speakers at the same time as local elections take place in the municipalities. It has a statutory role that involves it in the drafting and reviewing of all proposed legislation that may have a bearing on language and the Swedish-speaking community. While it has no decision-making powers, and its role is therefore advisory, the fact that it is an elected body gives its views greater weight and legitimacy.

Northern Ireland

The roots of conflict and the role of language

The armed conflict in this province of the United Kingdom during the final decades of the twentieth century cannot be called a linguistic conflict or even a conflict in which language was a central factor; nevertheless language played and continues to play

a significant role in the identity politics of Northern Ireland and consequently has been one of the areas which had to be addressed during the peace process. This short article is concerned with arrangements made for the Irish language and to a far lesser degree Ulster-Scots during the peace process and only addresses the wider context in the most general terms.

From the Sixteenth Century onwards military campaigns in Ireland by English forces were met by a series of Irish rebellions. When these were put down by superior English power, lands were confiscated and settlers brought over from mainland Britain to occupy the confiscated lands. The largest “plantation” of settlers occurred in the Seventeenth Century in the province of Ulster in the north of the island when equal numbers of settlers - some 20,000 in all - were brought from England and Scotland. They were required to be Protestant which set them apart from the Catholic and Irish-speaking indigenous population. The national and religious difference between Irish and British played into the wider European political conflicts and alliances of the time.

The catastrophic decline of the Irish language in the Nineteenth Century is usually ascribed to three main factors: that English had already established itself as a community language in the more prosperous east of the island; that the most dreadful of several famines, the “great hunger” of 1841 struck most fatally in the poorer West of the island, leading to a million deaths; to the emigration of a further million, and to the association made in the

minds of many people between the Irish language and the poverty and suffering of the rural West.

The various dividing lines in Irish society did not always run together. Under the influence of the French Revolution, several leading Protestants espoused republicanism and the cause of Irish independence. For much of the Nineteenth Century the Protestant Church of Ireland was if anything more supportive of the Irish language than the Catholic Church. It was only at the end of the Nineteenth Century that Irish Nationalism identified itself with the newly established Irish Language Movement and with the Catholic religion of the vast majority of the island's population.

The areas of the north where Protestantism was strongest saw an insurgent Catholic Ireland as a threat, and as the establishment of a separate Irish state drew nearer, threatened armed rebellion and in 1921 forced the partition of the island. Northern Ireland was to be ruled as part of the United Kingdom by its own devolved Parliament until 1972 . During this period, the governing Unionists, who were overwhelmingly Protestant, discriminated in many different ways against the Catholic population, most but not all of whom aspired to a United Ireland. Discrimination in employment practices and in the way electoral districts were drawn were two of the most serious forms of discrimination, but there were many others. After the rise of armed conflict between paramilitary groups claiming to represent the two communities and also between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British Army, Northern Ireland

was in 1972 brought under direct rule from London. As a result of a prolonged Peace Process devolved government was restored briefly in 1998 on a more equitable and power-sharing basis, but suspended several times before a more permanent settlement in 2007.

With independence, Irish became an official language in the independent South but, already badly weakened, was never revived in the way that was hoped despite a number of supportive initiatives. Today in the Republic of Ireland fewer than 20,000 people live in communities where Irish is the dominant community language. Varying degrees of knowledge of Irish, ranging from fluency to recognition of some words and phrases, is widespread in the population of the Republic. There is a TV channel and radio in Irish, a number of state supported schools which teach through Irish are chosen by an active minority of parents, and the language has more widespread passive support as one of the symbols of national identity.

By the mid Twentieth Century in Northern Ireland there were no native speakers of Irish and no traditional communities who used the language in their everyday life. After partition the Irish language was kept out of public life in Northern Ireland and increasingly marginalized in the education system. Both sides perceived the language as a badge of dissident identity, but for that very reason the Irish language commanded a rather greater level of activism and loyalty among the nationalist community than was the case in the

South where the language was subsidized. But it may well be that attitudes to the language were more various than the rhetoric of the political debate allowed. According to the 2001 Census, 658,103 people (36 per cent of the population of Northern Ireland) had “some knowledge of Irish” – of whom 559,670 identified themselves as Catholics and 48,509 as Protestants and “other Christians”. One is reminded that among the Protestant Scots whom the Plantation of Ulster in the Seventeenth Century brought to the province, some were speakers of Scottish Gaelic, a language closely related and mutually intelligible with the northernmost dialect of Irish.

The majority of the Scottish settlers who came to Ulster, however, would have been speakers of Scots. Dialects of Scots (a Germanic language closely related to English) are very widely spoken in Scotland today. Historically a standard literary language existed and before the Union with England Scots was also the language of the Scottish Court, but in modern times the standard language weakened though it is now the subject of renewed standardizing efforts. There is plenty of evidence that the Scots language was spoken in Ulster. Contacts with Scotland were close, and Scots certainly influenced the accent and the vocabulary of the province, particularly in the northern counties. To what extent Ulster-Scots (sometimes called Ullans) is to be considered a dialect of Scots or, as some maintain, has developed into a separate language, is a question I shall not enter into. It was and is still spoken - possibly by as many as 30,000 people - in some rural areas of Northern Ireland and of the adjoining county of Donegal in the Irish Republic. Many of

those, like myself, who worked in the field of European minorities in the early 1970s were unaware of its existence as a living language until it surfaced as a topic in the context of the Peace Process.

The limited role of language in the Peace Process

Two documents frame the Northern Ireland Peace Process. The Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) was an intergovernmental agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom and laid the foundations of the Belfast Agreement (1998), also known as the Good Friday Agreement. The Anglo-Irish Agreement enunciated a number of general principles and set up an Intergovernmental Conference which offered a framework for the discussion, among many other topics, of “the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in Northern Ireland”. Another article of the agreement refers to co-operation between the two parts of Ireland concerning cross-border aspects of economic, social and cultural matters. Though no specific mention is made of language or languages, both these references can be seen with hindsight to have opened the way for some of the eventual proposals in this field.

It was the Belfast agreement of 1998 which established the two major institutions which today constitute the re-established democratic framework for the province: the elected Northern Ireland Assembly, which requires cross-community voting on certain major decisions, and the power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive which is today the devolved Government of Northern

Ireland within the UK. In the Belfast Agreement the British and Irish Governments simply put their seal of approval on a multi-party agreement which they and all the major parties in Northern Ireland had reached after long negotiation. Here in its entirety are the sections within that agreement which deal with language:

3. All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland.

4. In the context of active consideration currently being given to the UK signing the Council of Europe Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the British Government will in particular in relation to the Irish language, where appropriate and where people so desire it:

- take resolute action to promote the language;
- facilitate and encourage the use of the language in speech and writing in public and private life where there is appropriate demand;
- seek to remove, where possible, restrictions which would discourage or work against the maintenance or development of the language;
- make provision for liaising with the Irish language community, representing their views to public authorities and investigating complaints;
- place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish medium education in line with current provision for integrated education;
- explore urgently with the relevant British authorities, and in co-operation with the Irish broadcasting authorities, the scope for

achieving more widespread availability of *Teilifis na Gaeilge* in Northern Ireland;

- seek more effective ways to encourage and provide financial support for Irish language film and television production in Northern Ireland; and
- encourage the parties to secure agreement that this commitment will be sustained by a new Assembly in a way which takes account of the desires and sensitivities of the community.

The Belfast Agreement was followed by an Implementation Order which dealt with cross-border co-operation in six fields, each of which involved setting up a joint implementation body. One of these was the North/South Language Body which consisted of *Foras na Gaeilge* in the Republic of Ireland and *Tha Boord of Ulster-Scotch* (The Ulster-Scots Agency) in Northern Ireland. Each was to receive funding both from its own Government and the Government of the other part of Ireland. This article does not go beyond the conclusion of the Peace Process and the introduction of the new constitutional arrangements, but it is indicative that the budget administered by this body over five years from 2005 amounted to £12 million for the Irish Language Broadcast Fund and another £12 million for an Ulster-Scots Academy. The St Andrews Agreement of the following year (2006) placed a duty on the incoming Northern Ireland Executive to adopt a strategy for the promotion of the Irish Language, and of the Ulster Scots “culture, heritage and language.”

Some sceptics voiced the suspicion that Ulster-Scots had been rescued from extinction for political reasons as a counterweight to Irish and a concession to the Unionist community. That is too simple an account. What seems to have happened as part of the Peace Process is that one numerically marginal but real linguistic element in the Ulster tradition was given a broader definition as time went on and elevated to be representative of the Protestant Unionist culture and identity as a whole.

The measures adopted in favour of Irish during the peace process were far from being the most controversial topics treated which lay more in the fields of policing, prisoners and discriminatory practices in employment. Moreover, the language proposals are extremely modest by comparison with the constitutions of the South Tyrol or Finland because they are not dealing with the human rights of a linguistic group to practice its language in all aspects of its daily life. The measures could be said to have two functions. Symbolically they are a recognition of an Irish identity. It was a fundamental principle of the Peace Process that the two identities and two possible aspirations for the future of Northern Ireland had to be respected. Secondly they apportion resources which enable the take-up of various services in Irish by those (still relatively few) people who may wish to take them up.

In the case of Ulster-Scots, the apportioning of resources is more towards creating an identity than to meeting what would be a

very limited demand indeed for services. The element of symbolic recognition, on the other hand, looms very large. But although the promotion of Ulster-Scots may have been intended as a counterweight to a resurgent Irish identity, it may in a perhaps unintended way have strengthened the identity of Northern Ireland as a distinct cultural unit with Scottish roots rather than stressing its Britishness or indeed its English roots.

DPI Board Members



Kerim Yildiz (Director), Kerim Yildiz is Director of DPI. He is an expert in International Human Rights Law and minority rights, and has written extensively on international Human Rights mechanisms and International Humanitarian Law. Kerim is the recipient of a number of awards, including from the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights for his services to protect human rights and promote the rule of law in 1996, the Sigrid Rausing Trust's Human Rights award for Leadership in Indigenous and Minority Rights in 2005, and the Gruber Prize for Justice in 2011.



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
Dermot Ahern

Dermot Ahern is a Former Irish Member of Parliament and Government Minister and was a key figure for more than 20 years in the Irish peace process, including in negotiations for the Good Friday Agreement and the St Andrews Agreement. He also has extensive experience at EU Council level including being a key negotiator and signatory to the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties. In 2005, he was appointed by the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to be a Special Envoy on his behalf on the issue of UN Reform. Previous roles include that of Government Chief Whip, Minister for Social, Community and Family Affairs, Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Justice and Law Reform. Dermot Ahern also served as Co-Chairman of the British Irish Inter Parliamentary Body 1993 – 1997.



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
Cengiz Çandar: Senior Journalist and columnist specializing in areas such as The Kurdish Question, former war correspondent. Served as special adviser to Turkish president Turgut Ozal.



Yilmaz Ensaroğlu: SETA Politics Economic and Social Research Foundation. Member of the Executive Board of the Joint Platform for Human Rights, the Human Rights Agenda Association (İHGD) and Human Rights Research Association (İHAD), Chief Editor of the Journal of the Human Rights Dialogue.



Prof. Mervyn Frost: Head of the Department of War Studies, King's College London. Previously served as Chair of Politics and Head of Department at the University of Natal in Durban. Former President of the South African Political Studies Association; expert on human rights in international relations, humanitarian intervention, justice in world politics, democratising global governance, just war tradition in an Era of New Wars and ethics in a globalising world.



Dr. Edel Hughes: Lecturer, University of East London. Expert on international human rights and humanitarian law, with special interest in civil liberties in Ireland, emergency/anti-terrorism law, international criminal law and human rights in Turkey and Turkey's accession to European Union. Previous lecturer with Amnesty International and a founding member of Human Rights for Change.



Dr Salomón Lerner Febres: Former President of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Perú; Executive President of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights of the Pontifical Catholic University of Perú.



Martin Griffiths: Former Deputy Head, Kofi Annan's UN Mission to Syria. Founding member and first Executive Director of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Served in the British Diplomatic Service, and in British NGOs, Ex -Chief Executive of Action Aid. Held posts as United Nations (UN) Director of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva and Deputy to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, New York. Served as UN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Great Lakes, UN Regional Coordinator in the Balkans and UN Assistant Secretary-General.



Avila Kilmurray: A founder member of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition and was part of the Coalition's negotiating team for the Good Friday Agreement. She has written extensively on community action, the women's movement and conflict transformation. Serves on the Board of Conciliation Resources (UK); the Global Fund for Community Foundations; Conflict Resolution Services Ireland and the Institute for British Irish Studies. Avila was the first Women's Officer for the Transport & General Workers Union for Ireland (1990-1994) and became Director of the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland in 1994. Avila was awarded the Raymond Georis Prize for Innovative Philanthropy through the European Foundation Centre.



Prof. Ram Manikkalingam: Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, served as Senior Advisor on the Peace Process to President of Sri Lanka, expert and author on conflict, multiculturalism and democracy, founding board member of the Laksham Kadirgamar Institute for Strategic Studies and International Relations.



Bejan Matur: Renowned Turkey based Author and Poet. She was a columnist for Zaman newspaper, focusing mainly on Kurdish politics, the Armenian issue, daily politics, minority problems, prison literature, and women's issues. Has won several literary prizes and her work has been translated into 17 languages. Former Director of the Diyarbakır Cultural Art Foundation (DKSV).



Monica McWilliams: Professor of Women's Studies, based in the Transitional Justice Institute at the University of Ulster. Was the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission from 2005 2011 and responsible for delivering the advice on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Co-founder of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition political party and was elected to a seat at the Multi-Party Peace Negotiations, which led to the Belfast (Good Friday) Peace Agreement in 1998. Served as a member of the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly from 1998-2003 and the Northern Ireland Forum for Dialogue and Understanding from 1996-1998. Publications focus on domestic violence, human security and the role of women in peace processes.



Jonathan Powell: Jonathan Powell is founder and CEO of Inter Mediate, an NGO devoted to conflict resolution working in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Jonathan was Chief of Staff to Tony Blair from 1995 to 2007 and from 1997 was also Chief British Negotiator on Northern Ireland. From 1978-79 he was a broadcast journalist with the BBC and Granada TV and from 1979 to 1994 a British Diplomat.



Sir Kieran Prendergast: Served in the British Foreign Office, including in Cyprus, Turkey, Israel, the Netherlands, Kenya and New York; later head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office dealing with Apartheid and Namibia; former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. Convenor of the SG's Executive Committee on Peace and Security and engaged in peacemaking efforts in Afghanistan, Burundi, Cyprus, the DRC, East Timor, Guatemala, Iraq, the Middle East, Somalia and Sudan.




Prof. Naomi Roht-Arriaza: Professor at University of Berkeley, United States, expert and author on transitional justice, human rights violations, international criminal law and global environmental issues.



Rajesh Rai: Rajesh was called to the Bar in 1993. His areas of expertise include Human Rights Law, Immigration and Asylum Law, and Public Law. Rajesh has extensive hands-on experience in humanitarian and environmental issues in his work with NGOs, cooperatives and companies based in the UK and overseas. He is Founding Director of HIC, a Community Centred NGO based in Cameroon, and of Human Energy (Uganda) Ltd, and was previously a Director of The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI). Rajesh also lectures on a wide variety of legal issues, both for the Bar Human Rights Council and internationally, in India, Africa, Asia, and the USA.



Prof. Dr. Mithat Sancar: Professor of Law at the University of Ankara, expert and author on constitutional citizenship and transitional justice, columnist for Taraf newspaper.



Prof. Dr. Sevtap Yokuş: Professor of Law at the University of Kocaeli. She is a widely published expert in the areas of constitutional law and human rights law, and is a practitioner in the European Court of Human Rights.



David Reddaway: He now works as an adviser, board member and consultant in the private and university sectors. He was previously British Ambassador to Turkey and to Ireland; High Commissioner to Canada; UK Special Representative for Afghanistan; and Charge d’Affaires in Iran, where he had first worked during the Iranian Revolution. He also served in Argentina; India; and Spain. He was a Fellow at Harvard University and a volunteer teacher in Ethiopia. He read History at Cambridge, and Persian at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.



Mark Muller QC: Senior advocate at Doughty Street Chambers (London) and the Scottish Faculty of Advocates (Edinburgh) specialised in public international law and human rights. He has many years’ experience of advising on conflict resolution, mediation, ceasefire and power-sharing and first-hand experience of a number of conflict zones, including Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq and Syria. Since 2005 he is Senior Advisor to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Beyond Conflict and Inter-Mediate. He is also a Harvard Law School Fellow and former Chair of the Bar Human Rights Committee and Head of Rule of Law for the Bar Council. He is the founder of Beyond Borders – a Scottish initiative dedicated to fostering peace and international understanding through cultural dialogue. He currently acts as Senior Mediation Expert for the Standby Team of Mediators of the UN Department of Political Affairs.



Joost Lagendijk: Columnist for the Turkish dailies ‘Zaman’ and ‘Today’s Zaman’, and a lecturer on EU Institutions and Policies at the Suleyman Shah University, Istanbul. He is also the author and editor of a number of books on European border issues, US and EU foreign policy strategies, and modern Turkey. From 1998 – 2009 Mr Lagendijk was a Dutch Green Left Party Member of European Parliament, where he focused on foreign policy and EU enlargement. He has also served as Chair of the Parliament’s Turkey Delegation and the rapporteur for the Parliament on the Balkans and Kosovo. From 2009 to 2012, Mr Lagendijk worked as a senior adviser at the Istanbul Policy Center in Istanbul.



Prof. Dr Ahmet Insel: A managing editor of Turkey editing house Iletisim and Head of the Department of Economics in Galatasaray University, Istanbul. Also a Professor at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University. Author and columnist.



Ali Bayramoğlu: Writer and political commentator. He is a columnist for the Turkish daily newspaper Yeni Safak. Member of Turkey’s Wise Persons Commission Established by Prime Minister Erdoğan.



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