



European Union



Norwegian Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs



Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the  
Netherlands



**Irish Aid**

Rialtas na hÉireann  
Government of Ireland

This project is co-funded by the European Union, Norwegian MFA, The Netherlands MFA, and Irish Aid /

Bu proje Avrupa Birliği, Norveç Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Hollanda Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve İrlanda Yardım tarafından ortaklaşa finanse edilmektedir

# Lessons learnt from WPC Experience: Opportunities and Challenges

## Roundtable Meeting Report

Brussels, 9-12 July 2019

Supporting inclusive dialogue at a challenging time in Turkey



Democratic  
Progress  
Institute















European Union



Norwegian Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs



Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the  
Netherlands



**Irish Aid**

Rialtas na hÉireann  
Government of Ireland

This project is co-funded by the European Union, Norwegian MFA, The Netherlands MFA, and Irish Aid /

Bu proje Avrupa Birliği, Norveç Dışışleri Bakanlıđı, Hollanda Dışışleri Bakanlıđı ve İrlanda Yardım tarafından ortaklařa finanse edilmektedir

# Lessons learnt from WPC Experience: Opportunities and Challenges

## Roundtable Meeting Report

Brussels, 9-12 July 2019



**DPI** | Democratic  
Progress  
Institute

---

Published by / Yayınlayan  
Democratic Progress Institute / Demokratik Gelişim Enstitüsü  
11 Guilford Street  
London WC1N 1DH

[www.democraticprogress.org](http://www.democraticprogress.org)  
[info@democraticprogress.org](mailto:info@democraticprogress.org)  
+ 44 (0) 20 7405 3835

First published / İlk Baskı, 2019  
ISBN – 978-1-911205-40-1

© DPI – Democratic Progress Institute / Demokratik Gelişim Enstitüsü

DPI – Democratic Progress Institute is a charity registered in England and Wales.  
Registered Charity No. 1037236. Registered Company No. 2922108

DPI – Demokratik Gelişim Enstitüsü İngiltere ve Galler’de kayıtlı bir vakıftır.  
Vakıf kayıt No. 1037236. Kayıtlı Şirket No. 2922108

This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee or prior permission for teaching purposes, but not for resale. For copying in any other circumstances, prior written permission must be obtained from the publisher, and a fee may be payable.

Bu yayının telif hakları saklıdır, eğitim amacıyla telif ödenmeksizin yada önceden izin alınmaksızın çoğaltılabilir ancak yeniden satılamaz. Bu durumun dışındaki her tür kopyalama için yayıncıdan yazılı izin alınması gerekmektedir. Bu durumda yayıncılara bir ücret ödenmesi gerekebilir.

# Contents

Foreword	11
Session 1 - The role of the European Union in conflict resolution processes	14
Session 2 - Assessment of the Wise Persons Committee experience	35
Session 3 - Opportunities for a Possible Resolution Process in Today's Turkey and Next Steps for former WPC Members	52
Participant List	79
DPI Aims and Objectives	81
DPI Board Members	85
DPI Council of Experts	94



## Foreword

On 9-12<sup>th</sup> July 2019, Democratic Progress Institute held a roundtable meeting in Brussels with former members of Turkey's Wise Persons' Committee (WPC). This activity was a follow-up event from the roundtable meeting held in Oslo in November 2018 and formed the latest in DPI's series examining the experiences of the WPC in Turkey. The aims and objectives of this follow-up meeting were to continue to examine the key lessons that could be learnt from the experiences gained as part of the WPC as well as looking ahead to the potential challenges and opportunities for a possible future resumption of the resolution process.

Apart from participants, the event was attended by guests from the European Union and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Mihaela Matei from the European External Action Service delivered her presentation on the role of the European Union in resolution and democratisation processes. Ms Matei outlined the multi-track approach to peace and resolution processes employed by the EU. She highlighted the importance of engaging through track 2 and 3, particularly in times where a process has broken down or is 'frozen'. It is during these periods that the value of civil society can be seen more starkly and enables them to contribute towards a more inclusive process and create sustainable outcomes.

The discussion also involved other EU representatives. Interactions among participants and our EU guests proved to be very frank and open as to the impact the EU has had with its approach to conflict resolution. Learning about the EU's key areas of responsibility in advancing peace and democracy in conflict-affected areas was valuable to the participants.

The meeting then considered the experience in Turkey. Looking back at their experiences in the WPC, participants discussed the successes and failures of this previous process, in which each member was mandated to work independently for the peace process - generating support for the process amongst the general public and creating a public space in which it could be discussed constructively.

Each participant was given the opportunity to give a brief assessment of their WPC experience before the group engaged in discussion with one another to pinpoint collective lessons that can be learnt from the process.

They noted that whilst the attitude of the general public was ripe for peace, the necessary planning and preparation was not in place, meaning the mechanisms required for a successful resolution process were lacking.

Participants discussed the current situation in Turkey and, looking ahead, what conditions are necessary for a resumption of the resolution process. In the session, participants explored what a path for peace would require in Turkey and discussed with each other some of their ideas to contribute to a potential future resolution process. Included in the discussions was the need for promoting of a language of peace - 'positive language for a positive solution' - as well as ensuring any future resolution process is an inclusive one that has the support of all parties.

This roundtable provided participants with the opportunity to discuss the current situation in Turkey and how to share their learning with wider constituencies and their own institutions. Both group discussions, as well as our own side meetings with participants prove that the dialogue amongst themselves and with DPI are highly important.

The roundtable was part of the project 'Supporting inclusive dialogue at a challenging time in Turkey' with the generous support of the EU



as well as the Irish, Dutch and Norwegian governments. I would like to extend our thanks to all our funders for making this event possible.

We would also like to express, once again, our deepest thanks to all of our speakers and participants in the programme for sharing their experiences and expertise, to the DPI team in London and Turkey who delivered this activity.

Please refer to the gallery section of the website for photos of the events and to 'In the media' for media coverage. The event has been covered positively in Turkish media and articles that have been written, along with a photo gallery and brief summary report, can be found on DPI's website: [www.democraticprogress.org](http://www.democraticprogress.org).

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Kerim Yildiz', written in a cursive style.

**Kerim Yildiz**

Chief Executive Officer

Democratic Progress Institute

# Session 1 - The role of the European Union in conflict resolution processes

**Wednesday 10 July 2019, Brussels**

**Mihaela Matei**, European External Action Service



*Mihaela Matei delivers her presentation alongside DPI CEO Kerim Yildiz and DPI Head of Turkey Programme Esra Elmas*

## **Kerim Yildiz**

I want to welcome everyone to this meeting with former members of the Wise Persons' Committee, advisers, EU representatives and staff. This meeting follows the one held in Oslo last year to discuss the role of the WPC during the resolution process in Turkey and what lessons - successes and failures - we can draw from that experience in a bid to better prepare for a possible future resumption of the process in Turkey. We have always found it incredibly important that such a project allowed the concept and the content of the peace process to be explained and

transmitted across to the wider communities there. This process was successful in breaking down existing taboos in the country. It is useful to rethink the impact of WPC and their experiences, as it might lead to crucial contributions to future democratisation processes in Turkey. At the time the process was designed, the focus was not put solely on Kurdish people, but on the rights of all minorities in the country. At DPI, we think the role of the EU in the peace process is extremely important. Mihaela Matei is a political officer at the Syrian desk of the European External Action Service. She will be talking about the role of the EU in conflict resolution. The debates will then be opened up for us to have a frank discussion. Then, we would like to hear the assessment of the committee and the lessons we can draw from that. At the end, we could discuss of the opportunity for a potential resumption of the process and whether there is such a hope.

### **Mihaela Matei**

Good morning everybody, it is good to be able to join you here today. Syria is a key study when it comes to the EU supporting a resolution to conflict. I will focus more on lessons learned in relation to Syrian democracy, instead of simply describing the Syrian conflict. I want to concentrate more on practical experiences. The EU tends to avoid being influenced by the situation on the ground, as the UN remains the main mediator in the Syrian conflict, led by the UN general secretary. The EU did not play a core role in finding a solution in the conflict. Indeed, how can we do it better than the UN when we have various unfolding developments, and a process that is blocked in a continuous way?

In diplomacy, we use the names “Track 1, 2 or 3” to depict stages of dialogue during a resolution process and I’ll refer to these throughout my presentation.

In conflict resolution, we talk about multi-track diplomacy. It encompasses three levels of dialogue. Track 1 diplomacy is used to establish formal contact between official leaders. Track 2 covers the unofficial dialogue between influential members of the civil society. It is a process that cannot replace official talks, but that fosters a dialogue often impossible to establish by engaging solely the officials. Then, Track 3 diplomacy is a people-to-people diplomacy undertaken by individuals. These tracks are mobile, as you can combine them. For instance, a Track 1.5 dialogue would be some informal talks held between officials. These are often found to be very fruitful in unfreezing blocked situations.

During the second development of the conflict, the lack of official involvement of the EU proved to be a major hinderance to resolving the conflict. The moment the Geneva peace process ended, we realised we needed a tool to implement it. The current tools were insufficient. At the time, indeed, the peace process was very asymmetric. The government engaged in talks with various diasporas, which were obviously weaker in comparison. Thus, two parties were supposed to negotiate the future of the country while being asymmetric. With the support of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Syrian Peace Process Initiative was created. It allowed the allocation of funds to implement track 1 and track 2.5. Its objectives were:

- To support the official talks and the implementation of the UN resolution;
- To support civil society and its possibility to engage in the process;
- To promote a women's initiative; and
- To deepen the EU's understanding of the Syrian conflict. This area was more self-centred.

Track 1 diplomacy was the main focus. It aimed at strengthening the weak parties so that they were able to support their views. It supported the office in Geneva for the Syrian opposition. The office is now organising meetings every month where they discuss issues such as human rights, refugees, IDPs etc. Eventually, such an initiative supported the development of a political capacity. We are talking about people that, back then, had no skills in political negotiations, that were against the official regime, itself backed by a very strong bureaucracy. We had to talk to them about negotiations. We also organised a lot of seminars about the Constitution, local government and elections so that they could deepen their understanding of the importance of engaging with these matters.

The Syrian government kept considering the opposition as a terrorist group with no discussions possible. Finally, we came to the situation where Track 1 was not enough. The deadlock was so that the EU was not able to influence. When Track 1's limits were reached, the solution was to engage more in another Track to try to build informal bridges and foster informal dialogue. The EU created two projects Supreme Council of the Syrian Revolution (SCSR) and Women's Advisory Board (WAB) – half official regime, half opposition. It brought the two parties together, in order to create a common ground. Several conferences were held to gather different ethnic groups.

Track 3 diplomacy completed the effort by bringing these people together in an unofficial manner. It explored the search for common ground through digital diplomacy, church organisation and local organisations. All these initiatives built up knowledge that, eventually, contributed to enforce Track 1. We trained people to support their views in what we thought would finally become official negotiations. While Track 1 was stuck in a dead end as the official negotiations were not improving, it moved on to Track 1.5 dialogue. Russia, Iran and Turkey decided the fate

of the conflict. They were able to discuss the most conflicting topics. This started 1.5 year ago yet we do not witness trickle-down effects on Track 1.

What lessons are to be learnt after 3-4 years of work? We had some positive and negative things. Many think tanks and NGOs focus on their work individually, they overlook the impact they could have on Track 1. Track 2 and Track 3 converge in the same direction, as civil society focuses more and more on refugees or security. In the end, several people talk about the same things. They compete for money, for power, or for visibility, while we would need to get them to agree on issues and ways forward together. Some also have the impression that nothing changes for their country. Some parties in the conflict try to invent processes for the sake of a process, because they are frightened by the inertia.

The Syrian regime has resisted to all Track 2 activities. We have limited or even non-existent access to decisions makers in Damascus. We cannot reach out to Bashar al-Assad and it is unlikely that the regime will change its behaviour in the near future.

Maybe we could look to new people to engage with? There are several examples of where we could look in the future, such as the bourgeoisie or business people. They have to protect their economic interest, so they are interested in fostering the peace process in Syria.

On a positive note, engagement in Track 2 and 3 projects is still bringing new outcomes. When the process was completely frozen, the sides involved in the conflict understood the power of civil society. If they want a political future in Syria, politicians need votes and support from local communities, and refugees. Even the official regime scrutinized their communities, sending specific people from NGOs with connections with the Syrian intelligence to send messages. There are informal channels of

communications used by the Syrian regime, which are of high interest for us.

We also have to go deeper with the implications for women, as their influence exceeds, by far, mere household issues. Women organisations are more empathic, more neutral, and capable of bringing together different cohorts into one large group.

Also, research should not be neglected. At a Syrian seminar, a sociologist spoke about centres of power in Syria and what power meant. One person of the opposition said it was nice to hear. Research should be brought in the centre of a resolution process.

In the future, the following issues are to be discussed:

- Streamlining all initiatives and implementing a coordination mechanism;
- Analyse the zero-sum game situation; how can we outreach this stage?
- How can we avoid the intermediary and reach the centre, people that can make changes on the ground?
- How can we better record and distribute the accumulated knowledge and experience gained from the dialogue and engagement we've had in Syria?

### **Kerim Yildiz**

Thank you very much for your in-depth presentation Mihaela. It shed a lot of light on the Syrian conflict and how the EU approaches conflict resolution issues. The issue we are dealing with in Turkey currently is how to interconnect with Syria. I am sure that this issue will come up. I now open the floor for questions and discussions.



*DPI CEO Kerim Yildiz addresses the group alongside Mihaela Matei and Esra Elmas as Eva Horelova, Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, Ankara looks on*

### **Participant**

It is great to be meeting someone from the EU. We have listened to your insights about the Syrian conflict. The situation in Turkey is drastically different. We have initiated a process, and we have achieved great progress in terms of the judiciary. For Turkey, the European Union means democracy. Unfortunately, despite the process, relations with the EU deteriorated. There are many democratic forces in Turkey, and they are resentful towards the EU. The peace process is a top priority for democracy. Similarly, EU input is very important, and I believe the EU should assume more responsibilities. Turkey cannot achieve democracy by itself. What steps should the EU take? Could the EU make that happen, or at least present suitable conditions for that to happen?

### **Participant**

Syria is a big problem for us as well. Since 2002, the date of the first harmonization package, there have been eight packages, and we have implemented all reforms in Turkey. The EU provided great help with the peace process in Turkey. All of a sudden, the EU decided not to open the



next chapter. It created a great disappointment in Turkey. If the EU is really invested in the Kurdish issue, why did it stop suddenly?

**Participant**

The EU has been very distant towards Turkey. It has even had a negative impact on the resolution in the Kurdish conflict. Do you acknowledge this was a mistake on the EU's part? Do you have any intention to support any upturn of the process?

Do you think the EU had a role in the failure of Turkey's accession?

**Mihaela Matei**

The Turkey situation is not my area of expertise so I must defer on the specific questions. However, what I will say is that the EU can offer tools and instruments, but it cannot bring about change in political will.

**EU Representative**

I am part of the EU delegation in Ankara. I encourage you to take the peace process as an opportunity to discuss such topics as how we should support the administration in Northern Syria, what is the Kurdish movement in Syria, what interconnection it has with the Kurdish movement in Turkey.

I hear the frustrations of the Turkish intellectuals, but at the same time, we can support the democratic transition in an external country, but we cannot do everything. The country needs to work by itself and to know where it wants to go. Also, it is not clear that Turkish people do want to go in the sense of EU accession. Yes, technical progress has been made, but not on the more important and difficult chapters. I do not witness a real will for accession in the majority of Turkish discourses. There is an absence of an EU political culture of compromise, which constitutes the biggest problem in the accession of Turkey to the EU. In

the last 5 to 10 years, many EU states have expressed their reluctance to integrate Turkey, which corresponds to a willingness to isolate Turkey. Five years before the attempted coup, Turkey became very toxic in some actors' eyes. Turkish ministers found themselves under big pressure from parliamentarians and constituencies. These constituencies were arguing that the enhancement of human rights and rule of law in Turkey could be negative, hence blocking any co-option process in Turkey. On the EU side, there is this idea that a candidate country should do more. I am personally consistently arguing for more politician to politician talks between Turkish and EU officials. Yet, I am not optimistic about the future. Accession is not really happening, as Turkey is becoming politically more and more toxic.

### **Participant**

The process as such is not the main point. I would be interested to hear a bit more on the substance, and its interconnection with the Syrian side. Following Rojava, we saw the need for a big decentralisation in Turkey. This is deeply connected with what could be done in the future with the Syrian setup.

### **Mihaela Matei**

Negotiations between the United States and Turkey are in a deadlock, only because no engagement has been made by the Turkish government in the Kurdish resolution process. Track 1 is not functioning, accession chapters are not being implemented, negotiations are not progressing. It does not mean there is nothing to be done. We need to focus more on Tracks 2 and 3. The EU can offer a lot of facilities, tools, to establish solutions on the civil society level, in a bottom-up way. Through our actions, we found out that focusing on one plan never works. Syria is the best example where changes did not come from the traditional political discussions. We kept people engaged and tried to make changes inside Syria.

**Kerim Yilidiz**

We need to talk about the design of the process, and particularly Track 2 issues. The EU support for DPI is a good indicator of the EU support for the resolution process. Whether or not accession talks are stopped with Turkey, the EU has a fundamental duty to keep engaging with these issues.

**Participant**

I hear about civil society in Syria, and I am surprised that this is mentioned. Ocalan stressed this issue of synchronisation, by saying that PYD had to watch out for Turkey's sensitivities. Synchronisation of the process is important. As part of the opposition, I was opposed to the vote renewal during the June election. The EU message was to see it as a failure. We understand that the EU is waiting for Turkey to take steps, but we should stress on synchronicity, and take steps together.

**Participant**

I would like to know whether the Syrian opposition had changed from the beginning of the civil war to today? Is there such a transformation taking place within the opposition? In North East Syria, de facto rules are established, Rojava has its own assembly and mechanisms. From an external point of view, we assume it works pretty well. But perhaps we need to explore this more. Could such a model work in Turkey or in the Middle East? We need to explore the possibilities of the Rojava model. The resolution process in Turkey ended because Syria represented a deadline for Ocalan and Erdogan. Thus, we could identify many similarities between the processes in both countries. Ocalan is the main character in this process. The EU could help with the political processes. The EU has been ignoring some leading organisations so far. It could rethink its attitude, as it has contributed to the deadlock. Lots of countries view the PYD or the YPG as terrorist organisations.

In accession talks, Turkey's policies count. The EU supports Turkey's policies in order to prevent refugees to enter the European territory. The EU has to change its refugee policy. Its responsibility is to resolve the problem in the countries where the refugees come from. The EU should also cooperate with women organisations in Rojava. Some important organisations in the Middle East are being ignored by the EU, though they could be critical in defeating jihadists. For instance, the victory of Kurdish women in defeating ISIS is a good illustration of the need for recognising the role of women in social changes.



*Participants interact with EU representatives during the first session of the day*

### **Participant**

My question concerns the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Is there a new momentum on the horizon? The PKK leader wrote in the Washington post. Maybe you could talk about the change we are currently witnessing? Are there any connections between the Turkish and the Syrian Kurds? What are the problems encountered in this dialogue?

**Mihaela Matei**

In Syrian negotiations, one of the EU priorities is to make the opposition capable of coming together, unified as a group. In that sense, we need to define the relation between both Kurdish movements. The opposition changed a lot, even if it was not visible, especially in news media.

You asked about the interconnections and the Rojava model. I am not sure that Rojava is a model. We can see that it is somehow functioning, but it is definitely not a democratic example. The PYD is a relatively new party. They are using the fact that they have disciplined militias to extend into a local government in Rojava. The EU does not speak to PYD directly, but still contacts are established. We are trying to bring together the two non-regime movements in Syria: both the opposition and the Kurds. They have a common ground for dialogue, yet there remains a high level of misunderstanding when it comes to Syrian Kurds. We find it very difficult to conduct a dialogue with them. The United States are working with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The EU tries to empower the Kurdish forces to develop a democratic model, but they are still reluctant to establish themselves democratically. The Kurds are exploiting natural resources and govern without involving the locals. The council in Raqqa, Syria, is more or less controlled by PYD. Democratisation is still a pending issue, that remains an open file for us, involving complicated questions. No official discussions are conducted with PYD, but some informal discussions are going on. We started a lot of projects in relation to community support in Rojava.

About the refugees: the European Union supports a safe, voluntary and dignified return to their countries. It is the only sustainable solution. Safety is the main issue. Lots of pressure is directed to Syria in order to set up safe conditions for refugees. There is nobody who more than the EU wants a good solution for refugees. The question of refugees is a

humanitarian issue that has to be held aside from the political process. Of course, they are connected issues, but the EU chose to consider it as a humanitarian issue.

When it comes to women in Rojava, they certainly were a model, they played a big role. This model arises from the PYD's egalitarian, left, secular ideology. This model is very interesting to study. We have individual contacts with them. For example, some Kurdish women coming from Rojava participated in Track 3 dialogue in Geneva. Still, the participation is tiny and limited.

Regarding Ocalan's words on synchronicity, it led to the suspension of a Turkish military intervention in North Syria. About its declaration regarding state sensitivities, I will have a short answer: the US has strong influence and makes certain changes in PYD behaviour. The US has the influence to determine a more open and democratic behaviour from PYD. Within this trend, it is hard to say how important Ocalan's role is. My hope is that at one time, PKK will stop raising funds in Europe to support terrorist organisations, so they will not be seen as a threat by the European Member States. The ball is now in their court.

### **Participant**

In the last couple of years, we witnessed a great entanglement of policies between the EU, Turkey and Syria. The EU is a great project, it is a model we respect, and we find inspiration in. Yet, the EU, rather than focusing on groups and individuals, should focus on the constitutional and legal part. The EU has been focusing on conflict resolution in Syria or other parts of the world for a while now, but no set of rules has yet been retrieved from their experience. I think it would be very fruitful to have such an input, as we could use it to enrich the debate. Let's make this more transparent.

**Participant**

Track 2 and Track 3 diplomacy are being implemented in Syria right now. Do you deal with actors coming from Turkey?

**Participant**

In Turkish there is this saying: you need to criticize yourself more seriously than others. There has been this constitutional amendment in Turkey. Turkey clearly missed this opportunity, and now the Constitution is worse than ever. We cannot just criticise the EU regarding its stance with Turkey, we also have to blame Turkey for its bad choices.

Yet, we can also criticise the EU. The European Court of Human Rights turned a deaf ear to what was happening in Turkey. On the one hand, the EU raised the voice regarding the constitutional process in Turkey but on the other hand, it remained silent in relation to what was done in Turkey. Impartiality is not always the right decision. If you do not take sides when injustice is going on, then you accept injustice. We should also ask ourselves: in a peace process, does it matter to be democratic at any price? Or does the necessity of the peace process prevail the setting-up of a democracy? The South African example shows us that the government was not really democratic when it started the process. But from a military or economic point of view, regardless of the government being democratic or not, they would focus on the peace process. Then there are two options: either we push the government to be more democratic, or we do not bother about the government being democratic, which I am well aware could come with costs. I do believe we need to be democratic at first, rather than pushing the current government to find a solution. We should always be pushing for democracy. The EU shares a very important message for humanity. The basic motivation for the EU project should be human rights and peace. These principles should not

be compromised for the purpose of finding solutions for smaller issues. The EU should review its policies with this point in mind.

**Kerim Yildiz**

I would like to gently remind that we are not here today to discuss who is right and wrong. The floor is open for questions and remarks.

**Mihaela Matei**

There are specific bodies dealing with conflict resolution, that are embedded in Security and Defence EU policies. Even if you have a set of rights and principles, every situation is different. You cannot duplicate the rules that have worked for a particular conflict to every conflict in the world. Let's take the example of the building of an Afghanistan peace facility. In practice, you have to decide based on the specific features of the conflict. In Afghanistan, we mandated a Swedish NGO to implement the process. The way they design the process is very much within the nature of the conflict itself, because of the Taliban specific nature. So, we do have a strict set of rules, but some broad principles are adaptable to each conflict.

There are two sets of actors involved in Turkey that acquired in the past an expertise with security issues. On the Kurdish issue, Turkish NGOs have been invited as observers. We do support a Kurdish-Kurdish dialogue. Turkey is observing in this dialogue, as well as France or other European Member States. Track 2 discussions are held among the participants. We do not want to impose our views, while involving Turkey and Turkish authorities in the process.

Now, about the balance between democracy and the peace process. The question was how to make a good balance between the quest for democracy and the successful implementation of a peace process. We, as EU representatives, have never criticized Turkish behaviour inside Syria.



The EU never took a stance against Turkey's actions. The reason behind that is that Turkey is one of the EU's few allies to still support a peace process. I cannot agree more with your claim.

### **EU Representative**

The EU position has been very clear and decisive, repeated several times through its "Progress report". I understand it is very frustrating for people on the ground. Unfortunately, there is not much lever left to influence the Turkish government from a European perspective. We take note of the Turkish government's commitment to make progress in the areas that were criticized, but we did not see more. Let's see what the judicial reform will achieve. The EU has its own problem within its borders, such as Brexit, Poland, Hungary. Hungary has been recently blocking internal issues (religious aspects, LGBTI community). This is all part of an internal dirty laundry. The bottom line is that the EU said what needed to be said, but nothing seems to change on the Turkish side. There are no more customs union negotiations. If you only improve human rights and the rule of law, it is not complete enough.

### **Participant**

Thank you very much for these precious insights about the situation. I have three questions:

- When it comes to the implementation of 2nd Track and 3rd Track discussions, what level of representation does it ensure in Syria? Is the diversity of Kurds in Syria correctly represented?
- I see four platforms for negotiations: within the Kurds, between Turkey and the Kurds, between Syrian dissidents and the Kurds, and between the Syrian regime and the Kurds. What level of maturity has each one of these different negotiation processes achieved? Which one is the most promising?

- We understand that 1st Track dialogues are not supported for the moment. When will it start, or will it ever start?

### **Participant**

Thank you for the very informative analysis. I too have three questions:

- You briefly mentioned the support of the EU for the PYD? Can you talk more about that?
- We are discussing the EU's perspective, but in the field the EU has no military, no weapons. Maybe the EU is the weakest actor on the ground. What is the perspective of the EU for Syria regarding this aspect?
- In answering the Ocalan question, you talked about the dual nature of the PKK. I am just trying to understand your perspective. Currently in Turkey the state mind is partially linked to this process and the hope that resolving the Kurdish issue in Syria could have a positive effect on Turkey. Ocalan seems to confirm he wants to be part of such a process.

### **Kerim Yildiz**

This is a complicated area; this meeting is not dedicated for these types of questions.

### **Participant**

These processes are dynamic processes. In the title of this meeting, we see it as well. I think the process needs to present as much inclusiveness as possible. I want to cite the SETA negotiations as an example. Groups and organisations connected to the government were highly involved. We need to reach out to these types of organisations that are in touch with the government but are not part of it. Considering the recent developments in Turkey, inclusiveness is essential. Through my research in the region, I saw that civil society actors are eager to be included

in this process. Are you thinking of including more actors? Erdogan was an important actor, but opposition parties are growing, they are representing the middle class, so they should not be overlooked.

Relations between the EU and Turkey are at a standstill. The EU has a lot of leverage for Turkey. It is perhaps not realistic to talk about full membership, but Turkey is still an official candidate to integrate into the EU. There has to be other comments and working areas, that could potentially spill over to help resolve the Kurdish issue in Syria. Back in time, during the resolution process, the EU had no influence over it, and I think we suffered from this. We have to leave the issue of full membership aside for the moment and focus on developing EU-Turkey relations. A system of balance and monitoring could be developed. I disagree with you when you say that Turkey has no culture of compromise. The EU leaders have to be more comprehensive, more inclusive when looking at the situation in Turkey. This change of view would play a big role in resolving the Kurdish issue.

### **Participant**

I want to raise the issue of art and culture in negotiations. I am the only artist present here. The EU needs to include more artists and actors in this process. This is something that could ultimately strengthen the human dimension. More people from the arts and culture need to participate in these meetings.

### **Participant**

Switzerland hasn't been involved in these issues since 2016, with the end of the peace process. Situations vary between Syria and Turkey, due to the difference in context. It induces different policies undertaken by the international stage. One essential feature in reaching peace is to include all actors. An exception is made of Turkey, as the regime did not engage. In nine out of ten cases, commitment is lacking from at least one of

the parties, most often state entities. Political commitment is needed to change the equation. The Colombian case was an exception, because the president sustained the peace process at all costs, engaging every day a bit more. Even when the political commitment is lacking, and the public and media are not involving themselves, it is important that one keeps working on it. A peace process needs all levels to be achieved. Multitrack decisions enable different layers to engage between each other and to prepare the ground for when the moment is right to prepare an agreement.



*Roland Salvisburg from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs  
adds his voice to the discussion*

Recent developments in Turkey make us think that the moment may be right. Indeed, unless the Kurdish issue is solved in a sustainable manner, Turkey will never come to terms with itself. We are all keeping a close eye on developments in Turkey in order to support a sustainable solution of the Kurdish issue. No big signals have arisen yet, but things are slowly moving.

**Mihaela Matei**

Kurdish people are not involved in the EU initiatives at the scale we would have liked them to. Some Kurds do participate in some events, though it remains a minimal involvement. The PYD has barely been involved at all. All the dialogues are interconnected. There is this French initiative on Kurdish-Kurdish dialogue that led nowhere because Turkey influenced the actors in boycotting the issue. The PYD is an opportunistic actor, which looks for a solution for themselves. They are very pragmatic. Turkey has worked tirelessly in order to boycott any voice or representation of the PYD. The EU has turned itself towards more engagement with local communities for the resilience of the process. We do not work exclusively with the PYD, the YPG or the SDF. Turkey tried to block the international initiative. We witness no Turkish appetite to engage in a dialogue with the Kurds in Syria or even with the international community.

The peace processes in Turkey and Syria are similar to communicating vessels. The situation in one state influences the situation in another. Turkey is currently heading towards a toxic attitude, aiming at blocking every initiative by the international community in favour of the Kurdish movements. If something happens in the North East, it could perhaps have a positive impact. Yet, Turkey's position remains unchanged: The PYD is a terrorist organisation, and they do not want to move on this side. The situation could benefit from local cooperation in Kurdish areas. There are a lot of people moving in and out, refugees, Internally Displaced Persons. These individuals need collective help, so there is a lot of common ground for local cooperation. But Turkey keeps on politically stopping such humanitarian efforts.

## Participant

DPI has intervened in this process. Even in the most difficult times, DPI continued its efforts. The media have reacted more and more positively. DPI has engaged the business community in the process, which is now a success. SETA also does involve businessmen and women, but it has the handicap of recreating the official state mindset. That won't be productive. You need someone who can point out the flaws of the government. This is the reason why DPI is a very important actor in the process. It contributed to the rising visibility of the process. As Erdogan said, "we have put the resolution process in the fridge". The EU is not here to support a resumption of the process, but DPI is. Please try to help and support DPI. We should make these efforts visible through even more oriented events. We should place more carefulness in choosing partners and actors involved in the process.

## Kerim Yildiz

Thank you. We are approaching the end of our session. Thank you very much Mihaela for your presentation and to all of you for valuable additions to the discussion.



*DPI participants gather for a group photo with EU representatives Mihaela Matei, Eva Horelova and James Rizzo; Roland Salvisburg from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; and DPI staff*

## Session 2 - Assessment of the Wise Persons Committee experience

**Wednesday 10 July 2019, Brussels**

### **Kerim Yildiz**

This second session has no speakers, so the floor is yours to discuss lessons learnt from the Wise Persons Committee.

The process initially started under a different name. Now, whether the process can be resumed under the same name, or would require a new name and design, is unclear. One thing is however clear: it cannot be the same process, due to political developments. I open the floor for discussion.

### **Participant**

The peace process lasted three years, between 2013 and 2016. I want to make a brief timeline of the highlights of the developments then. In February 2012, there was an operation against the Turkish intelligence service. The Gulenists were opposed to the peace initiative at the time. The position was noteworthy, and I think it contributed to the failure of the process. The Gulenists were opposing the process and they had some powerful connections within media and the judiciary. Liberals were opposed because of their hostility towards Erdogan. Conservatives or nationalists were also opposed. Overall, a lot of segments of the society were opponents of the peace process. Together, they make up a sizeable chunk of the society.



*DPI Participants give their assessments of the WPC experience*

Who was supporting this initiative? In the Black Sea region, the social support was high. 90% of the Kurds supported the peace process. The main weakness remained the absence of support from the People's Republican Party (CHP). Erdogan first made an attempt to rally their support, but after it failed once he did not try again. In the end, Erdogan was concerned that the process would cost his political career and decided to stop the process.

The Gulenists held a lot of power in the region, and they acted rather forcefully against the process. This was revealed after the attempted coup, as a lot of military actors were found to be affiliated with the Gulenist movement.

If we cannot resolve the issue with the Kurds, we are going to be overlooked by the powerful states.

### **Participant**

There are advantages and disadvantages in working on the ground. Despite those, the WPC represented a significant step in establishing



peace. It showed that despite all the hate speech and terrorist discourse, the people of Turkey can still come together and reconcile their disagreements. The idea of peace was still taken to heart by the public at large. In April and June, the WPC did some marvellous work. The survey conducted at the time showed that support for the peace process was over 70%. When the process was first initiated in 2013, in January three women were assassinated in Paris. The Turkish intelligence was accused of being the perpetrators. Within the state, some cliques are known to be anti-Kurdish. Gulenists are not the only culprits. There are a lot of factions within the state in Turkey. They are hard to dismiss. This problem needs to be addressed if we consider the process to start again.

Our state still has an issue with democracy, and, at the end of the day, it is a military state, comparable to an authoritarian regime. In my opinion, solving the Kurdish issue through democracy is not the priority. It would be better to first establish peace, before implementing democracy.

Syria played a huge role in the actions of the WPC. We remember the demonstrations in 2014, in support of the Kobane Kurdish forces, that turned into political backlash and direct violence.

I have a couple of technical considerations to stress. First, laws should have been adopted ahead of the process. Legislation should have been made to protect civil servants acting during the process. Also, it was impossible to approach Ocalan at the time. Using a HDP delegation to convey the message to Erdogan and PKK was not the right way, as it induces a lot of conflicting responsibilities. In 2015, we paid a high price because of this. The methodology was not right. In the formation of the WPC, there were some elements missing, especially the lack of participation from democrats and Alevis.

Thanks to DPI and the many organisations supporting these endeavours, peace advocacy has continued. The importance of DPI's activities needs to be acknowledged. In Oslo, hopes for peace were revived. We are the ones keeping this idea of peace alive. There have been many errors or missing elements, but I believe that the next process will change. The accumulated experiences will be useful in the coming process.

### **Participant**

In 7 regions, 63 people worked on discussions. The following are some results that were obtained:

- By the end of the whole process, a considerable part of society supported it.
- Support increased as the process progressed.
- In the absence of conflict, people did not lose their relatives or friends. This is what they valued most, and why they put trust in us.

We did not focus solely on the Kurdish issue. All the people participating in our meetings brought their own problems to the table. We listened carefully to each of them. This is a societal problem. Everybody struggles with discrimination. These meetings were not only held for the benefit of Kurdish people, but for every forgotten segment of society.

We also discussed foundational issues. People asked for better representation of minorities in the Constitution. In 81 provinces, they set the agenda, both for the supporters and the opponents. The WPC served as a bridge between society and the government. They spoke about people's fear and expectations and put that into reports that were conveyed to the government. In the future, the WPC will be seen as a truly historical experience.

Society did not know about the particular actions of the WPC. It is important to stress that despite our diversity we had a common willingness to push for peace. In the region of the Central Anatolia delegation, intellectuals, or more educated people in society, did not support the process. However, less educated people were more supportive of the process. People either opposing the process or keeping their distance to it were hurting the implementation of peace. This was one of the most important obstacles. We did not get any support from the media in the process, because there was a deep anger against the political leadership.



*DPI Participant studies the conference pack materials during discussion*

## **Participant**

My personal assessment of the experience I had as a member of the WPC is positive. I think it is a dynamic model which can be adapted to different political contexts. It is important to persuade people into the idea of peace, and the WPC made great efforts to this end.

Today, it can be re-established while taking into account the current specifics. In the region of the Marmara delegation, people's views sometimes differed from the aim of the process. The resolution was not limited to the Kurdish people, it concerned and still concerns all Turkish citizens. The new social contract is important for everyone, not just the Kurds. I saw fear and anxiety, alongside support. There was a fear of loss or of losing control or power.

The ruling power did not sufficiently put our reports into use. They reinterpreted the concerns of the citizens at their own political benefit. There was no evaluation of these reports. The government was not willing to use people's concerns to actually address the issues.

Today, if the process is to be resumed, we must bear in mind that the situation has evolved. Back then, the problem was to be resolved within Turkish borders, and the resolution process was a national issue. Now, the issue is a cross border one. Since 1989, history has shown us that Kurds had more than a sociological impact. They can shape Turkish politics. It is essential to treat them as a whole, and not as regionally disseminated populations. What we are currently witnessing is an internationalisation of the Kurdish issue.

### **Participant**

Looking back at the process, whether it be during its preparation, its beginning or its elaboration, parties conceived its meaning in very different ways. Both parties had their own intentions, but they tried to hide it from one another. This impeded the process. In addition, the process was not well explained to the public at large. Even if the parties had understood it themselves, they would have benefited from better organisation. Today, we have come to the conclusion that the aim of the process was not well discussed at state level. Between the parties,

there was a feeling of distrust and suspicion. The state tried to avoid third parties, even though they could perhaps have helped resolve this atmosphere of distrust.

When it comes to the reports, I really think they were useful. They paved the way for further democratisation.

I am from a conservative background. I care about the EU a lot. EU-Turkey Relations are important but Turkish people are even more important. Thus, it is crucial to involve citizens in the designing of Turkey-EU relations. It could be achieved by involving the İyi Party and the MHP in the design of these relations.

The EU did not support this fringe of society enough, as we have already seen after the attempted coup. I am asking the EU representatives to take up a new discourse and be more inclusive for the Turkish conservative segment.

### **Participant**

The most important thing is that for two and a half years we talked about peace. Great links were fostered between the East and the West. Gulenists were the biggest obstacle of the process. I remember one member of the WPC saying ‘their intention is not to make peace but to establish an executive presidency’. We did not limit ourselves to the writing of reports. We wanted to understand the expectations of society at large. In the South-East region, expectations were diverging. People were emphasising the need for democracy in the region. We put this in the report. At the end of the process, expectations of both parties were different.

As you want us to assess the peace initiative, I would say that it provides a unique example for the entire world. The WPC worked tirelessly and made great steps in the right direction.

## Participant

The WPC was not prepared enough. It was almost like an *ad hoc* exercise. The AKP and the PKK defended their own interests and are therefore equally to blame for the failure of this process, as they acted without focus on common interest.

Despite these downsides, we can identify some positive aspects. In some regions, public support went from 40% social support when it started to 77% at its end. There were some shortcomings, but still, it contributed to create a bridge between the parties. People with different political convictions were represented through us. Retrospectively, I would say we did achieve a type of ‘Turkey Alliance’ at the time. The number of clashes decreased, and peace was more stable than it had been for a long time. Looking back, I would also say its greatest failure concerns education in the mother tongue. If a new process is to be made, this would need to be at the core of discussions. From a sociological point of view, it will remain a very interesting period in Turkey. Let’s keep in mind Ocalan’s words in his letter: the next process will be of a political nature. It will discuss Turkey’s relation with all Kurds in the Middle-Eastern region. In Syria and Iraq, Kurdish actors have to be taken into account, and only against that background will we have a rapprochement between the Turkish state and the Kurds.

During the peace process, democratic autonomy was one of the core topics. Ocalan talked about strengthening local authorities. In the new process, it is very unlikely there will be discussion about autonomy. Kurdish people want normalisation more than autonomous power now.



*Discussion explored the lessons that should be learnt from the previous resolution process in Turkey*

### **Participant**

Switzerland is interested in opportunities in Turkey. Let's try an experiment: put a group together and ask them what they would do if they had a mandate to act. This allows people to put themselves in someone else's shoes, it encourages creative ideas. When society starts to talk about peace, they start to create opportunities, which itself fosters support and willingness for change. It is also an exercise that can influence policy makers sooner or later. I would like to hear from the WPC members how the ground could be better prepared. Every peace process is made in difficult circumstances, by its very definition. Therefore, it requires a lot of effort and work, but talking about it beforehand and at every step of its development is the best way for it to succeed.

### **Participant**

I was a WPC member in the region of the Black Sea. It is important to be precise because the experiences have differed from region to region. In our case, people were pretty reluctant towards the process. We were

very naïve about their expectations. We did not know much about what we were doing. We were full of belief and optimism.

The resolution process had a positive impact. It was not only a top-down approach. We managed to make it a public process to legitimise it. It was not only about state actors interacting together. The resolution process was on the front page of the newspapers. Still, its organization was led by the state. It was a state-centred process. If it was to be repeated, it definitely needs more civilian input. I think it was counter-productive to rely that much on the state. Then, as it happened, if the state withdraws itself from the process, it meant all the initiatives and efforts that were ongoing had to come to an end. In the Black Sea region, people wanted to get rid of the WPC because we were the same as the governors in their eyes.

The reports outline the people's opinion. In that respect, they are priceless. Today, these things could not be reported to the state or said out loud. But back then, people felt like they were being heard and were more relaxed, so they allowed themselves to stand up for their values and hopes.

I don't remember the EU having a huge role back then. Yes, they contributed to the democratic transition in general. But in the WPC and the peace process in itself, the EU was not interested. At the time, the EU processed the Turkish agenda through the lens of the Turkish opposition. This was the wrong way of thinking in my view, because the importance of our work did not find any echo in the EU's eyes. We were barely covered by the international press, and that is deplorable considering the importance of our work.

### **Participant**

Maybe my colleague doesn't know about this, but minorities' rights were heard on the international scene. I was in touch with the US and the EU



representative of Foreign Affairs and they asked for our reports. They were not as uninterested as you claim.

**Participant**

I want to make a point about pro-governmental NGOs. Embedded NGOs are very dominant in Turkey. I do not mean their political orientation, but their proximity with the government. These are political influencers in Turkey. They have the power to influence Erdogan and the AKP. They are very important and have great power even if they are barely known to the public. Therefore, they played an important role during the process, and their influence should not be ignored in the case of a process resumption.

At the beginning of the process, we did not have visibility on what the process would look like. That was Erdogan's project. It was not created by the intellectuals. Despite everything, in my opinion, I think it was a good experience for the Turkish democracy.

The opposition leaders should have supported the WPC much more. They reacted against us because they saw the WPC as Erdogan's tool. Turkey has two alternatives in front of it: it will be either autocratic, or democratic.

**Participant**

The developments in Syria must be carefully watched. Turkey started the peace process with regard to their external security concern, not for peace concerns. The PKK gained an important status by being recognised as a quasi-legitimate actor by the state. The state wanted to control the Northern Syrian situation through the PKK. Both parties had expectations of the situation yet through different agendas. In the end, both parties tried to impose their wills. They had too high expectations

of the other side. Both parties largely ignored the real concerns of the other side.

We were not really a Wise Persons Committee, but a peer group. It seems like peace as a name is acceptable, but it did not become tangible. The concept was brought to the public in vague terms, without real implementation mechanisms.

It is fair to say that the WPC did not reach the expected results. It could have worked if only there was an international monitoring group. It totally lacked a third party to monitor the process. If it is to be done again, an international independent organisation should monitor the process.

### **Participant**

On the 4<sup>th</sup> April, we had an advisory meeting setting up the role of WPC. The Prime Minister came up with a job description that was to carry peer activities, aiming at creating awareness and increasing social support for the process. The WPC carried out several activities, and they were all great contributions. In my personal opinion, the two actors running the process, that is to say Erdogan and Ocalan, contributed to increase the support in both communities. But we should not downplay our contribution as WPC members. We have played an important role through our actions, by visiting villages, holding meetings, bringing parts of society together. Anyway, we did our best.

Yet, there were no possibilities to interact with the parties, or even to implement concretely some measures. The mandate as WPC was not wide enough. The lack of trust was getting obvious as the process went on. We found out about two things that deepen a bit more our feeling of being a fig leaf hiding the growing disinterest of both sides for peace. First, the state was building military outposts on the border. Secondly,

PKK was recruiting youngsters to the mountains. Perhaps the process would have evolved differently if we had the actual mandate to intervene against it and to communicate about it.

### **Participant**

I think we can pinpoint the three main reasons why the process failed:

- The architecture of the process. The purpose of the state and the PKK were unclear. Time management was awful. There were no mechanisms and no actor in place to speak up when a problem arose.
- There was significant shortcoming in terms of representation and inclusiveness.
- The Syrian context. For the PKK, it was a great opportunity for their power. PKK went for the Syrian option. The Turkish state saw what was going on as a threat, which revived the issue of survival in their mind.

All governments have tried to resolve the conflict since 1983. The biggest barrier in front of us is that Turkey has no Kurdish policy. They are opposed to the PKK and the PYD. The government does not have a stance regarding the status of the Kurds, further than this stubborn opposition. There is also an obvious lack of trust. The failed process has shaken the foundations of the relations between both parties. Yet, there exists a new momentum currently in Turkey. After the most recent election in Turkey, the government has to address the Kurdish initiative.

### **Participant**

During the peace initiative I was constantly on TV to cover it. As to the design of the process, I think this was a missing item in the work of the WPC. We, just as the general population, perceived a lack of strategy, a lack of clear mechanisms. People thought things were being done behind

closed doors. Some people felt shut out. Some others were thinking that it was being driven too much by only the government. Others did not like the fact that it was an open process.

Many segments of society were judgmental about the process. Regarding the content of the peace project, nothing was discussed. It was almost like only the WPC members knew what was going on. Were you briefed at all? I don't think you were told anything. You just wanted the support of the people. People wanted the WPC to have a say. This is what the process should have looked like, and it was clearly missing. We should not repeat the same mistakes. There is currently competition going on about who is going to assume what responsibilities, play what role in a future process. This is what we hear as journalists. Thanks to DPI, I found out that even though these processes were not 100% transparent, you still need to include civil society as much as possible. We need to design a process beneficial for everyone and make everyone understand that the process is working for them.



*Alongside DPI CEO Kerim Yildiz, a participant engages in the discussion*

**Participant**

The PKK was not ready either. Neither party were ready for the process. They all made up different excuses, but the reality behind it was their lack of readiness. Now, the conditions have changed. The April elections showed that the Kurds now have legal and democratic influence, they are very important actors. After 23<sup>rd</sup> of June, HDP were mentioned more. The CHP is also undergoing a transformation. The power in place tries to keep its distance from this phenomenon and to obstruct such developments. If the government decides to restore the process, it needs to cooperate with the Kurds. The only way they have out is coming to a compromise with the Kurds. The PKK is beginning to understand that it can play an important role in politics.

**Participant**

Conditions have changed in Turkey. The current situation illustrates that the political power has come to realise that some elements are not sustainable anymore. In the post-election period, the atmosphere seems to have changed. Expectations for a return to peace have increased. The financial crisis is very important in this respect. People believe that peace can foster economic development. During the election, we saw there was a ground to build on, like including Ocalan somehow in the process. The outlook I have on these developments overall is optimistic. The candidates for power are now diversifying and are gaining legitimacy. Instead of connecting the parties on a very official level, it might be fruitful to act more on the civil society level. For a new process to begin, we need to start with small activities. DPI organizes such activities. We could perhaps organise a WPC meeting in Turkey with even more participants. Until now, we wanted to learn more than act. Now, DPI has a role to play in getting to the action.

**Participant**

When the process first collapsed, WPC could do nothing but keep the memory of peace alive. Now, new interesting developments are unfolding. The 17<sup>th</sup> December incident made AKP feel insecure and under attack. The only way to combat the Gulenists was to cooperate with the army. In order to do that, they had to sacrifice their alliance with the Kurds. Now that the Gulenists are completely out of the bureaucracy and the state, it is possible to build bridges with the Kurdish officials again. The balance has changed. AKP can reconsider its alliance with the Kurds. They need more time to rebuild trust and confidence.

We can try to become more visible in the media and the press. We should prepare a report. Some people are still in touch with Erdogan, and this contact can be interesting for us in the case of a process resumption. We have to make sure that the parties of this process are given a firm briefing on the objectives and tools at hand to serve peace. We have to maintain contacts with all the interested people in the first process. They should be included in the potential new initiative. Also, I think the greatest misfortune with the peace process was that it always coincided with the elections. Peace has nothing to do with victory. You do not compete over peace, as everyone wins from it. On the contrary, elections are nothing but losers and winners. We should keep this in mind in tackling a new process, and make sure we separate it from any electoral ambition.

None of the people around this table gave up on the process. I am confident in an upcoming initiative.

**Kerim Yildiz**

It has been a very useful and in-depth discussion in terms of the lessons drawn from the WPC experience. We will continue to look at what can be done. What today's discussions are suggesting is that the process

needs to start. We talked a lot about resuming a process, and this by far exceeded my expectations for today. There are still many factors to be considered in the possibility of a new process. We now have enough experience, and we have learned from other parts of the world what mistakes we should avoid. We should now talk concretely about how we can contribute to this new process. Everything indicates that something has to be done. I think Erdogan himself has understood it, as well as opposition leaders. There will be no democratisation without addressing this issue seriously. Thank you for the presence of EU representatives, your presence is clearly sending positive messages to Turkey that the EU is behind such moves.

## Session 3 - Opportunities for a Possible Resolution Process in Today's Turkey and Next Steps for former WPC Members

**Thursday 11 July 2019, Brussels**

### **Esra Elmas**

Yesterday we talked about past WPC experiences, and we mainly focused on positive ones, such as raising awareness and developing the idea of peace in our society. We also discussed the shortcomings of your experiences, in terms of the lack of planning especially, or the lack of outcomes and goals discussed beforehand.

Today, we want to discuss the future of the WPC. You are all public names in Turkey, and we should talk about the resumption of a process. What are the opportunities and barriers ahead of us?



*Esra Elmas, Head of Turkey Programme, DPI chaired the session on day two of the roundtable meeting*



**Participant**

After we presented our final report in 2016, many people thought the WPC had no further use. We continued to gather with members of the WPC. In 2015, 20 of us signed a document to call both parties to sit together. Recently, we started a campaign to free Jelal Edican. We visited Leyla Guven during her hunger strike. In a way, we tried to keep WPC alive in Turkish public opinion as well. There is still a lot on our agenda. So many attacks are currently made on human rights. We have to continue our work. Even though this process had some ups and downs, a new process has to start again in Turkey. We are talking about more than 20 million Kurds living in Turkey, and they cannot be overlooked. Any current actions by former WPC members will pave the way for a new process. The current autocratic model will never give birth to a fruitful process. We need to push for a new constitution, alongside new democratic institutions. In Turkey, we are organising events to this end. In the latest elections, the HDP, the CHP and the AKP acted together for the first time. This is an encouraging sign of a developing democratisation. We remain motivated to initiate a new peace process.

**Esra Elmas**

There are new political actors emerging in Turkey, maybe a new political climate for a peace process. Since yesterday, we have repeated again and again that we need a new political resolution, but what would that be exactly?

**Participant**

In my view, we have three options ahead of us:

- The current regime could become more autocratic. The state knows there is a Kurdish issue but, up until 2023, they can strengthen their autocratic stance and postpone the resolution of this issue.

- If the situation calls for early elections, this could lead to an undemocratic regime. This would entail a resumption of the process, and again a lot of bargaining with the Kurds. I think it would be the worst option, because this would be election-based, and centred on relations with the US.
- The third option would be normalisation. New actors emerging make us think of this possibility. But as far as I can tell, none of them came up with a framework on how to start the process again. Maybe this will come up at our meeting.

We need to talk about how normalisation can take place. A new constitution is key. Turkish citizenship is at the core of this issue. Democratic autonomy will not be on the agenda, but we can focus on local authority, or development of the mother tongue. No actors should be set aside. I know people from the İyi party who are ready to act for peace, but don't know how to do it. We should reach out to them. DPI could target those people as no sides are to be ignored. Ocalan should be included, but he does not represent all the Kurds, so the process should not be confined to the KCK.

### **Participant**

From an intellectual point of view, we are all pro-peace. But is peace a necessity today in Turkey? Is there a sense of urgency for it? We need to discuss that. There are issues of course, but is peace as urgent as it was in 2013? Will people be as supportive as they were back then, as today's issues are not as severe as they were? The risk of death has decreased. People are not motivated by peace, because people are not losing their lives. There were so many deaths at the time that peace was an obligation. The slogan "let the mothers not cry" made its way to people's heart because it was a reality. I don't think it is the case anymore. For two days, we have been talking about strategies for peace, but is this enough to convince an

organisation to give up its arms? I once saw a documentary on ETA. The commander said, “I do not want to pass this anger on to my children, it has to stop”. But I am not sure we have this point of view in Turkey, whether it be on the PKK or on the AKP side. People are not willing to give up conflict. For this reason, the discourse used in 2013 would not be successful today.

We should focus on the political resolution, which in my opinion involves the HDP. It has become such a big and normal actor in Turkey. Yet, its leaders are imprisoned. This pro-Kurdish party gained prominence in Turkey, thanks to its normal stance. That is what we need to support. We should stress the importance of freeing the HDP political actors.

**Participant**

Right now, in Turkey we do not have the same atmosphere as when we started the previous process. But still, I think something else does exist, and can favour the resumption of the process. Indeed, there is an increasing demand for rule of law. There is a great demand because of the economic crisis. People feel boxed in, and the way out of this pressure is to build peace. The context may be different than what it was in the past, but peace remains the solution to exit our current situation.

**Participant**

I don't agree that there is no need for peace right now. Everyone has this sentiment that the situation is not sustainable from an economic or a human rights point of view. We may be facing embargos any time. We need to realise this. In Istanbul, the head of the police forces said that DPI was doing an amazing job, and asked “please put an end to this, we are sick and tired of attending martyrs' funerals”. We are taking this situation for granted, but it should be extraordinary. The media are not showing it, and we do not hear the voice of opposition.

In Turkey, all segments of society are intertwined, they live side by side. Thus, the solution will not be found on one side. This process was abandoned because of divergent visions. I have always said that armed forces should send their representatives to DPI meetings. We should also reach out to the nationalists, the İyi Party or their networks.

We need to remind people about peace in our country. Let's be realistic: we are surrounded by trouble. But in order to achieve peace, we need to be open and realistic. We should not have hidden agendas.

### **Participant**

In the first peace process, the motivation was because people were dying. Today, the motivation would be more about democracy, legal reform, rule of law, and more transparency. Around the table, we have seen each other for years, and we have gotten used to one another. Our commonality is that we want the issue to be resolved through political means. But we also have different ideas on how it should be resolved. At these meetings, we try to gather data on what we have in common.

### **Participant**

In 1995-96, I returned to Turkey and studied the Kurdish problem. I have been publishing on this topic since 2001. I created this list of things we should avoid. If we create an initiative, we shouldn't use language such as "this is a necessity, we have to do that, we are boxed in". The country is already polarised enough. We should say "this is for the public good of Turkey, for the general interest".

It is wrong to consider Ocalan and Erdogan as the representatives of the Kurds. Kurdish citizens can act independently from all leaders, they do not automatically follow their leads. During the last five elections, the Kurds have been sending out important messages. They supported the resolution process. After the coup attempt, they sided with Turkey and

stood against the coup. They did not support urban warfare. During 16 April referendum, they asked the government to resolve the problem. In the recent elections, they once again voted for the benefit of Turkey. It is neither the AKP nor the PKK that represent the Kurds. They are able to deliver messages on their own.



*All participants were given time to expand on their thoughts during the second day of meetings*

The Alevis want to become equal citizens of Turkey. They are interested in general problems of Turkey, not just their own. I participated in meetings in the South East, and Kurds were not saying the AKP was a strong party. That debate is over. There are newly emerging leaders, who show that the general tendency goes more towards justice and law. People stood against all that injustice.

I have a project about urban cities. I conducted interviews with a variety of actors and saw that we needed to take a step back from this peace business. Instead of saying peace, we should say “normalisation”. This is

mainly what people are looking for. Kurdish citizens just want to live a normal day-to-day life and recover that trust in having a normal daily life.

The urban warfare showed us that the Kurdish problem is an urban problem, that is no more located in the remote mountains. In order to achieve normalisation, we need to focus on local governments.

### **Participant**

There are two aspects of the Kurdish problem. Firstly, there is a range that expresses itself through violence, which is the combative part. Secondly, some argue that the Kurdish issue emerged from several factors.

As the WPC, we see the resolution as a phase of the whole process. A mistake was made at some point, and we talked about it. Yet, we did not discuss the underlying reasons, and the ways that could eradicate the fundamental problems. We just focused on violence and its expression, but it is mostly cultural. The government could resolve these underlying reasons through simple measures. There are several examples: street names and education in mother tongue being just two. This could have been managed very easily, but the government did not do it. “Conflict resolution”, as we call it, hides the underlying reasons that fed the conflict. Cultural rights are a big part of them.

The HDP has to evolve into a more significant political actor and the AKP should not be criminalising it. This problem should be resolved on the basis of equal citizenship, through equal vocabulary.

### **Participant**

Politics is the art of determining a priority. In determining that policy or priority, synchronisation is the key. That is to say that our priorities should match the society’s ones. The EU process and the Kurdish resolution process are related. DPI has a role to play in this, because these issues are

interconnected. It is obvious that there is a significant problem of trust in this regard. What was once a strategic union of the opposition block did not turn into a voluntary union and there is no sign of such a thing in the near future. In Turkey, we have a tradition of populist politics. We come from this tradition of a dominant and oppressive state. The more we expand the ground for the civilian politics, the better it is for us. We should find a way to narrow the political space for the oppressive government. On the other side, PKK is oppressive in its own way. The best we can do is to try and transform our interlocutors.

### **Participant**

In South Africa, the approach to peace was very realistic and down-to-earth. They considered peace in terms of advantages and interests, including financial ones, that could derive from it. We talked to Mandela's lawyer who said: "peace is a business for realists, not idealists, because idealists think they can crush their opponents, but realists know they have to live side by side with their enemies". When we approach the matter realistically, the process will impose itself to us in Turkey.

There are also obstacles to peace. The newly emerging political movements do not yet have a strong enough leadership, capable of carrying the Kurdish problem. When the Kurdish people were asked about the candidate who could resolve the problem, despite all their anger, they still said Erdogan was the best to tackle it. New parties are not strong enough to be considered in charge of the issue.

One of the most important developments is that the demographics of the HDP constituency is changing. It is becoming more and more autonomous from the PKK. It is becoming more urbanised, more autonomous, more middle class. I am not sure whether the PKK is understanding this transition.

I think the Kurdish issue has two sides. On a one hand, what I would call the “rights issue”, and on the other the one that has to do with weapons. There are thus two resolution aspects: the representation issue, and the disarmament. Political transition does not go without disarmament. We don’t have the political will to ask for disarmament.

I believe that there is going to be a process. We have to think about institutions in different ways. I want to stress that the interlocutors matter. The traditional system of interlocutors including Ocalan and the State are going to be part of it. But we have to include the civil society more. We should establish democratic pressure on the state, perhaps through a board of advisors or experts. Yet, I am not sure the WPC could function well for a new process. I am not sure about the use of the “third party”. Experiences from around the world show that third party inclusion does not always work. Both parties have to accept it beforehand. You cannot impose it to sides who do not want it.

We also have a need for a new language. Some concepts have been overused in Turkey, and don’t have a positive use anymore. People don’t like to hear about peace or autonomy, as these concepts have been overused. There is a need for impartial terms easily acceptable to society. We have three stages ahead of us during this process. One is achieving absence of conflict. Then comes the negative peace. Lastly, positive peace will happen. This is a long process, but first of all we need the conflict to end.

### **Participant**

When I spoke about opponents, this is not what I meant. I also meant the state operators. Now they are seeing the relation between Turkey and PYD in a better light.



## **Participant**

I don't think we will ever be on the same page regarding the content of a potential new peace process. Let's try to reach a consensus at least. We need to talk about methodology. When we talk about disarmament and democratisation, I think we should keep in mind that the state won't want to get rid of the carrot. The PKK is postponing the perspective of disarmament. This is very dangerous. You cannot bargain about a person's liberty. The PKK should be ready to give up its arms if it really cares about Turkey's democratisation. Thus, the PKK should decide if it wants to be part of this democratisation or not. In terms of a new Constitution, fundamental rights should not be a bargaining chip on the table. We have in mind the example of Colombia, where the two leaders gave their agreements to the resolution process but still the population was not supportive of it. Even if representation functions properly, you may not have the support of the society. We need to trust the dynamism and the maturity of society. But we also need to implement peace no matter what it says. We need to realize democracy within our own capacities, even if the population does not agree. We need to create the right platform for discussion. We cannot do this with a 3 months or 6 months long ceasefire. We need more time. I believe that, be it through democratisation or through disarmament, if a new initiative is to emerge, then people like us, who naively assume their role to be to change things, should not be quite as enthusiastic this time. We really believed in the dream. But in the coming period, if we are asked to take part in a process resumption, we will be reflecting more about the past errors, and answering questions like "what is the architecture", "what is the agenda", "what are the red lines". We won't be as audacious as we were in the past.



*Participants engaged with each other on a range of issues through the activity*

## **Participant**

Some think we do not have the right climate for a new initiative. I disagree. In Istanbul, people want more justice and rule of law. In Cizre, people want peace. The situation in Cizre is tense, people have their relatives in prison, they are going through checkpoints when they walk down the streets.

There are these enormous expectations. Kurdish people have all these grievances. What is going to happen? Turkey needs this peace process. There is nothing wrong in calling that a peace process. When we talk about the resolution process, they think it will be to the benefit of the AKP. I agree that we need a new language, and not using the authoritarian one based on give and take. Yet, these words have meaning and yes, we need more autonomy. Regardless of what you think of Kurds, you need to change that and create more decentralisation in Turkey. This coming process should not just be for the survival of Turkish state, but for the

benefit of all communities. We need to create a sentiment where everyone has something to win. The actors on the ground, instead of creating conflict between them, we need to resolve the conflicts. Concerns of all communities need to be heard.

**Participant**

The Kurdish issue seems to be a very touchy one from an outside perspective. As a government, you are often self-restrained in talking about it. However, there is no need to be restricted. There is a need for a peace process since 1993, a need for solving issues through a different approach. A peace process should address the root causes, as well as the concerns of all communities alongside the ones of the state. You have a role in convincing actors that Turkey will be better off once it has resolved this issue than pushing it ahead of itself. One should always try to do the impossible and try again and again. You should try to develop the political commitment that would then engage the whole society in a process that could be to the benefit of the society and the state. In Switzerland, we consider ourselves friends of Turkey, and are a deeply convinced that a Turkey that would have come to terms with its demons would be a much more positive power in the whole region, as well as in Europe.

**Participant**

We already know about the things we talk about today. Nothing divides us deeply. Turkey's geographic position in the Middle East is very important and we should also bear that in mind. It has vast oil reserves. Other natural resources draw the attention of imperialist forces. There are 127 organisations in Syria. So much weapons are going through them.

Those who were supposed to continue the peace process failed. This problem cannot be solved through politicians. We have to apply the

pressure from bottom up. The grassroots of our society want peace. I once met a police officer at the airport. In spite of his role, he was very supportive of a peace process. We are going to resolve it thanks to the process of society. This is our main asset. I also want to note that we are not the only people interested in the process. There are lots of very important scientists, artists. We should include them in these meetings. We are being heavily criticized. I am making this proposition to DPI to include more diverse people in the discussions. I met families of the martyrs. They looked at us, the WPC, as supporters of terrorists who killed their children, and therefore as responsible for the deaths of their children. These are bitter truths we have to face.

### **Participant**

In Turkey, we were all very unhappy when the peace process ended. Normalisation is behind us; we lost the ground that we made. A lot of people left the country. We are going through a financial crisis. Politics reflect these changes. Could you have imagined AK Party losing all three of the major municipalities? This did not happen because CHP became strong, but because voters sent a message saying they wanted to change things. Our meetings are now more important than ever, because people want change. As the opposition is growing, there are new demands about returning to the parliamentary system. For that, we need a new constitution. Maybe democratisation won't be the only way towards conflict resolution. But it will have such an impact I think it may bring a resolution. A new constitution is on the horizon. Pressure in this direction is applied upon the government by the opposition party. The issue of autonomy, cultural rights, and equal citizenship are items of bargains in the Kurdish problem. Ocalan talked about constitutional priorities and talked about equal rights, and education in the mother tongue. All these issues pop up again in discussing a new constitution. HDP will become one of the stakeholders in the opposition block, playing

this role on the formal level. Real interlocutors would be those fighting in the shadow. It is necessary to develop a new discourse to counter the government discourse. DPI should focus on creating solutions for Turkey's democracy.



*Participants looked at what conditions are necessary for the resumption of the resolution process in Turkey*

## **Participant**

At the beginning of the process, Ocalan said the time for armed struggle is over, now it is time for political struggle. In reaction, the PKK said “we can discuss this if he comes to Kandil and participates in the congress”. It was a way of showing they did not believe in that. Considerable parts of civil society didn’t believe it either. Perhaps that’s not true for the majority of Kurds, as they supported it. But the PKK was not ready for the process. The state was not ready for the process either. When the issue of autonomy and barricades in the city erupted, the state reacted very harshly. Major Kurdish cities were demolished. Most of the people in those cities left. The strategy of the PKK was not supported by

inhabitants living there. The HDP was oppressed and not supported by anyone. Suleyman Soylu and his people were in favour of crushing the HDP down. But when Kurdish voters finally spoke their minds in the local election, they suddenly became important again. Kurds are aware of this shift. They have the power to sway Turkey's fate.

Where do we stand now? There are discussions on whether the peace process is going to restart. In a Washington Post column, Cemal Bayik said the process needs to be started. But he says nothing about Ocalan, which is a critical point. We were invited to contribute to this change. Is the invitation still valid? Is Turkish society ready to approach this from a non-violent perspective? Remember the South African experience: they told us they only tackled the peace process once all parties were convinced it was the best option. Is that the case for us in Turkey? I am not so sure. I have friends from the Turkish left, and some Kurdish ones, and they don't believe in giving up security to establish peace. Then, do we need arms for the resolution of the Kurdish problem or not? This is something to be discussed. What we can do is we can defend a peaceful resolution and popularise our pacifist opinion. How can we raise awareness around our conviction? We need a new mentality.

### **Participant**

The question is what should be done? A lot of different dynamics play into starting the peace process. One has to do with the conflict becoming less and less bearable. Today, in Turkey, the conflict is kind of balanced. I do not say that in a positive way. The state has achieved military domination. The PKK's field of influence has shrunk. We cannot base our hopes on the existence of conflict. There are three measures we can take into consideration. The first has to do with the government, the second is the internal dynamics of Turkey, and then we have to look at external dynamics. There is this matter of S-400. We are waiting for

sanctions from the US or Europe. Such sanctions can push the Turkish government into a discourse of survival. If that happens, the Kurdish element will be pushed aside. AK Party has a narrow window to act. Its opponents are raising more and more serious obstacles to its monopoly. The ruling party came to represent a kind of stagnation. Erdogan is feeling all of this. He will take some steps back. He will perhaps attempt some normalisation. The problem is spread all over the Middle East, and this is both a disadvantage and a benefit. The situation might bring the Kurdish problem up on the Turkish agenda once again. This would make the Kurdish problem a top priority.

The last elections showed a clear message: Turkey is tired of polarisation. Everyone is seeing the detrimental effects of polarisation. There are so many pressures on each and every community. Voters are against it and show it by voting for centrists. There is a great demand for more centrism in Turkey. This is going to have an impact on Barbacan, who is starting a new party. The HDP voters can act autonomously despite their attachment to their party. A group of voters could move towards the centre and could even be the founders of it. The society is no longer held captive by politics but has more of a say in politics. The central ground could be the way out for Turkey, and a privileged place for expression. So, there are all these parameters. In the Kurdish issue, we need to wait to see what progress we could make. Endless opportunities exist for actors. Let's wait for a couple of months, as things will get clearer.

### **Participant**

We need an anchor for the peace process. In the past, this anchor was the urgency to put an end to death. But today is a sustainable situation compared to 2013, and there is no urge for a ceasefire. Ocalan made a call, saying the time for warfare was over. It was the discourse used at the time. I think people did not want the PKK to lay down their arms.

Disarmament was not the priority back then. Today, the anchor for a new process in my view is that the PKK is exhausted, and Kurds are exhausted. Recently, the leader of the PKK supported Imamoglu, who is someone not directly related to Kurds. It shows that things are much more political, and not only militarised. A considerable amount of civilian concerns is injected in politics. The idea that things can be accomplished through non-violent means is out there. People want normalisation. Secondly, people are fed up with AK Party. They want democratisation, peace and the rule of law. If all of these are to be tackled, the Kurdish issue will necessarily have to be tackled as well. This is what people will be asking for. It will rely on newly emerging actors. Cities have been devastated, Kurds are tired of weapons, and this is very new. Even the conservative chunks of the Turkish society are realising the importance of dialogue, democracy, the rule of law, and free media. Regardless of what is going on in Syria, or between Erdogan and Ocalan, people are realizing other things are to be done in Turkey. The PKK is being more and more normalised, through the HDP, and I think it is a good thing.

### **Participant**

Turkey is sick and tired of polarisation, of the PKK, of the one-man rule. Turkey is exhausted but Turkey needs a story as well. In the EU, they call it “election fatigue”. I think “polarisation fatigue” is what we are experiencing. I think this new story could be based on two pillars. One of them is that the platform for discussion of the Kurdish issue is shifting towards the regional rather than the national. This is a paradigmatic change, as it is the opposite of what happened last time. Also, and this is something Mihaela emphasised yesterday, the relation between Turkish and Syrian Kurds is to the benefit of Turkey. Turkey might be justified in Afrin and might want to protect itself. But we need to realise that good relations are to the benefit of both parties. The opposition is very important, because they change the discourse. They are no longer seeing



the PYD as a threat, but as our neighbours. As long as the Turkish security is not engaged, we should treat them with respect. This relation should definitely be a component of the new story.

There have been two important letters: Ocalan's and Cemal Bayik's. Ocalan's letter is the one we need to take into account. Cemal's letter is weak and does not tell us much about the future of Turkey. Ocalan's letter gives us many clues about the future of the relations between Syria, Turkey and the Kurds. We need to prepare Turkey as well. Like we said previously, normalisation is key.

At the end of this, maybe we can draft a text that lays out a new story for the main issues in Turkey. The paradigm to discuss the Kurdish issue has changed. We can draft a text and sign it, so that it can be ready for September.

### **Participant**

We could perhaps release a statement in October or November to contribute to that discussion. This text could contribute to unfold the new story for Turkey. I have already made a note, and it could be published as an article. We need to conceptualise the whole story, help it mature. We all represent communities and could be advocates of this new paradigm. Taboo subjects were talked about, like certain concepts that can trigger some harsh reactions, such as peace, autonomy, etc. Basic points of references could be "advanced democracy", "local authorities", and "citizenship". These are widely accepted concepts that still have meaning in people's eyes.

Now, the ball is in CHP's court. All eyes are on Imamoglu. There are uncertainties on what he is going to do. He is a reasonable man. In this context, DPI can hold roundtable meetings to gather different parties at a local level. It could alleviate tensions at the local level.

**Participant**

DPI has kept going despite harsh circumstances, and they invited people from all the parties. The Members of Parliament cannot come on their own willingness, they need to report that to their superiors. DPI has never ended dialogue. Reports of DPI are always sent to Erdogan. Even if he does not react, he knows about them. We talked about a normalisation process. I think we are already within the process of normalisation. The constitutional court is becoming better, let me tell you as a lawyer. Recently, the constitutional court made an interesting ruling about governance of the Armenian religious community. It stated that the state could not intervene in the choice of the Armenian religious leader. This is an important step towards normalisation. They gave the ruling upholding the European Court of Human Rights pending decision. These are all normalisation signs.

What are the CHP, the MHP and Iyi Party going to do? We have to establish contacts with them and watch closely their future actions. Three TV channels called me while I was abroad, and I told them I was participating in meetings on the resumption of the resolution process. I think we should give them a report specially made for public discussion.

**Kerim Yildiz**

These thoughts are very important, and the discussion is very valuable to us. For a long time, DPI has insisted for the employment of these concepts, including “conflict resolution”. There are two more topics to focus on in the afternoon: disarmament and security. The core of DPI’s focus is to try to keep the dialogue alive in the minds of the public. The other reality is the armed organisation and the institutions that are close to this organisation, like the HDP. Even if the disagreements are intense, we should not give up on dialogue. I do not believe discussions between the state and the PKK have ever stopped completely. In relation to the

matter of interlocutors, this is essential. Somebody gave the example of Colombia, saying that people did not want the peace process. This should not be a criterion. I was in a meeting when somebody made a suggestion to Santos, saying that in Ireland, people voted for peace, and told him Colombian people would also support this. Yet, they didn't. So, they did not actually plan the peace process saying, "we should overlook people's will". But they made a mistake in preparing the public opinion for the process. This example reminds us that you actually need to prepare people for such a process. That is what was missing in Colombia. This aspect is very important. In my personal opinion, a peace process in Turkey would have a positive effect on Syria. When DPI conducts studies or activities, we are backed by others. For instance, the EU supports us financially. We could not carry out this work without the benefit of such support. I always tell everyone that the WPC was a brilliant idea. The state reached out to people from all over the country. This was a successful experiment in Turkey, and we could share this experience with others.

### **Participant**

The political climate in Turkey is different from 2013. There are lots of restrictions in the media, but we don't see a significant demand for peace in civil society now. Some parts of the society still demand the rule of law and peace. There is this social demand for normalisation. The right strategy would be to focus on the social demand, and perhaps bring it together with other demands in the society. In the region where I come from, this demand is very clear. For the people, the most urgent need is normalisation. We need to make sure they can get back to their daily lives without any security issue. Usually, during summer months, there is not much going on, but this summer is going to be a hot one politically speaking.

## **Participant**

I gave autonomy as an example, and of course Kurds are going to benefit from this. But the top priority is inclusiveness, so that everyone feels they have something to win. Autonomy is not the core idea anymore. Plus, autonomy is something that could hinder the willingness of other parties, as it is an enormous concession for them. We talked a lot about the political climate in Turkey, whether it is conducive to peace. As journalists, we are often asked “will this piece of news interest readers/viewers”. I am often amazed by this question, because if you don’t release this piece of news or this news story, of course people won’t be interested in it. During the last elections, on Twitter, people were discussing so much about the Kurdish issue it was one of the top items! People had different reasons to be interested in this issue, but any time the resolution of the Kurdish issue comes up in the public debate, people are interested.

The PYD is not on the terrorist list of the US, and at the same time in Turkey we make ourselves believe it is our principal enemy. The whole world is fighting against ISIS, so why are we demonising a political party that is itself fighting ISIS? Speaking about the opposition, Mr. Kilicdaroglu is an important figure. Maybe we can discuss the relation between Turkey and the PYD with him, by contacting the People’s Republican Party. They have a general understanding of the Kurdish issue, but still need to deepen their knowledge. So, we could raise their awareness on this issue. The only organisation raising awareness has been DPI. Persistently, DPI brought together people who did not have the same opinion on the Kurdish issue. I think some events have already been organised in Turkey, but I am suggesting doing it again from time to time, bringing people from different sections of the society together to discuss.

For the Constitution, what sort of guarantee are we going to have? Conflicting parties are interlocutors for one another. Since 1992, I have been living in many European cities and met so many people from the diaspora. My mother lives in Ankara, and I witnessed the progress made by her neighbours. I don't think we should make efforts in convincing the masses, as they already wish some progress would be made in the matter.

**Esra Elmas**

We are talking about normalisation, and common dialogue, and moving towards a common goal. But I'm afraid the majority in Turkey is not as optimistic as you are.

**Participant**

That's one more reason to be optimistic. Let's aim for optimism!

**Participant**

I am also a hopeless optimist. How to convince the Kurdish majority? I think we have passed a threshold. There are several things that can be done:

- We all believe new political actors are emerging. We need to be in touch with all of them and keep the channels of communication active. We can still talk to them.
- New political parties are being shaped, targeting the AKP voter base. Two political parties are being established. They are currently developing policies for the Kurdish issue, and democratisation. I am thinking that maybe before they fully develop, we could influence or shape their policymaking. As they are making their policies, we could reach out to them and engage with them.

- Things are going on behind the scene. A new process is being prepared. Some actors will be highly influential: Ocalan, actors in Syria, the KRG. Maybe we could forge relations with them.

### **Participant**

On 6<sup>th</sup> May 2019, Ocalan made an announcement alongside with three other prisoners. Lawyers enumerated seven items, talking about “deep social reconciliation”. The WPC did that before. The HDP is dealing with other parties, and this will be of great importance. The local elections created an opportunity for this dialogue which tends towards improvement. The importance of political parties will increase. Civil society may achieve a stronger role in that. We need social reconciliation, following all the suffering, in order to heal the wounds. Ocalan should be able to talk to different sections of society and run his own organisation. The US is somehow part of this process, by establishing certain policies in Syria, and we need to be more focused on the involvement of the US in the region. The strategic orientation remains the same. The letter speaks about “Honourable peace”. There is this tradition of impunity in Turkey, and how the state fears facing what has been going on in the past, not liquidating gangs within the state and not holding them accountable vis a vis of the courts. This situation needs to be addressed. The culture of impunity undermines the trust of people in the state. The AKP needs to be self-critical and reflect on the past.

### **Participant**

First of all, I want to make a contribution to the method. I have carried out research for a few years. As part of the study, I visited many cities in the country. I felt negative reactions of the people towards the WPC. I saw that the conservatives and the Kurds feel a certain respect for one another. We base our work on this communality of sentiments. Some of my colleagues here underlined this sentimental aspect and the

importance of sharing feelings. We need to go beyond the intellectual debate and reach out to families, to people on an emotional basis. This could be a new method for DPI or other civil society organisations. This could prepare society for a better future. In addition, more than 50% of the population dislikes the HDP. There are parties trying to benefit from the antipathy towards HDP. People see the HDP as PKK supporters. If the HDP attracted so many voters during the last elections, I think it was more because of a rejection of the AKP than of a real belief in the HDP. In Turkey's process of democratisation, this will continue to be a problem, unless it is addressed. Another issue is the nationalistic base in Turkey, like the İyi party or some segments of the CHP. We have to convince these parties that honesty and transparency in their relationship with the HDP would benefit them. After the 15<sup>th</sup> of July coup attempt, the initially diminishing influence of the military over politics is now on the rise again. Now the military is capable of outbalancing Erdogan.

### **Participant**

I went to visit a martyr's family. It was such a devastating memory for us. This martyr's mother held my hand and told me "it is good that you are doing this, but if only you had started six months ago, my son wouldn't have died". I wrote about that moment in a journal. It is not just an empty slogan to say "a mother should not cry at the loss of their son anymore". Still, there has been a lot of progress. The first of them is the professionalisation of the army service. It means people feel less sentimental about serving in the army. The remote-control drones also helped the state combat the PKK to a great extent. Suleyman Soylu is the worst Minister of the Interior to have been in office in Turkey. I don't like what he says.

I believe normalisation is very important, but it has to be accompanied with democracy and rights, and this is what we should focus on. I think

it could be better to start the process in Turkey and move to Syria. I believe we should discuss upon that. I think strategy is going to be more important than sentiments in the near future.

**Participant**

I don't believe that the process will start in Turkey and then move to Syria, for two reasons. First, time is running out in Syria, they are increasingly under pressure, on all sides, both internally and externally. Also, all actors taking about the process mention Syria first. We saw that in Ocalan's letter. I don't think the process in Turkey will have any influence on Syria.

**Participant**

Perhaps we should speak about what we know about near future. Turkey does not have a lot of space for movement because of external pressure. Through US mediation, Turkey has tried to do something in Syria. Cemal Bayik published in the Washington Post. This wouldn't have happened without US support. Sahin Cilo signed a document about child soldiers in Geneva in an attempt to appear more respectable. Such moves are being encouraged, to appear more legal. Turkey could have reacted more strongly in the media. There are things to be noted here. First, Ocalan is being used in the elections. There is also a rumour that on the 1<sup>st</sup> of September, Ocalan is going to ask for PKK to lay down weapons.

This Kurdish opening is a way for Erdogan and the AK Party to appear respectable. I don't think Erdogan is going to remove the Minister of Economy from office. But this resumption of the Kurdish process can be a strategy for Erdogan. We know Erdogan can be very pragmatic at times, we have examples of this behaviour. These people are very Machiavellian and would do anything to remain in power.



In the post-Erdogan period, we might talk about how conflict resolution might unfold under such circumstances. Let's say that Erdogan loses the next elections. In that case, I think all parties, from the CHP to the HDP will feel obliged to say something about this. As was said, we could reach out to these new parties. This is a practical suggestion. We have to hear what they have to say about the resolution process. Everybody will have to take new positions in the future, so it would be interesting for DPI to reach out to them.

**Participant**

Potential new parties, as well as any potential constitutional reforms, will become clear by the end of the year.

I think it is better to start from Syria, because Turkey has internal uncertainties. The table is not set yet. I think the uncertainty is going to last at least for another one and a half years. Turkey has this problem with the PYD. If efforts are focused on Syria, they would be more fruitful. Other countries are expecting Turkey to resolve its problem with the PYD, but we are running out of time. I don't believe the PKK is going to engage in warfare anymore, because of the technological advancement of the Turkish Republic.

**Participant**

I am probably the only person who comes from the Defence industry background. Guerrilla warfare is outdated anyway. The PKK develops drones as well. Technology does not work in favour of the state only.

There is a need for a new constitution. Within the executive presidency, the fact that the President is also the head of the party is not essential. This would be only a cosmetic change. I don't see a problem to the President being the head of the party. Some things are more critical in the executive presidency. For example, we should discuss the fact that

one single person runs the entire game, including the media and private firms, more.

### **Esra Elmas**

Allow me to summarise briefly what has been said during the past two days. We need a new success story for Turkey and its society. There are two legs: the government, the opposition. There is a fatigue in Turkey, and things have to change!

The language needs to be different. We need to be more inclusive. Regarding politics, we shouldn't just focus on the government, but on the opposition as well. We know what the government has been doing but we don't know what it is going to do about the emerging parties. Secondly, society at large needs a success story, and not just the politics. Past elections in Istanbul are a good indicator on what mood people are in Turkey. They voted for Imamoglu because they wanted to raise their voices against the status quo. We should not neglect the social demand. We need to instil the idea that peace is essential in Turkey.

### **Kerim Yildiz**

The discussion has been thought provoking, whether it be during the sessions or outside the meeting room. I found the opportunity to engage with each and every one of you. I would like to thank you very much for being here and coming to Brussels.

## Participant List

Name	Title
Ahmet Tarik Celenk	Director of Ekopolitik and former WPC member
Ahmet Faruk Unsal	Member of the Initiative for Rights and former WPC member
Ali Bayramoglu	Journalist and former WPC member
Aysegul Dogan	Journalist and TV Programmer at Tele One
Fazil Husnu Erdem	Professor of Constitutional Law at Dicle University and former WPC member
Emin Fuat Keyman	Professor at Sabancı University and former WPC member
Prof. Dr. Ufuk Uras	Former MP
Prof. Dr. Vahap Çoşkun	Professor of Law at Dicle University and former WPC member
Kadir Inanir	Actor and former WPC member
Kezban Hatemi	Lawyer, President of Turkey's Democracy Platform and former WPC member
Prof. Dr. Sevtap Yokuş	Professor of Law at Altınbaş University and Founding Member of Women Mediators of Turkey
Mahmet Emin Ekmen	Lawyer and former WPC member
Yildiray Ogur	Columnist at Daily Karar and former WPC member
Ozturk Turkdogan	Head of Human Rights Association and former WPC member
Oral Calislar	Columnist at Daily Posta and former WPC member
Ipek Kotan	Interpreter

Deniz Cebe	Interpreter
Kerim Yildiz	CEO, Democratic Progress Insitute
Esra Elmas	Head of Turkey Programme, Democratic Progress Insitute
David Murphy	Project Officer, Democratic Progress Insitute
Joana Bundo	Programme Assistant, Democratic Progress Institute
Elisabeth Pinoli	Intern, Democratic Progress Insitute
Hubert Duhot	Turkey Planner at FPI2, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, European Commission
Bernard Brunet	Head of Unit, Relations with Turkey, European Commission
Eva Horelova	Head of Political Section, Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, Ankara
James Rizzo	Policy Officer, Relations with Turkey, European Commission
Mihaela Matei	Syria Desk, EEAS
Roland Salvisburg	Head of the Peace Policy Bureau for Europe and Asia, Mediation and Democratization, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

## DPI Aims and Objectives

### **Aims and objectives of DPI include:**

- To contribute to broadening bases and providing new platforms for discussion on establishing a structured public dialogue on peace and democracy building.
- To provide opportunities, in which different parties are able to draw on comparative studies, analyse and compare various mechanisms used to achieve positive results in similar cases.
- To create an atmosphere whereby different parties share knowledge, ideas, concerns, suggestions and challenges facing the development of a democratic solution in Turkey and the wider region.
- To support, and to strengthen collaboration between academics, civil society and policy-makers.
- To identify common priorities and develop innovative approaches to participate in and influence democracy-building.
- Promote and protect human rights regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political persuasion or other belief or opinion.

DPI aims to foster an environment in which different parties share information, ideas, knowledge and concerns connected to the development of democratic solutions and outcomes. Our work supports the development of a pluralistic political arena capable of generating consensus and ownership over work on key issues surrounding democratic solutions at political and local levels.

We focus on providing expertise and practical frameworks to encourage stronger public debates and involvements in promoting peace and democracy building internationally. Within this context DPI aims to contribute to the establishment of a structured

public dialogue on peace and democratic advancement, as well as to widen and create new existing platforms for discussions on peace and democracy building. In order to achieve this we seek to encourage an environment of inclusive, frank, structured discussions whereby different parties are in the position to openly share knowledge, concerns and suggestions for democracy building and strengthening across multiple levels.

DPI's objective throughout this process is to identify common priorities and develop innovative approaches to participate in and influence the process of finding democratic solutions. DPI also aims to support and strengthen collaboration between academics, civil society and policy-makers through its projects and output. Comparative studies of relevant situations are seen as an effective tool for ensuring that the mistakes of others are not repeated or perpetuated. Therefore we see comparative analysis of models of peace and democracy building to be central to the achievement of our aims and objectives.

# DEMOKRATİK GELİŞİM ENSTITÜSÜ'NÜN AMAÇLARI VE HEDEFLERİ

## **DPI'nin amaçları ve hedefleri:**

- Barışın ve demokrasinin inşası üzerine yapılandırılmış bir kamusal diyalogun oluşması için gerekli olan tartışma ortamının geliştirilmesi ve genişletilmesi.
- Farklı kesimlerin karşılaştırmalı çalışmalar vesilesiyle bir araya gelerek, farklı dünya örnekleri özelinde benzer durumlarda olumlu sonuçlar elde etmek için kullanılmış çeşitli mekanizmaları incelemesine ve analiz etmesine olanak sağlamak. Farklı kesimlerin bir araya gelerek Türkiye ve daha geniş bir coğrafyada demokratik bir çözümün geliştirilmesine yönelik bilgilerini, düşüncelerini, endişelerini, önerilerini, kaygılarını ve karşılaşılan zorlukları paylaştığı bir ortam yaratmak. Akademisyenler, sivil toplum örgütleri ve karar alıcılar arasındaki işbirliğinin desteklemek ve güçlendirmek.
- Ortak öncelikleri belirlemek ve demokrasi inşası sürecini ve sürece katılımı etkileyecek yenilikçi yaklaşımlar geliştirmek. Din, dil, ırk, renk, cinsiyet, siyasi görüş ve inanç farkı gözetmeksizin insan haklarını teşvik etmek ve korumak.

Demokratik Gelişim Enstitüsü (DPI), Türkiye'de demokratik bir çözümün geliştirilmesi için, farklı kesimlerin bir araya gelerek bilgilerini, fikirlerini, kaygılarını ve önerilerini paylaştıkları bir ortamı teşvik etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmalarımız, demokratik çözümün sağlanması için kilit önem taşıyan konularda fikir birliğine varma ve uzlaşılan konuları

sahiplenme yeteneğine sahip çoğulcu bir siyasi alanın geliştirilmesini desteklemektedir.

Kurum olarak güçlü bir kamusal tartışmayı; barışı ve demokrasiyi uluslararası düzeyde geliştirmeye yönelik katılımları teşvik etmek için uzmanlığa ve pratiğe dayalı bir bakış açısıyla hareket ediyoruz. Bu çerçevede barış ve demokratik ilerleme konusunda yapılandırılmış bir kamusal tartışmanın oluşturulmasına katkıda bulunmayı; barış ve demokrasi inşası tartışmaları için yeni platformlar yaratmayı ve mevcut platformları genişletmeyi amaçlıyoruz.

Bu amaçlara ulaşabilmenin gereği olarak, farklı kesimlerin demokrasinin inşası ve güçlendirmesi için bilgilerini, endişelerini ve önerilerini açıkça paylaşabilecekleri kapsayıcı, samimi ve yapılandırılmış tartışma ortamını çeşitli seviyelerde teşvik etmeye çalışıyoruz. DPI olarak farklı projelerimiz aracılığıyla akademi, sivil toplum ve karar alıcılar arasındaki işbirliğini desteklemeyi ve güçlendirmeyi de hedefliyoruz.



## Board Members / Yönetim Kurulu Üyeleri



### **Kerim Yıldız (Chief Executive Officer / İcra Kurulu Başkanı)**

Kerim Yıldız is an expert in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, international human rights law and minority rights, having worked on numerous projects in these areas over his career. Yıldız has received a number of awards, including from the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights for his services to protect human rights and promote the rule of law in 1996, and the Sigrid Rausing Trust's Human Rights award for Leadership in Indigenous and Minority Rights in 2005. Yıldız is also a recipient of the 2011 Gruber Prize for Justice. He has also written extensively on international humanitarian law, conflict, and various human rights mechanisms.

Kerim Yıldız çatışma çözümü, barışın inşası, uluslararası insan hakları ve azınlık hakları konusunda uzman bir isimdir ve kariyeri boyunca bu alanlarda çok çeşitli projelerde çalışmıştır. Kerim Yıldız, 1996 yılında insan haklarının korunması ve hukuk kurallarının uygulanması yönündeki çabalarından ötürü İnsan Hakları İçin Avukatlar Komitesi Ödülü'ne, 2005'te Sigrid Rausing Trust Vakfı'nın Azınlık Hakları alanında Liderlik Ödülü'ne ve 2011'de ise Gruber Vakfı Uluslararası Adalet Ödülü'ne layık görülmüştür. Uluslararası insan hakları hukuku, insancıl hukuk ve azınlık hakları konularında önemli bir isim olan Yıldız, uluslararası insan hakları hukuku ve insan hakları mekanizmaları üzerine çok sayıda yazılı esere sahiptir.

**Nicholas Stewart QC (Chair / Yönetim Kurulu Başkanı)**

Nicholas Stewart, QC, is a barrister and Deputy High Court Judge (Chancery and Queen's Bench Divisions) in the United Kingdom. He is the former Chair of the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales and former President of the Union Internationale des Avocats. He has appeared at all court levels in England and Wales, before the Privy Council on appeals from Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and the Bahamas, and in the High Court of the Republic of Singapore and the European Court of Human Rights. Stewart has also been the chair of the Dialogue Advisory Group since its founding in 2008.

Tecrübeli bir hukukçu olan Nick Stewart Birleşik Krallık Yüksek Mahkemesi (Chancery and Queen's Bench Birimi) ikinci hâkimidir. Geçmişte İngiltere ve Galler Barosu İnsan Hakları Komitesi Başkanlığı (Bar Human Rihts Committee of England and Wales) ve Uluslararası Avukatlar Birliği (Union Internationale des Avocats) başkanlığı görevlerinde bulunmuştur. İngiltere ve Galler'de gerçekleşen ve Malezya, Singapur, Hong Kong, Bahamalar, Singapur ve Avrupa İnsan Hakları mahkemelerinin temyiz konseylerinde görüş bildirdi. Stewart, 2008'deki kuruluşundan bu yana Diyalog Danışma Grubunun başkanlığını da yürütüyor.



### **Priscilla Hayner**

Priscilla Hayner is co-founder of the International Center for Transitional Justice and is currently on the UN Department of Political Affairs Standby Team of Mediation Experts. She is a global expert on truth commissions and transitional justice initiatives and has authored several books on these topics, including *Unspeakable Truths*, which analyses truth commissions globally. Hayner has recently engaged in the recent Colombia talks as transitional justice advisor to Norway, and in the 2008 Kenya negotiations as human rights advisor to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the United Nations-African Union mediation team. Hayner has also worked significantly in the implementation stages following a peace agreement or transition, including Sierra Leone in 1999 and South Sudan in 2015.

Geçiş Dönemi Adaleti için Uluslararası Merkez'in (International Center for Transitional Justice) kurucularından olan Priscilla Hayner, aynı zamanda BM Kıdemli Arabuluculuk Danışmanları Ekibi'ndedir. Hakikat komisyonları, geçiş dönemi adaleti inisiyatifleri ve mekanizmaları konusunda küresel bir uzman olan Hayner, hakikat komisyonlarını küresel olarak analiz eden *Unspeakable Truths* (Konulmayan Gerçekler) da dahil olmak üzere, alanda pek çok yayına sahiptir. Hayner, yakın zamanda Kolombiya barış görüşmelerinde Norveç'in geçiş dönemi adaleti danışmanı olarak ve 2008 Kenya müzakerelerinde eski BM Genel Sekreteri Kofi Annan ve Birleşmiş Milletler-Afrika Birliği arabuluculuk ekibinin insan hakları danışmanı olarak görev yapmıştır. Hayner, 1999'da Sierra Leone ve 2015'te Güney Sudan da dahil olmak üzere birçok ülkede, barış anlaşması ve geçiş sonrası uygulamaları konularında çalışmalar yapmıştır.



### **Arild Humlen**

Arild Humlen is a lawyer and Director of the Norwegian Bar Association's Legal Committee. He is widely published within a number of jurisdictions, with emphasis on international civil law and human rights, and he has lectured at the law faculty of several universities in Norway. Humlen is the recipient of the Honor Prize of the Bar Association of Oslo for his work on the rule of law and in 2015 he was awarded the Honor Prize from the international organisation Save the Children for his efforts to strengthen the legal rights of children.

Hukukçu olan Arild Humlen aynı zamanda Norveç Barosu Hukuk Komitesi'nin direktörüdür. Uluslararası medeni hukuk ve insan hakları gibi yargı alanları üzerine çok sayıda yazısı yayınlanmış, Norveç'te bir dizi hukuk fakültesinde ders vermiştir. Oslo Barosu bünyesinde Sığınmacılık ve Göçmenlik Hukuku Davaları Çalışma Grubu başkanı olarak yaptığı çalışmalardan dolayı Oslo Barosu Onur Ödülü'ne layık görülmüştür.



### **Jacki Muirhead**

Jacki Muirhead was appointed Chambers Administrator at Devereux Chambers, London, UK, in November 2015. Her previous roles include Practice Director at FJ Cleveland LLP, Business Manager at Counsels' Chambers Limited and Deputy Advocates Clerk at the Faculty of Advocates, UK.

Şu anda Devereux Chambers isimli hukuk firmasında üst düzey yönetici olarak görev yapan Jacki Muirhead bu görevinden önce Cleveland Hukuk Firması çalışma direktörü, Counsel's Chambers Limited isimli hukukçular odasında şef katip ve Avukatlar Fakültesi'nde (Faculty of Advocates) pazarlama müdürü olarak çalışmıştır.

**Prof. David Petrasek**

Professor David Petrasek is Associate Professor at Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, Canada. He is a former Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of Amnesty International. He has worked extensively on human rights, humanitarian and conflict resolution issues, including for Amnesty International (1990-96), for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (1997-98), for the International Council on Human Rights Policy (1998-02) and as Director of Policy at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2003-07). Petrasek has also taught international human rights and humanitarian law courses at the Osgoode Hall Law School at York University, Canada, the Raoul Wallenberg Institute at Lund University, Sweden, and at Oxford University.

Kanada'da Ottawa Üniversitesi'nde Uluslararası Siyasal İlişkiler Bölümünde öğretim üyesi olarak görev yapmaktadır. Geçmişte Uluslararası Af Örgütü Eski Genel Sekreteri'ne başdanışmanlık yapan Prof. David Petrasek, uzun yıllardır insan hakları, insancıl hukuk ve uyuşmazlıkların çözümü konularında çalışmalar yürütmektedir. Bu alanlarda önde gelen bir uzman ve yazardır. 1990-1996 yılları arasında Uluslararası Af Örgütü, 1997-1998 yılları arasında Birleşmiş Milletler İnsan Hakları Yüksek Komiserliği, 1998-2002 yılları arasında İnsan Hakları Politikası üzerine Uluslararası Konsey ve 2003-2007 yılları arasında da İnsani Diyalog Merkezi'nde Politika Bölümü Direktörü olarak çalışmıştır.



### **Antonia Potter Prentice**

Antonia Potter Prentice is currently the Director of Alliance 2015 – a global network of humanitarian and development organisations. Prentice has extensive experience on a range of humanitarian, development, peacemaking and peacebuilding issues through her previous positions, including interim Senior Gender Adviser to the Joint Peace Fund for Myanmar and providing technical advice to the Office of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General to the Yemen peace process. Prentice has also been involved in various international organisations including UN Women, Dialogue Advisory Group, and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Prentice co-founded the Athena Consortium as part of which she acts as Senior Manager on Mediation Support, Gender and Inclusion for the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and as Senior Adviser to the European Institute for Peace (EIP).

Antonia Potter Prentice, insani yardım kuruluşlarının ve kalkınma örgütlerinin küresel ağı olan İttifak 2015'in direktörüdür. Prentice, Myanmar için Ortak Barış Fonu'na geçici Kıdemli Cinsiyet Danışmanı ve Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreteri Yemen Özel Elçisi Ofisi'ne teknik tavsiyeler vermek de dahil olmak üzere insancıl faaliyetler, kalkınma, barış yapma ve barış inşası gibi konularda sivil toplum bünyesinde 17 yıllık bir çalışma tecrübesine sahiptir. BM Kadınları, Diyalog Danışma Grubu ve İnsani Yardım Diyalogu Merkezi gibi çeşitli uluslararası örgütlerde görev yapan Prentice, kurucuları arasında yer aldığı Athena Konsorsiyomu Arabuluculuk Desteği, Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Kaynaştırma için Kriz Yönetimi İnisiyatifi'nde yöneticilik ve Avrupa Barış Enstitüsü'ne (EIP) başdanışmanlık yapmaktadır.



### **Catherine Woollard**


Catherine Woollard is the current Secretary General for ECRE, the European Council for Refugees and Exiles, a pan-European alliance of 96 NGOs protecting and advancing the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and displaced persons. Previously she served as the Director of the Brussels Office of Independent Diplomat, and from 2008 to 2014 she was the Executive Director of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) – a Brussels-based network of not-for-profit organisations working on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. She also held the positions of Director of Policy, Communications and Comparative Learning at Conciliation Resources, Senior Programme Coordinator (South East Europe/CIS/Turkey) at Transparency International and Europe/Central Asia Programme Coordinator at Minority Rights Group International. Woollard has additionally worked as a consultant advising governments on anti-corruption and governance reform, as a lecturer in political science, teaching and researching on the EU and international politics, and for the UK civil service.

Catherine Woollard, Avrupa Mülteci ve Sürgünler Konseyi (ECRE) Genel Sekreteri'dir. ECRE, Avrupa ülkelerinin ittifakına dayalı ve uluslararası koruma alanında çalışan yaklaşık 96 sivil toplum kuruluşunun üye olduğu bir ağıdır. Geçmişte Bağımsız Diplomatlar Grubu'nun Brüksel Ofis Direktörü olarak çalışan Woollard 2008-2014 yılları arasında çatışmanın önlenmesi ve barışın inşası üzerine çalışan sivil toplum kuruluşlarının oluşturduğu bir ağ olan Avrupa Barış İnşası İrtibat Bürosu'nun direktörü olarak görev yapmıştır. Conciliation Resources'da Siyaset, İletişim ve Karşılaştırmalı Öğrenme Birimi Direktörü, Transparency International'da Güneydoğu Avrupa ve Türkiye Kıdemli Program Koordinatörü, Minority Rights Group'da Avrupa ve Orta



Asya Program Koordinatörü olarak görev yapmıştır. Hükümetlere yolsuzluk konusunda danışmanlık hizmeti vermiş, akademisyen olarak Birleşik Krallık'taki kamu kurumu çalışanlarına siyaset bilimi, AB üzerine eğitim ve araştırma ve uluslararası politika alanlarında dersler vermiştir.

## Council of Experts / Uzmanlar Kurulu Üyeleri



### **Bertie Ahern**

Bertie Ahern is the former Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of Ireland, a position to which he was elected following numerous Ministerial appointments as well as that of Deputy Prime Minister. A defining moment of Mr Ahern's three terms in office as Taoiseach was the successful negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998. Mr Ahern held the Presidency of the European Council in 2004, presiding over the historic enlargement of the EU to 27 member states. Since leaving Government in 2008 Mr Ahern has dedicated his time to conflict resolution and is actively involved with many groups around the world. Current roles include Co-Chair of The Inter Action Council; Member of the Clinton Global Initiative; Member of the International Group dealing with the conflict in the Basque Country; Honorary Adjunct Professor of Mediation and Conflict Intervention in NUI Maynooth; Member of the Kennedy Institute of NUI Maynooth; Member of the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin; Member of the Varkey Gems Foundation Advisory Board; Member of Crisis Management Initiative; Member of the World Economic Forum Agenda Council on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution; Member of the IMAN Foundation; Advisor to the Legislative Leadership Institute Academy of Foreign Affairs; Senior Advisor to the International Advisory Council to the Harvard International Negotiation Programme; and Director of Co-operation Ireland.

Tecrübeli bir siyasetçi olan Bertie Ahern bir dizi bakanlık görevinden sonra İrlanda Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı olarak görev yapmıştır. Bertie Ahern'in

başbakanlık yaptığı dönemdeki en belirleyici gelişme 1998 yılının Nisan ayında Hayırlı Cuma Anlaşması'yla sonuçlanan barış görüşmesi müzakerelerinin başlatılması olmuştur. Ahern, 2004 yılında Avrupa Konseyi başkanlığı görevini yürütürken Avrupa Birliği'nin üye ülke sayısının 27'ye çıktığı tarihsel süreçte payı olan en önemli isimlerden biri olmuştur. 2008 yılında aktif siyasetten çekilen Bertie Ahern o tarihten bu yana bütün zamanını çatışma çözümü çalışmalarına ayırmakta ve bu amaçla pek çok grupla temaslarda bulunmaktadır. Ahern'in hali hazırda sahip olduğu ünvanlar şunlardır: The Inter Action Council Eşbaşkanlığı, Clinton Küresel İnsiyatifi Üyeliği, Bask Ülkesindeki Çatışma Üzerine Çalışma Yürüten Uluslararası Grup Üyeliği, İrlanda Ulusal Üniversitesi Arabuluculuk ve Çatışmaya Müdahale Bölümü Fahri Profesörlüğü, Berlin Kültürel Diplomasi Enstitüsü Üyeliği, Varkey Gems Vakfı Danışma Kurulu Üyeliği, Kriz İdaresi İnisiyatifi Üyeliği, Dünya Ekonomik Forumu Müzakere ve Çatışma Çözümü Forumu Konsey Üyeliği, Harvard Uluslararası Müzakere Programı Uluslararası Danışmanlar Konseyi Başdanışmanı.



### **Dermot Ahern**

Dermot Ahern is a former Irish Member of Parliament and Government Minister and was a key figure for more than 20 years in the Irish peace process, including in negotiations for the Good Friday Agreement and the St Andrews Agreement. He also has extensive experience at the EU Council level, including as a key negotiator and signatory to the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties. In 2005, he was appointed by the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, to be a Special Envoy on the issue of UN Reform.

Geçmişte İrlanda Parlamentosu milletvekilliği ve kabinede bakanlık görevlerinde bulunan Dermot Ahern, 20 yıldan fazla bir süre İrlanda barış sürecinde anahtar bir rol oynamıştır ve bu süre içinde Belfast Anlaşması (Hayırlı Cuma Anlaşması) ve St. Andrews Anlaşması için yapılan müzakerelere dahil olmuştur. AB Konseyi seviyesinde de önemli tecrübeleri olan Ahern, AB Anayasası ve Lizbon Antlaşmaları sürecinde de önemli bir arabulucu ve imzacı olmuştur. 2005 yılında dönemin Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreteri Kofi Annan tarafından BM Reformu konusunda özel temsilci olarak atanmıştır.



### **Prof. Dr. Aşkın Asan**

Professor Dr. Aşkın Asan is an executive board member of the Maarif Foundation, a member of Turkey's Democracy Platform, and a faculty member at Istanbul Ticaret University. Elected as a Member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly from Ankara, Prof. Dr. Asan served as a vice president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean and was a member of the Turkish Delegation of the Parliamentary Union of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference during her time in parliamentary office. She is a former Deputy Minister of Family and Social Policies (2011-2014) and was Rector of Avrasya University in Trabzon between 2014-2017.

Maarif Vakfı Mütevelli Heyeti üyesi ve Türkiye Demokrasi Platformu kurucu üyesi olan Aşkın Asan, 23. Dönem'de Ankara Milletvekili olarak Parlamentoda görev yaptı. TBMM'de Akdeniz Parlamenter Asamblesi (APA) Türk Grubu Başkanı, Milli Eğitim, Gençlik ve Spor Komisyonu ve İKÖPAB Türk Grubu Üyesi oldu. 2011-2014 Yılları arasında Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı Bakan Yardımcısı görevini yürüttü. 2014-2017 yılları arasında Avrasya Üniversitesi'nin rektörlüğünü yapan Asan, şu an İstanbul Ticaret Üniversitesi öğretim üyesidir.



### **Prof. Dr. Mehmet Asutay**

Professor Dr. Mehmet Asutay is a Professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic Political Economy & Finance at the Durham University Business School, UK. He researches, teaches and supervises research on Islamic political economy and finance, Middle Eastern economic development and finance, the political economy of the Middle East, including Turkish and Kurdish political economies. He is the Director of the Durham Centre for Islamic Economics and Finance and the Managing Editor of the Review of Islamic Economics, as well as Associate Editor of the American Journal of Islamic Social Science. He is the Honorary Treasurer of the BRISMES (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies); and of the IAIE (International Association for Islamic Economics).

Dr. Mehmet Asutay, İngiltere'deki Durham Üniversitesi'nin İşletme Fakültesi'nde Ortadoğu'nun İslami Siyasal Ekonomisi ve Finansı alanında profesör olarak görev yapmaktadır. Asutay Türk ve Kürt siyasal ekonomisi, İslami siyasal ekonomi, ve Ortadoğu'da siyasal ekonomi konularında dersler vermekte, araştırmalar yapmakta ve yapılan araştırmalara danışmanlık yapmaktadır.



### **Ali Bayramoğlu**

Ali Bayramoğlu is a writer and political commentator. Since 1994, he has contributed as a columnist for a variety of newspapers. He is currently a columnist for *AL-Monitor*. He is a member of the former Wise Persons Committee in Turkey, established by then-Prime Minister Erdoğan.

Yazar ve siyaset yorumcusu olan Ali Bayramoğlu uzun yıllar günlük yayınlanan Yeni Şafak gazetesinde köşe yazarlığı yapmıştır. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın başbakanlığı döneminde oluşturulan Akil İnsanlar Heyetinde yer almıştır. Bayramoğlu köşe yazılarına şu an Al-Monitor'de devam etmektedir.



### **Prof. Christine Bell**

Professor Christine Bell is a legal expert based in Edinburgh, Scotland. She is Professor of Constitutional Law and Assistant Principal (Global Justice) at the University of Edinburgh, Co-director of the Global Justice Academy, and a member of the British Academy. She was chairperson of the Belfast-based human rights organization, the Committee on the Administration of Justice, from 1995-7, and a founder member of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission established under the terms of the Belfast Agreement. In 1999 she was a member of the European Commission's Committee of Experts on Fundamental Rights. She is an expert on transitional justice, peace negotiations, constitutional law and human rights law. She regularly conducts training on these topics for diplomats, mediators and lawyers, has been involved as a legal advisor in a number of peace negotiations, and acted as an expert in transitional justice for the UN Secretary-General, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and UNIFEM.

İskoçya'nın başkenti Edinburgh'ta faaliyet yürüten bir hukukçudur. Edinburgh Üniversitesi'nde Anayasa hukuku profesörü olarak ve aynı üniversite bünyesindeki Küresel Adalet Projesinde Müdür yardımcısı olarak görev yapmaktadır. İngiliz Akademisi üyesi de olan Bell, 1995-1997 yılları arasında Belfast merkezli İnsan Hakları örgütü Adalet İdaresi Komisyonu başkanı ve Belfast Anlaşması şartları çerçevesinde kurulan Kuzey İrlanda İnsan Hakları Komisyonu kurucu üyesi olarak görev yaptı. 1999'da ise Avrupa Komisyonu Temel Haklar Uzmanlar Komitesi üyeliğinde bulundu. Temel uzmanlık alanları Geçiş Dönemi Adaleti, Barış Müzakereleri, Anayasa Hukuku ve İnsan Hakları olan Prof. Bell, aynı zamanda bu konularda diplomat, arabulucu ve hukukçulara eğitim vermekte, BM Genel Sekreterliği, İnsan Hakları Yüksek



Komiserliđi Ofisi ve UNIFEM'in de dahil olduđu kurumlarda hukuk danışmanı olarak görev yapmaktadır.



### **Cengiz Çandar**

Cengiz Çandar is currently a columnist for *Al-Monitor*, a widely respected online magazine that provides analysis on Turkey and the Middle East. He is a former war correspondent and an expert on the Middle East. He served as a special adviser to the former Turkish president, Turgut Ozal. Cengiz Çandar is a Distinguished Visiting Scholar at the Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies (SUITS).

Kıdemli bir gazeteci ve köşe yazarı olan Çandar uzun yıllar Radikal gazetesi için köşe yazarlığı yapmıştır. Al Monitor haber sitesinde köşe yazarlığı yapmaktadır. Ortadoğu konusunda önemli bir uzman olan Çandar, bir dönem savaş muhabiri olarak çalışmış ve Türkiye eski Cumhurbaşkanı merhum Turgut Özal'a özel danışmanlık yapmıştır.



## **Andy Carl**

Andy Carl is an independent expert on conflict resolution and public participation in peace processes. He believes that building peace is not an act of charity but an act of justice. He co-founded and was Executive Director of Conciliation Resources. Previously, he was the first Programme Director with International Alert. He is currently an Honorary Fellow of Practice at the School of Law, University of Edinburgh. He serves as an adviser to a number of peacebuilding initiatives including the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, the Legal Tools for Peace-Making Project in Cambridge, and the Oxford Research Group, London.

Andy Carl çatışma çözümü ve barış süreçlerine kamusal katılımın sağlanması üzerine çalışan bağımsız bir uzmandır. Barışın inşasının bir hayırseverlik faaliyetinden ziyade adaletin yerine getirilmesi çabası olduğuna inanan Carl, çatışma Çözümü alanında çalışan etkili kurumlardan biri olan Conciliation Resources'un kurucularından biridir. Bir dönem Uluslararası Uyarı (International Alert) isimli kurumda Program Direktörü olarak görev yapan Carl, halen Edinburgh Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi bünyesinde Fahri Bilim Kurulu Üyesi olarak görev yapmaktadır. Barış inşası üzerine çalışan Cenevre Mezunlar İnisiyatifi bünyesindeki Barış ve Geçiş Dönemi İnisiyatifi, Cambridge'te yürütülen Barışın İnşası için Yasal Araçlar Projesi ve Londra'da faaliyet yürüten Oxford Araştırma Grubu gibi bir dizi kurum ve oluşuma danışmanlık yapmaya devam etmektedir.



### **Dr. Vahap Coşkun**

Dr. Vahap Coşkun is a Professor of Law at University of Dicle in Diyarbakır where he also completed his bachelor's and master's degrees in law. Coşkun received his PhD from Ankara University Faculty of Law. He has written for Serbestiyet and Kurdistan24 online newspaper. He has published books on human rights, constitutional law, political theory and social peace. Coşkun was a member of the former Wise Persons Commission in Turkey (Central Anatolian Region).


Dr. Vahap Coşkun Diyarbakır'da, Dicle Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi'nde öğretim üyesidir. Lisans ve lisansüstü eğitimini Dicle Üniversitesi'nde tamamladıktan sonra Ankara Üniversitesi'nde Hukuk Doktoru tamamlamıştır. Serbestiyet ve Kurdistan 24 online gazetesinde makale yazan Coşkun, insan hakları, anayasa hukuku, siyasal teori ve toplumsal barış konulu kitaplar yayınlamıştır. Coşkun, Akil İnsanlar Komisyonu'nun İç Anadolu bölgesi üyesiydi.



### **Ayşegül Doğan**

Ayşegül Doğan is a journalist who has conducted interviews, created news files and programmes for independent news platforms. She studied at the Faculty of Cultural Mediation and Communications at Metz University, and Paris School of Journalism. As a student, she worked at the Ankara bureau of Agence-France Presse (AFP), the Paris bureau of Courier International and at the Kurdish service of The Voice of America. She worked as a programme creator at Radyo Ekin, and as a translator-journalist for the Turkish edition of Le Monde Diplomatique. She was a lecturer at the Kurdology department of National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations in Paris. She worked on political communications for a long time. From its establishment in 2011 to its closure in 2016, she worked as a programmes coordinator at IMC TV. She prepared and presented the programme “Gündem Müzakere” on the same channel.

Bağımsız haber platformlarına özel röportaj, haber dosyası ve programlar hazırlayan gazeteci Ayşegül Doğan; Metz Üniversitesi Medyasyon Kültürel ve İletişim Fakültesi’nin ardından eğitimine Paris Yüksek Gazetecilik Okulu’nda devam etti. Okul yıllarında, Fransız Haber Ajansı-AFP’nin Ankara, Courier International’ın Paris bürosunda ve Amerika’nın Sesi Kürtçe servisinde gazeteciliği deneyimledi. Radyo Ekin’de programcı, Le Monde Diplomatique Türkçe’de çevirmen gazeteci olarak çalıştı. Paris’te yaşadığı süre içinde Doğu Dilleri ve Medeniyetleri Enstitüsü Kürdoloji bölümünde okutmanlık yaptı. Uzunca bir süre siyaset iletişimi ile ilgilendi. 2011’de kurulan IMC TV 2016’da kapatılana dek; program koordinatörü olarak çalıştı. Aynı kanalda “Gündem Müzakere” programını hazırladı ve sundu. Halen ülkesindeki pek çok meslektaş gibi etik ilkelere bağlı; bağımsız bir gazeteci olarak çalışma arayış, istek ve heyecanını koruyor.



**Prof. Dr. Fazıl Hüsnü Erdem**

Dr. Fazıl Hüsnü Erdem is Professor of Constitutional Law and Head of the Department of Constitutional Law at Dicle University, Diyarbakır. In 2007, Erdem was a member of the commission which was established to draft a new constitution to replace the Constitution of 1982 which was introduced following the coup d'état of 1980. Erdem was a member of the Wise Persons Committee in Turkey, established by then Prime Minister Erdoğan, in the team that was responsible for the South-eastern Anatolia Region.


Fazıl Hüsnü Erdem Dicle Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Anayasa Hukuku Anabilim Dalı Başkanı'dır. 2007'de, 1980 darbesinin takiben yürürlüğe giren 1982 darbe anayasasını değiştirmek üzere kurulan yeni anayasa hazırlama komisyonunda yer almıştır. Erdem, 2013'de Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti tarafından Demokratik açılım ve çözüm süreci kapsamında oluşturulan Akil İnsanlar Heyeti üyesidir.



### **Prof. Dr. Salomón Lerner Febres**

Professor Dr. Salomón Lerner Febres holds a PhD in Philosophy from Université Catholique de Louvain. He is Executive President of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights and Professor and Rector Emeritus of Pontifical Catholic University of Peru. He is former President of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru. Prof. Lerner has given many talks and speeches about the role and the nature of university, the problems of scholar research in higher education and about ethics and public culture. Furthermore, he has participated in numerous conferences in Peru and other countries about violence and pacification. In addition, he has been a speaker and panellist in multiple workshops and symposiums about the work and findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru. He has received several honorary doctorates as well as numerous recognitions and distinctions of governments and international human rights institutions.

Prof. Salomón felsefe alanındaki doktora eğitimini Belçika'daki Université Catholique de Louvain'de tamamlamıştır. Peru'daki Pontifical Catholic Üniversitesi'nin onursal rektörü sıfatını taşıyan Prof. Salomón Lerner Febres, aynı üniversite bünyesindeki Demokrasi ve İnsan Hakları Merkezi'nin de başkanlığını yapmaktadır. Peru Hakikat ve Uzlaşma Komisyonu eski başkanıdır. Üniversitenin rolü ve doğası, akademik çalışmalarda karşılaşılan zorluklar, etik ve kamu kültürü konulu çok sayıda konuşma yapmış, şiddet ve pasifizm konusunda Peru başta olmak üzere pek çok ülkede yapılan konferanslara konuşmacı olarak katılmıştır.



### **Prof. Mervyn Frost**

Professor Mervyn Frost teaches International Relations, and was former Head of the Department of War Studies, at King's College London, UK. He was previously Chair of Politics at the University of Natal, Durban, South Africa and was President of the South African Political Studies Association. He currently sits on the editorial boards of International Political Sociology and the Journal of International Political Theory, among others. He is an expert on human rights in international relations, humanitarian intervention, justice in world politics, democratising global governance, the just war tradition in an era of New Wars, and ethics in a globalising world.

Londra'daki King's College'in Savaş Çalışmaları bölümünün başkanlığını yapmaktadır. Daha önce Güney Afrika'nın Durban şehrindeki Natal Üniversitesi'nde Siyaset Bilimi bölümünün başkanlığını yapmıştır. Güney Afrika Siyaset Çalışmaları Enstitüsü Başkanlığı görevinde de bulunan Profesör Frost, İnsan Hakları ve Uluslararası İlişkiler, İnsancıl Müdahale, Dünya Siyasetinde Adalet, Küresel Yönetimin Demokratikleştirilmesi, Yeni Savaşlar Döneminde Adil Savaş Geleneği ve Küreselleşen Dünyada Etik gibi konularda uzman bir isimdir.





### **Martin Griffiths**

Martin Griffiths is a senior international mediator and currently the UN's Envoy to Yemen. From 1999 to 2010 he was the founding Director of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva where he specialised in developing political dialogue between governments and insurgents in a range of countries across Asia, Africa and Europe. He is a co-founder of Inter Mediate, a London based NGO devoted to conflict resolution, and has worked for international organisations including UNICEF, Save the Children, Action Aid, and the European Institute of Peace. Griffiths has also worked in the British Diplomatic Service and for the UN, including as Director of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (Geneva), Deputy to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (New York), Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Great Lakes, Regional Coordinator in the Balkans and Deputy Head of the Supervisory Mission in Syria (UNSMIS).

Üst düzeyde uluslararası bir arabulucu olan Martin Griffiths, uluslararası bir arabulucudur ve yakın zamanda BM Yemen Özel Temsilcisi olarak atanmıştır. Asya, Afrika ve Avrupa kıtalarındaki çeşitli ülkelerde hükümetler ile isyancı gruplar arasında siyasi diyalog geliştirilmesi üzerine çalışan Cenevre'deki İnsani Diyalog Merkezi'nin (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) kurucu direktörü olan Martin Griffiths 1999-2010 yılları arasında bu görevi sürdürmüştür. Çatışma çözümü üzerine çalışan Londra merkezli Inter Mediate'in kurucuları arasında bulunan Griffiths, UNICEF, Save the Children ve Action Aid isimli uluslararası kurumlarda da görev yapmıştır. İngiltere Diploması Servisi'ndeki hizmetlerinin yanı sıra Birleşmiş Milletler bünyesinde Cenevre Ofisi'nde İnsani Faaliyetler Bölümü'nde yönetici, New York ofisinde Acil Yardım Koordinatörü yardımcılığı, Büyük Göller (Great Lakes) bölgesinde İnsani Yardım Koordinatörü, Balkanlarda BM Bölgesel


Koordinatörü ve BM eski Genel Sekreteri Kofi Annan'ın BM ve Arap Birlięi adına Suriye özel temsilcilięi yaptıęı dönemde kendisine bař danıřmanlık yapmıřtır.



### **Kezban Hatemi**

Kezban Hatemi holds an LL.B. from Istanbul University and is registered with the Istanbul Bar Association. She has worked as a self employed lawyer, as well as Turkey's National Commission to UNESCO and a campaigner and advocate during the Bosnian War. She was involved in drafting the Turkish Civil Code and Law of Foundations as well as in preparing the legal groundwork for the chapters on Religious Freedoms and Minorities and Community Foundations within the Framework Law of Harmonization prepared by Turkey in preparation for EU accession. She has published articles on women's, minority groups, children, animals and human rights and the fight against drugs. She is a member of the former Wise Persons Committee in Turkey, established by then Prime Minister Erdoğan, and sits on the Board of Trustees of the Technical University and the Darulacaze Foundation.


İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi'nden mezun olduktan sonra İstanbul Barosuna kayıtlı olarak avukatlık yapmaya başlamıştır. Serbest avukatlık yapmanın yanı sıra UNESCO Türkiye Milli Komisyonu'nda hukukçu olarak görev yapmış, Bosna savaşı sırasında sürdürülen savaş karşıtı kampanyalarda aktif olarak yer almıştır. Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik süreci gereği hazırlanan Uyum Yasaları Çerçeve Yasasının Dini Özgürlükler, Azınlıklar ve Vakıflar ile ilgili bölümlerine ilişkin hukuki çalışmalarda yer almış, Türk Ceza Kanunu ve Vakıflar Kanunu'nun taslaklarının hazırlanmasında görev almıştır. İnsan hakları, kadın hakları, azınlık hakları, çocuk hakları, hayvan hakları ve uyuşturucu ile mücadele konularında çok sayıda yazılı eseri vardır. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın başbakanlığı döneminde oluşturulan Akil İnsanlar Heyetinde yer almıştır. Bunun yanı sıra İstanbul Üniversitesi ile Darülaceze Vakfı Mütevelli heyetlerinde görev yapmaktadır.



### **Dr. Edel Hughes**

Dr. Edel Hughes is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Middlesex University. Prior to joining Middlesex University, Dr Hughes was a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of East London and a Lecturer in Law and the University of Limerick. She was awarded an LL.M. and a PhD in International Human Rights Law from the National University of Ireland, Galway, in 2003 and 2009, respectively. Her research interests are in the areas of international human rights law, public international law, and conflict transformation, with a regional interest in Turkey and the Middle East. She has published widely on these areas.

Dr. Edel Hughes, Middlesex Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi'nde kıdemli öğretim üyesidir. Daha önce Doğu Londra Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi ve Limerick Üniversitesi'nde görev yapan Hughes, doktorasını 2003-2009 yılları arasında İrlanda Ulusal Üniversitesi'nde Uluslararası İnsan Hakları Hukuku alanında tamamlamıştır. Hughes'un birçok yayınının da bulunduğu çalışma alanları içinde, Orta Doğu'yu ve Türkiye'yi de kapsayan şekilde, uluslararası insan hakları hukuku, uluslararası kamu hukuku ve çatışma çözümü yer almaktadır.



### **Kadir İnanır**

Kadir İnanır was born in 1949 Fatsa, Ordu. He is an acclaimed actor and director, and has starred in well over a hundred films. He has won several awards for his work in Turkish cinema. He graduated from Marmara University Faculty of Communication. In 2013 he became a member of the Wise Persons Committee for the Mediterranean region.

Ünlü oyuncu ve yönetmen Kadir İnanır, 100'ü aşkın filmde rol almış ve Türk sinemasına katkılarından dolayı pek çok ödüle layık görüşmüştür. 1949 senesinde Ordu, Fatsa'da doğan İnanır, Marmara Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Radyo-Televizyon Bölümünden mezun olmuştur. 2013 senesinde barış sürecini yönetmek amacıyla kurulan Akil İnsanlar Heyeti'ne Akdeniz Bölgesi temsilcisi olarak girmiştir.



### **Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnel**

Professor Ahmet İnel is a former faculty member of Galatasaray University in Istanbul, Turkey and Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne University, France. He is Managing Editor of the Turkish editing house, *İletişim*, and member of the editorial board of monthly review, *Birikim*. He is a regular columnist at *Cumhuriyet* newspaper and an author who published several books and articles in both Turkish and French.

İletişim Yayınları Yayın Kurulu Koordinatörlüğünü yürüten Ahmet İnel, Galatasaray Üniversitesi ve Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne Üniversitesi'nde öğretim üyesi olarak görev yapmıştır. Birikim Dergisi yayın kolektifi üyesi ve Cumhuriyet Gazetesinde köşe yazarıdır. Türkçe ve Fransızca olmak üzere çok sayıda kitabı ve makalesi bulunmaktadır.



### **Avila Kilmurray**

Avila Kilmurray is a founding member of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition. She was part of the Coalition's negotiating team for the Good Friday Agreement and has written extensively on community action, the women's movement and conflict transformation. She serves as an adviser on the Ireland Committee of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust as well as a board member of Conciliation Resources (UK) and the Institute for British Irish Studies. She was the first Women's Officer for the Transport & General Workers Union for Ireland (1990-1994) and from 1994-2014 she was Director of the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, managing EU PEACE funding for the re-integration of political ex-prisoners in Northern Ireland as well as support for community-based peace building. She is a recipient of the Raymond Georis Prize for Innovative Philanthropy through the European Foundation Centre. Kilmurray is working as a consultant with The Social Change Initiative to support work with the Migrant Learning Exchange Programme and learning on peace building.

Avila Kilmurray, Kuzey İrlanda Kadın Koalisyonu'nun kurucusudur ve bu siyasi partinin temsilcilerinden biri olarak Hayırlı Cuma Anlaşması müzakerelerine katılmıştır. Toplumsal tepki, kadın hareketi ve çatışmanın dönüşümü gibi konularda çok sayıda yazılı eseri vardır. Birleşik Krallık ve İrlanda'da aralarında Conciliation Resources (Uzlaşma Kaynakları), the Global Fund for Community Foundations (Toplumsal Vakıflar için Kürsel Fon) , Conflict Resolution Services Ireland (İrlanda Çatışma Çözümü Hizmetleri) ve the Institute for British Irish Studies (Britanya ve İrlanda çalışmaları Enstitüsü) isimli kurumlarda yönetim kurulu üyesi olarak görev yapmaktadır. 1990-94 yılları arasında Ulaşım ve Genel İşçiler Sendikası'nda

Kadınlardan Sorumlu Yönetici olarak çalışmış ve bu görevi yerine getiren ilk kadın olmuştur. 1994-2014 yılları arasında Kuzey İrlanda Toplum Vakfı'nın direktörlüğünü yapmış ve bu görevi sırasında eski siyasi mahkumların yeniden entegrasyonu ile barışın toplumsal zeminde yeniden inşasına dair Avrupa Birliği fonlarının idaresini yürütmüştür. Avrupa Vakıflar Merkezi tarafından verilen Yenilikçi Hayırseverler Raymond Georis Ödülü'nün de sahibidir.





### **Prof. Ram Manikkalingam**

Professor Ram Manikkalingam is founder and director of the Dialogue Advisory Group, an independent organisation that facilitates political dialogue to reduce violence. He is a member of the Special Presidential Task Force on Reconciliation in Sri Lanka and teaches politics at the University of Amsterdam. Previously, he was a Senior Advisor on the Sri Lankan peace process to then President Kumaratunga. He has served as an advisor with Ambassador rank at the Sri Lanka Mission to the United Nations in New York and prior to that he was an advisor on International Security to the Rockefeller Foundation. He is an expert on issues pertaining to conflict, multiculturalism and democracy, and has authored multiple works on these topics. He is a founding board member of the Laksham Kadirgamar Institute for Strategic Studies and International Relations, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Amsterdam Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü'nde misafir Profesör olarak görev yapmaktadır. Sri Lanka devlet başkanına barış süreci için danışmanlık yapmıştır. Danışmanlık görevini hala sürdürmektedir. Uzmanlık alanları arasında çatışma, çokkültürlülük, demokrasi gibi konular bulunan Prof. Ram Manikkalingam, Sri Lanka'daki Laksham Kadirgamar Stratejik Çalışmalar ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Enstitüsü'nün kurucu üyesi ve yönetim kurulu üyesidir.



## **Bejan Matur**

Bejan Matur is a renowned Turkey-based author and poet. She has published ten works of poetry and prose. In her writing she focuses mainly on Kurdish politics, the Armenian issue, minority issues, prison literature and women's rights. She has won several literary prizes and her work has been translated into over 28 languages. She was formerly Director of the Diyarbakır Cultural Art Foundation (DKSV). She is a columnist for the *Daily Zaman*, and occasionally for the English version, *Today's Zaman*.

Türkiye'nin önde gelen şair ve yazarlarından biridir. Şiir ve gazetecilik alanında yayımlanmış 10 kitabı bulunmaktadır. 2012 yılının başına kadar yazdığı düzenli köşe yazılarında Kürt siyaseti, Ermeni sorunu, gündelik siyaset, azınlık sorunları, cezaevi yazıları ve kadın sorunu gibi konuları işlemiştir. Yapıtları 28 değişik dile çevrilen Matur, çok sayıda edebiyat ödülü sahibidir. Diyarbakır Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı Kurucu Başkanlığı görevinde bulunmuştur.



### **Prof. Monica McWilliams**

Professor Monica McWilliams teaches in the Transitional Justice Institute at Ulster University in Northern Ireland. She currently serves on a three-person panel established by the Northern Ireland government to make recommendations on the disbandment of paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland. During the Northern Ireland peace process, Prof. McWilliams co-founded the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition political party and was elected as a delegate to the Multi-Party Peace Negotiations, which took place in 1996 to 1998. She was also elected to serve as a member of the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly from 1998 to 2003. Prof. McWilliams is a signatory of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and has chaired the Implementation Committee on Human Rights on behalf of the British and Irish governments. For her role in delivering the peace agreement in Northern Ireland, Prof. McWilliams was one recipient of the John F. Kennedy Leadership and Courage Award.

Prof. Monica McWilliams, Ulster Üniversitesi'ndeki Geçiş Dönemi Adaleti Enstitüsü'ne bağlı Kadın Çalışmaları Bölümü'nde öğretim üyesidir. 2005-2011 yılları arasında Kuzey İrlanda İnsan Hakları Komisyonu Komiseri olarak Kuzey İrlanda Haklar Beyannamesi için tavsiyeler hazırlamaktan sorumlu olarak görev yapmıştır. Kuzey İrlanda Kadın Koalisyonu'nun kurucularından olan Prof. McWilliams 1998 yılında Belfast (Hayırlı Cuma) Barış Anlaşması'nın imzalanmasıyla sonuçlanan Çok Partili Barış Görüşmeleri'nde yer almıştır.



### **Hanne Melfald**

Hanne Melfald worked with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for eight years including as the Senior Adviser to the Secretariat of the Foreign Minister of Norway before she became a Project Manager in HD's Eurasia office in 2015. She previously worked for the United Nations for six years including two years with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan as Special Assistant to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. She has also worked for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Nepal and Geneva, as well as for the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration. Melfald has a degree in International Relations from the University of Bergen and the University of California, Santa Barbara, as well as a Master's degree in Political Science from the University of Oslo.

Hanne Melfald, başkanışmanlık dahil olmak üzere 8 yıl boyunca Norveç Dışışleri Bakanlığı bünyesinde çeřitli görevlerde bulunmuş, 2015 yılından itibaren İnsani Diyalog için Merkez isimli kurumun Avrasya biriminde Proje Müdürü olarak çalışmaya başlamıştır. Geçmişte Birleşmiş Milletler bünyesinde görev almış, bu görevi sırasında 2 yıl boyunca Birleşmiş Milletler'in Afganistan Yardım Misyonunda BM Genel Sekreteri Özel Temsilcisi olarak görev yapmıştır. Ayrıca Birleşmiş Milletler Cenevre Yerleşkesi bünyesinde bulunan Nepal İnsani Yardım Koordinasyon Ofisinde de görev almıştır. Bir dönem Norveç Sığınmacılar Konseyi ve Norveç Göçmenlik İşleri Müdürlüğünde çalışan Hanna Melfald Norveç'in Bergen ve ABD'nin Kaliforniya Üniversitelerinde aldığı Uluslararası İlişkiler eğitimini Olso Üniversitesinde aldığı Siyaset Bilimi yüksek lisans eğitimiyle tamamlamıştır.



## **Roelf Meyer**

Meyer is currently a consultant on international peace processes having advised parties in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Burundi, Iraq, Kosovo, the Basque Region, Guyana, Bolivia, Kenya, Madagascar, and South Sudan. Meyer's experience in international peace processes stems from his involvement in the settlement of the South African conflict in which he was the government's chief negotiator in constitutional negotiations with the ANC's chief negotiator and current South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa. Negotiating the end of apartheid and paving the way for South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, Meyer continued his post as Minister of Constitutional Affairs in the Cabinet of the new President, Nelson Mandela. Meyer retired as a Member of Parliament and as the Gauteng leader of the National Party in 1996 and co-founded the United Democratic Movement (UDM) political party the following year. Retiring from politics in 2000, Meyer has since held a number of international positions, including membership of the Strategy Committee of the Project on Justice in Times of Transition at Harvard University.

Roelf Meyer, Güney Afrika'daki barış sürecinde iktidar partisi Ulusal Parti adına başmüzakereci olarak görev yapmıştır. O dönem Afrika Ulusal Kongresi (ANC) adına başmüzakereci olarak görev yapan ve şu an Güney Afrika devlet başkanı olan Cyril Ramaphosa ile birlikte yürüttüğü müzakereler sonrasında Güney Afrika'daki ırkçı apartheid rejim sona erdirilmiş ve 1994 yılında ülkedeki ilk özgür seçimlerin yapılması sağlanmıştır. Yapılan seçim sonrası yeni devlet başkanı seçilen Nelson Mandela kurduğu ilk hükümette Roelf Meyer'e Anayasal İlişkilerden Sorumlu Bakan olarak görev vermiştir. Roelf Meyer 2011-2014 yılları arasında Güney Afrika Savunma Değerlendirme

Komitesine başkanlık yapmış, aynı zamanda aktif olan bazı barış süreçlerine dahil olarak Kuzey İrlanda, Sri Lanka, Ruanda, Burundi, Irak, Kosova, Bask Bölgesi, Guyana, Bolivya, Kenya, Madagaskar ve Güney Sudan'da çatışan taraflara danışmanlık yapmıştır.



### **Mark Muller QC**

Mark Muller, QC, is a senior advocate at Doughty Street Chambers (London) and the Scottish Faculty of Advocates (Edinburgh) where he specialises in public international law and human rights. Muller is also currently on the UN Department of Political Affairs Standby Team of Mediation Experts and is the UN Special Envoy to Syria in the Syrian peace talks. He has many years' experience of advising numerous international bodies, such as Humanitarian Dialogue (Geneva) and Inter-Mediate (London) on conflict resolution, mediation, confidence-building, ceasefires, power-sharing, humanitarian law, constitution-making and dialogue processes. Muller also co-founded Beyond Borders and the Delfina Foundation.

Mark Muller Londra merkezli Doughty Street Chambers Hukuk Bürosu'na ve Edinburg'daki İskoç Avukatlar Birliği'ne bağlı olarak çalışan tecrübeli bir hukukçudur. Uluslararası kamu hukuku ve insan hakları hukuku alanında uzman olan Muller, Afganistan, Libya, Irak ve Suriye gibi çeşitli çatışma alanlarında uzun seneler çatışma çözümü, arabuluculuk, çatışmasızlık ve iktidar paylaşımı konusunda danışmanlık hizmeti vermiştir. 2005'den bu yana İnsani Diyalog için Merkez (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue), Çatışma Ötesi (Beyond Borders) ve Inter Mediate (Arabulucu) isimli kurumlara kıdemli danışmanlık yapmaktadır. Harvard Hukuk Fakültesi üyesi olan Muller bir dönem İngiltere ve Galler Barosu İnsan Hakları Komisyonu başkanlığı ve Barolar Konseyi Hukukun Üstünlüğü Birimi başkanlığı görevlerini de yürütmüştür. Kültürel diyalog yoluyla barışı ve uluslararası anlayışı teşvik etme amacıyla İskoçya'da kurulan Sınırlar Ötesi (Beyond Borders) isimli oluşumun kurucusu olan Muller halen BM Siyasal İlişkiler

Birimi bünyesindeki Arabulucular Destek Ekibinde Kıdemli Arabuluculuk Uzmanı olarak görev yapmaktadır.






## Avni Özgürel

Mehmet Avni Özgürel is a Turkish journalist, author and screenwriter. Having worked in several newspapers such as *Daily Sabah* and *Radikal*, Özgürel is currently the editor in chief of the daily *Yeni Birlik* and a TV programmer at TRT Haber. He is the screenwriter of the 2007 Turkish film, *Zincirbozan*, on the 1980 Turkish coup d'état, *Sultan Avrupa'da* (2009), on Sultan Abdülaziz's 1867 trip to Europe; and *Mahpeyker* (2010): *Kösem Sultan*, on Kösem Sultan. He is also the screenwriter and producer of 2014 Turkish film, *Darbe* (Coups), on the February 07, 2012 Turkish intelligence crisis. In 2013 he was appointed a member of the Wise Persons Committee in Turkey established by then Prime Minister Erdoğan.

Gazeteci-yazar Avni Özgürel, uzun yıllar Milliyet, Akşam, Sabah ve Radikal gibi çeşitli gazetelerde haber müdürlüğü ve köşe yazarlığı yaptı. 2013 yılında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti tarafından Demokratik açılım ve çözüm süreci kapsamında oluşturulan Akil İnsanlar Heyeti üyesidir. 1980 darbesini konu eden belgesel film Zincirbozan (2007), Sultan Abdülaziz'in 1867'de Avrupa'ya yaptığı yolculuğu konu eden Sultan Avrupa'da (2009), Mahpeyker: Kösem Sultan (2010) ve 7 Şubat Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MİT) operasyonunun anlatıldığı "Darbe" filmleri senaristliğini ve yapımcılığını üstlendiği projeler arasındadır. Özgürel, şu anda Yeni Birlik gazetesinin sahibi ve genel yayın yönetmenidir. Ayrıca TRT Haber'de program yapmaktadır.



### **Prof. John Packer**

Professor John Packer is Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Human Rights Research and Education Centre (HRREC) at the University of Ottawa in Canada. Prof. Packer has worked for inter-governmental organisations for over 20 years, including in Geneva for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Labour Organisation, and for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. From 1995 to 2004, Prof. Packer served as Senior Legal Adviser and then the first Director of the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in The Hague. In 2012 – 2014, Prof. Packer was a Constitutions and Process Design Expert on the United Nation's Standby Team of Mediation Experts attached to the Department of Political Affairs, advising in numerous peace processes and political transitions around the world focusing on conflict prevention and resolution, diversity management, constitutional and legal reform, and the protection of human rights.

Dr. John Packer Kanada'da Ottawa Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi'nde doçent ve İnsan Hakları Araştırma ve Eğitim Merkezi (Human Rights Research and Education Centre) müdürüdür. 20 yıl boyunca Packer BM Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği, Uluslararası Çalışma Örgütü ve BM İnsan Hakları Yüksek Komiserliği gibi Cenevre'de bulunan hükümetler arası örgütlerde çalışmıştır. 1995'ten 2004'e kadar Lahey'de Packer Kıdemli Hukuk Danışmanı, ardından da Ulusal Azınlıklar Yüksek Komiserliği birinci müdürü olarak görev almıştır. 2012-2014 yıllarında Packer BM Arabuluculuk Uzmanlar Ekibi siyasi ilişkiler biriminde Anayasa ve Süreçlerin Tasarımı Uzmanı olarak yer aldı. Dünyadaki birçok barış süreci ve siyasi geçişler konusunda danışmanlık yapan Pecker, çatışma önleme ve çözümü, çeşitlilik yönetimi, anayasa ve hukuk reformları ve insan hakları korumasına odaklanmıştır.



## **Jonathan Powell**

Jonathan Powell is the founder and CEO of Inter Mediate, an NGO devoted to conflict resolution around the world. In 2014, Powell was appointed by former Prime Minister David Cameron to be the UK's Special Envoy to Libya. He also served as Tony Blair's Chief of Staff in opposition from 1995 to 1997 and again as his Chief of Staff in Downing Street from 1997 to 2007. Prior to his involvement in British politics, Powell was the British Government's chief negotiator on Northern Ireland from 1997 to 2007 and played a key part in leading the peace negotiations and its implementation.

Ortadoğu, Latin Amerika ve Asya'da yaşanan çatışmaların çözümü üzerine çalışan ve devletten bağımsız arabuluculuk kurumu olan Birleşik Krallık merkezli Inter Mediate'in kurucusudur ve İcra Kurulu Başkanı'dır. 2014 yılında Birleşik Krallık Başbakanı David Cameron tarafından Libya konusunda Özel Temsilci olarak atanmıştır. 1995-2007 yılları arasında Birleşik Krallık eski Başbakanı Tony Blair kabinesinde Başbakanlık Personel Daire Başkanlığı görevinde bulunmuş, 1997 yılından itibaren Kuzey İrlanda sorununun çözümü için yapılan görüşmelere Britanya adına başmüzakereci olarak katılmıştır. 1978-79 yılları arasında BBC ve Granada TV için gazeteci olarak çalışmış, 1979-1994 yılları arasında ise Britanya adına diplomatlık yapmıştır.



### **Sir Kieran Prendergast**

Sir Kieran Prendergast is a former British diplomat who served as the Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs at the United Nations from 1997 to 2005 and as High Commissioner to Kenya from 1992 to 1995 and to Zimbabwe from 1989 to 1992. During his time at the UN, Prendergast stressed the human rights violations and ethnic cleansing that occurred during the War in Darfur and was involved in the 2004 Cyprus reunification negotiations. Since his retirement from the UN, he has conducted research at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (United States) and is a member of the Advisory Council of Independent Diplomat (United States). Prendergast also holds a number of positions, including Chairman of the Anglo-Turkish Society, a Trustee of the Beit Trust, and Senior Adviser at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Birleşik Krallık Dışişleri Bakanlığı bünyesinde aralarında Kıbrıs, Türkiye, İsrail, Hollanda, Kenya ve ABD’de diplomat olarak çalışmıştır. Birleşik Krallık Dışişleri ve Milletler Topluluğu Bürosu’nun (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) Güney Afrika’daki Apartheid rejimi ve Namibya konularıyla ilgilenen birimine başkanlık etmiştir. Bir dönem BM Siyasal İlişkiler Biriminde Müsteşar olarak çalışmış, BM Genel Sekreteri’nin Barış ve Güvenlik konulu yönetim kurulu toplantılarının düzenleyiciliğini yapmış, Afganistan, Burundi, Kıbrıs, Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti, Doğu Timor gibi bölgelerde barış çabalarına dahil olmuştur.



### **Rajesh Rai**

Rajesh Rai was called to the Bar in 1993 with his areas of expertise including human rights law, immigration and asylum law, and public law. He has been treasurer of 1MCB Chambers (London) since 2015 and has also been a Director of an AIM-listed investment company where he led their renewable energy portfolio. Rai is a frequent lecturer on a wide variety of legal issues, including immigration and asylum law and freedom of experience (Bar of Armenia), minority linguistic rights (European Parliament), and women's and children's rights in areas of conflict (cross-border conference to NGOs working in Kurdish regions). He is also Founder Director of HIC, a community centred NGO based in Cameroon.

1993 yılında İngiltere ve Galler Barosu'na kaydolmuştur. İnsan Hakları Hukuku, Göçmenlik ve Sığınma Hakkı hukuku ile Kamu Hukuku temel uzmanlık alanlarıdır. Kamerun'daki HIC isimli sivil toplum örgütü ile Uganda'daki Human Energy isimli şirketin kurucusudur. Bir dönem The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants – JCWI – (Göçmenlerin Refahı için Ortak Konsey) direktörlüğünü yapmıştır. Başta İngiltere ve Galler Barosu İnsan Hakları Komisyonu adına olmak üzere uluslararası alanda özellikle Avrupa, Asya, Afrika, ABD ve Hindistan'da çok çeşitli hukuki konular üzerine seminerler ve dersler vermiştir.



### **Sir David Reddaway**

Sir David Reddaway is a retired British diplomat currently serving as Chief Executive and Clerk of the Goldsmiths' Company in London. During his previous career in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, he served as Ambassador to Turkey (2009-2014), Ambassador to Ireland (2006-2009), High Commissioner to Canada (2003-2006), UK Special Representative for Afghanistan (2002), and Charge d'Affaires in Iran (1990-1993). His other assignments were to Argentina, India, Spain, and Iran, where he was first posted during the Iranian Revolution.

Halen çeşitli özel şirket ve üniversitelere danışman, yönetim kurulu üyesi ve konsültasyon uzmanı olarak hizmet etmektedir. 2016 yılının Ocak ayından bu yana Londra Üniversitesi bünyesindeki Goldsmith Koleji'nde Konsey üyesi ve Goldsmith şirketinde yönetici katip olarak görev yapmaya başlamıştır. Bir dönem Birleşik Krallık adına Türkiye ve İrlanda Cumhuriyeti Büyükelçisi olarak görev yapan Reddaway bu görevinden önce Birleşik Krallık adına Kanada'da Yüksek Misyon Temsilcisi, Afganistan'da Özel Temsilci, İran'da ise Diplomatik temsilci olarak görev yapmıştır. Bu görevlerinin yanı sıra İspanya, Arjantin, ve Hindistan'da diplomatik görevler üstlenmiştir.

**Prof. Naomi Roht-Arriaza**

Professor Naomi Roht-Arriaza is a Distinguished Professor of Law at the Hastings College of Law, University of California (San Francisco) and is renowned globally for her expertise in transitional justice, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law. She has extensive knowledge of, and experience in, post-conflict procedures in Latin America and Africa. Roht-Arriaza has contributed to the defence of human rights through legal and social counselling, her position as academic chair, and her published academic works.

Prof. Naomi Roht-Arriaza Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin San Francisco şehrindeki UC Hastings College of the Law isimli Hukuk okulunda öğretim üyesi olarak görev yapmaktadır. Geçiş Dönemi Adaleti, İnsan Hakları İhlalleri, Uluslararası Ceza Hukuku ve Küresel Çevre Sorunları gibi konular uzmanlık alanına girmektedir.



### **Prof. Dr. Mehmet Ufuk Uras**

Mehmet Ufuk Uras is a co-founder and member of social liberal Greens and the Left Party of the Future, founded as a merger of the Greens and the Equality and Democracy Party. He was previously a former leader of the now-defunct University Lecturers' Union (Öğretim Elemanları Sendikası) and was elected the chairman of Freedom and Solidarity Party in 1996. Ufuk resigned from the leadership after the 2002 general election. Ufuk ran a successful campaign as a “common candidate of the Left”, standing on the independents' ticket, backed by Kurdish-based Democratic Society Party and several left-wing, environmentalist and pro-peace groups in the 2007 general election. He resigned from the Freedom and Solidarity Party on 19 June 2009. After the Democratic Society Party was dissolved in December 2009, he joined forces with the remaining Kurdish MPs in the Peace and Democracy Party group. On 25 November 2012, he became a co-founder and member of social liberal Greens and the Left Party of the Future, founded as a merger of the Greens and the Equality and Democracy Party. Ufuk is a member of the Dialogue Group and is the writer of several books on Turkish politics.

Prof. Dr. Mehmet Ufuk Uras İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi'nde lisans, yüksek lisans ve doktora öğrenimini tamamladıktan sonra, milletvekili seçilene kadar İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü'nde yardımcı doçent doktor olarak görev yapmıştır. 22 Temmuz 2007 genel seçimlerinde İstanbul 1. Bölge'den bağımsız milletvekili adayı olmuştur. Seçimlerin sonucunda %3,85 oranıyla yani 81.486 oy alarak İstanbul 1. Bölge'den bağımsız milletvekili olarak 23. dönem meclisine girmiştir. Seçimler öncesinde liderliğinden ayrıldığı Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (ÖDP) Genel başkanlığına 11 Şubat 2008'de yapılan 5. Olağan



Kongresi'ni takiben geri dönmüştür. 17 Haziran 2009 tarihinde, partinin dar grupçu bir anlayışa kaydığı düşüncesi ve sol siyasetin daha geniş bir yelpazeye ulaşması iddiasıyla bir grup arkadaşıyla Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi'nden istifa etmiştir. ÖDP'den ayrılışıyla birlikte Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi kuruluş sürecine katılmıştır. DTP'nin 19 kişiye düşüp grupsuz kalmasından sonra, Kürt sorununun parlamentoda çözülmesi gerektiğini savunarak Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP) grubuna katılmıştır. Ufuk Uras, seçim sürecinde, kuruluş çağrısını yaptığı Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi'ne üye olmuştur. 25 Kasım 2012'de kurulan Yeşiller ve Sol Gelecek Partisinin kurucularındandır ve aynı zamanda PM üyesidir. Uras'ın çok sayıdaki yayınları arasında "ÖDP Söyleşileri", "İdeolojilerin Sonu mu?" (Marksist Araştırmaları Destek Ödülü), "Sezgiciliğin Sonu mu?", "Başka Bir Siyaset Mümkün", "Kurtuluş Savaşında Sol", "Siyaset Yazıları" ve "Alternatif Siyaset Arayışları" "Sokaktan Parlamente'ye" "Söz Meclisten Dışarı" ve "Meclis Notları" adlı kitapları da bulunmaktadır.

**Prof. Dr. Sevtap Yokuş**

Professor Dr Sevtap Yokuş is a Law Faculty Member at İstanbul Altınbaş University in the Department of Constitutional Law. She holds a PhD in Public Law from the Faculty of Law, İstanbul University, awarded in 1995 for her thesis which assessed the state of emergency regime in Turkey with reference to the European Convention on Human Rights. She is a widely published expert in the areas of Constitutional Law and Human Rights and has multiple years' experience of working as a university lecturer at undergraduate, postgraduate and doctoral level. She also has experience of working as a lawyer in the European Court of Human Rights.

Prof. Dr. Sevtap Yokuş İstanbul Altınbaş Üniversitesi Anayasa Hukuku Anabilim Dalı öğretim üyesidir. İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Kamu Hukuku Doktora Programı bünyesinde başladığı doktorasını “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’nin Türkiye’de Olağanüstü Hal Rejimine Etkisi” başlıklı tezle 1995 yılında tamamlamıştır. Akademik görevi sırasında lisans, yüksek lisans ve doktora aşamasında dersler veren Prof. Dr. Yokuş özellikle Anayasa Hukuku ve İnsan hakları Hukuk alanında uzmanlaşmıştır. Ayrıca Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’ne başvuruda pratik avukatlık deneyimi de bulunmaktadır.













11 Guilford Street  
London WC1N 1DH  
United Kingdom  
+44 (0) 207 405 3835

[info@democraticprogress.org](mailto:info@democraticprogress.org)  
[www.democraticprogress.org](http://www.democraticprogress.org)

 @DPI\_UK

 DemocraticProgressInstitute