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The DPI aims to create an atmosphere whereby different parties share knowledge, ideas, concerns, and suggestions facing the development of a democratic solution to key issues in Turkey and the wider region. The work focuses on a combination of research and practical approaches to broaden bases for wider public involvement by providing platforms for discussion in the form of roundtable meetings, seminars, workshops and conferences. This is being carried out in order to support and contribute to existing work on Turkey whilst also extending to the wider region.

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DPI aims to facilitate the creation of an atmosphere whereby the different parties are able to meet with experts from Turkey and abroad, to draw on comparative studies, as well as analyse and compare various mechanisms used to achieve positive results in similar cases. The work supports the development of a pluralistic political arena capable of generating consensus and ownership over work on key issues surrounding a democratic solution at both the political and the local level.

This paper intends to investigate the challenges facing disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes in post-conflict societies and suggests that inclusive approaches based on dialogue can be successful in overcoming them. Through an exploration of the complex nature of contemporary conflict this paper shows that post-conflict environments are not as straightforward as their name implies. It follows from this that DDR programmes could meet with greater success if they take into account the processes, people and incentives involved in sparking and sustaining the conflict rather than being seen as an administrative task with success measured purely in terms of military security.

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DDR and the Complexity of Contemporary Conflict

INTRODUCTION

The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants is widely recognised as being central to the prospects of a state or region emerging from conflict. A DDR component has been present in almost all recent United Nations (UN) operations and programmes have been enacted at a local, national and regional level. Implementation of DDR programmes is a complex processes that require great coordination among the different actors involved.¹ This paper seeks to explain some of the challenges facing post-conflict reconstruction efforts, suggesting that the processes and grievances which spark and sustain fighting remain relevant after the formal end of hostilities, and therefore, it is not correct to view DDR as a purely administrative or technical task.² It will be suggested that seeing DDR as part of a wider political process in which inclusive and constructive dialogue can play an important role represents a possible alternative route to success.³

Definition of Terms

Given the extent of the UN's role in promoting and implementing DDR it is logical to take their definitions as a starting point. The UN operates on the basis that

¹ Massimo Fusato, 'Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants' *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder <<http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/demobilization>>

² Nicole Ball and Luc van de Goor, 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Mapping, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles' Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, August 2006 <http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20060800_cru_paper_ddr.pdf>

³ Albert Caramés Boada and Eneko Sanz Pascual, 'Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2008' Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009, p. 9 <<http://escolapau.uab.es/img/programas/desarme/ddr/ddr2009i.pdf>>

'Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.'⁴

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.⁵

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance'.⁶

In some cases, the international community may refer to a fourth "R" in DDR (i.e. DDRR) representing rehabilitation, which encompasses difficult issues such as the need to address the psychological and emotional aspects of returning home, as well as problems that arise in relation to the wider community. Nearly all DDR programmes address rehabilitation in some form, but the most often used acronym for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is DDR.⁷

⁴ 'Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration' United Nations Peacekeeping <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml>>

⁵ United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre <<http://www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php>>

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Sanam Naraghi Anderlini and Camille Pampell Conaway, 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration' Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit For Advocacy And Action, <http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/31_disarmament.pdf>

While these definitions are useful in setting out the ideas behind the different elements of DDR and the range of activities which are involved, the temptation to see each term as representing a separate stage in a sequential process may be unhelpful. This paper is willing to suggest that template solutions to the problems which DDR programmes seek to address are likely to prove illusive, given the unique character of each conflict. This suggests that a flexible approach in which the sequencing and range of activities undertaken will vary from case to case may be more productive.

The Importance of DDR

The justification for dedicating a publication to the analysis of DDR rests on its important role in creating a sustainable peace. While it may be possible to formally end hostilities without addressing DDR issues, as long as there are substantial numbers of mobilised, armed combatants without a stake in a post-conflict society then any peace will likely be fragile. However, it is also true that DDR cannot be seen as a substitute for a peace process and a political solution, for where ‘intentions to kill, terrorise and inflict damage remain, it will always be possible to find the means to conduct such action’.⁸ This suggests that a broader consideration of how DDR should be approached can be valuable.

As was alluded to above, DDR has been embraced by the UN as well as by local and regional actors and it has been attempted in numerous conflict environments. Programmes have ranged from large-scale efforts to disarm and demobilise tens of thousands of combatants coordinated by multiple countries to local-scale interventions led by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) aimed at reintegrating specific sub-groups. Given the number and diversity of examples and the tragically patchy success of DDR, attempting to learn from history and understand when and how DDR can be

⁸ A. Özerdem, ‘Insurgency, militias and DDR as part of security sector reconstruction in Iraq: how not to do it’, *Disasters*. Vol. 34, No.1, 2010, p. 53

successful is important. Furthermore, as DDR engages specifically with weapons and armed groups, critical analysis is always warranted.⁹

Firstly, the complexity of contemporary conflict will be highlighted and the implications for DDR will be explored in the paper. Part I is intended to discuss the often counterintuitive nature of civil conflict and highlight the potential for networks to play a central role. It will be suggested that one factor in the persistence of contemporary civil conflict, and so one of the key challenges facing DDR efforts, is that conflict is not purely destructive; it involves not just the collapse of a system but the emergence of new systems of profit and power.¹⁰ From this it follows that the distinction between conflict and post-conflict is not as straightforward as is often assumed given the continuation of these systems beyond the formal end of hostilities. This could have significant implications for the planning and implementation of DDR because 'post-conflict' situations 'often bear little resemblance to what is implied in their definition'.¹¹

With the above analysis in mind, Part II outlines and assesses aspects of DDR in Colombia, Iraq and Northern Ireland. In Colombia, the relative challenges faced when integrating different armed groups highlight the importance of the national and international context and the wider political environment. In Iraq a simplistic division of armed groups into 'good' and 'bad' led to the alienation of Sunnis and the factionalisation of Iraqi politics, whereas more nuanced and inclusive efforts based on identification of mutual interests and responsibilities had successes at a local level. In Northern Ireland, formerly imprisoned, politically motivated combatants participated in a range of reintegration projects and made a significant contribution to the peace process.

Part III addresses the specific challenges facing women and children during post-conflict DDR. Both women and children have suffered during past DDR campaigns, sometimes leading to the re-emergence of conflict. It will be suggested that inclusive

⁹ R. Muggah, 'Introduction' in Muggah, R. ed. 'Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war'. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p. 3

¹⁰ D. Keen, 'Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone.' Oxford: James Currey, 2005, p. 11

¹¹ R. Muggah, 'Introduction' in Muggah, R. ed. 'Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war'. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p. 248

approaches which recognise the involvement and interests of the full range of actors could meet with greater success.

Having established the complexity of contemporary conflict and the overlap between conflict and post-conflict environments, the paper will conclude by highlighting the potential to locate DDR within a wider process of political settlement and peace building. It will also be suggested that the complex motivations of combatants and the potential for violence to fulfil an economic or livelihood role indicates that promoting opportunities to live non-violent lives after conflict could have a place at the heart of DDR. The paper will introduce the idea of viewing DDR as representing the forging of a new social contract between state and combatant as an alternative to the focus on military security which has characterised past unsuccessful DDR efforts.¹²

¹² M. Knight and A. Özerdem, (2004) 'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace', *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 41, No. 4, 2004
<<http://unddr.org/docs/Guns,CampsandCash,DDR.pdf>>

CHAPTER 1: The Complexity of Armed Conflict and the Implications for DDR

The challenge of DDR lies in persuading combatants to abandon their use of violence and take up peaceful lives. This paper starts with a suggestion that will start by suggesting that doing so requires an understanding of the often diverse and contradictory motivations and incentives that lead civilians to become combatants in the first place, and of how these can shift and transform during conflict. One way of doing this is through seeking to understand the 'underlying interests, incentives and institutions' of conflict affected societies and in this part of the paper it will be suggested that doing so can shed light on the continuities between conflict and post-conflict environments and therefore on to the central challenges of peace building.¹³ The relevance of this approach is best understood in the context of the tendency for actors involved in planning and implementing DDR to view it as an administrative or managerial task.¹⁴ The aim of this chapter is to show that engaging with DDR on a purely administrative and military security basis may struggle to address the diverse challenges facing post-conflict societies and the needs of the people who live in them, given the complexity of contemporary conflict.

However, it is first important to note that while this part will highlight the potential economic roles of violence, it in no way seeks to reduce all civil conflict to issues of greed and opportunism. Rather, it will show that conflicts are complicated and that this complexity must be engaged with when planning for DDR. Drawing attention to economic processes in other conflicts can illustrate the problems of the conflict – post-conflict distinction, which will have relevance for the Turkish and other cases even if the circumstances are different. In addition, even where economic incentives play an insignificant role during conflict, the potential for weapons and relationships to be turned towards banditry in the aftermath of conflict, if grievances and other motivating

¹³ DFID, 'Political Economy Analysis How To Note' 2009 <<http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/PO58.pdf>>

¹⁴ M. Berdal, 'Disarmament and demobilisation after civil wars: arms, soldiers and the termination of armed conflicts'. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.5-6

factors are not addressed, means that a consideration of such processes is appropriate.¹⁵

Understanding Motivations for Violence

The interpretation of contemporary armed conflict has tended to focus either on identifying sides, battles and tactics or on the anarchic and chaotic nature of fighting. The former continues the Cold War tradition while latter has been influenced by accounts of fighting in the former Yugoslavia and Africa describing savage, irrational and mindless conflict rooted in ethnic rivalries and environmental pressures.¹⁶

A more nuanced analysis which engages with the underlying political, economic and institutional processes at work in war torn societies suggests that contemporary civil conflicts are neither straightforward nor irrational nor purely destructive. Such an approach may be best able to shed light on the range of functions which violence can fulfil for those involved and therefore on the challenges facing those seeking to advance DDR. The explanatory power of such analysis can be illustrated through a consideration of cooperative conflict, one of the most counterintuitive features of post-Cold War civil conflict.

While there has been much debate about tactics, strategy, causes and consequences, the assumption that conflicts are fought between sides aiming for victory has often been accepted uncritically. However, there are numerous examples of tactics and relationships between combatants which make no sense if victory is assumed to be the motivation for all those involved in the conflict.¹⁷ One example is the conflict in Bosnia, widely presented in mainstream media as rooted in ethnic hatreds unleashed by the collapse of an authoritarian system and yet 'key aspects are inexplicable' without considering the non-ideological functions of violence. While there was clearly a strong

¹⁵ D. Last, cited in M. Knight and A. Özerdem, (2004) 'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace', *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 41, No. 4, 2004, p.506

¹⁶ D. Keen, 'The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars.' Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p.10

¹⁷ *Ibid.* p.13

ethnic dimension to fighting in Bosnia, narratives centred on ancient, primordial hatreds between ethnic groups cannot explain the inter ethnic and even inter military trading that occurred.¹⁸

During the siege of Sarajevo, Bosnian Muslim and Serbian soldiers met at night to trade food and fuel despite representing opposing sides in the war. The reliance of Sarajevo on black market goods both represented an opportunity for, and necessitated, 'commercial collaboration across front lines'. Bosnian Serb forces also sold up to 60 truckloads of weapons and ammunition to the Fifth Corps of the Bosnian Army which was later used in attacks against them. If it is assumed that the sole motivation for Serbian combatants was victory in the siege and the wider war, then how can evidence that the defence of Sarajevo was in part facilitated by the 'besiegers... supplying the besieged' and that Bosnian forces were strengthened by buying weapons from Serbs be understood?¹⁹ The problems of attempting DDR without taking into account the dynamics of conflict will be set out in more detail in section 3.

The conflict in Sierra Leone also demonstrates the difficulty of getting to grips with the challenges facing post-conflict societies without engaging with the political and economic processes which contributed to the conflict. Although portrayed by influential figures as being a chaotic and anarchic conflict, there were examples of calculated and cooperative behaviour by combatants.²⁰ There were in fact very few genuine battles fought in the conflict with most violence instead being directed towards civilians, as well as avoiding direct conflict with rebels, Government forces sold weapons to RUF fighters.²¹ This suggests that, for at least some of those involved, war was not solely about winning. It also created an environment in which it was possible

¹⁸ P. Andreas, 'The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, 2004, p.31
<http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Political_Science/documents/Clandestine_Political_Economy_of_War_and_Peace.pdf>

¹⁹ Ibid, p.38

²⁰ R.D. Kaplan, (1994) 'The Coming Anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet', *The Atlantic*, February 1994, p.543-545
<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/4670/?single_page=true>

²¹ D. Keen, 'The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars.' Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p.19

to profit in ways impossible during peace and this had a significant effect on peace building.²²

The above section suggests that looking at the incentives and interests driving behaviour and the 'interaction between political and economic processes in society' represents a way of gaining a better understanding of the challenges facing DDR.²³ The examples of Bosnia and Sierra Leone were used to show that the economic considerations of belligerents can be a factor in conflict. Rather than as the ideologically driven pursuit of victory or as irrational chaos, conflict can be seen as being influenced by the diverse motivations of combatants which can lead to counterintuitive, yet understandable, outcomes. As will now be shown, the complex processes, including economic relationships, involved in sustaining conflict can persist through the transition to post-conflict and can profoundly affect the chances of achieving sustainable peace. This suggests that seeking to implement DDR without engaging with the wider political and economic context of a post-conflict society may be unsuccessful.

The Problematic Conflict – Post-Conflict Division and Bosnia

Thinking about conflict in a way which recognises the complex processes at work is relevant to DDR because it can challenge the assumption that there is a clean break between conflict and post-conflict environments.²⁴ At the heart of this paper is the recognition of the continuities between conflict and post-conflict and of how these shape post-conflict environments. It is suggested that recognising these complexities could contribute to the success of DDR programmes and that inclusive approaches which recognise the choices facing combatants could help in this regard.

²² P. Collier, 'Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective' in Berdal, M. & Malone, D. M. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, <<http://web.idrc.ca/openebooks/421-5/>>

²³ DFID, 'Political Economy Analysis How To Note' 2009, p.4 <<http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/PO58.pdf>>

²⁴ C. Binder, K. Lukas, and R. Schweiger, 'UN Security Council Resolution 1325, Gender and Transitional Justice' in Korieh, C. J. & Okeke-Ihejirika, P. eds. Gendering Global Transformations: Gender, Culture, Race and Identity. Oxon: Taylor & Francis, 2009, p. 201-219

On this issue, there is a tendency among institutions, donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to conceptualise DDR as an administrative or managerial task in contrast to the explicitly political process of reaching a peace settlement.²⁵ However, it is far from certain that the grievances and processes which sparked and sustained armed conflict will automatically cease to be relevant at the formal end of hostilities.²⁶ The following two sections are willing to show that such networks can both persist and can be transformed at the end of hostilities and suggest that failing to engage with the dynamics of the conflict could undermine attempts at DDR.

Bosnia

As was referred to above, conflict in Bosnia was more complex than has been widely assumed. The examples of illicit trade in weapons, food and fuel crossing supposedly rigid ethnic boundaries set out above were far from isolated, indeed some have argued that the Bosnian state would likely not exist had it not been for the operation of a shadow war economy.²⁷

At the outbreak of conflict, Bosnian Serb forces had a significant advantage in terms of access to weapons, being supplied both by the Yugoslav People's Army and with arms trafficked from Belgrade. The decision to impose an international arms embargo on the region had the effect of 'locking in' this disparity by increasing the importance of access to black market weapons, an area in which the government of Sarajevo was disadvantaged. Bosnian Serb forces were aware of their advantage and the perception of a mismatch and the expectation of a quick victory may have played a

²⁵ Albert Caramés Boada and Eneko Sanz Pascual, 'Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during 2008' Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009, p. 9 <<http://escolapau.uab.es/img/programas/desarme/ddr/ddr2009i.pdf>>; Massimo Fusato, 'Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants' Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder <<http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/demobilization>>

²⁶ M. Berdal, 'Disarmament and demobilisation after civil wars: arms, soldiers and the termination of armed conflicts'. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.6

²⁷ P. Andreas, 'The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, 2004, p. 33 <http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Political_Science/documents/Clandestine_Political_Economy_of_War_and_Peace.pdf>

role in the decision to go to war. Early territorial gains by Bosnian Serb forces can be linked to the success of the coordinated use of illicit networks to arm groups. The Serb backed paramilitary groups which played a central role in ethnic cleansing were also bolstered by fighters from Serbia seeking to take advantage of the conflict to loot, traffic and trade.²⁸

The resistance to Bosnian Serb forces also came to rely on connections to criminal networks. The early defence of Sarajevo rested on a coalition of criminal gangs and police forces with the former continuing to prey on the population whilst winning important military victories. There are also accounts of Chinese made anti-tank weapons being smuggled into the city disguised as wounded soldiers on stretchers and of shipments of gunpowder being mixed in with permitted shipments of oxygen cylinders.²⁹ Tacit US approval of larger-scale smuggling contributed to the emergence of a relatively strong Bosnian army, which was a significant factor in forcing a political settlement to the conflict.³⁰

If an understanding of economic processes, networks and incentives sheds light on the outbreak and dynamics of conflict in Bosnia then it can also contribute to our understanding of the difficulties surrounding post-conflict reconstruction, for the networks which shaped the conflict in the manner set out above continued to operate after the signing of the Dayton Accords. Post-conflict efforts were taking place in the context of a criminalised state and economy due to the central role played by illicit trade, trafficking and criminal networks during the conflict.³¹

According to Jacques Klein, the UN Special Representative to Bosnia, war-time clandestine networks moved into people trafficking and tax evasion post-conflict and

²⁸ Massimo Moratti and Amra Sabic-El-Rayess, 'Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina' International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2009 <<http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Bosnia-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf>>

²⁹ P. Andreas, 'The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, 2004, p.39 <http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Political_Science/documents/Clandestine_Political_Economy_of_War_and_Peace.pdf>

³⁰ Ibid p.41-42

³¹ Massimo Moratti and Amra Sabic-El-Rayess, 'Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina' International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2009 <<http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Bosnia-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf>>

deals struck between militaries which facilitated illicit economic activity during the conflict continued to operate.³² It is no coincidence that the elites who emerged with power and influence in Sarajevo in the aftermath of the settlement were those who were 'most connected to the shadowy world of clandestine transactions' and who had made fortunes through smuggling and trafficking. This process led to entrenched political corruption rooted in the ties formed between politicians, the security sector and criminal networks during conflict which 'undermined the rebuilding of the city, eroded public trust in government, and impeded democratic reform', reducing the chances of a successful transition to peace.³³

Similarly, the informal economy which had developed during the conflict strengthened after the formal end of hostilities. It both provided vital services to the population and hampered the development of formal institutions by channelling money through illicit networks and so starving the state of revenue.³⁴ It is estimated that by 1999 the state was missing out on \$30m a year in revenue from one market alone where guns and drugs were sold alongside other goods.³⁵

This section has shown the continued relevance of the processes which shaped conflict in the post-conflict period in Bosnia. The strength and scale of the illicit networks which sustained the fighting undermined formal reconstruction efforts whilst paradoxically supplying the population with important goods. There is an equally strong case to be made for the continued relevance of security concerns (both

³² USGAO 'Bosnia Peace Operation: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation Of the Dayton Peace Agreement' Report to Congressional Requesters, 7 July 2000, p. 13 <http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/229311.pdf>; B. Divjak and M. Pugh, 'The Political Economy of Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina', International Peacekeeping. Vol. 15, No.3, 2008, p. 375 <http://www.relooney.info/0_NS4053_74.pdf>

³³ P. Andreas, 'The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, 2004, p.44 <http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Political_Science/documents/Clandestine_Political_Economy_of_War_and_Peace.pdf>

³⁴ Tobias Pietz, 'Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Soldiers in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina' Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), Hamburg, Germany, Issue 135, March 2004 <<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=15911>>

³⁵ P. Andreas, 'The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, 2004, p.46 <http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Political_Science/documents/Clandestine_Political_Economy_of_War_and_Peace.pdf>

conventional and human)³⁶ for combatants in the post-conflict period, with excess deaths often remaining higher than at pre-war levels.³⁷

The key point at this stage is the suggestion that designating the period following the end of formal hostilities as 'post-conflict' does not automatically mean that the conflict itself ceases to be relevant or that pre-war society will naturally return, with DDR representing an uncontroversial administrative task. DDR is far from straightforward and must take all those involved in the conflict into account. As the above analysis of Bosnia shows, when existing systems fail during the stress of conflict, new systems and networks can be created to take their place.³⁸ As DDR programmes operate in this context, it is reasonable to suggest that engaging with the wider issues surrounding the conflict could contribute to better outcomes. The implications for DDR of this part's argument will be discussed in more detail below.

The Implications for DDR

Where 'intentions to kill, terrorise and inflict damage remain, it will always be possible to find the means to conduct such action'.³⁹ The regional nature of many contemporary conflicts and the ability of, and incentives for, clandestine networks to evade embargos makes it almost impossible to prevent weapons entering a country.⁴⁰ With this in mind it is difficult to interpret DDR simply as a technical task requiring the collection of a certain number of weapons and demobilisation of a certain number of combatants. Focusing on numbers and the technical implementation of a template solution may be unlikely to succeed given the 'multiple dimensions of the choice to

³⁶ For a discussion of the differences between the conventional and human security paradigms see Booth, K. (1991); UNDP (1994) and Paris, R. (2001)

³⁷ R. Muggah, 'Introduction' in Muggah, R. ed. 'Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war'. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.240

³⁸ D. Keen, 'The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars.' Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p.11

³⁹ A. Özerdem, 'Insurgency, militias and DDR as part of security sector reconstruction in Iraq: how not to do it', *Disasters*. Vol. 34, No.1, 2010, p.53

⁴⁰ M. Pugh, 'Crime and Capitalism in Kosovo's Transformation', Paper presented at ISA Conference Hawaii, March 2005, p. 4 <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/twe/papers/Pugh,_Mike_-_Crime_and_Capitalism_in_Kosovo's_Transformation.pdf>

disarm.’⁴¹ In order to be successful it may be necessary for DDR processes to take into account the motivations of combatants and the opportunities and incentives facing them.

A nuanced analysis shows that there can be diverse motivations behind combatants’ decisions to use violence, involving economic considerations as well as factors relating to grievances and identity. This understanding suggests that giving up a weapon can represent a ‘point of no return’ when combatants and leaders ‘must have faith in a future where the advantages of peace outweigh those of war’.⁴² With this in mind, efforts to convince combatants of the benefits of peace both through pursuing constructive and inclusive dialogue and through political reform where appropriate contribute to success. Furthermore, given the potential economic role of weapons, and indeed of conflict itself, the opportunity to take up non-violent livelihoods could be important. This point will underpin this paper’s suggestion that it may be useful to consider DDR as a social contract, involving mutual responsibilities and commitments.

In Part II, this paper will introduce and analyse DDR programmes in Colombia, Iraq and Northern Ireland drawing out possible implications for future cases in other regions.

⁴¹ Z. Marriage, ‘Flip-flop rebel, dollar soldier: Demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.131

⁴² M. Knight and A. Özerdem, (2004) ‘Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace’, *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 41, No. 4, 2004, p. 506 <<http://unddr.org/docs/Guns,CampsandCash,DDR.pdf>>

CHAPTER 2: DDR in Colombia, Iraq and Northern Ireland

Colombia

While this paper works to suggest that the uniqueness of every conflict makes template solutions difficult, that does not mean that comparisons between conflicts are worthless. In Colombia, the relative challenges faced when reintegrating different groups in different phases of conflict suggests that the details of the conflict, groups and context could have an impact on the viability of DDR programmes and that generating public support through a wider political process could contribute to success. In Iraq, simplistic understandings of the motivations of combatants and the use of distinctions between 'good' and 'bad' combatants when deciding who should be eligible for DDR benefits seriously undermined Iraq's political future. On the other hand, when more nuanced, inclusive approaches were pursued based on mutual interests and responsibilities they achieved successes at local levels. In Northern Ireland, the involvement of former combatants in the peace process and in reintegration and other community projects made significant contributions to changing attitudes to violence. These points will be explored in more detail below, starting with the two DDR efforts in Colombia.

Section one suggested that understanding the specific context in which the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants will be taking place could be important. The record of DDR in Colombia, a country which has witnessed sustained conflict over the last several decades involving a range of armed groups, represents a powerful case study through which to reveal the influence of conflict dynamics on peace processes.

DDR in Colombia has been carried out in two broad periods; the first between 1989 and 1994 and the second which began in 2003 and which is as yet unresolved. While the former progressed relatively smoothly and was met with success at least in the short term, the latter has been more problematic. That even within one country and one conflict the viability and nature of DDR can vary widely shows the importance of

seeking to understand the particular context involved and illustrates the difficulty of developing generally applicable rules.⁴³

The conflict in Colombia started during the 1960s with the emergence of a string of left-wing groups prepared to use guerrilla tactics in their pursuit of a socialist regime to redress 'inequality, social exclusion and the concentration of political power in the hands of a few'. A range of right-wing paramilitary organisations formed in opposition to the Marxist guerrillas, by the 1980s becoming 'independent counterinsurgency forces... supported by cattle ranchers, emerald traders, agricultural entrepreneurs and large landowners'. Both guerrillas and paramilitaries sustained their operations through illicit trading, most notably through large-scale connections with drug trafficking, taxing coca production and extortion. Both guerrillas and paramilitary groups have been demobilised during the conflict with varying degrees of success.⁴⁴

In 1989 a deal was reached which would entail the demobilisation and reintegration of the guerrilla group M-19. 791 combatants were demobilised between 1989 and 1990 and M-19 made an initially successful transition into mainstream politics, becoming the Alianza Democrática M-19 and achieving strong results in elections. Many members continue to participate in policy making and debate and 'their sustained political engagement has contributed to strengthen liberal political ideals and human rights norms in Colombia.'⁴⁵ From 2002 onwards Colombia has faced the challenge of integrating former combatants from the AUC paramilitary organisation following a coordinated demobilisation of 31,671 fighters and also around 15,800 individually demobilised fighters from both paramilitary and guerrilla groups with limited success.⁴⁶ Analysis as to why the more recent integration efforts have failed to match those of 20 years ago offers important insights surrounding the importance of

⁴³ M Berdal, and D.H Ucko, 'Introduction: The political reintegration of armed groups after war' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.8

⁴⁴ Maria Derks, Hans Rouw and Ivan Briscoe, 'A Community Dilemma: DDR and the Changing Face of Violence in Colombia' Peace Security and Development Network, № 00030, July 2011 <http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2011/20110700_briscoe_derks_colombia.pdf>

⁴⁵ Sergio Jaramillo, Yaneth Giha and Paula Torres, 'Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Colombia' International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2009 < <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Colombia-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf>>

⁴⁶ A.Guaqueta, 'The way back in: Reintegrating illegal armed groups in Colombia then and now' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.11

the wider social and political context, the role of a political settlement, the nature of the group involved and the practical difficulties of political transition.

Firstly, the demobilisation and reintegration of M-19 took place alongside significant reforms to Colombia's political system. Colombia had been seen as being in the midst of a national crisis linked to weaknesses in the democratic system and the violent growth and pervasive influence of the drug economy. Many within society had started to call for more substantial changes to Colombian politics than the piecemeal measures which had been implemented, with support growing for the state to address the grievances of the left. In this context the integration of a prominent guerrilla group into mainstream politics at the same time as the political system was being dramatically restructured represented a 'unique moment of great optimism and hope'.⁴⁷

The nature of M-19's guerrilla activities and outlook was also significant in the initial ease with which it made the transition into peaceful political life. The group was less radical than Marxist groups like FARC, envisioning reform rather than revolution, and had anticipated entering mainstream politics as a broad force. This was reflected in the group's willingness to accept concessions during peace negotiations. Furthermore, the group's conduct during the war was relatively restrained. M-19 generally attacked symbolic political targets rather than trying to defeat the state through direct coercion and was less systematically involved in the drug trade than other guerrilla and paramilitary groups. These factors made the integration of M-19 members into the mainstream Colombian political process uncontroversial.⁴⁸

In contrast, the political environment confronting the second phase of guerrilla and paramilitary reintegration has been much less favourable and the dynamics of the conflict in the preceding 20 years has profoundly affected the chances of success. This has been particularly evident in relation to the prospective transformation of paramilitaries into a mainstream political force.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ A.Guaqueta, 'The way back in: Reintegrating illegal armed groups in Colombia then and now' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.13-14

⁴⁸ Sergio Jaramillo, Yaneth Giha and Paula Torres, 'Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Colombia' International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2009 < <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Colombia-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf>>; Maria Derks, Hans Rouw and Ivan Briscoe, 'A Community Dilemma: DDR and the Changing Face of Violence in Colombia' Peace Security and Development Network, No 00030, July 2011 < http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2011/20110700_briscoe_derks_colombia.pdf>

⁴⁹ A.Guaqueta, 'The way back in: Reintegrating illegal armed groups in Colombia then and now' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.21

Whereas the rehabilitation of M-19 was widely seen in a positive light, support for a future political role for former paramilitaries was far from universal. While some accepted their status as a '*de facto* political force by virtue of their power' many mainstream political actors regarded them as a contaminating presence and revelations of links between paramilitaries and politics led to scandals. These difficulties can be linked to the problematic human rights record of paramilitary groups in comparison to the more restrained tactics of M-19, and to their more systematic involvement in illicit and predatory economic activity.⁵⁰

One estimate, by the Columbian think tank Cinep, places the number of victims of homicide, torture and forced disappearances at more than 14,000 between 1998 and 2003, including numerous civilians subjected to beheadings, dismemberment and rape.⁵¹ Interviews have revealed accounts of paramilitary combatants being told to kill entire villages, albeit 'one by one over a period of a few days [because] if we kill everyone all at once, they call it a massacre and we have problems with human rights'.⁵²

Furthermore, in the decades since the demobilisation and reintegration of M-19, the extent of AUC and guerrilla involvement in profiting from and facilitating drug trafficking had become impossible to ignore, with growing awareness that economic motivations were a central factor in the high levels of violence afflicting Colombia. Awareness of money accepted by paramilitaries from multinational corporations was also damaging to public attitudes towards the reintegration of former AUC members. These two issues, along with the record of paramilitary groups using violence to secure political power and turn it to their own ends, undermined the idea that paramilitary groups were defending the security of the people or the state against guerrillas or that they were seeking to redress legitimate grievances. While some focused on the potential for the undeniably powerful networks created by the paramilitaries to threaten Colombian democracy and others emphasised the gravity of their human rights

⁵⁰ Sergio Jaramillo, Yaneth Giha and Paula Torres, 'Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Colombia' International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2009 < <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Colombia-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf>>; Maria Derks, Hans Rouw and Ivan Briscoe, 'A Community Dilemma: DDR and the Changing Face of Violence in Colombia' Peace Security and Development Network, № 00030, July 2011 < http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2011/20110700_briscoe_derks_colombia.pdf>

⁵¹ A.Guaqueta, 'The way back in: Reintegrating illegal armed groups in Colombia then and now' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. eds. Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.22

⁵² Interviewee 'Vladimiro' in Theidon, K. (2009)p.15

violations, it is clear that the specific nature of the groups and the details of the conflict shaped the chances of successful reintegration.⁵³

Despite efforts to reintegrate paramilitary groups ‘normality’ has not been reached and residues of the paramilitary phenomenon pose grave threats’. There is evidence that new criminal structures with suspected links to the paramilitaries were formed in the aftermath of demobilisation and in some regions paramilitary fighters still wield local political power.

Possible implications for future DDR efforts

The record of DDR in Colombia shows the potential importance of both a wider political settlement and a favourable political and social context to the successful reintegration of armed groups. The key factors in shaping the ease with which groups joined mainstream political life were also linked both to the specific actions and political outlook of the guerrilla and paramilitary groups and to their involvement in what has been described as the ‘alternative systems of profit, power and protection’ created during conflict.⁵⁴

Perhaps most significantly, in simultaneously undertaking constitutional reforms to redress grievances widely perceived to be legitimate and incorporating a demobilised M-19 into mainstream politics, Colombia was able to foster and capitalise on a period of great optimism. The reforms to Colombia’s 1886 constitution were enacted through a one off National Constituent Assembly and had been requested by M-19 as a condition of disarmament and demobilisation. However, they were also supported across Colombian society including by the student movement and a referendum which found in favour of creating the Assembly had an 86% turnout.⁵⁵ In this way the reintegration of

⁵³ A.Guaqueta, ‘The way back in: Reintegrating illegal armed groups in Colombia then and now’ in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.25

⁵⁴ D. Keen, ‘The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars.’ Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p.11

⁵⁵ A.Guaqueta, ‘The way back in: Reintegrating illegal armed groups in Colombia then and now’ in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.14; Sergio Jaramillo, Yaneth Giha and Paula Torres, ‘Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Colombia’ International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2009 < <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Colombia-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf>>; Maria Derks, Hans Rouw and Ivan Briscoe, ‘A Community Dilemma: DDR and the Changing Face of Violence in Colombia’ Peace Security and Development Network, No 00030, July 2011 <http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2011/20110700_briscoe_derks_colombia.pdf>

M-19 represented one part of a wider process of democratic and political reform, addressing both the grievances of the group and those of wider society.

The Columbian case suggests that attempts to reintegrate armed groups without implementing parallel democratic reforms and in the context of social division could be difficult. With this in mind, in the context of Turkey, an exclusive focus on achieving a military victory over armed groups 'without a campaign for hearts and minds' could be seen to represent an inauspicious basis for DDR.⁵⁶

Iraq

While estimates of the number of casualties caused by the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation range widely, there is little doubt that the number is approaching the hundreds of thousands and may be many times more. The vast majority of these deaths have occurred since President Bush declared mission accomplished, signalling the start of the reconstruction process, and US reconstruction experts were on the ground as early as the summer of 2003.⁵⁷ Given the proliferation of armed groups and spiralling violence during the conflict and occupation it would be reasonable to assume that any DDR efforts had little effect. However, while DDR did indeed have little positive impact in restraining violence, this section will suggest that the failures of DDR planning and implementation in Iraq have had a significant negative impact on Iraq's future security. While the above discussion of reintegration in Colombia focused on the importance of the wider political climate, the following analysis of DDR in Iraq will emphasise the significance of specific errors of judgement by the occupying powers rooted in their simplistic understanding of the nature of the armed actors in Iraq and of the developing conflict. It will also highlight the success, albeit at a local level, that was achieved when more nuanced and inclusive approaches were adopted, based on the identification of mutual interests and responsibilities.

⁵⁶ H. J. Barkey, 'Turkey and the PKK: A Pyrrhic Victory?' in Art, R. J. & Richardson, L. eds. *Democracy and Counterterrorism*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2007, p.373

⁵⁷ J. Hamre, F. Barton, B. Crocker, J. Mendelson-Forman, and R. Orr, R. 'Iraq's Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Field Review and Recommendations', 17 July 2003 <<http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/0307hamre.pdf>>

The environment in which DDR efforts took place in Iraq has been described as being 'uniquely inauspicious' due to the fact that none of the groups involved had been clear winners or losers during the war.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the invasion brought about the collapse of an Iraqi state already weakened by years of sanctions with seventeen out of twenty three ministry buildings destroyed within three weeks. In this context, the much maligned decision to disband the Iraqi security forces contributed to a security vacuum in which a range of groups were empowered to take up arms.⁵⁹

The logic behind the decision to disband the Iraqi army was linked to a simplistic understanding of the motives of Sunnis in Iraq, and this same logic contributed to the failure of the DDR campaign. There was an assumption underpinning US action that members of the Ba'athist security forces were 'blindly devoted' to Saddam Hussein and so the decision to disband them and then the more serious error of excluding them from DDR benefits has been linked to a desire for retribution.⁶⁰ This left military force as the central component of US policy towards the Sunni insurgency.

However, a more nuanced analysis of the Sunni insurgency shows that many were not closely linked to the Ba'athist regime and were likely motivated more by nationalist opposition to occupation than loyalty to Saddam Hussein.⁶¹ Disbanding the Iraqi army, a source of great pride across Iraq and the degradation of which by Saddam Hussein had caused resentment among officers, further stoked nationalist sentiment.⁶² Failure to recognise the subtleties of the insurgency in its early stages would continue,

⁵⁸ D. Ucko, 'Militias, tribes and insurgents: The challenge of political reintegration in Iraq' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. Eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.89

⁵⁹ T. Dodge, 'What were the causes and consequences of Iraq's descent into violence after the initial invasion?', Expert Submission to The Iraq Enquiry, November 2009, p.4 <<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/37045/dodge-submission.pdf>>

⁶⁰ D. Ucko, 'Militias, tribes and insurgents: The challenge of political reintegration in Iraq' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. Eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.91; T. S. Mowle, 'Iraq's militia problem', *Survival*. Vol. 48, No.3, 2006, p.45

⁶¹ D. Ucko, 'Militias, tribes and insurgents: The challenge of political reintegration in Iraq' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. Eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.91; Özerdem, 'Insurgency, militias and DDR as part of security sector reconstruction in Iraq: how not to do it', *Disasters*. Vol. 34, No.1, 2010, p.45

⁶² A.S. Hashim, 'Military Power and State Formation in Modern Iraq', *Middle East Policy*. Vol. 10, No. 4, 2003, p. 39 <<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1061-1924.2003.00128.x/pdf>>

with former soldiers said to have been 'deliberately alienated' throughout the DDR process due to their assumed loyalty to the Ba'athist regime.⁶³

It has been suggested that there was a missed opportunity to put in place an orderly demobilisation and reintegration process when former soldiers re-emerged and staged demonstrations over their lack of pay.⁶⁴ Instead, up to one million men were cut loose, suffering dramatic loss of economic security, psychological trauma and shame and leading in many cases to armed resistance to the occupation.⁶⁵ The failure to capitalise on this opportunity and to understand the implications of disbanding the armed forces reflects a general lack of interest in DDR issues among the occupying powers. Reconstruction of security structures was not a priority and 'was tackled ineffectively; the strategies, institutional capacities and resources invested in the process were highly inadequate and inappropriate'.⁶⁶

At the same time as Sunni groups were excluded, Shia militia groups were often engaged with relatively uncritically, despite the fact that they posed 'an equal danger to the chances of peace, justice or democracy in Iraq'.⁶⁷ This has been linked in part to a perception that as they had fought Saddam Hussein they were in some sense deserving of a reward.⁶⁸ Initial plans for a five year long three track transition and reintegration process in which militias would have been broken up and incorporated into official security forces were quickly undermined, with the timescale dropping to seven months before distrust between militias and government led to a breakdown. Instead militia leaders were brought into the political process with only limited preconditions, including Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army who were allowed to enter mainstream politics following largely symbolic disarmament. After elections in which Shia and Kurd

⁶³ D. Ucko, 'Militias, tribes and insurgents: The challenge of political reintegration in Iraq' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. Eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.91

⁶⁴ A.S. Hashim, 'Military Power and State Formation in Modern Iraq', *Middle East Policy*. Vol. 10, No. 4, 2003, p. 38 <<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1061-1924.2003.00128.x/pdf>>

⁶⁵ Özerdem, 'Insurgency, militias and DDR as part of security sector reconstruction in Iraq: how not to do it', *Disasters*. Vol. 34, No.1, 2010, p.47; A.S. Hashim, 'Military Power and State Formation in Modern Iraq', *Middle East Policy*. Vol. 10, No. 4, 2003, p. 39-40<<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1061-1924.2003.00128.x/pdf>>

⁶⁶ David M. Walker, 'Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks' DIANE Publishing, 2008

⁶⁷ T. S. Mowle, 'Iraq's militia problem', *Survival*. Vol. 48, No.3, 2006, p.41

⁶⁸ D. Ucko, 'Militias, tribes and insurgents: The challenge of political reintegration in Iraq' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. Eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.92

representatives came to dominate the transitional assembly this process accelerated, with Shia and Kurd militias 'increasingly incorporated into security forces'.⁶⁹ This represented the fulfilment of Sunni fears that they would be disadvantaged in a new Iraqi state with security structures formed on sectarian lines. The uncoordinated reintegration of armed actors into mainstream Iraqi politics made a significant contribution to the factionalisation of Iraqi politics as elections entrenched the *de facto* power imbalance, with Sunni groups boycotting polls in protest.⁷⁰

While simplistic analyses of insurgent and militia groups, general lack of focus on DDR issues and later panic and desperation in the Iraqi government have been blamed for the initial failure of DDR in Iraq, the perspectives of the militias involved were also important in undermining the process. The continuing insecurity in the context of an ongoing Sunni insurgency and rivalries between Shia militia groups left little incentive for armed groups to disarm. Instead, opportunities to engage with and enter mainstream politics were seen as a chance to develop power bases within the emerging Iraqi state by placing supporters into positions of power. This meant, for example, the development of the ministries of health and transportation into Sadr loyalist strongholds and the purging of departments on sectarian grounds.⁷¹

Significantly for this paper, later small scale successes in restraining and reintegrating militias rested on more nuanced understandings and engagement with local security dynamics. Rather than tarring all militia groups as one, US forces began to identify and target more moderate elements with whom to work towards improving local security, a process which involved dialogue and understanding. These relationships were based on recognition of common interests and mutual commitments to pursue them.

Possible Implications for Future DDR Efforts

⁶⁹ T. S. Mowle, 'Iraq's militia problem', *Survival*. Vol. 48, No.3, 2006, p.50

⁷⁰ D. Ucko, 'Militias, tribes and insurgents: The challenge of political reintegration in Iraq' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. Eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.98

⁷¹ *Ibid.* p.99

One of the most costly errors of DDR in Iraq was to allow simplistic value judgements about the groups involved to influence policy. While excluding Sunni insurgents may have satisfied a desire for retribution against forces presumed to remain loyal to Saddam Hussein, in reality it has pushed Iraq further towards dysfunctional and violent sectarian politics. When combined with the disordered reintegration of Shia militia leaders, allowing them to maintain their power bases, it has alienated Sunnis leaving them feeling like 'the second level of people'.⁷² If 'counterinsurgency ultimately is a political operation, not a military one' then excluding one of the central groups of actors and allowing the impression to develop that a significant segment of society is being alienated seems unlikely to result in a successful outcome.⁷³

In contrast, when DDR was based on dialogue with a broader range of actors, including moderate members of Shia militia and Sunni insurgent groups who had previously carried out attacks on coalition forces, it led to considerable successes on a local level. This supports this paper's suggestion that developing a more nuanced approach which recognises the difficult choices facing combatants and seeks progress through inclusion and dialogue could be important.⁷⁴

Secondly, DDR was attempted in the context of significant insecurity across Iraq and in which the political development of the Iraqi state was as yet unclear. Given the ongoing Sunni insurgency Shia militias had little interest in giving up weapons and the development of severe inter ethnic violence by 2006 and their perceived exclusion from power left Sunnis with similar disincentives to disarm.⁷⁵ This reflects the suggestion of this paper that embracing peace in a post-conflict environment cannot be assumed to represent an unproblematic choice for combatants and is unlikely to be the only option available. With this in mind seeking to foster common cause through constructive and inclusive dialogue and emphasising mutual interests and responsibilities, as occurred at local levels in Iraq, can be seen as a potentially useful approach to DDR and peacebuilding efforts.

⁷² Sunni accountant in Baghdad quoted in Schmidt, M. S. & Arango, T. (2011)

⁷³ T. S. Mowle, 'Iraq's militia problem', *Survival*. Vol. 48, No.3, 2006, p.51

⁷⁴ D. Ucko, 'Militias, tribes and insurgents: The challenge of political reintegration in Iraq' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. Eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.105

⁷⁵ T. S. Mowle, 'Iraq's militia problem', *Survival*. Vol. 48, No.3, 2006, p.54

Inclusive Reintegration in Northern Ireland

Despite often tortuous progress, and recent security threats from dissident actors, the peace process in Northern Ireland has been widely hailed as a successful example of conflict resolution.⁷⁶ Following the Good Friday Agreement signed in April 1998 large numbers of paramilitary prisoners were released in what has been described as a strikingly successful yet often controversial process.⁷⁷ This section will highlight the inclusive approach to the reintegration of formerly imprisoned politically motivated combatants in Northern Ireland as an alternative to exclusively security focused and technical approaches in which combatants are often treated as passive subjects.

This paper has already highlighted some of the problems with thinking of DDR as an administrative task to be implemented without careful consideration of the unique context in which it is being carried out. Not engaging with the dynamics of the conflict and the grievances and incentives which motivate the combatants may undermine peace building efforts. The case of Northern Ireland further suggests that attempting to implement DDR on a narrow and technical basis may mean that a source of conflict transformation potential is overlooked, as those involved in the conflict may be well placed to positively contribute to peace building.⁷⁸

The earlier analysis of DDR in Iraq showed how excluding groups from DDR and other post-conflict reconstruction processes can undermine long-term security and development. In Iraq this was linked to a simplistic understanding of the nature of Sunni groups and a counterproductive desire to punish those perceived as being loyal to the former Ba'athist regime. In Northern Ireland the obstacles to the involvement of

⁷⁶ M. Simpson, 'Real IRA: Will NI dissident threat ever go away?', BBC News Northern Ireland website, 26 April 2011 <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-13196461>>

⁷⁷ 'The Northern Ireland Peace Process: A Supplement to Striking Process' Conciliation Resources, London, 2003 <http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/08s_0Northern%20Ireland%20supplement_2003_ENG_F.pdf>

⁷⁸ Kieran McEvoy and Peter Shirlow, 'Re-imagining DDR Ex-combatants, leadership and moral agency in conflict transformation' *Theoretical Criminology*, February 2009 vol. 13 no. 1 31-59 <<http://tcr.sagepub.com/content/13/1/31.abstract>>

paramilitary groups in peace building and reintegration processes stemmed from both the communities and the groups concerned. As with the later efforts at DDR in Colombia, there was public opposition to reintegration on the basis of it being seen to reward 'men of violence'. Furthermore, many of those imprisoned during the conflict perceived terms like 'reintegration' as reflecting a failure to distinguish between the political nature of their actions and common criminality, implying that they were separate from society and must change in order to be accepted back in. Despite these obstacles, released prisoners had a significant role in the reintegration of combatants in Northern Ireland.⁷⁹

Firstly, many of the key participants involved in peace negotiations for both Loyalist and Republican parties 'were former prisoners who had been convicted of politically motivated offences committed during the conflict'. It has been suggested that their experiences of negotiating with prison authorities and their involvement in the conflict itself equipped them with both skills and credibility, which allowed them to carry communities with them during peace negotiations. This same credibility has also been relevant to their involvement in local level restorative justice programmes with the participation of former prisoners said to have been 'a defining feature' of projects which were 'engaged in valuable and effective work'. Former combatants have in this way contributed to changing attitudes to violence within communities.⁸⁰

The ability of the IRA to maintain discipline and enforce decisions has also been identified as making an important contribution to the peace process in Northern Ireland. While recent events have shown that dissident groups continue to operate, the IRA's recruitment and organisation of young people throughout the peace process and its ability to restrain spoiler groups, occasionally through violent means, facilitated the transition to peace.⁸¹

⁷⁹ 'The Northern Ireland Peace Process: A Supplement to Striking Process' Conciliation Resources, London, 2003 <http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/08s_0Northern%20Ireland%20supplement_2003_ENG_F.pdf>

⁸⁰ Kerim Yildiz and Susan Breau, 'The Kurdish Conflict: International Humanitarian Law and Post-Conflict Mechanisms' Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, London, 2010, p. 240-244

⁸¹ Meher Khatcherian, 'Priority to DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) or Internal Peace?' <<http://cahiers.cerium.ca/Priority-to-DDR-Disarmament>>

Thirdly, former prisoners from both Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries have made significant contributions to 'community organisations, housing associations, neighbourhood regeneration projects, youth diversionary projects, community education projects and many more types of organisation'. Again, perhaps the greatest advantage offered by their involvement in these activities is the credibility that former combatants can bring to demobilisation and reintegration processes. Efforts to reduce violence in post-conflict societies may carry greater weight if those who have previously embraced violence for political ends are involved in the process.⁸²

This section has highlighted some of the ways in which former combatants have contributed to reintegration and to the wider process of peace building in Northern Ireland. While this paper has suggested that every conflict represents a unique context and therefore that templates for DDR may be unhelpful, the potential for former combatants to bring credibility and perspective to peace building could be transferable. Former combatants and, in particular, politically motivated former prisoners may represent a significant resource for reintegration planning, negotiation and implementation. Demobilisation projects in Uganda, Somaliland, Eritrea, Mozambique and Ethiopia have also shown the value of involving former combatants in planning and administration of aspects of DDR.

⁸² 'The Northern Ireland Peace Process: A Supplement to Striking Process' Conciliation Resources, London, 2003 <http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/08s_0Northern%20Ireland%20supplement_2003_ENG_F.pdf>; Kerim Yildiz and Susan Breau, 'The Kurdish Conflict: International Humanitarian Law and Post-Conflict Mechanisms' Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, London, 2010, p. 240-244

CHAPTER 3: Women, Children and DDR

This paper has highlighted the existence of more nuanced analyses of conflict and post-conflict and has explored some of the difficulties that can arise when complexities are overlooked. This final section will suggest that as well as the dynamics of conflict and the political and economic context being important, the profiles of the combatants themselves can also have an effect on DDR. With this in mind, the challenges facing DDR programmes with regard to women and children will now be explored. Rather than following the tendency to combine the two into a single category marked 'vulnerable', this section will consider women and children as separate groups.

Women

One of the key problems facing women with respect to DDR is that their roles in conflict are often not recognised in the first place.

While women remain a minority among the combatants and state security forces, they suffer the greatest. During war women face devastating forms of sexual violence, and, in the absence of a male, women often are forced to turn to sexual exploitation in order to earn a livelihood and support their families or dependents.

The 250,000- 500,000 women and girls were raped during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The 20,000–50,000 women and girls were raped during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s. The 50,000–64,000 internally displaced women in Sierra Leone were sexually attacked by combatants. An average of 40 women and girls are being raped every day in South Kivu, DRC (UN Women: Facts and Figures on Peace and Security). It is estimated that more than 200,000 women and children have been raped over more than a decade of the country's conflict. The UNIFEM (now UN Women) stated that about 36 percent of the funds were allocated for the gender analysis, but only 16 percent were associated with targeted output indicators for the purpose to address women's needs, and less than 8 percent of actual budgets addressed women's needs. Thus, promotion and protection of women's and girls' rights are the most

neglected in all three pillars 'economic empowerment, political legitimacy, and social cohesion' in the post-conflict reconciliation period to achieve the lasting peace.⁸³

The specific details of DDR programmes can also leave women disadvantaged even if they are technically eligible to participate. Many DDR programmes involve cantonment of combatants during disarmament and demobilisation, whereby fighters are held in camps whilst various administrative processes are completed. Cantonment can also allow groups to show commitment to abandoning violence but without fully demobilising immediately, in effect offering a 'halfway house' between mobilisation and demobilisation.⁸⁴ However, a United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) report suggests that cantonment sites often fail to meet the needs of women and girls and suggests that security fears regarding cantonment stops many women from participating in DDR. This can be exacerbated if they have dependents to consider. Women may also face substantial gender related obstacles to reintegration into society following conflict. They may be expected to resume traditional gender roles and can suffer discrimination due to being a female head of household or for having been subjected to gender based sexual violence. The high rates of divorce in post-conflict Eritrea have been linked to the difficulty of resolving the clash between traditional and conflict-transformed gender roles. When these factors are added to the general challenge facing all combatants of integrating into economies which have been degraded by conflict it is easy to see why 'female ex-combatants often find it more difficult than male ex-combatants to achieve economic reintegration'.⁸⁵

In Zimbabwe, 1.48 percent women ex-combatants were demobilized neglecting their roles before, during, and after conflict. Demobilization and reintegration policy was not gender-sensitive. Women ex-combatants who contributed significantly during the time of armed struggle were not treated as special and important stakeholders during the DDR process. It means female ex-combatants faced more reintegration problems

⁸³ Bishnu Pathak, 'Women and DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration' TRANSCEND Media Service, <<http://www.transcend.org/tms/2011/09/women-and-ddr-disarmament-demobilization-reintegration/>>

⁸⁴ M. Knight and A. Özerdem, (2004) 'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace', Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 41, No. 4, 2004, p. 506 <<http://unddr.org/docs/Guns,CampsandCash,DDR.pdf>>

⁸⁵ UNIFEM, 'Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration' 2004, p. 39 <http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/Getting_it_Right__Doing_it_Right.pdf>

compared to their male counterparts.⁸⁶ In Somalia, the criteria for participation in DDR program implicitly excluded women and girls combatants being not treated as equal to male combatants. The emotional or forced nature of male combatant roles was not favorable for the reintegration of women and girls.⁸⁷ Child soldiers, in Sierra Leone, have been a great focus of international arena in recent years, pressure the concerned parties to quickly discharged, but no concrete initiatives to women combatants. In DDR program, women combatants constituted just 6.5 percent. Amputees and war wounded women and girls combatants expressed frustration that they received less financial support and job training than male-counterparts who were engaged in the DDR process.⁸⁸

It is observed that there has been a huge reluctance of international community to engage and integrate the women ex-combatants into security forces and civilian life; however it is one of the most widespread human rights violation and abuse. It happens because of women's absence in participation on peace processes and DDR initiatives and its assessment, formulation, implementation, and evaluation. Many women combatants fear to participate on DDR programs because of possible harassment and social stigmatization. However, the absence of targeted assistance for special needs groups, such as women and the disabled, may lead the resumption of violence.

Absence of women's participation to a whole peace and security, building lasting peace is impossible. Nevertheless, women's participation on global security remains marginal. The underrepresentation of women in all formal and non-formal institutions, the DDR

⁸⁶ Sally Baden, 'Post-conflict Mozambique: Women's Special Situation, Population Issues and Gender Perspectives to be Integrated into Skills Training and Employment Promotion' June 1997, BRIDGE (development - gender) Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, p. 66

⁸⁷ UN-INSTRAW, 'Reintegrating Female Ex-Combatants: Good Practices and Lessons Learned in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Women and Girls' <<http://www.un-instraw.org/data/media/documents/GPS/GDDR%20VD%20Summary%20III%20.pdf>>

⁸⁸ Ernest Harsch, 'Women: Africa's ignored combatants: Gradual progress towards a greater role in DDR' Africa Renewal, Vol.19, issue 3, October 2009, p. 17 <<http://www.un.org/en/africarenewal/vol19no3/193women.html>>; UN-INSTRAW, 'Reintegrating Female Ex-Combatants: Good Practices and Lessons Learned in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Women and Girls' <<http://www.un-instraw.org/data/media/documents/GPS/GDDR%20VD%20Summary%20III%20.pdf>>

programs are overlooked. The question of physical security and the existence of significant legal constraints, women's integration into economic life, and societies have been difficult. Gender-balanced DDR initiatives, intentional solicitation of the input of women at the community levels on priorities, allocation of national budgets, and development of international programs on women friendly shall be the best practices in increasing women's participation.⁸⁹

To mitigate some of these difficulties UNIFEM emphasises the possibility of increasing female involvement in planning and implementation of DDR and argues for the inclusion of gender considerations in every DDR programme.⁹⁰ Given this paper's earlier analysis which suggested that the participation of former combatants can lead to positive outcomes, it may be that involving female combatants in planning and delivery of DDR could contribute to greater success.

Children

Although worthy of separate consideration, children do share some of the disadvantages facing women in relation to DDR. They can be similarly overlooked as combatants, particularly when used as slaves rather than fighters, and face similar security threats during cantonment. However, they are also particularly vulnerable to trauma, stemming both from their involvement in conflict and from their transition to civilian life.⁹¹ For example, a UNICEF survey of children in Kabul found that more than 80 per cent felt that life was not worth living and a survey of children in Bosnia found that more than 94 per cent suffered from symptoms of post-traumatic stress.⁹²

⁸⁹ Bishnu Pathak, 'Women and DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration' TRANSCEND Media Service, <<http://www.transcend.org/tms/2011/09/women-and-ddr-disarmament-demobilization-reintegration/>>

⁹⁰ UNIFEM, 'Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration' 2004, p. 30 <http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/Getting_it_Right__Doing_it_Right.pdf>

⁹¹ M. Knight and A. Özerdem, (2004) 'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace', Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 41, No. 4, 2004, p. 503 <<http://unddr.org/docs/Guns,CampsandCash,DDR.pdf>>

⁹² Z. A. Bhutta, 'Children of War: The Real Casualties of the Afghan Conflict', BMJ: British Medical Journal. Vol.324, No.7333, 2002, p.351

Children face particular challenges when expected to reintegrate into society due to the fact that for many it is not a case of *re-integrating* at all. For children involved in conflict from a young age the transition to peace may be better understood as a first integration into civilian. Furthermore, their attachment to their fighting group can lead to demobilisation representing a further trauma to overcome. These difficulties have contributed to historic failures when applying DDR to children involved in conflict. In Sierra Leone those under 18 were not recognised by the first DDR programme and were left with little incentive not to return to conflict.⁹³ The failure to include child soldiers in DDR in Sierra Leone contributed to the re-emergence of conflict, seriously disrupting attempts to bring about peace.⁹⁴

Given that failing to include children in DDR programmes has undermined peace processes in the past, it is reasonable to suggest that recognising the roles children play in conflict could be an important step towards more successful DDR. From this starting point, addressing the specific vulnerabilities outlined above may be able to mitigate some the risks of failure. With this in mind, The World Bank's suggestion that DDR programmes dealing with children focus on 'family reunification, psychological support and education, and economic opportunity' could be a possible route to greater success.⁹⁵

Reintegration of children in situations of armed conflict is a complex and long-term proposition. It begins with negotiating the release of children and their physical extrication from armed groups. The family tracing and reunification phase that follows is often complicated, time-consuming and resource-intensive. Beyond the practical challenge of locating the families and communities of lost children, successful reunification must also address the psychological challenges, which include dealing with the sense of alienation, guilt or anger that children may feel against families whom they

⁹³ D. Keen, 'Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone.' Oxford: James Currey, 2005, p.259

⁹⁴ M. Knight and A. Özerdem, (2004) 'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace', Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 41, No. 4, 2004, p. 503 <<http://unddr.org/docs/Guns,CampsandCash,DDR.pdf>>

⁹⁵ M. Knight and A. Özerdem, (2004) 'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace', Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 41, No. 4, 2004, p. 503 <<http://unddr.org/docs/Guns,CampsandCash,DDR.pdf>>

may accuse of failing to protect them. Additionally, reintegration programmes must also address challenges related to the communities themselves being prepared to accept the return of their children, in contexts where atrocities may have been committed by those children in their communities.⁹⁶

Comprehensive understanding of reintegration is required in implementation of the longer-term reintegration of children in war-affected communities due to tackle all the challenges associated with this process. All reintegration programmes should follow the Paris Principles,⁹⁷ formulated to guide protection partners on the ground. It is suggested that, 'for best results these programmes must be founded on inclusive community-based programming and should be directed at all children in the community so as not to stigmatize child soldiers.' Unfortunately, although UNICEF and NGO partners on the ground have identified these principles, donor response to their efforts has not always been forthcoming. The international community is quick to respond to emergency funding requests, but the reintegration of children falls into the fault line between emergency assistance and development assistance. 'It is important for the donor community to appreciate the special needs of the children and for timely and sustained resources to be provided to child protection partners so that they may do their work more efficiently.'⁹⁸

⁹⁶ 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes for Children' <<http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/ddrforchildren.html>>

⁹⁷ The Paris Principles: Principles And Guidelines On Children Associated With Armed Forces Or Armed Groups, February 2007 <<http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf>>

⁹⁸ 'Children and DDR' United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre <http://www.unddr.org/jddrs/05/30.php?search_phrase=ddr#startLoc>; 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes for Children' <<http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/ddrforchildren.html>>

Conclusion

This paper has suggested that it may be useful to engage with the complex reality of contemporary conflict when thinking about DDR. Nuanced analysis reveals that conflict is multifaceted and that combatants can have diverse motivations which give rise to the counterintuitive processes which sustained conflict in Bosnia and Sierra Leone. Crucially, as numerous scholars have argued, these processes and the grievances and other motivations of belligerents do not automatically cease to exist at the formal ending of hostilities. With these points in mind, the tendency of international actors to interpret DDR as a technical and administrative task measured in terms of military security can be seen as problematic. They fail to engage with the complex political, social and economic context of a post-conflict environment and with the continuing relevance of the processes and incentives which sparked and sustained fighting.

Through case studies of DDR in Colombia and Iraq this paper has suggested that the dynamics of conflict and the nature of the groups involved can have a profound influence on the challenges and opportunities facing DDR efforts. This makes the development of generally applicable rules very difficult and warns of the dangers of 'thinking in terms of readily transferable templates and of divorcing the discussion from... realities on the ground'.⁹⁹ However, from both countries there is a basis for suggesting that locating DDR within a wider and more inclusive political process which engages with the concerns of those involved can pay dividends.

In Colombia, the reintegration of the guerrilla group M-19 was eased by the sense of national progress which was generated by undertaking extensive political and constitutional reforms alongside the demobilisation and reintegration process. In the context of public dissatisfaction with weak democracy in Colombia and the sense of crisis surrounding the growth of the drug economy, bringing an armed political actor into the mainstream political process carried great symbolic value. In Iraq, lessons learned from the failure of DDR at the national level were eventually applied at the local level where inclusive approaches which engaged with militias and even insurgent

⁹⁹ M. Berdal, and D.H Ucko, 'Introduction: The political reintegration of armed groups after war' in Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. H. eds. *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, p.4

groups found success. Dialogue with local actors led to the identification of mutual interests and then to cooperation towards achieving improvements in local security.

The case of reintegration in Northern Ireland suggests that involving former combatants in a more inclusive approach to DDR can make a positive contribution to peace. Recognising the varied skills of former combatants and, perhaps most significantly, the credibility that their involvement could add to community projects, helped in the transformation of attitudes to violence.

The case for recognising both the roles in violence and the specific DDR challenges facing women and children was then briefly discussed. Both women and children have historically been overlooked as participants in conflict with a corresponding failure of post-conflict measures to meet their distinct needs. Given that such failures have undermined past peace processes, it was suggested that seeking to include women and children in better targeted and better designed DDR programmes could be important in improving the chances of success.

Finally, the importance of ensuring that there are economic opportunities for demobilising combatants to live non-violent lives cannot be ignored, given the potential economic role of weapons. As Frelimo and Renamo soldiers in Mozambique have argued, 'guns make good business' and 'guns can mean food.'¹⁰⁰ With this in mind, Knight and Özerdem have argued that it is important to recognise the social and economic implications of disarmament for combatants. This is captured in their putting forward the idea of DDR representing the forging of a new social contract between the combatant and the government in which the former gives up the security and economic benefits of weapons in return for 'opportunities and assistance in finding new peaceful livelihoods'.¹⁰¹ Rather than seeing DDR as a one sided pursuit of orthodox security for the state, success may instead rest on seeking to understand the challenges and opportunities facing combatants and seeking to address these as part of a wider process involving both economic opportunities and political reforms.

¹⁰⁰ A.Vines, 'Disarmament in Mozambique', *Journal of African Studies*. Vol. 24, No. 1, 1998, p.192-193

¹⁰¹ M. Knight and A. Özerdem, (2004) 'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace', *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 41, No. 4, 2004, p. 506 <<http://unddr.org/docs/Guns,CampsandCash,DDR.pdf>>

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