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## **Foreword**

DPI aims to create an atmosphere whereby different parties share knowledge, ideas, concerns, and suggestions facing the development of a democratic solution to key issues in Turkey and the wider region. The work focuses on a combination of research and practical approaches to broaden bases for wider public involvement by providing platforms for discussion in the form of roundtable meetings, seminars, workshops and conferences. This is being carried out in order to support and contribute to existing work on Turkey whilst also extending to the wider region.

DPI's work will incorporate research and discussions on a wide range of strategic and relevant topics including constitutional reform; preparing for constitutional changes in conflicting societies; post conflict societies; freedom of expression and association; cultural and language rights, political participation and representation; women's role in resolving the conflict; access to justice and transitional justice including truth and reconciliation commissions.

DPI aims to facilitate the creation of an atmosphere whereby the different parties are able to meet with experts from Turkey and abroad, to draw on comparative studies, as well as analyse and compare various mechanisms used to achieve positive results in similar cases. The work supports the development of a pluralistic political arena capable of generating

consensus and ownership over work on key issues surrounding a democratic solution at both the political and the local level.

This report gives a summary of the roundtable meetings that took place during DPI's Comparative Study visits to the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland during 2011, and of participants' evaluative discussion on the visits, which took place in Turkey in March 2012. It details both the speeches given by guest experts in the area of conflict resolution and related fields, as well as contributions and reflections from the participants during the roundtable discussions. Each of the Comparative Study visits included in this report were hosted by the government of the country visited. DPI is grateful for this assistance and would like to thank each of the hosting governments, as well as all participants and contributors to these activities, which we hope will contribute to ongoing discussion in Turkey.

A detailed report of each of DPI's activities is available in electronic and hard copy. Please visit our website: [www.democraticprogress.org](http://www.democraticprogress.org) for further information.

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DPI Council of Experts

April 2012

# **A Summary of DPI Comparative Study Visits to the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland, 2011 – 2012**

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**A Summary of DPI Comparative Study Visits to the United  
Kingdom and Republic of Ireland**

**2011 – 2012**

## COMPARATIVE STUDIES VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

**22nd - 29th July 2011: London, Belfast and Edinburgh**

*This section details DPI's roundtable discussions held in London, Belfast and Edinburgh, from the 22<sup>nd</sup>-29<sup>th</sup> July 2011. As the first in the series of comparative study visits, the goal of this trip was to bring together representatives from different political parties, academics, journalists and civil society activists to share the experiences of the countries visited. It was an unprecedented accomplishment; for the first time, politicians from opposing parties came together (with academics, journalists and civil society representatives) to travel and discuss the issues raised by the shared experiences of the United Kingdom.*

*By studying the United Kingdom's experiences of conflict resolution, devolution and constitutional arrangements, and through meeting major players involved in these processes, the participants were able to share knowledge that would be of use in addressing the Kurdish issue and helping to bring it to a peaceful resolution. A key aim of the visit was to broaden the bases for democratic dialogue. Discussions took place in King's College London, the Legatum Institute, Windsor House, Stormont (the Northern Irish Assembly) and Trequair House. Jonathan Powell, former Chief of Staff to former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, delivered a key-note address in London about the lessons learned from the Northern Irish peace process.*



*King's College London, DPI Comparative Study visit to the United Kingdom, 2011*

*Here are some of the key issues that were discussed:*

- How to forge a trusting relationship between (former) antagonists
- The relationship between civil society, trade unions, political parties and peace processes
- The relationship between constitutional processes and conflict resolution and the role of the constitution in the devolution process
- The role of local government in the devolution process
- The role of ethnicity, language and nationalism in the devolution process and in Northern Ireland's peace process
- The public perception of the devolution process
- The extent to which the Good Friday Agreement was successful
- Confidence-building measures in the Northern Irish peace process
- The perception of terrorism in the United Kingdom and its impact on Northern Ireland's peace process
- The role of a third party in Northern Ireland's peace process
- Transitional justice in Northern Ireland
- The relationship between the political and military wings of the Irish nationalist movement
- Cross-community cooperation in Northern Ireland
- The role of civil society and media in broadening the bases for a peace process in Northern Ireland
- Issues surrounding the release of prisoners in Northern Ireland





*Stormont, Belfast, DPI Comparative Study visit to the United Kingdom, 2011*

*Here are some of the key observations that arose from the trip:*

- All participants affirmed that they learned a lot over the trip. Many commented that they had previously thought they had a good understanding of the UK experience but that they nonetheless gained a lot of information and ideas that were completely new to them. Talking to individuals with first-hand knowledge of the relevant issues was agreed to be particularly useful.
- Follow-up trips to South Africa, the Republic of Ireland and Wales were suggested to develop the participant's knowledge of these countries' experiences. Both of these suggestions were acted upon; the Republic of Ireland became the venue for the second comparative studies trip, while Wales and South Africa are the planned destinations for trips in 2012.
- Throughout the visit, the participating journalists produced a great volume of articles which generated massive news coverage and public attention in Turkey, which made a significant contribution to raising public awareness.



*Trequeair House, Innerleithen, Scottish Borders, DPI Comparative Study visit to the United Kingdom, 2011*

### **Summary of Keynote Speech: Jonathan Powell**

The Northern Ireland conflict was very particular to Northern Ireland and so was the solution. There is not a 'Northern Ireland model' that can be transferred elsewhere. But, lessons can be learned. Northern Ireland took many lessons from South Africa, for example, the rule of consensus, that is, the rule which ensures support from both sides for the agreement.

The first time I met Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness in 1997 at Stormont, I refused to shake their hands. They had shot my father and put my brother on a death list. Not long after that, I had a call from McGuinness asking for a meeting '*in cognito*' in Derry. I went, and as I waited to be picked up, I was suddenly bundled into a black taxi and taken to a Catholic enclave somewhere in Derry. There was no trust. They saw me as the British establishment, which they did not trust. Over the years of going to safehouses, trust was achieved. This is only possible if it is safe, and if concessions are made. Trust was still limited though. In 2004, negotiations took place in a monastery. There are limits to trust but some must exist if bridges are to be built.

Peter Sheridan, the most senior Catholic policeman, had to move three times to avoid the IRA, his car was bombed too. I met McGuinness (Sinn Féin) and was given homemade soup, made by Peggy McGuinness, his mother. Being able to talk about the soup together helped. Those kind of things are essential.

Political momentum came with an election victory (Labour, led by Blair) – this was used to make progress on the Northern Ireland question. Blair's first visit upon being elected was to Northern Ireland. He reassured Unionists they would be considered. Without such effort and political capital, progress would have been more difficult. Blair deliberately set a timetable for progress. John Major (previous UK Prime Minister) had not been strong enough, he never set a timetable and never spoke to Sinn Féin. As a result, Sinn Féin gave up. We deliberately set up a period of six weeks post ceasefire, when Sinn Féin would be brought in. The difficulty was in persuading the Unionists to stay and not walk out once Sinn Féin were involved. The deadline set for a solution was one year. Without this, a solution would not have been possible – you can talk forever. Blair negotiated until a solution was reached, but with an absolute cut off point of Easter one year later. But without political momentum, a solution cannot be possible.

Numerous conditions were needed for peace:

1) Economic position: Ireland is viewed as the 'celtic tiger'. If it weren't for its strong economic position, for example if it were poor and priest-ridden, it would have less confidence

2) Both countries were in the European Union

3) A border was less important – both Catholics and Protestants existed

4) A belief that neither side could win militarily

The British military knew it could contain the IRA but could not wipe them out. Both sides knew, a military solution was not possible, and that a political solution was needed. Equal employment, housing and so on needed to be addressed, but Sinn Féin knew they could not drive the British government and army out of Northern Ireland, and that a political solution was needed. We started to reach out to John Hume (moderate SDLP member). The situation can be contrasted with that of Sri Lanka, where both sides believed they could win militarily, so went back to war. In Northern Ireland, both sides knew they could not win militarily, this was key.

Leadership is very important. Adams and McGuinness were political leaders of strong calibre. They led their organisation, almost intact, into a peace agreement on terms it would never have accepted ten years earlier. Trimble, on the Unionist side, was also a good leader. He sacrificed his own party and support for peace. Ian Paisley was a Protestant radical. From 2004 onwards (following a close encounter in hospital) he always looked for an agreement, whereas he had previously been a 'no' man.

I left government to write a book on Northern Ireland. The most important thing of all was the process. Without a process, there would be a vacuum, filled by violence – look at the Middle East. In that context, we more or less know what peace would look like in terms of territory, but there is no process to get us there. Perez described it as the following: the good news is there is light at the end of the tunnel, the problem is there is no tunnel. I call it the bicycle theory – you always need a

process. We had to release prisoners – killers – it was very difficult, but we had to in the name of peace. the IRA committed the biggest bank robbery in history, but even that could not break negotiations.

If there is one danger to learn from, it is pre-conditions. John Major, in 1994, wanted the IRA to say it was a permanent ceasefire, not a temporary one. The IRA did not agree. They also demanded decommissioning, which was refused. They watered this demand down and said 'most weapons' must be decommissioned. The IRA said no! Then they said a 'token amount' – and the IRA still said no. Pre-conditions should be dealt with within the peace process talks, not as a reason for the talks. Also, the concept of surrender is an anathema in negotiations. Parties will never surrender, so one has to find a way for them to stand down with their 'own' reason. It is critical not to force them. Paisley demanded photos of the arms decommissioning at the last minute, and this was refused so the deal was broken.

Symbols are crucial. For example, whether a crown should be used on a police force badge is as equally argued as more substantive issues.

The problem is often one of sequencing and choreography. Neither side wants to go first as there is not trust. We had to break things into small steps so that both sides had confidence. We also needed independent referees such as George Mitchell from the US. This person had to be acceptable to both sides, therefore could not be British. Arms were also surrendered to an independent party. The main way to reach a solution is to break away from a 'zero sum' game. One must move forward from the idea that there is a winner. In 1996, Adams realised he not only had to sell the agreement to his own side, but also to the Unionists. Paisley did the same. Only

when both sides see themselves as winners can it work, otherwise one side will try to reopen negotiations.

However long a conflict has lasted, it can be resolved. Successive governments though it could not be (Thatcher, Churchill). You need a strong leader. In Blair's book, he describes how I thought he had a 'messiah complex'. And this was necessary! Absolute belief in a solution.



*Sir Kieran Prendergast and Jonathan Powell, London, DPI Comparative Study visit to the United Kingdom, 2011*

## COMPARATIVE STUDIES VISIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND SUMMARY

**November 27th - December 1st, 2011: Dublin**

*This section details DPI's roundtable discussions held in Dublin, Ireland, from 27th November - 1st December, 2011. The discussions focused on the subject of conflict resolution and the peace process in Ireland, and formed the second in a series of round tables that began with visits to London, Belfast and Edinburgh in July 2011.*

*By studying Ireland's experience of conflict resolution through meeting major players involved in the Northern Ireland peace process, the participants were able to share valuable knowledge. Discussions took place at the Department of Foreign Affairs in Iveagh House; Dáil Éireann (Irish Parliament) and at Carton House, Maynooth. Speakers included Sir Kieran Prendergast, former British Diplomat and former Under-Secretary-General for Political affairs at the United Nations, Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Féin, Maurice Manning, President of Ireland's Human Rights Commission, Brian Glynn, Director, Conflict Resolution Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland, David Cooney, Secretary-General, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland, and Ian White, Political and International Director, Glencree Centre, Dublin. Talks focused on the study of the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process where various conflict resolution mechanisms were analysed and compared. A summary of some of the key elements discussed is below:*

- The role of media in conflict resolution. The importance of the media's approach, and of trying to understand what the other side was thinking, their motivations and aspirations, to identify a common ground.

- The importance of the language of peacebuilding. The language used by the media can be influential in preparing the public for peace. The media's language can also have a negative impact on a conflict.
- The effects of censorship.
- The role of civil society in peacebuilding.
- The role of religious leaders, whose involvement in resolving conflicts can be underappreciated, undervalued and underused.
- The role of the Glencree Center for Peace and Reconciliation in promoting the ongoing peace process in Ireland.
- The relationship between the Irish Government and the peace process, the different sectors which work towards promoting peace, ceasefire, power-sharing and the role of the European Union and the United States in promoting the peace process in Northern Ireland.
- The importance of equality legislation across a full range of areas and the explicit commitment to human rights norms.
- International involvement and international support as integral aspects of a successful peace process.



- Rights and Identity as part of a peace process. The importance of a Human Rights Commission in maintaining peace.



*Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, DPI Comparative Study visit to the Republic of Ireland, 2011*

### **Summary of Keynote Speech: Sir Kieran Prendergast**

The identity of people is what they feel it to be. It is a mistake to try to deny or engineer identity. You must allow it to be what it is and, when you do that, you may end up decreasing the sense of identity in people. This relates to the Law of Physics: every action has an equal negative reaction. Therefore, if you suppress someone's identity, you will increase the demand for that identity.

I have an uncle who was a revolutionary in his youth and the most neutral term he ever used for Ulster was 'the six Counties'. My uncle once said 'if you want to encourage the speaking of Irish then the Government should ban it'. The best thing to promote the speaking of Irish would be to ban it, because no-one spoke Irish anymore and it was difficult to learn but if you ban it, you

immediately create a demand. This demand is something we need to be aware of. So, my first point is that the question of identity is very important. However, taking measures to identify identity can counter this effect.

The second point that I would like to address is: how do you get started in your efforts to solve the issue in Turkey? I think the issue of building confidence is very important. What each party needs to do is to identify what is important to the other side. When I was working for the United Nations, we would often try to provide small steps for people to take. It is usually impossible to address very, very serious issues right from the start but we can look at small steps which will move us forward. Sometimes it is the things that you do not do that speak the loudest.

For example, working out what terms are most offensive to the other side and deciding not to use them can be a confidence-building venture. More specifically, if you know that a term is offensive to the other side, do not use it. Then signal to them that you are purposefully not using it.

Turkey is going through a difficult time at the moment and the conflict must be resolved by people within Turkey. It cannot be resolved by outsiders. As part of this resolution it is vital for each party to try to understand the other side, to try to understand why they are doing what they are doing.

This requires some feat of imagination but is worth doing. When I was in Israel, for example, there was a feeling that terrorism was something that just sprang up from its own accord. In actual fact, things usually have a cause. They happen for a reason and you need to work out what that reason is from the

perspective of the other side. Furthermore, you need to make sure you are not doing things to make that situation worse.

Professor Comerford mentioned the Easter Uprising of 1916. My grandmother told me that the Easter Uprising was very unpopular at the time in Dublin and throughout Ireland. The reason was that people thought that it was done at the wrong time. It was the middle of the First World War and so people thought it was not the right time to start an armed rebellion. They wanted to wait. I do not think that it was the Easter Uprising that created the Insurgency. I think it was a response to the British Government and the next thing that happened was the creation of martyrs. One of Ireland's biggest poets, W.B. Yeats (who was a Protestant), wrote a poem Easter 1916 which spoke about this:

*I write it out in a verse –  
MacDonagh and MacBride  
And Connolly and Pearse  
Now and in time to be,  
Wherever green is worn,  
Are changed, changed utterly:  
A terrible beauty is born.*

This sentiment has echoed down the decades. If the British Government had not executed those people, who knows what would have happened. We might have been speaking about history in a very different way. So, within this, there is a lesson for you to learn.

Another point I want to make is that the real game changer is the issue of use of force. Now, how do we address that point? I think this is something that policy makers probably need to think about quite hard.

When I was with the United Nations, we very often dealt with guerrillas. They would ask 'why should we give up our arms? It is our only weapon.' So, how do you move past that point? We used to say, and even got Mrs. Thatcher to say this to the President of South Africa, that you cannot require people to relinquish the armed struggle completely unless there is something very clear and firm to be given to them in response to that. You may be able to achieve a suspension of violence but it will not last unless there is a really strong and sustained response from the Government's side.

Ceasefires create a political space and that political space has to be filled and it has to be used in order for it to last. When we look at Ireland, for example, one of the game changers was the IRA's agreement to stop using force. As an outsider, one of the things I think you are going to have to deal with in Turkey as politicians, as journalists, as academics and as policy makers is the question of how you get to that point, given the lack of trust.

When I was dealing with issues like this in the United Nations, we tended to try to look at it as packages. Often there was the view that 'nothing was agreed until everything was agreed.' Packages were created because everything had to be kept confidential. If you release every element, one-by-one to the public, there will always be very severe criticisms of those concessions. People need to see the package and this is the approach I use to take when I was dealing

with guerrillas and the relevant governments. It has been said in Turkey that if violence is given up, many good things will happen.

However, if we are going to build confidence, we need to be more specific. We need to ask what it would take for us to find that the armed struggle is no longer relevant and then see if that answer is a fit or a non-fit. This needs to be done in secrecy and in private so that the advantages of both sides can be seen in the overall package.

My feeling as an outsider to Turkey is that more thought needs to go into this process. For example, the classic agreement was achieved in Cyprus when it was decided that there were not going to be anymore high-level agreements because they were always vague and compromised. Instead, they did it the classic way. A new constitution was created with a review of all laws, and amendments were made to all relevant laws. I am sure this is what you Members of Parliament are going to do in the coming sessions when you look at a new constitution. Again, from my experience, this involves a very wide consultation process, which cannot be hurried. The broader the consultations, the better the results will be. It is also important to ensure that people have a sense of ownership over the process. The best constitutions in the world will be the ones where everyone has had their chance to have an input and share their views.

You are the ones who are living through this situation and you will have to find the solutions but I say to you: be positive and do not give up. Be optimistic. Do not be provoked. You can only be provoked if you allow yourself to be provoked. If you refuse to be provoked, no-one is going to be able to provoke

you. You are going to have to find some type of balance as you move forward and perhaps this will include a review of your counter-terrorism laws. As someone living in Western Europe, it is difficult to see so many thousands of detained, arrested and charged people in Turkey. However, the way forward is for you to decide.



*Dublin Castle, Dublin, DPI Comparative Study visit to the Republic of Ireland, 2011*

**DPI ROUNDTABLE:**  
**EVALUATION OF COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN THE UK AND IRELAND**

**March 9<sup>th</sup> - 11<sup>th</sup>, 2012**

**Polonezköy, Turkey**

*This section details DPI's roundtable discussions held in Polonezköy, Turkey, from the 9<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> March, 2012. The discussions focused on an evaluation of the comparative studies that had taken place in the preceding months in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The aim was to identify the key lessons learned from these trips and to decide how best to build on these experiences to make a substantive contribution to DPI's Turkey programme. On Friday 9<sup>th</sup> of March, participants arrived at Polonezköy, where they began proceedings with an evening meal filled with lively discussion. Talk on the following two days focused on an evaluation of the comparative study trips and the question of how to expand DPI's work in the future. All participants made substantive contributions to the ensuing conversation.*

*The meeting began with a talk by Sir Kieran Prendergast, a summary of which follows.*



*DPI Evaluation Roundtable, Polonezköy, Turkey, 2012*

## **Summary of Keynote Speech: Sir Kieran Prendergast:**

### ***Getting from 'Here' to 'There'***

When Kerim asked me for a subject for today, I thought I would choose something as vague as possible, because who could know what the conditions would be by the time we actually met. We must first ask ourselves where 'here' is and where 'there' is. You should decide this, not any outsider. Tolstoy said, 'Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.'

All conflicts have common elements but it is a mistake to assume one can apply lessons from one to another without taking their similarities and dissimilarities into account.

I think Turkey as it is has a lot going for it; a strong economy, vibrant growth, a shrinking budget deficit. Good demographics too; a young, capable population. On previous trips, academics have expressed doubts over its academic system as there is not enough emphasis on problem solving, which instead has to be learned on the job. But that's something you can tweak. The state is spending large amounts on education, so there seems to be a bright future ahead. There is a Victorian expression that talks of the worm in the bud, or to put it another way, 'You've got a lovely pair of shoes but there's a stone in them!'. This is not a stone you can shoot out. A more sophisticated solution is needed.

As an outsider, these problems seem to take several forms, including the Kurdish issue and the PKK issue. There is some overlap but these are not the same thing. Even if you solved the Kurdish issue, you would still have PKK



remnants to deal with. There is the issue of the constitution, counter-terrorism legislation and freedom of thought. The question of getting from 'here' to 'there' centres around the new constitution and the resolution of the Kurdish and PKK issues.

When we discussed the formation of DPI, our major objective was to broaden the base of support for a political solution. From reading the Turkish press, it seems that a lot of progress has been made there. Many in Turkey take news and views from TV. Many of you write columns which are largely read by the elite. Perhaps more could be done by stimulating television access. Hilal has used her television show to help in this respect. Bearing in mind that television is more pervasive than print media, there could be more outreach to the public via this medium.

There is an issue over how to break the present current downward spiral of violence, including an urban bombing campaign and the greater use of force by the military on PKK bases in Northern Iraq and Turkey, and an increasing harshness of rhetoric. This trend of moving away from one another needs to be reversed. Words matter. Words can heal. Words can also inflame. Leaders, whether of the BDP, AKP, CHP or MHP, should be encouraged to soften their rhetoric, to speak positively.

The other question here is the question of initiative. It is unusual to have the same party having consecutive three terms of office. In the next election, people would be entitled to ask why the Kurdish question hasn't been solved over this period. The Media tend to blame the PKK for not giving up weapons. If you think about it, this contradicts the image of strong government – why should the government be held hostage to the PKK, allowing them decide

when progress is possible? If the majority government and the people of the east want peace, this means that the government should take the initiative.

It has been done in the past. Regarding Israel and the Palestinians, Rabin used to say, 'We will negotiate as if there is no violence, and react to violence as if there are no negotiations.'

You shouldn't allow spoilers to drive things off course.

In the history of ceasefires, more conflicts have been resolved without ceasefires than with. Tony Blair's credibility in Britain is low now due to Iraq, but high in this room. My impression is that the British government did not talk directly with IRA members, but with their representatives.

Confidence building measures are very important. The thing is to start small, move on to bigger things and to get the sequencing right.

I've previously talked about the issue of respect. In particular, both sides need to understand perceptions of the other side.

The arrests and so on suggest to me that the anti-terrorism laws are too broadly based – three to five thousand individuals, some say as many as seven thousand, are in jail as a result. Each side needs to put itself in the other's position. Simulations can be quite useful, forcing you to put yourselves in the mindset of the other side.

Regarding the drafting of the constitution, psychology is very important. Rights are won and earned, not given. A sense of ownership on all sides is important. For the constitution to be lasting, it must be built by everyone.

In Iraq, I was used to short deadlines when the constitution was being developed. The general feeling was that the shorter time span was useful. A sense of momentum is important.

I recently read a copy of a speech by Ahmet Davutoğlu. It put me in mind of the idea of a car doing a hill start – you need a lot of forward momentum to make it. You can't let spoilers obstruct things.

The psychological aspect cannot be overestimated, nor can the sense of ownership. You should aim to come out with a result where everyone feels they've gained. You don't want a result where there are winners and losers. Classically, this causes the losers to go out to seek ways of collapsing the settlement.

Can outsiders help? Ahmet Davutoğlu's speech is about precisely that. Reflecting on work done in South America, it's clear that it's difficult to find an effective mediator – regional actors tend to have their own agendas and it can be difficult to establish trust. However, it is also difficult to do things completely alone.

Turkey may be different due to its lack of colonial history, its proud independence and its negative international experience at the end of the Ottoman Empire.

My big piece of advice is that once the process starts you musn't let the thread break. I say thread because it can be very weak. There may be times when the thread falls to ground, but it musn't be allowed to break.

Choreography is a crucial thing to bear in mind. The consequences of a lack of choreography were clearly demonstrated in 2009 in the incident surrounding the return of several PKK supporters from Iraq.

By choreography, I mean a detailed understanding of the situation as well as a commitment by both sides, and high levels of coordination for all logistical details. Perhaps in the Habur incident instance both sides were too happy with the initial deal to think about the practical, logistical details.

There is a serious need to look at legislation, especially counter-terrorism legislation. How many have been imprisoned for allegedly plotting violence and how many for thinking 'wrong' thoughts? In my opinion, all thought and speech is free except perhaps for blasphemy and incitement to violence.


Improving the bail mechanism should also be considered.

That's as far as I want to go for now. This should be an interactive process and I know that all of you here have good ideas as to what could be done.

Regarding MHP, I don't want to disagree with anybody, but we should remember that there is no need to preach to the converted. You should focus on the unconverted. As such, shouldn't MHP and nationalists be a target for DPI? An admittedly difficult but legitimate target. They could be invited to briefings, seminars or public discussion perhaps. Enlarging the debate necessitates their involvement.

Cengiz used to tell me that there are three broad groups to think about: the south-east, the middle Anatolian region (both religious and nationalist), the coasts and the west. Middle Anatolia cannot be ignored. At the same time, we cannot assume that all nationalists vote for MHP. Some vote for AKP and CHP too.

The aim must be to broaden the understanding of the need for peace and the resolution of issues of Kurdish nationality, culture, politics.



*Sir Kieran Prendergast, DPI Evaluation Roundtable, Polonezköy, Turkey, 2012*

*Discussion and analysis of the Comparative Study Visits to the United Kingdom and Ireland then followed. Some of the key elements that arose were:*

- Participants discussed the current political situation in Turkey, followed by an analysis of the experiences gained during the Comparative Study visits.
- Participants believed the comparative study trips had been very useful. Several participants emphasised that they had been struck by the fact that although peace processes elsewhere had faced serious obstacles, the commitment to resolve their issues peacefully and democratically had not been shaken. This was said to be extremely relevant to Turkey.
- Participants wanted to build on the comparative study trips to make them as functional as possible. They discussed how to spread the

information gathered from the trips at all levels of society, from citizens to party leaders to government officials.

- It was stressed that both ordinary citizens and those who might be hostile to an inclusive peace process must be persuaded of the necessity of a democratic, peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. They must be convinced that there is nothing to fear from a peaceful settlement and that this is in fact something that Turkish society as a whole will benefit from. As such, attention should be focused on people in the West as well as those in the South East. The focus should be not just on persuading the public, but also on informing them and sharing what has been learned from the comparative study trips. This will demonstrate to the public that the problems currently faced are neither unique to Turkey nor insurmountable.
- The issue of language and rhetoric was discussed. The importance of influential figures using positive, inclusive language when discussing the resolution of the Kurdish issue was discussed, as were issues associated with the demonisation of groups in the media, politics and indeed in the public consciousness.
- The journalists' success in publicising issues raised by the trips was highlighted. Several articles had been written as a result of previous trips, as well as a television programme produced by Hilal Kaplan, and televised interviews with participants on various channels in Turkey.
- The importance of using media with as high a penetration rate as possible was discussed; targeting television and news programmes was identified as a way of raising awareness and encouraging participation at the grassroots level.

- Other suggestions mooted for increasing popular support and involvement in the peace process were that university seminars could be held, participants could do more to publicly engage with the issues, Turkish language versions of DPI reports could be made widely available and civil society organisations could be engaged.
- Many felt that the politician members of the group will be key to further raising awareness, especially at senior levels of political parties and government. These members were asked what they had done, or planned to do, to make their colleagues aware of this work and the examples they had studied in the comparative visits. Members of Parliament confirmed that they had informed senior party members about their experience of the visits, and that his colleagues had shown a lot of interest in the subject during party assembly meetings. It was confirmed that efforts had been made to spread information within parties, including, for example the production of a report circulated among senior party members of one party. Politicians were identified as having a key responsibility to take the initiative in promoting peace.
- The group discussed expanding the participation in DPI's roundtable discussions and comparative study trips to include those with different perspectives on the peace process, including religious communities and nationalist groups. The group agreed that the circle of journalists represented should be expanded to include those that wrote for papers with either a religious or nationalist point of view.
- The diaspora were identified as a group that DPI should focus on reaching. Suggestions for how to do this included concerts, conferences and roundtable discussions that would target these groups, to be held in

Brussels, Germany, London or other cities with significant diaspora populations.

- The importance of DPI's work on Track II diplomacy was reinforced.



*DPI Evaluation Roundtable, Polonezköy, Turkey, 2012*



## **CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS**

The roundtable sessions in Polonezköy clearly showed the impact that the comparative study trips have had. The development of the group's discussions, objectives and dynamics over the course of the trips has been striking. From the first trips, where the emphasis was on bringing together a diverse range of individuals to share comparative experiences, to the final discussion in Turkey, the group has evolved into a body that has taken ownership of the process of using DPI's Turkey Programme to make a substantive contribution to reaching a peaceful, democratic solution to the Kurdish issue.

Although the participants come from different political backgrounds, the atmosphere during discussions at Polonezköy was palpably warm – where individuals disagreed on particular points, each one made an effort to ensure that a constructive solution acceptable to the group as a whole was achieved. The dynamic forged across the comparative study visits has resulted in a cohesive group able to draw on a diverse range of skills and points of view, all committed to working together to effect positive change.

The evolution of the group's activities has been equally noteworthy. Visits to the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland afforded the chance to study other country's experiences of issues similar to those of Turkey. Again and again, participants said that this reinforced the message that obstacles could and would be overcome. Through lengthy conversations about the relevance of these examples, they have developed a practical framework for how their experiences with DPI's Turkey Programme can be converted into concrete initiatives to help bring about a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue. This evolution from observation to discussion to action is already producing results;

articles have been written; television programmes have been produced; public awareness has been raised; senior members of political parties and members of government have been briefed. As time goes on, the participants in DPI's Turkey Programme will continue to work together to achieve a democratic, peaceful and inclusive resolution.



## **Appendix: DPI Board and Council of Experts Members**

### **Director:**

KerimYildiz

KerimYildiz is Director of DPI. He is an expert in International Human Rights Law and minority rights, and has written extensively on international Human Rights mechanisms and International Humanitarian Law. Kerim is the recipient of a number of awards, including from the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights for his services to protect human rights and promote the rule of law in 1996, the Sigrid Rausing Trust's Human Rights award for Leadership in Indigenous and Minority Rights in 2005, and the Gruber Prize for Justice in 2011.

### **Board Members:**

Nick Stewart QC (*Chair*)

Barrister and Deputy High Court Judge (Chancery and Queen's Bench Divisions), United Kingdom. Former Chair of the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales and Former President of Union Internationale des Avocats.

Prof. Penny Green (*Secretary*)

Head of Research and Director of the School of Law's Research Programme at King's College London and Director of the International State Crime Initiative (ICSI), United Kingdom (a collaborative enterprise with the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and the University of Hull, led by King's College London).

Priscilla Hayner

Author on Truth Commissions and Transitional Justice initiatives. Co-founder of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Global expert and previous consultant to the Ford Foundation and to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Widely published on the subject of truth-seeking.

Arild Humlen

Lawyer and Director of the Norwegian Bar Association's Legal Committee, Norway. Widely published within a number of jurisdictions, with emphasis on international civil law and human rights. Has lectured at law faculties of several universities in Norway. Awarded the Honor Prize of the Bar Association for Oslo for his work as Chairman of the Bar Association's Litigation Group for Asylum and Immigration law.

Jacki Muirhead

Practice Director, Cleveland Law Firm. Previously Barristers' Clerk at Counsels' Chambers Limited and Marketing Manager at the Faculty of Advocates. Undertook an International Secondment at New South Wales Bar Association.

Prof. David Petrasek

Professor of International Political Affairs at the University of Ottawa, Canada. Expert and author on human rights, humanitarian law and conflict resolution issues, former Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of Amnesty International, consultant to United Nations.

Antonia Potter

Expert in humanitarian, development, peacemaking and peacebuilding issues. Consultant on women, peace and security; and strategic issues to clients including the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, the Global Network of Women Peacemakers, MediatEUR, and Terre des Hommes.

## **Council of Experts:**

Christine Bell

Professor at the University of Ulster; expert on Transitional Justice, peace negotiations, Constitutional Law and Human Rights Law. Trainer for diplomats and lawyers.

Cengiz Çandar

Senior Journalist and columnist specialising in areas such as The Kurdish Question. Former war correspondent. Served as special adviser to Turkish President Turgut Ozal.

Yilmaz Ensaroğlu

Director of Law and Human Rights at SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research), Member of the Executive Board of the Joint Platform for Human Rights and İHGD, Chief Editor of the Journal of the Human Rights Dialogue.

Prof. Mervyn Frost

Head of the Department of War Studies, King's College London. Former President of the South African Political Studies Association. Expert in the field of Human Rights politics, International Relations and Justice.

Martin Griffiths

Founding member of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Served in the British Diplomatic Service, and held numerous humanitarian posts in the United Nations.

Dr. Edel Hughes

Lecturer at the School of Law, University of Limerick. Previously a researcher at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, NUI Galway, where she completed her PhD in 2009.

Author of numerous publications, including on International Criminal Law.

Dr. Salomón Lerner Febres

Former President of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Perú; Executive President of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights of the Pontifical Catholic University of Perú.

Prof. Ram Manikkalingam

Professor at University of Amsterdam. Served as Senior Advisor on the Peace Process to President of Sri Lanka; author on conflict, multiculturalism and democracy.

Bejan Matur

Renowned Turkey based author, poet and columnist with Zaman daily newspaper. Formerly Director of the Diyarbakır Cultural Art Foundation (DKSV).

Jonathan Powell

British diplomat, former Downing Street Chief of Staff under Prime Minister Tony Blair between 1997 – 2007. Chief negotiator in the Northern Ireland peace talks, leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Currently runs Inter Mediate, a UK-based non-state mediation organisation.

Sir Kieran Prendergast

Served in the British Foreign Office; Diplomat; former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. Now engaged in peacemaking efforts.

Prof. Naomi Roht Arriaza

Professor at University of Berkeley, United States; expert and author on transitional justice, human rights, international criminal law and global environmental issues.

Prof. Dr. Mithat Sancar

Professor of Law at the University of Ankara, expert and author on Constitutional Citizenship, Transitional Justice, and International Human Rights Law. Columnist for Taraf newspaper.

Prof. Dr. Sevtap Yokus

Professor of Law University of Kocaeli, expert on constitutional law and human rights law, practitioner in European Court of Human Rights. Author of numerous publications on the European Convention on Human Rights.



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