The Good Friday Agreement – An Overview

June 2013
Abstract

For decades, resolving the Northern Ireland conflict has been of primary concern for the conflicting parties within Northern Ireland, as well as for the British and Irish Governments. Adopted in 1998, the Good Friday Agreement has managed to curb hostilities, though sporadic violence still occurs and antagonism remains pervasive between many Nationalists and Unionists. Strong political bargaining through back-channel negotiations and facilitation from international and third-party interlocutors all contributed to what is today referred to as Northern Ireland’s peace process and the resulting Good Friday Agreement. Although the Northern Ireland peace process and the Good Friday Agreement are often touted as a model of conflict resolution for other intractable conflicts in the world, the implementation of the Agreement has proven to be challenging. This paper will first provide an overview of the conflict, then address the means by which a political situation was eventually found to solve this political problem as well as examine the implementation challenges of the Good Friday Agreement.
Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................. 8
Overview of the Conflict ......................................................................................... 10
The Negotiations ...................................................................................................... 15
  Inter-Nationalist Party Negotiations ................................................................. 16
  Back-Channel Negotiations ............................................................................... 19
Third Parties ........................................................................................................... 23
The Role of Civil Society ......................................................................................... 27
The Adoption of the Good Friday Agreement ....................................................... 32
Security-Related Issues Faced by the Good Friday Agreement ......................... 35
  Decommissioning .......................................................................................... 35
  The Release and Integration of Paramilitary Prisoners ................................ 39
  The Reform of the Police Force and the Judicial System ............................. 41
The Controversial Question of Sovereignty ........................................................... 43
Human Rights Issues ............................................................................................... 48
  Mechanisms Designed to Safeguard and Promote the Respect of Human Rights ........................................................................................................ 48
  Transitional Justice in Northern Ireland ....................................................... 51
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 54
Annexes .................................................................................................................... 55
  Annex 1. Timeline of the Key Dates in the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process .................................................................................................. 55
Annex 2. Key Individuals in the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process .................................................................57

Annex 3. Key Bodies in the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process ........................................................................60

Annex 4. Key Agreements and Other Documents in the Northern Ireland Peace Process ......................................................63
Introduction

The once seemingly intractable conflict between Nationalist and Unionist parties within Northern Ireland is considered to have been largely resolved for over 14 years. Violence has greatly diminished in the region and most of the parties of the conflict are now sharing power in formal institutions, accommodated with popular legitimacy within the reconciling 1998 Good Friday Agreement.\(^1\) Although it is arguably too early to determine whether the Agreement marks a final break from the past, it is often touted as a successful model of conflict resolution, notably due to the fact that it has produced institutions that are intended to be clearly and consistently consociational. Various accounts of the way in which the deal between the disputing parties was brokered at the highest level have emerged over time. This includes back-channel negotiations between representatives of the Irish Republican Army and the British Government prior to official talks taking place, as well as the involvement of third parties, the nature and role of which have had a significant impact on the final outcome.

This working paper seeks to examine the Northern Ireland peace process in depth to enable general lessons and observations to be drawn. After giving an overview of the conflict, this paper will

---

\(^1\) The **Good Friday Agreement** signed in 1998 was the ultimate compromise between Nationalist and Unionist parties in dispute, which brought an end to violence in Northern Ireland. The Agreement addressed a number of issues ranging from devolution and decommissioning to criminal justice and policing reforms. It established the Northern Ireland Assembly, its Executive and a consultative Civic Forum to which substantial powers were devolved from the United Kingdom Government to Northern Ireland. A referendum was held on 22 May 1998 where 71.2% of people in Northern Ireland and 94.39% in the Republic voted ‘Yes’ to accepting the Agreement.
analyse the various features of conflict-resolution inherent to the Northern Ireland peace process. These main elements include the preliminary inter-nationalist party negotiations held prior to official inter-party negotiations, back-channel negotiations which were subsequently held between the disputing parties, as well as the role of third parties in facilitating the peace process. Secondly, this paper will elaborate on the challenges inherent to the Good Friday Agreement’s implementation. On the one hand, it will analyse numerous crucial security-related issues such as decommissioning, the controversial release and reintegration of paramilitary prisoners, the reform of the police force and the judicial system, as well as the unresolved question of sovereignty. On the other hand, it will debate human rights issues faced by the Good Friday Agreement. Most importantly, these issues include both the missing elements in various mechanisms which were designed to safeguard and promote the respect of human rights as well as the issue of transitional justice. This working paper aims at providing a global understanding of Northern Ireland’s peace process and the Good Friday Agreement. Further papers will be published by the Democratic Progress Institute, focusing on specific aspects of Northern Ireland’s peace process as part of a series.
The Good Friday Agreement - Contents

Strand One: The Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland
Strand Two: The North/South Ministerial Council
Strand Three: The British-Irish Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference

Other sections:
• Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity;
• Decommissioning;
• Security;
• Policing and Justice;
• Prisoners;
• Validation, Implementation and Review.

Overview of the Conflict

Divisions between the Protestant and Catholic communities of Northern Ireland arguably date back to as far as the 1600s, when the affairs of the island were influenced by Protestant Britain, before being formally incorporated into the United Kingdom in 1801. In the midst of growing resistance to British rule, the island was divided by the United Kingdom’s Government of Ireland Act of 1920, which partitioned six countries in the northeast from the remaining 26 and established separate parliaments in Belfast and Dublin.\(^2\) While the North remained under British sovereignty, represented by the

---

\(^2\) The Government of Ireland Act 1920 was the Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom which partitioned Ireland. The Act was intended to establish separate Home Rule institutions within two new subdivisions of Ireland: the six north-eastern counties were to form ‘Northern Ireland’, while the larger part of the country was to form ‘Southern Ireland’. Both areas of Ireland were to continue as a part of the United Kingdom, and provision was made for their future unification under common Home Rule institutions.
Governor of Northern Ireland\textsuperscript{3}, the South formed an independent Republic, joining the United Nations as an independent State in 1955. Between 1920 and 1972, Northern Ireland’s devolved parliament exercised a considerable degree of autonomy. During this period, Northern Ireland’s two thirds Protestant majority dominated the political sphere. Widespread civil, political and socio-economic rights violations led to intercommunal unrest. The Catholic population argued that they had lower educational standards and were discriminated against in employment, public housing and regional development. Local Government boundaries were redrawn to ensure Unionist domination in Catholic majority areas. Catholic discrimination against the Protestant population was also pervasive, but due to the general marginalisation of the Catholic population, this arguably had a lesser impact on the Protestant community. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) formed a majority in every parliament. Thus, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, which is the highest executive office, was always chosen by the Governor of the UUP. Broadly, the Protestant community favoured maintaining the union with the United Kingdom (hence ‘Unionists’) while the Catholic community generally favoured uniting with the Catholic majority Irish Republic, and thus are often referred to as Nationalists or Republicans.\textsuperscript{4} This disparity in political representation contributed to the rise of Sinn Féin and other Catholic Nationalist parties at the expense of a more

\textsuperscript{3} The Governor of Northern Ireland was the principal officer and representative in Northern Ireland of the British monarch. The office was established on 9 December 1922 and abolished on 18 July 1973.

\textsuperscript{4} There are exceptions to this generalisation. Statistics can be found in DPI’s report entitled ‘Comparative Studies Visit to the United Kingdom – Conflict Resolution’, pp. 55-65
moderate opposition. It also nurtured growing hostility between Protestant and Catholic communities, as the political institutions in place failed to address issues of injustice, unrest and exclusion in Northern Ireland. Violent communal clashes erupted in 1966 and British troops were deployed to the region with the aim of ‘restoring order’ in 1969. The 1960s also saw a proliferation of paramilitary organisations. The historic nationalist paramilitary, the Irish Republican Army, split into the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) in 1969. The OIRA declared a ceasefire in 1972 before splintering again, with one faction, the Irish National Liberation Army, renewing violence. The PIRA emerged as the dominant group within the Republican movement and is often referred to today simply as the IRA. Sinn Féin is often referred to as the political wing of the IRA. Whether or not this is the case; today it is considered a legitimate political party. During the peace process, this relationship was crucial to the importance of Sinn Féin as a party for negotiations. Unionist paramilitaries were also established during this period, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in 1966 and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) in 1971. The moderate Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was founded in 1971 by the Reverend Ian Paisley in opposition to perceived UUP accommodation of Nationalists.5

---

The Troubles

The period of the late 1960s – early 1970s until 1998 is often referred to as ‘the Troubles’. This expression was used as a euphemism to talk about the conflict. The culmination of the Troubles took place in 1972, when 496 people were killed as a result of the conflict.

The culmination of the Troubles took place in 1972, when 496 people were killed as a result of the conflict. On 30 January 1972, ‘Bloody Sunday’ came to be known as one of the deadliest days of the conflict. The same year Britain suspended the Northern Ireland Parliament and instigated direct rule over the region. Increased security measures were enforced by the British Government during the 1970s and Republicans expressed outrage at their perceived criminalisation by British media, politicians and security personnel. Violence persisted throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and by the end of the latter decade over 3,600 people (civilians, paramilitaries, security forces and soldiers) had been killed during 30 years of conflict.

Bloody Sunday

Bloody Sunday, also known as the Bogside Massacre, occurred on 30 January 1972 when during a peaceful civil rights protest march in (London)Derry, Northern Ireland, 13 unarmed civilians were shot dead by the British Army while 14 others were injured.

Relations between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom developed significantly during this period. Several bilateral agreements were reached in order to try and stem the
bloodshed. The Sunningdale Agreement\(^6\) signed in 1973, approved a Northern Ireland Assembly, Executive and a cross border ‘Council of Ireland’ which collapsed due to vehement opposition by both the Republicans and the Unionists. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 gave the Republic of Ireland an advisory role in Northern Ireland, whilst stipulating that its constitutional relationship to the United Kingdom could not be changed without majority endorsement by the people of Northern Ireland.\(^7\) Similarly, the Anglo-Irish Agreement faced widespread opposition in both Republican and Unionist communities and was accused of circumventing popular discontent.

**The Downing Street Declaration**

The Downing Street Declaration was a joint declaration issued on 15 December 1993 at the British Prime Minister’s office in 10 Downing Street. It affirmed both the right of the people of Ireland to self-determination, and that Northern Ireland would be transferred to the Republic of Ireland from the United Kingdom if and only if a majority of its population was in favour of such a move.

---

\(^6\) The **Sunningdale Agreement** was an attempt to establish a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive and a cross-border Council of Ireland. The Agreement was signed at the Civil Service College (now the National School of Government) in Sunningdale Park located in Sunningdale, Berkshire, on 9 December 1973. Unionist opposition, violence and a loyalist general strike caused the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement in May 1974.

\(^7\) The **Anglo-Irish Agreement**, signed on 15 November 1985, was an agreement between the United Kingdom and Ireland which aimed to help bring an end to the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The treaty gave the Irish Government an advisory role in Northern Ireland’s Government while confirming that there would be no change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland unless a majority of its people agreed to join the Republic. It also set out conditions for the establishment of a devolved consensus Government in the region.
In 1993, a degree of success emerged with the Downing Street Declaration which included a commitment by the British and Irish Governments to involve all political parties that renounced violence in the political conflict-resolution process. The declaration was followed by ceasefire announcements by the PIRA and several Unionist paramilitary groups.

The Negotiations

During the 1980s and the 1990s, various lines of communication were established between the key actors involved in the conflict, with much of the peace process conducted in private between representatives of the disputing parties. The British Government engaged in secret back-channel contacts with the IRA from 1972 onwards. The channel gave the opportunity for contentious issues to be negotiated away from direct media attention and enabled parties to gain an appreciation of the motives, capacities and directions of one another. The British Government and the IRA pursued both direct and indirect contact conducted by Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and related individuals. One notable example is that of Father Alec Reid who served as an intermediary in negotiations between Sinn Féin and the British Government from 1986 onwards. Father Alec Reid’s involvement demonstrated

---


9 Father Alec Reid is an Irish priest; a member of the Redemptorist Order based in West Belfast’s Clonard Monastery, and had been close to the Republicans since the start of the Troubles in 1969. He has a personal relationship with Gerry Adams which led to him becoming an intermediary and mediator between the Republican Movement and a number of other parties to the conflict. He has been described as an ‘unsung hero’ who had done
the prominent role that third parties can have in peace processes. The existence of back-channel discussions offered a clear sign to paramilitary groups that the British Government was not opposed to a negotiated route out of the conflict. These talks paved the way for the Downing Street Declaration. This declaration signalled the beginning of open talks between the British Government and the IRA. Whereas in the 1970s and the 1980s the official position of the British Government was to reject any public contact with the IRA, the ceasefires and negotiations during the 1990s led to the success of the Good Friday Agreement.10

The Sunningdale Agreement
The Sunningdale Agreement was signed on 9 December 1973 by the British and Irish Governments, and the parties involved in the Northern Ireland Executive. It attempted to establish a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive and a cross-border Council of Ireland. Unionist opposition, violence and a loyalist general strike caused the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement in May 1974.

Inter-Nationalist Party Negotiations

Establishing communication lines between the Nationalist parties was crucial for a coherent approach in the search for common grounds for peace. The motive for the latent discussions was to encourage the political involvement of Sinn Féin in the peace more than ‘practically anyone else involved’. However, some are critical of Reid’s conduct, as he also undertook advocacy in an attempt to mould the process in a way he saw fit rather than acting simply as an unbiased mediator.

process. The British Government was unequivocally against any direct representation of the IRA or Sinn Féin in negotiations while they continued to use violent methods.

The first attempt at inter-nationalist party negotiations is said to have come from Gerry Adams\(^{11}\) in the late 1980s. Gerry Adams attempted to start a dialogue with other Irish Nationalists through the intermediation of a religious figure from Belfast.\(^{12}\) Even though the Nationalist alliance that Gerry Adams advocated was unlikely to materialise at the time, negotiations between various Irish Nationalist representatives had begun, which demonstrated a political will for future cooperation on commonly accepted grounds. This attempt paved the way for Sinn Féin and the SDLP leaders to hold direct talks in 1988. In January 1988, just a few months after Sinn Féin released its ‘Scenario for Peace’, a document which called for dialogue on the question of Northern Ireland, Gerry Adams received a letter from an anonymous third party asking if Sinn Féin were willing to formally meet the SDLP ‘to explore whether there could be agreement on an overall nationalist political strategy for justice and peace’. John Hume had been similarly approached and expressed the SDLP’s willingness to meet Sinn Féin. Meetings were subsequently held between 11 January 1988 and 30 August 1988, in spite of widespread hostility, especially from the British government and the Unionist parties. A series of documents was subsequently released throughout September 1988, delineating

\(^{11}\) Gerry Adams has been the leader of Sinn Féin since 1983.  
the respective parties’ views and recommendations for the peace process. Despite their different ideologies and approaches, there was undoubtedly mutual willingness for cooperation as leaders from Nationalist parties (such as John Hume) maintained contact with Gerry Adams from 1988 onwards. In 1990, another attempt was made to uphold common Irish Nationalist objectives by attempting to draft a joint declaration with the aim of persuading the IRA to adopt a non-violent approach. Soon, the on-going dialogue had acquired a clear public presence. The involvement of Peter Brooke, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, marked the pinnacle of this trend. On 9 November 1991, he stated that partition is simply an acknowledgement of reality rather than an assertion of national self-interest.\textsuperscript{13} Claiming that ‘an Irish republicanism seen to have finally renounced violence would be able, like other parties, to seek a role in the peaceful political life of the community,’ Peter Brooke effectively invited the IRA to end its armed struggle to enter peaceful political dialogue towards an inclusive political settlement to the conflict. He also reiterated the British Government’s neutrality by declaring, ‘The British Government has no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland: our role is to help, enable and encourage’.

The main motivation behind these alternative communications between the British Government and the IRA was to end violence permanently through peaceful political means.

Back-Channel Negotiations

Back-channel negotiations are defined here as ‘secret communication between the leadership of opposing groups,’ sometimes conducted by a third party or involving an intermediary.\(^{14}\) They are often considered to be beneficial for resolving intractable conflicts.\(^{15}\) The Northern Ireland peace process involved such back-channel negotiations between the British Government and Nationalist paramilitaries, dating back to the 1970s. These negotiations can be seen as constituting a longstanding underground negotiating relationship. They had significant importance for the peace process. The negotiations contributed for example to the ceasefire announced by the IRA in 1994 as well as the final settlement in 1998.\(^ {16}\) The effectiveness of any back-channel lies in its ability to foster the appropriate conditions for the development of mutual trust and solidarity between parties, as these crucial factors can move the positions of the respective parties forward.\(^ {17}\) Personal relationships, information sharing and growing trust were defining characteristics of the channel in Northern Ireland as they contributed to facilitating the development of a cooperative relationship and conferred increased credibility on the parties’ intentions.


Back-channel communications can have a transformative effect on relationships due to the centrality of personal relationships and the building of trust. Mediators often encourage negotiators to change their attitude in back-channel negotiation processes. In the context of Northern Ireland, when the chief negotiator of Tony Blair’s Government, Jonathan Powell, met secretly with Sinn Féin politician and IRA leader Martin McGuinness in a climate of distrust and mutual suspicion, he was given homemade soup made by Martin McGuinness’s mother, and came to see the humanness of Martin McGuinness: ‘being able to talk about the soup together helped. Those kinds of things are essential’.

Brendan Duddy, a Derry businessman with extensive political connections and access to senior contacts, acted as an intermediary in the Northern Ireland negotiations for over 20 years. Brendan Duddy had been accepted as the primary official channel of communication by both sides and he had developed strong personal relationships with the president of Sinn Féin and the chief of police in Derry, both considered key figures in the process.

---

19 Jonathan Powell is a British diplomat. He served as the first Downing Street Chief of Staff throughout Tony Blair’s mandate as British Prime Minister, from 1997 to 2007.
20 Martin McGuinness is an Irish Sinn Féin politician. He used to be a Provisional Irish Republican Army leader. He was the MP for Mid Ulster from 1997 until his resignation on 2 January 2013. He is currently the Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland since 2007.
Despite being by no means impartial - he was described as having strong Republican leanings - Brendan Duddy was trusted by both sides thanks to his motivation for peace. He was thought to have met the key requirements for being an intermediary, having both discretion and the ability to accurately convey intentions and information from side to side. 22

Secret communications are often preferred to public official talks by peace negotiators. Secret communications allow parties to focus exclusively on problem-solving rather than on taking positions that seek public approval. 23 In the mid to late 1990s, it was confirmed that a line of communication had been existent for over 20 years between the British Government and the Republicans.24 This information was leaked to the press following British Intelligence Officer Michael Oatley’s retirement and his arrangements for contact succession by a fellow SIS Officer. It was at this point that the British Government considered reviving its policy of ‘talking to terrorists’ indicating that the line of communication remained open and that the British State was ready to listen. The IRA responded positively, asserting that it was in a position to consider alternative options. Secret contacts informed the British Government that the IRA may be ready to discuss a political way out of the conflict.

24 Setting the Record Straight: A record of communication between Sinn Féin and the British Government October 1990 – November 1993, Belfast, Sinn Féin Publicity Department 1994, p. 3
However, in the case of Northern Ireland, underground negotiations did not go unhindered. Apart from Brendan Duddy, there were other intermediaries. Some leaked information to the press and were considered unreliable as they attracted press coverage.

Continuity of personnel can play a very important role in a negotiation process. The renewal of contact in the 1980s and 1990s involved individuals from both sides, who had participated in previous rounds of negotiations.25 Brendan Duddy explained in an interview that the personality of the individuals who were to take over his role had to be compatible with his own personality.26 Building trust requires time, especially under conditions where both sides reject one another’s legitimacy, therefore continuity in personnel and entrusted individuals gave the secret channel high levels of validity, which came to be a defining characteristic for cooperative communication.

While back-channel negotiations have the potential to create an environment of trust and exchange of information, there is an increased chance that inaccuracies and errors occur and lead to misunderstandings. One of the most controversial incidents of misunderstanding happened in 1993 when the British Government received a message purportedly from the IRA, stating that ‘the conflict is over but we need advice on how to bring it to a close’.27

26 The interview was conducted by Niall Ó Dochartaigh. Niall Ó Dochartaigh is a Lecturer in Political Science and Sociology at the National University of Ireland, Galway.
27 Setting the Record Straight: A record of communication between Sinn Féin and
As the message was believed to be genuine, the British Government responded with a nine paragraph document to Sinn Féin saying that ‘only if the IRA’s campaign was brought to an end could progressive entry into dialogue take place’. Apparently in response to the message, the following day, the IRA exploded a bomb in the English town of Warrington.28

In short, the defining characteristic of back-channel negotiations is secrecy. In order for a viable relationship to emerge between the disputing parties, on-going cooperation and coordination is required to build trust and to reduce uncertainty. The development of personal relationships, the existence of long-lasting intermediaries and the consequent exchange and flow of information are factors that can increase mutual understanding and create a shift towards a more integrative approach at the intersection between opponents.

**Third Parties**

From the start of the negotiations it was evident that the road to peace in Northern Ireland would be complicated. Consequently, the parties to the conflict sought assistance from international interlocutors. The traditional role of a third party is to help the conflicting parties to find a solution to the conflict or to limit the destructive effect of continuing violence.29 A facilitator must

---

be trustworthy, impartial and credible to both sides. Such a key facilitator sent by the United States to Northern Ireland was Senator George Mitchell, who became known for the introduction of his so-called ‘Mitchell Principles’.\textsuperscript{30} The Mitchell Principles, through the public embracement of democracy and non-violence, offered the possibility to both parties to proceed with decommissioning and negotiations. This attempt was successful. The PIRA declared a ceasefire to which the British Government responded by requesting a six-week quarantine to ensure genuine compliance and endorsement of the Mitchell Principles.\textsuperscript{31}

**Mitchell Principles**

On 22 January 1996, the Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning was released, outlining the six ground rules of the Mitchell Principles. The Mitchell Principles specified that ‘all involved in negotiations had to affirm their commitment. They were named after U.S senator George Mitchell, who played a key role in the peace process.

\textsuperscript{7(2), pp. 1-24}

\textsuperscript{30} The Mitchell Principles specified that ‘all involved in negotiations had to affirm their commitment:
- To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;
- To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations;
- To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;
- To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;
- To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and,
- To urge that ‘punishment’ killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions’.

• To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;
• To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations;
• To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;
• To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;
• To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree;
• To urge that ’punishment’ killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions’.

These positive developments eventually led Sinn Féin to take part in the talks leading up to the Good Friday Agreement. It should be taken into account however that the Mitchell Principles did not establish full confidence amongst the parties involved. The UUP did not meet directly with Sinn Féin until 1999, and the DUP refused to meet with Sinn Féin until 2007. Furthermore, whereas violence had been publically renounced, it was not brought to a complete end as independent decommissioning bodies continued to find evidence of PIRA involvement in violence until after the St Andrews Agreement of 2006. Despite its limitations, however, the commission led by Senator George Mitchell forged a new approach to the establishment of negotiations.
The St Andrews Agreement
Following multi-party talks held in St Andrews, Scotland, regarding the devolution of power to Northern Ireland, the St Andrews Agreement was signed by the British and Irish Governments and all the major political parties in Northern Ireland on 13 October 2006. It restored the Northern Ireland Assembly and created a new Northern Ireland Executive.

Promises of international aid, especially from the United States, also incentivised resolving the conflict. In 1977 Jimmy Carter delivered a public speech promising United States aid to Northern Ireland for a political settlement to be reached. Following the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, substantial capital was injected by the United States into Northern Ireland. USAID set up the International Fund for Ireland, which to date has received £628 million from the United States Government, the EU, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Third parties, just like back-channel links, can play an important role in facilitation of a process that opens up lines of reliable communication between conflicting parties, developing good will and a common sense of humanity.32

In a quagmire of conflicting motives and alleged agendas, the international and intermediating presence contributed to building trust in the process amongst the parties. Third party intermediaries can help disputing parties realise the need to cooperate with each other in order to attain a sustainable solution and to stress what their basic needs really are: economic and industrial development, employment, security, housing and civil rights.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement

The Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed by the British and Irish Governments on 15 November 1985. It aimed to help bring an end to the Troubles in Northern Ireland. It gave the Irish Government an advisory role in Northern Ireland’s Government while confirming that there would be no change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland unless a majority of its people agreed to join the Republic of Ireland. It also set out conditions for the establishment of a devolved consensus Government in the region.

The Role of Civil Society

The role of civil society as a key mediating institution with the ability to bridge differences has been widely recognised and advocated for in conflict resolution processes.33 Indeed, commentators have spoken of civil society as the ‘premier mediating [and] moralising institution’ which can have a profound impact on conflict resolution.34 Similarly, President Al-Nasser of the United Nations General Assembly has stressed that efforts should be made to ‘ensure greater inclusiveness [of] traditional and indigenous mediation mechanisms’ that are ‘incorporated and combined with official mediation efforts’, to ensure the optimum situation for conflict resolution.35

The reasons for the successful role civil society has played in peace processes are manifold. Firstly, civil society, notably a cooperation of NGOs, is more likely to be neutral than are governments.\textsuperscript{36} As neutrality has been recognised to help mediators establish trust, credibility and respect from both sides of any conflict, mediating attempts conducted by civil society have proven to be more successful overall.\textsuperscript{37} This ability may be enhanced by the importance of mediation in strengthening the legitimacy and authority of leaders in civil society. For instance, faith-based actors are often well suited for mediation as this can be seen as a key part of their everyday job.\textsuperscript{38} Additionally, civil society has significant knowledge in specific areas and can thus dedicate a more comprehensive effort to mediation efforts.\textsuperscript{39} Civil society mediators, especially at the local and national level, are usually better equipped to sustain mediation throughout and following a peace process because they have easier access to information than an external state or inter-governmental organisation (IGO) for instance.\textsuperscript{40} Finally, civil society actors have the luxury of being able to dedicate more time to their activities, and unlike political actors, do not have constituents to respond to, which enables them to be independent.\textsuperscript{41} Civil society actors can

\textsuperscript{40} Democratic Progress Institute (2012) ‘Civil Society Mediation in Conflict Resolution’, p. 26
\textsuperscript{41} Democratic Progress Institute (2012) ‘Civil Society Mediation in Conflict Resolu-
contribute to mediation in a number of different ways: faith-based mediation; Track I ½ diplomacy, which is conducted by ex-political figures having direct access to decision-makers and insurgency groups; and Track II diplomacy, which is carried out by NGOs and civil society as a whole and is the main mediating channel for civil society actors. Many critiques of Northern Ireland’s peace process point to a lack of integration of the wider community. There is indeed a tension between expanding participation – and thereby legitimacy – and the increasing difficulty of cooperation and decisive action as the number of players at the negotiating table increases. However, civil society organisations have provided ‘a large measure of the glue that has held Northern Ireland society together’ since the start of the Troubles, as this report will demonstrate.

As the British government had largely been unable to present itself as an objective party in any negotiation or mediation attempt because of their intrinsic role in the conflict, it was all the more necessary for civil society actors to play a direct role in conflict resolution and reconciliation. They had the potential to offer a viable intermediary route to build trust and come to a compromised

settlement. This was particularly evident during the backchannel negotiations, which would not have been as successful without the involvement of key intermediaries, such as Brendan Duddy and Father Alec Reid, to mediate between the different sides. In particular, faith-based actors such as Father Alec Reid took the lead by ‘focusing on the inclusion of all parties to a final agreement’. Other notable examples include the 1974 Feakle Talks, the Fitzroy-Clonard Fellowship, the Corrymeela Centre for Reconciliation, and the Civic Forum for Northern Ireland, which this report gives a brief overview of.

### The 1974 Feakle Talks

In May 1974, the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement broke down due to a lack of cross-community belief in the British government’s abilities to mediate at this time. On 10 December 1974, a group of eight Protestant clergymen met secretly in Feakle, County Clare, Republic of Ireland, with senior representatives of the Irish Republican Army, in an attempt to ‘halt the campaign of violence that had then been carried out by the Provisional IRA for nearly five years’. They appealed to the Republicans on humanitarian grounds, arguing that violence would not bring about their goals. The meeting was productive to the extent that the Republicans produced a document outlining their own aims and justifications for their methods. Although

---


minor, this mediation assisted in developing the links that spurred the 1990s peace process into action and was conducive to the announcement of the IRA temporary ceasefire over Christmas and New Year of 1974-1975.\textsuperscript{49}

**The Fitzroy-Clonard Fellowship and the Corrymeela Centre for Reconciliation**

The Fitzroy-Clonard Fellowship and the Corrymeela Centre for Reconciliation are both faith-based civil society actors that have promoted dialogue and peace through inter-church community meetings. The Fitzroy-Clonard Fellowship was founded in 1981 as an inter-church Bible discussion group. The Fellowship had the specific aim to recognise the ‘other’ as fellow-Christian and soon took on an important mediating role in the conflict. This faith-based group promoted reconciliation, as its ethos ‘Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of god’ clearly illustrates. It contributed to the mediating process, first privately between Sinn Féin and the Unionist. However, from the early 1990s mediating became public as the Fellowship asked both sides to consider and discuss a ceasefire, which culminated in the 1994 ceasefires.

The Corrymeela Centre for Reconciliation was established in 1965 by a Presbyterian minister to provide a space for both religious communities to come together. As the conflict developed, the centre became both more important in promoting dialogue between the two sides as well as expanding into a veritable centre that viewed reconciliation through the lens of Christ’s forgiveness of his enemies.\textsuperscript{50} In short, the role faith-

\textsuperscript{49} Democratic Progress Institute (2012) ‘Civil Society Mediation in Conflict Resolution’, pp. 53-54

\textsuperscript{50} Sandal, N. A. (2011) ‘Religious actors as epistemic communities in conflict transfor-
based organisations in the conflict were a crucial factor in putting civil society at the forefront of mediating between the two opposing sides.

**Getting to the Agreement - Conditions**

- Preliminary intraparty negotiations, to prevent dissent within each party
- Inclusive interparty negotiations, first through back-channel negotiations, then through public negotiations
- Right timing, notably need for public acceptance of the peace process
- Involvement of civil society
- Involvement of third-party mediators to facilitate negotiations
- Arrangement regarding when decommissioning should occur

**The Adoption of the Good Friday Agreement**

In 1998, an unprecedented compromise was reached between Nationalist and Unionist parties when the Good Friday Agreement was signed. The Agreement was supported by Sinn Féin, the SDLP and the UUP. A referendum was held in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to obtain the populations’ approval of the Good Friday Agreement. In Northern Ireland, the Agreement was endorsed by 71% of the population (with an 81% turn out) and in the Republic of Ireland by 94% (with a 51% turn out). The DUP opposed the Agreement, but having won a majority in the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly election, was eventually brought into a
power-sharing executive with Sinn Féin following the St Andrews Agreement. The Good Friday Agreement addressed a number of issues ranging from devolution and decommissioning to criminal justice and policing reforms. It established the Northern Ireland Assembly, its Executive and a consultative Civic Forum to which substantial powers were devolved from the British Government to Northern Ireland.51

Although the Northern Ireland peace process is often touted as a model of conflict resolution for similar intractable conflicts in the world, the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement has proven to be problematic from the start.52 At every stage the process appeared fragile and uncertain.53 Jonathan Powell compared the peace process to keeping a bicycle upright: ‘you have to keep the process moving forward, however slowly. Never let it fall over’.54 Martin McGuinness, Sinn Féin’s chief negotiator, echoed this sentiment when he stated that the failure to fully implement the Good Friday Agreement is at the root of the [current] political crisis affecting Northern Ireland.55

The following chapter will address the core issues surrounding the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, examining the main security-related issues, as well as assessing the mechanisms designed to safeguard and promote the respect of human rights and providing transitional justice.

**The Good Friday Agreement**

The Good Friday Agreement was signed on 10 April 1998 by the British and Irish Governments, as well as by the main political parties involved in the conflict, including the Ulster Unionist Party, the Ulster Democratic Party, the Progressive Unionist Party, the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin, and the Social Democratic and Labour Party.

On 22 May 1998, it was approved by referendum in Northern Ireland by 71.2% (with an 81% turn out) and in the Republic of Ireland by 94.39% (with a 51% turn out).

The Good Friday Agreement is divided into three strands. Strand One focuses on the Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland. Strand Two establishes the North/South Ministerial Council. Strand Three sets up the British-Irish Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. It also contained sections on rights, safeguards, and equality of opportunity; decommissioning; security; policing and justice; prisoners; and validation, implementation and review.
Security-Related Issues Faced by the Good Friday Agreement

Decommissioning

Lack of mutual trust was one of the main factors that impeded initial decommissioning. Some Unionists repeatedly refused to negotiate with so-called terrorists and urged for decommissioning to be a conditional step prior to negotiations. Overwhelmingly, the DUP’s discourse about the peace process was framed in terms of ‘giving in to the demands of the pan-Nationalist front’ if decommissioning did not occur prior to the start of negotiations.\(^56\) DUP’s supporters and many Unionists had genuine concerns about their security situation before the PIRA and other Republican groups disarmed.\(^57\)

On the other hand, many Nationalists would not decommission prior to an agreement being reached, arguing that it would contribute to strengthening their negotiating power, and act as a deterrent to Unionist spoilers’ attempts to overthrow the peace process by taking advantage of their weak military strength. PIRA hostility to ever renouncing its military tactics was epitomised in the slogans daubed on the walls of Belfast declaring ‘not a bullet, not an ounce’.*\(^58\)

---

The parties involved in Northern Ireland gradually came to see unarmed political negotiation as the best and only means of resolving the conflict.\textsuperscript{59} For instance, discussing Sinn Féin’s position regarding the ongoing conflict, Gerry Adams stated in 1987, ‘there’s no military resolution, none whatsoever … There can only be a political solution … an alternative, unarmed struggle, to attain Irish Independence’.\textsuperscript{60} Both communities then eased towards a more conciliatory approach and it was eventually agreed that that decommissioning would be carried out during the negotiations leading up to the Good Friday Agreement. Nevertheless, tensions remained between some Unionists and some Nationalists even after the Good Friday Agreement was adopted, as the Good Friday Agreement did not set out any clear timetable and did not represent a legal constraint.

One of the main problems with the Good Friday Agreement was that it does not contain any comprehensive provision that sanctions non-decommissioning. Consequently, decommissioning became dependent upon the people’s good will. Article 25 of the Good Friday Agreement relates that decommissioning exclusively concerns politicians and does not set out any consequences should decommissioning not occur at the grassroots level. Consequently, each side was reluctant to decommission first. These tensions were exacerbated due to the fundamental disagreement between the

parties over the sequencing of disarmament and inclusion into political institutions. The Republican and Unionist parties were under pressure to reflect the views of their constituencies in their negotiating position and referred to the intransigence of their communities to underline their positions on demilitarisation and inclusion in institutions. Some Unionists accused the Nationalists of ‘failing to live up to the spirit of the Agreement’s requirement for the decommissioning of arms’, while Sinn Féin blamed the British Government for ‘failing to demilitarise quickly enough’. Although decommissioning was marred by difficulties, it proved relatively successful in the long run. In 2002 Gerry Adams announced that he could ‘imagine a future without the IRA’. In July 2005, the IRA Army Council formally announced an end to its armed campaign, stating its commitment to using ‘purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means’. By mid-2005, General de Chastelain, a retired member of the Canadian military and diplomat, had announced that decommissioning in Northern Ireland was complete. It is

65 General de Chastelain is a retired member of the Canadian military and diplomat. He served twice as Canada’s Chief of the Defence Staff, from 1989 to 1993 and from 1994 to 1995. He was also Canada’s Ambassador to the United States in 1993-1994. He was appointed Chairman of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) from 1997 to 2011 by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
crucial to note that the weapons were not merely handed over to the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) but destroyed in the presence of the IICD, by being put in dumps and concreted over to be genuinely out of use. On the other hand, the end of British military operations in Northern Ireland was chaired in July 2007. As of December 2011, there were about 5,000 remaining British troops in Northern Ireland, and only fourteen army bases remained active.

**General de Chastelain**

General de Chastelain is a retired member of the Canadian military and diplomat. He served twice as Canada's Chief of the Defence Staff, from 1989 to 1993 and from 1994 to 1995. He was also Canada's Ambassador to the United States in 1993-1994. He was appointed Chairman of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) from 1997 to 2011 by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland.

Decommissioning in Northern Ireland remains a contentious issue due to the difficulty of ensuring its genuine completion. Importantly, both sides have a history of hiding weapons for use in the future. In another example, Reverend Ian Paisley had insisted on taking pictures of the decommissioning process in the early 1990s, which led to increasing tensions and was met with the Republicans’ refusal. Similarly, David Trimble, then leader of

Accessible at: [http://www.democraticprogress.org/turkey-comparative-studies-visit-to-](http://www.democraticprogress.org/turkey-comparative-studies-visit-to-)

38
the UUP, demanded categorical proof that all weapons had been destroyed, but had to resign himself to accepting that no tangible proof of the sort could be given.68

The Release and Integration of Paramilitary Prisoners

Another crucial and highly controversial issue relating to security was that of the release and integration in society of former paramilitary prisoners. In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, large numbers of paramilitary prisoners were freed in 2000, which triggered public outcry on the basis of reintegration being seen to reward ‘men of violence’. There was widespread criticism on the possibility for former paramilitary activists to run for political offices. Most recently, this was clearly demonstrated in the 2011 Presidential elections in the Republic of Ireland, when Martin McGuinness69 stood for election in which the intense popular and media focus on his Republican background was clear evidence for the continued political relevance of the past.70

Nevertheless, it must be noted that release and amnesty were granted to paramilitary prisoners on a conditional basis, meaning that those ‘becoming re-involved in political violence [were] expected

69 Martin McGuinness is the incumbent Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland since 2007. He is a Sinn Féin politician and used to be a leader of the Provisional IRA.
to serve out their sentences in full’.\textsuperscript{71} Many former paramilitary prisoners felt that by denying full legitimacy of their political struggle, the conditions for their release and means of reintegration reflected a failure to distinguish between the political nature of their actions and criminality.\textsuperscript{72} For instance, extradition requests for the surviving escapees from the 1983 Maze Prison Escape were dropped in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, but not all were granted amnesty.

Many former combatants in Northern Ireland, notably politicized ex-prisoners, have significantly contributed to reintegration and to the wider process of peace building in Northern Ireland by bringing credibility and perspective to peace building. Many of the key participants involved in peace negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Good Friday Agreement were ex-combatants with a record of conviction and imprisonment. Their active participation in the peace building process, as well as their involvement in local programmes and awareness campaigns have been claimed to positively impact communities’ will to end the conflict, as efforts to reduce violence can carry greater weight when they are led by former combatants.\textsuperscript{73}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} Von Tangen Page, M. (2000) \textit{A Negative Peace: Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement}, Centre for Defence Studies, London, p. 35
\end{itemize}
The Reform of the Police Force and the Judicial System

Policing has been another controversial issue surrounding the Agreement. The Good Friday Agreement promised a new policing service that aimed to be ‘more representative of the community it polices, democratically accountable, free from political control, infused with human rights and culturally neutral’.\textsuperscript{74} It was commissioned primarily because of a failure to find ‘an acceptable democratic basis for governance’\textsuperscript{75} and the Catholic community’s ‘perception of unequal treatment by the police force’\textsuperscript{76} in the past. Controversial symbols were thus changed to be free from any association with either the British or Irish States. The Royal Ulster Constabulary was renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland. A new oath of allegiance was devised, which upheld human rights and equal respect to all communities. Uniforms, badges and the logo of the police force were changed to be politically neutral. The Union flag was removed from police buildings, and a new flag was designed for the Police Service of Northern Ireland, representing the new badge of the police force on a green background. Furthermore, entry requirements were made

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{74} Sinn Féin (2001) ‘Response to the Revised Implementation Plan on Policing: A new beginning to policing’
Accessible at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/docs/sf250801a.htm
Accessible at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf
\textsuperscript{76} Democratic Progress Institute (2011) 'Turkey: Comparative Studies Visit to The Republic of Ireland - Conflict Resolution', p. 101
\end{footnotesize}
flexible with regards to prior criminal offences, so that there was no systematic disqualification from entry into the police force. This was a particularly controversial provision as it inherently enabled former political activists with criminal records to apply and potentially enter the police force. Although these numerous provisions were condemned by the Ulster Unionist Party as a ‘gratuitous insult’ to the Royal Ulster Constabulary, these measures were widely acclaimed as a crucial step towards intercommunal peace. Additionally, the Patten Report provided for recruitment of the police force to be conducted by an independent agency. Until March 2011, positive discrimination measures were implemented to ensure the even religious composition of the police force. These measures were deemed crucial as in 2001 the police force comprised 92% Protestants. However, this provision was removed in March 2011 following protests from Unionist politicians claiming it was unfair sectarianism. Most notably, Secretary of State Owen Paterson claimed that this practice was no longer justified as 30% of officers had a Catholic background. As the table below testifies, the composition of the police workforce has not changed since the removal of this provision.

Furthermore, in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement’s provisions related to the reform of the judicial system in Northern Ireland, the Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland (CJI) was established in 2003.79 An ad-hoc Committee on Criminal Justice Reform was also set up by the Northern Ireland Assembly between December 2001 and January 2002 to reform the judiciary. It produced the Report on the Draft Justice (NI) Bill and the Criminal Justice Review on 14 January 2002.

The Controversial Question of Sovereignty

The controversial question of sovereignty over Northern Ireland remains unresolved and thus highly contentious. The Good Friday Agreement

---


79 The Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland (CJI) is an independent, statutory inspectorate established under section 45 of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002. Its mandate is to inspect all aspects of the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland apart from the judiciary.
Agreement allows for referendums to be held in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland over this issue. Should the majority consulted choose to have a unified Ireland, British sovereignty over Northern Ireland would in principal yield to Irish sovereignty. This provision denotes a concern with conflict management in the short-to-medium term as opposed to genuine conflict resolution, as the determination of the question of sovereignty is made largely contingent upon demographic changes.80

Recent events attest to the contestability of sovereignty in Northern Ireland. There have been some violent riots in Belfast since 3 December 2012, following Belfast City Council voting to change its policy on the Union Flag. Until December 2012, the Union Flag was displayed outside of Belfast City Hall every single day of the year. However, the new policy restricts displays of the Union Flag at the city hall to 15 designated days during the year, in line with Stormont City Hall’s policy, which triggered opposition from the Unionist community. According to the Police Service of Northern Ireland, several thousand people took part in the riots. However, this policy change has been described as a necessary step towards equality between both communities as well as more political neutrality, and has been acclaimed as demonstrating the council’s commitment to a shared future. Most notably, the fact that neither Sinn Féin nor the Social Democratic and Labour Party of Northern Ireland (SDLP) placed pressure for the Union Flag to be completely removed and accepted instead that it could be

displayed on specific occasions, highlighted their recognition of the current constitutional status of Northern Ireland. Attitudes and perceptions have also perceivably changed over time. The following Northern Ireland Life & Times surveys, carried out in 2010, are highly informative in this sense.\textsuperscript{81}

**Figure 2: Survey on Political Attitudes in Northern Ireland\textsuperscript{82}**

**Question:** Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Unionist, a Nationalist or neither?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>% of the Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{81} Northern Ireland Life & Times – Surveys. Accessible at: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/quests/

\textsuperscript{82} Northern Ireland Life & Times (2010) Survey on Political Attitudes in Northern Ireland. Accessible at: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2010/Political_Attitudes/UNINATID.html
**Figure 3: Survey on Political Attitudes in Northern Ireland**

**Question:** Do you think the long-term policy for Northern Ireland should be for it…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>% of the Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to remain part of the United Kingdom with direct rule</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to remain part of the United Kingdom with devolved Government</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or, to reunify with the rest of Ireland?</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent State</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other answer</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

83 Northern Ireland Life & Times (2010) Survey on Political Attitudes in Northern Ireland
Accessible at: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2010/Political_Attitudes/NIRELND2.html
Figure 4: Survey on Political Attitudes in Northern Ireland

**Question:** If the majority of people in Northern Ireland ever voted to become part of a United Ireland do you think you…
(Question asked only to those who answered that the long-term policy for Northern Ireland should be not to reunify with the rest of Ireland.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>% of the Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>would find this almost impossible to accept</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>would not like it, but could live with it if you had to</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or, would happily accept the wishes of the majority</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accessible at: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2010/Political_Attitudes/FUTURE1.html
Human Rights Issues
Mechanisms Designed to Safeguard and Promote the Respect of Human Rights

The protection of human rights was one of the main agendas of the Good Friday Agreement. As a result, there have been a number of provisions to safeguard and promote the respect of human rights in Northern Ireland. Most notably, the Good Friday Agreement required that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) be incorporated into Northern Irish Law.85 The Good Friday Agreement also made several guarantees of ‘minimal human rights protections’ in Northern Ireland, notably safeguarding eight key civil rights, including ‘the right of free political thought, freedom of expression and religion, the right to equal opportunity, and the right to freedom from sectarian harassment’.86 To this end, the Good Friday Agreement provided for the establishment of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) in 1999.87 The Equality Commission in Northern Ireland was also established to prevent discrimination, largely concerning the workplace and access

85 Good Friday Agreement, also known as Belfast Agreement (1998)
87 The Joint Committee was mandated by the Good Friday Agreement to consider the possibility of a ‘Charter of Rights for the Island of Ireland’ which would include all human rights standards currently signed up to by the United Kingdom and Irish Governments to establish a minimum protection structure. The Joint Committee presented its advice to both Governments, advocating in favour of the creation of a ‘Charter of Rights for the Island of Ireland’ in June 2011. However, as of January 2013, no genuine steps had been taken towards this end.
This commission is particularly crucial as up until the Good Friday Agreement, the Catholic community is said to have suffered discrimination. As the following surveys demonstrate, the success of the promotion of intercommunal harmony remains questionable in Northern Ireland, but communities’ attitudes towards intercommunal mixing suggest that there may be hope for the future.

**Figure 5: Survey on Community Relations in Northern Ireland**

**Question:** Northern Ireland is a normal civic society in which all individuals are equal, where differences are resolved through dialogue and where all people are treated impartially.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>% of the Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One: Definitely not been achieved</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nine</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten: Definitely has been achieved</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Figure 6: Survey on Community Relations in Northern Ireland**

**Question:** Are you in favour of more mixing or more separation where people live?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>% of the Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Much more mixing</strong></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bit more mixing</strong></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Keep things as they are</strong></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bit more separation</strong></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Much more separation</strong></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Can’t choose</strong></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

90 Northern Ireland Life & Times (2010) Survey on Community Relations in Northern Ireland
Accessible at: [http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2010/Community_Relations/MIXDLIV.html](http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2010/Community_Relations/MIXDLIV.html)
Figure 7: Survey on Community Relations in Northern Ireland

Question: Are you in favour of more mixing or more separation where people work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>% of the Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much more mixing</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit more mixing</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep things as they are</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit more separation</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much more separation</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can’t choose</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transitional Justice in Northern Ireland

The Good Friday Agreement establishes mechanisms related to transitional justice. Access to transitional justice not only satisfies grievances for past abuse, but as the State is seen as a source of redress for popular grievances, its legitimacy and future support is enhanced. Furthermore, it helps foster trust between the State and society, where previously there may have been none.

91 Northern Ireland Life & Times (2010) Survey on Community Relations in Northern Ireland
Accessible at: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2010/Community_Relations/MIXDWORK.html
Northern Ireland is an interesting case insofar as no formal Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been established as has occurred in many other post-conflict societies, such as South Africa. A number of reasons have been put forward for this. Notably, the authorities feared that an exhaustive investigation into the past so soon after the Good Friday Agreement had been reached could be destabilising to a still-fragile peace. Similarly, it has been suggested that due to the impartial reform of existing power structures, which enabled both sides to be in power, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission could question the legitimacy of existing institutions and further destabilise peace. There was still widespread mistrust between both communities throughout the late 1990s and 2000s. Thus each community feared that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission would enable the other to promote a selective and biased interpretation of history, and the subsequent rewriting of the past in a way that would absolve themselves of responsibility for atrocities.

**The Saville Inquiry**

On 3 April 1998, the Saville Inquiry was opened to examine the events that came to be known as Bloody Sunday. Two years later, public hearings for the Saville Inquiry began. In June 2010, the Saville Inquiry released its report, finding the British armed forces guilty of launching an unjustifiable and unprovoked attack on unarmed civilians. British Prime Minister David Cameron officially apologised to the families of the Bloody Sunday victims.

A number of commissions have been established to investigate controversial events which occurred during the conflict. The best-
known of these is probably the Saville Inquiry into 1972’s ‘Bloody Sunday’ which found the British armed forces guilty of launching an unjustifiable and unprovoked attack on unarmed civilians. The Saville Inquiry’s findings led to British Prime Minister David Cameron officially apologising to the victims’ families on 15 June 2010. Despite these efforts, the number of similar commissions has been limited and many among the Nationalist community feel that the State’s role as a perpetrator of violence and its collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries has been forgotten to create a ‘sanitised’ official version of events. On the other side of the communal divide, the Loyalist community has expressed criticism over the release of former Republican prisoners as part of the Good Friday Agreement’s transitional justice campaign. However, as has been previously explained, political prisoners’ release was conditional upon continued non-violent behaviour, which has prompted ex-combatants to criticise the lack of distinction between reprehensible criminal acts and legitimate political activities. To date, Northern Ireland has not carried out any socio-economic justice to redistribute resources between the two communities. Debate on the establishment of a transitional court of justice in Northern Ireland is likely to continue.
Conclusion

This working paper has demonstrated that the reputation of Northern Ireland’s peace process as a model of conflict resolution may lack nuance. The peace process resulting in the historic Good Friday Agreement can be described as successful as it led the disputing parties to negotiate a peaceful political end to the conflict. It has been shown that the success of Northern Ireland’s peace process lies in its combination of inter-nationalist party negotiations and back-channel negotiations benefiting from the involvement of third party actors, which resulted in the adoption of a compromise to end the conflict by peaceful political means, embodied by the Good Friday Agreement.

However, the implementation of the Agreement still faces significant challenges which have nurtured the persistence of intercommunal tensions in Northern Ireland. Specifically, disputes concern security-related issues such as decommissioning, the release and reintegration of paramilitary prisoners, the reform of the police force and the judicial system. The question of sovereignty over Northern Ireland also remains unresolved. Issues related to human rights are also essential, due to the fact that transitional justice has been limited in Northern Ireland. Although various mechanisms were designed by the Good Friday Agreement to safeguard and promote the respect of human rights in Northern Ireland, no formal Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been established, retributive justice has largely been dismissed, and no distributive justice measures have been implemented.
Annex 1:
Timeline of the Key Dates in the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process

1801: Incorporation of the island of Ireland into the United Kingdom.

1919-1921: Irish War of Independence


Late 1960s to 1998: The ‘Troubles’

1968: Start of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland.

1969: The historic Irish Republican Army split into the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA).

1972: The British Government engages in secret back-channel contacts with the IRA.


9 December 1973: The British and Irish Governments, and the parties involved in the Northern Ireland Executive, sign the Sunningdale Agreement.
15 November 1985: The British and Irish Governments sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

Late 1980s: Start of intraparty negotiations within the Nationalist community.

15 December 1993: Downing Street Declaration.


3 April 1998: Opening of the Saville Inquiry to examine the events of 30 January 1972 in (London)Derry, Northern Ireland.

10 April 1998: Signing of the Good Friday Agreement.

22 May 1998: Referendums held in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland to approve the Good Friday Agreement. In Northern Ireland, the Agreement is endorsed by 71.2% of the population (with an 81% turn out) and in the Republic of Ireland by 94.39% (with a 51% turn out).

9 September 1999: Release of the Patten Report by the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland – also known as the Patten Commission – comprising 175 recommendations with the objective of ‘depoliticising the police’.


July-August 2000: Paramilitary prisoners freed by the United Kingdom, in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement.

4 November 2001: Dismantlement of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and creation of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

28 July 2005: The IRA Army Council formally announces an end to its armed campaign.

26 September 2005: General de Chastelain, Chairman of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning,
announce that he is satisfied that decommissioning in Northern Ireland is complete.

13 October 2006: The British and Irish Governments, and the political parties of the Government of Northern Ireland sign the St Andrews Agreement.

15 June 2010: The report of the Saville Inquiry finds the British armed forces guilty of launching an unjustifiable and unprovoked attack on unarmed civilians. British Prime Minister David Cameron officially apologises to the families of the Bloody Sunday victims.

March 2011: Positive discrimination measures in the Police Service of Northern Ireland are abolished.

Annex 2:
Key Individuals in the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process

Gerry Adams: He has been the leader of Sinn Féin since 1983.

General de Chastelain: He is a retired member of the Canadian military and diplomat. He served twice as Canada’s Chief of the Defence Staff, from 1989 to 1993 and from 1994 to 1995. He was also Canada’s Ambassador to the United States in 1993-1994. He was appointed Chairman of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) from 1997 to 2011 by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland.
**Brendan Duddy:** He was a Derry businessman with extensive political connections and access to senior contacts, who acted as an intermediary in the Northern Ireland negotiations for over 20 years.

**John Hume:** A former teacher, he first came to prominence through the civil rights movement in the late 1960s. He was a founding member of the Social Democratic and Labour Party in 1970, and took over as leader from 1979 to 2001. In 1979, he also became a Member of the European Parliament. He has been one of the driving forces of the Northern Ireland peace process for over 40 years. Notably, he was a member of the power-sharing executive set up after the Sunningdale Agreement in December 1973 and helped to shape the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. In 1988, he began a series of contacts with Gerry Adams. These were to prove crucial in developing the current process. In 1998, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize along with David Trimble.

**Martin McGuinness:** He is an Irish Sinn Féin politician. He used to be a Provisional Irish Republican Army leader. He was the MP for Mid Ulster from 1997 until his resignation on 2 January 2013. He is currently the Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland since 2007.

**Senator George Mitchell:** Senator George Mitchell was sent as the United States Special Envoy for Northern Ireland in 1995. He became known for the introduction of his so-called ‘Mitchell Principles’ in 1996.
Reverend Ian Paisley: Reverend Ian Paisley founded the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in 1971, and was its leader from 1971 to 2008. He served as First Minister of Northern Ireland between 8 May 2007 and 5 June 2008.

Jonathan Powell: He is a British diplomat. He served as the first Downing Street Chief of Staff throughout Tony Blair’s mandate as British Prime Minister, from 1997 to 2007.

Father Alec Reid: He is an Irish priest and a member of the Redemptorist Order based in West Belfast’s Clonard Monastery, and had been close to the Republicans since the start of the Troubles in 1969. He has a personal relationship with Gerry Adams which led to him becoming an intermediary and mediator between the Republican Movement and a number of other parties to the conflict. He has been described as an ‘unsung hero’ who had done more than ‘practically anyone else involved’. However, some are critical of Reid’s conduct, as he also undertook advocacy in an attempt to mould the process in a way he saw fit rather than acting simply as an unbiased mediator.

David Trimble: He is a British politician. He was the Leader of the Ulster Unionist Party from 1995 to 2005. He served as the first First Minister of Northern Ireland from 1998 to 2002. In 1998, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize along with John Hume.
Annex 3: Key Bodies in the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process

Alliance Party of Northern Ireland: Founded in 1970 from the New Ulster Movement, it originally represented moderate and non-sectarian Unionism. Over time, it moved towards neutrality on the Union, and has come to represent wider liberal and non-sectarian concerns: for instance, in the Northern Ireland Assembly, it is designated as neither unionist nor nationalist, but 'Other'. It is a signatory of the Good Friday Agreement.

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP): Founded by Ian Paisley in 1971, it is currently the largest party in the Northern Ireland Assembly and the fourth-largest party in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom. It is more radically unionist than the UUP.

Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC): It was founded in 1996 in order to contest the Forum elections of May 1996, but did not have a clear ideology. Its primary aim was to bring women’s experience of cross-community work to bear on the peace talks. It is a signatory of the Good Friday Agreement.

Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA): It emerged in 1969 from a split within the Irish Republican Army (which had existed since 1922). It engaged in military action against the British Army until May 1972.
**Progressive Unionist Party (PUP):** Founded in 1979, it is a small unionist political party in Northern Ireland which was historically linked to the Ulster Volunteer Force. It is a signatory of the Good Friday Agreement.

**Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA):** It emerged in 1969 from a split within the Irish Republican Army (which had existed since 1922). It engaged in military action against the British Army until 2005, when it formally declared the end of its armed campaign and decommissioning was completed in Northern Ireland.

**Saville Inquiry:** It was opened on 3 April 1998 to examine the events that came to be known as Bloody Sunday. Two years later, public hearings for the Saville Inquiry began. In June 2010, it released its report, finding the British armed forces guilty of launching an unjustifiable and unprovoked attack on unarmed civilians.

**Sinn Féin:** It is an Irish republican political party in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which took its current form in 1970. It has historically been associated with the Provisional IRA. It is a signatory of the Good Friday Agreement.

**Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP):** It was founded in 1970 by John Hume. It advocates further devolution of powers while Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom, and the eventual reunification of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It is a signatory of the Good Friday Agreement.
**Ulster Defence Association (UDA):** Founded in 1971, it is the largest loyalist paramilitary and vigilante group in Northern Ireland. It waged an armed campaign from 1971 to 2007, using the name Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) when it wished to claim responsibility for attacks, which allowed it to remain legal until 1992.

**Ulster Democratic Party (UDP):** First established in June 1981 as the Ulster Loyalist Democratic Party by the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), it was a small loyalist political party in Northern Ireland which remained active until its dissolution in 2001. It is a signatory of the Good Friday Agreement.

**Ulster Unionist Party (UUP):** Tracing its formal existence back to 1905, it is the oldest of the two main unionist parties in Northern Ireland. It was led by David Trimble between 1995 and 2005. It is a signatory of the Good Friday Agreement.

**Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF):** Formed in 1956, it is a loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland. It ended its armed campaign in 2007.
Annex 4:
Key Agreements and Other Documents in the Northern Ireland Peace Process

**Anglo-Irish Agreement:** The Anglo-Irish Agreement, signed on 15 November 1985, was an agreement between the United Kingdom and Ireland which aimed to help bring an end to the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The treaty gave the Irish Government an advisory role in Northern Ireland's Government while confirming that there would be no change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland unless a majority of its people agreed to join the Republic. It also set out conditions for the establishment of a devolved consensus Government in the region.

**Downing Street Declaration:** The Downing Street Declaration was a joint declaration issued on 15 December 1993 at the British Prime Minister’s office in 10 Downing Street. It affirmed both the right of the people of Ireland to self-determination, and that Northern Ireland would be transferred to the Republic of Ireland from the United Kingdom if and only if a majority of its population was in favour of such a move.

**Good Friday Agreement:** The Good Friday Agreement was signed on 10 April 1998 by the British and Irish Governments, as well as by the main political parties involved in the conflict, including the Ulster Unionist Party, the Ulster Democratic Party, the Progressive
Unionist Party, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin, and the Social Democratic and Labour Party. On 22 May 1998, it was approved by referendum in Northern Ireland by 71.2% (with an 81% turn out) and in the Republic of Ireland by 94.39% (with a 51% turn out).

**Mitchell Principles:** The Mitchell Principles were outlined in the Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning released on 22 January 1996.

**St Andrews Agreement:** The St Andrews Agreement was signed by the British and Irish Governments and all the major political parties in Northern Ireland on 13 October 2006, following multi-party talks held in St Andrews, Scotland, regarding the devolution of power to Northern Ireland. It restored the Northern Ireland Assembly and created a new Northern Ireland Executive.

**Sunningdale Agreement:** The Sunningdale Agreement was signed on 9 December 1973 by the British and Irish Governments, and the parties involved in the Northern Ireland Executive. It attempted to establish a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive and a cross-border Council of Ireland. Unionist opposition, violence and a loyalist general strike caused the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement in May 1974.
DPI Board and Council of Experts

Director:

Kerim Yildiz
Kerim Yildiz is Director of DPI. He is an expert in international human rights law and minority rights, and is the recipient of a number of awards, including from the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights for his services to protect human rights and promote the rule of law in 1996, the Sigrid Rausing Trust’s Human Rights award for Leadership in Indigenous and Minority Rights in 2005, and the Gruber Prize for Justice in 2011. Kerim has written extensively on human rights and international law, and his work has been published internationally.

DPI Board Members:

Nicholas Stewart QC (Chair)
Barrister and Deputy High Court Judge (Chancery and Queen’s Bench Divisions), United Kingdom. Former Chair of the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales and Former President of Union Internationale des Avocats.

Professor Penny Green (Secretary)
Head of Research and Director of the School of Law’s Research Programme at King’s College London and Director of the International State Crime Initiative (ICSI), United Kingdom (a collaborative enterprise with the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and the University of Hull, led by King’s College London).
Priscilla Hayner
Co-founder of the International Centre for Transitional Justice, global expert and author on truth commissions and transitional justice initiatives, consultant to the Ford Foundation, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and numerous other organisations.

Arild Humlen
Lawyer and Director of the Norwegian Bar Association’s Legal Committee. Widely published within a number of jurisdictions, with emphasis on international civil law and human rights. Has lectured at law faculties of several universities in Norway. Awarded the Honor Prize of the Bar Association for Oslo for his work as Chairman of the Bar Association’s Litigation Group for Asylum and Immigration law.

Jacki Muirhead
Practice Director, Cleveland Law Firm. Previously Barristers’ Clerk at Counsels’ Chambers Limited and Marketing Manager at the Faculty of Advocates. Undertook an International Secondment at New South Wales Bar Association.

Professor David Petrasek
Professor of International Political Affairs at the University of Ottowa, Canada. Expert and author on human rights, humanitarian law and conflict resolution issues, former Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of Amnesty International, consultant to United Nations.
Antonia Potter Prentice
Expert in humanitarian, development, peacemaking and peacebuilding issues. Consultant on women, peace and security; and strategic issues to clients including the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, the Global Network of Women Peacemakers, Mediator, and Terre des Hommes.

DPI Council of Experts

Dr Mehmet Asutay
Dr Mehmet Asutay is a Reader in Middle Eastern and Islamic Political Economy and Finance at the School of Government and International Affairs (SGIA), Durham University, UK. He researches, teaches and supervises research on Middle Eastern economic development, the political economy of Middle East including Turkish and Kurdish political economies, and Islamic political economy. He is the Honorary Treasurer of BRISMES (British Society for Middle East Studies) and of the International Association for Islamic Economics. His research has been published in various journals, magazines and also in book format. He has been involved in human rights issues in various levels for many years, and has a close interest in transitional justice, conflict resolution and development issues at academic and policy levels.

Christine Bell
Legal expert based in Northern Ireland; expert on transitional justice, peace negotiations, constitutional law and human rights
law advice. Trainer for diplomats, mediators and lawyers.

**Cengiz Çandar**
Senior Journalist and columnist specializing in areas such as The Kurdish Question, former war correspondent. Served as special adviser to Turkish president Turgut Ozal.

**Yilmaz Ensaroğlu**
SETA Politics Economic and Social Research Foundation. Member of the Executive Board of the Joint Platform for Human Rights, the Human Rights Agenda Association (İHGD) and Human Rights Research Association (İHAD), Chief Editor of the Journal of the Human Rights Dialogue.

**Dr. Salomón Lerner Febres**
Former President of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Perù; Executive President of the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights of the Pontifical Catholic University of Perù.

**Professor Mervyn Frost**
Head of the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Previously served as Chair of Politics and Head of Department at the University of Natal in Durban. Former President of the South African Political Studies Association; expert on human rights in international relations, humanitarian intervention, justice in world politics, democratising global governance, just war tradition in an Era of New Wars and ethics in a globalising world.
Martin Griffiths
Founding member and first Executive Director of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Served in the British Diplomatic Service, and in British NGOs, Ex -Chief Executive of Action Aid. Held posts as United Nations (UN) Director of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva and Deputy to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, New York. Served as UN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Great Lakes, UN Regional Coordinator in the Balkans and UN Assistant Secretary-General.

Dr. Edel Hughes
Senior Lecturer, University of East London. Expert on international human rights and humanitarian law, with special interest in civil liberties in Ireland, emergency/anti-terrorism law, international criminal law and human rights in Turkey and Turkey’s accession to European Union. Previous lecturer with Amnesty International and a founding member of Human Rights for Change.

Avila Kilmurray
A founder member of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition and was part of the Coalition’s negotiating team for the Good Friday Agreement. She has written extensively on community action, the women’s movement and conflict transformation. Serves on the Board of Conciliation Resources (UK); the Global Fund for Community Foundations; Conflict Resolution Services Ireland and the Institute for British Irish Studies. Avila was the first Women’s Officer for the Transport & General Workers Union for Ireland.
(1990-1994) and became Director of the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland in 1994. Avila was awarded the Raymond Georis Prize for Innovative Philanthropy through the European Foundation Centre.

**Professor Ram Manikkalingam**

Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, served as Senior Advisor on the Peace Process to President of Sri Lanka, expert and author on conflict, multiculturalism and democracy, founding board member of the Laksham Kadiringamar Institute for Strategic Studies and International Relations.

**Bejan Matur**

Renowned Turkey based Author and Poet. Columnist, focusing mainly on Kurdish politics, the Armenian issue, daily politics, minority problems, prison literature, and women’s issues. Has won several literary prizes and her work has been translated into 17 languages. Former Director of the Diyarbakır Cultural Art Foundation (DKSV).

**Professor Monica McWilliams**

Professor of Women’s Studies, based in the Transitional Justice Institute at the University of Ulster. Was the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission from 2005 to 2011 and responsible for delivering the advice on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Co-founder of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition political party and was elected to a seat at the Multi-
The Good Friday Agreement – An Overview


Jonathan Powell
British diplomat, Downing Street Chief of Staff under Prime Minister Tony Blair between 1997-2007. Chief negotiator in Northern Ireland peace talks, leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Currently CEO of Inter Mediate, a United Kingdom-based non-state mediation organization.

Sir Kieran Prendergast
Served in the British Foreign Office, including in Cyprus, Turkey, Israel, the Netherlands, Kenya and New York; later head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office dealing with Apartheid and Namibia; former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. Convenor of the SG’s Executive Committee on Peace and Security and engaged in peacemaking efforts in Afghanistan, Burundi, Cyprus, the DRC, East Timor, Guatemala, Iraq, the Middle East, Somalia and Sudan.

Rajesh Rai
Rajesh was called to the Bar in 1993. His areas of expertise include Human Rights Law, Immigration and Asylum Law, and Public
Law. Rajesh has extensive hands-on experience in humanitarian and environmental issues in his work with NGOs, cooperatives and companies based in the UK and overseas. He also lectures on a wide variety of legal issues, both for the Bar Human Rights Committee and internationally.

**Professor Naomi Roht Arriaza**
Professor at University of Berkeley, United States, expert and author on transitional justice, human rights violations, international criminal law and global environmental issues.

**Professor Dr. Mithat Sancar**
Professor of Law at the University of Ankara, expert and author on Constitutional Citizenship and Transitional Justice, columnist for Taraf newspaper.