Civil Society Mediation in Conflict Resolution

Working Paper
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Working Paper

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Foreword

DPI aims to foster an environment in which different parties share information, ideas, knowledge and concerns connected to the development of democratic solutions and outcomes. Our work supports the development of a pluralistic political arena capable of generating consensus and ownership over work on key issues surrounding democratic solutions at political and local levels.

We focus on providing expertise and practical frameworks to encourage stronger public debates and involvements in promoting peace and democracy building internationally. Within this context DPI aims to contribute to the establishment of a structured public dialogue on peace and democratic advancement, as well as to create new and widen existing platforms for discussions on peace and democracy building. In order to achieve this we seek to encourage an environment of inclusive, frank, structured discussions whereby different parties are in the position to openly share knowledge, concerns and suggestions for democracy building and strengthening across multiple levels. DPI’s objective throughout this process is to identify common priorities and develop innovative approaches to participate in and influence the process of finding democratic solutions. DPI also aims to support and strengthen collaboration between academics, civil society and policy-makers through its projects and output. Comparative studies of relevant situations are seen as an effective tool for ensuring that the mistakes of others are
not repeated or perpetuated. Therefore we see comparative analysis of models of peace and democracy building to be central to the achievement of our aims and objectives.

Civil society can play a crucial role in all aspects of conflict resolution, including mediation, and yet they are often not provided with the opportunities to do so within official, government-led peace processes. This working paper examines the suitability of different civil society actors as mediators in conflict resolution both as part of the official process and independently through an exploration traditional mediator characteristics exemplified through case studies of Northern Ireland and Darfur.

This working paper was prepared with the kind assistance of Rebecca McCartney.

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Director
DPI
November 2012
Introduction

Civil society is becoming increasingly recognised as a key aspect which needs to be included in any peace process to ensure thorough conflict resolution, where ownership of the agreement is felt by every party to the conflict. It must be remembered however that every conflict is unique, and so too is the make-up of each nation’s civil society; therefore, there is no ‘one model-fits all’ showing how civil society should be included in a peace process.

Studies concerning civil society participation in peace processes are increasingly being undertaken, but the role that civil society actors can play in mediating between parties to the conflict that are unwilling or unable to negotiate directly is under-research. This paper seeks to assess the value of civil society mediation in a conflict situation, and how it can complement and, at times, be more effective than traditional government-led mediation efforts. This is far from the norm of peacekeeping, but it nevertheless provides an alternative which has the potential to become more prominent in the future if official processes create the appropriate openings. As more opportunities are presented to civil society to mediate, the more it becomes evident that civil society mediators are a complimenting and positive element; a commodity to be utilised to bring about peace. Nevertheless, caution must be exercise and effective safeguards put in place to ensure that the reputation of civil society mediation is not damaged by unsuccessful efforts.
Commentators have spoken of civil society as the ‘premier mediating [and] moralising institution’ which can have a profound impact on conflict resolution.\(^1\) Similarly, President Al-Nasser of the United Nations General Assembly has recently stressed that more efforts should be made to ‘ensure greater inclusiveness [of] traditional and indigenous mediation mechanisms’ that are ‘incorporated and combined with official mediation efforts’, to ensure the optimum situation for conflict resolution.\(^2\)

The role that civil society can play will be explored by considering the characteristics and qualities of mediators, and juxtaposing civil society mediators alongside government-derived mediators to consider the advantages and disadvantages of both. A consideration of the different types of civil society mediation will then be addressed to include a consideration of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), faith-based actors and women. Finally, civil society mediation will be assessed in the case of the Northern Ireland conflict and the Darfur conflict by looking at the civil society initiatives developed, as well as the opportunities that could have been taken to enhance the process.

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What is civil society?

The term ‘civil society’ is very difficult to define as there is no universal standard, given the diversity of the societal makeup in different nations. Commentators have repeatedly stressed that civil society does not have a ‘single or eternally fixed form’;³ nor is there unanimity on a ‘median’ definition of civil society’.⁴ Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that civil society is a ‘third sector’, distinct somewhat from government and business where citizens, on the whole, affiliate for neither power nor profit.⁵

Civil society has been described as an ‘arena’ where people ‘associate voluntarily to advance common interests’.⁶ The types of organisations that comprise civil society are vast but can be loosely classified into the following groupings:

- Issue and interest based groups, for example NGOs and charities
- Professional, trade and academic associations
- Ethnic groups bound by culture, language and/or history

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• Religious and faith-based groups

• Gender groups

Often these groups are recognised and accredited Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), but civil society as a whole is not limited to an ensemble of these CSOs and includes less organised or rigid groupings such as those that form along ethnic lines. Furthermore, the legitimisation of CSOs depends on a country’s legal structure and whether formal registration is required. While the community may recognise non-associated groups, in a political participatory capacity, associated groups may be afforded greater influence. Nevertheless, it must be reiterated that every nation functions uniquely, and the community may dictate the amount of legitimacy and influence a specific grouping has in any political activity.

Demonstrable of the diverse make-up of civil society, in some nations, particularly authoritarian ones, governments have close associations with CSOs. In China for example there are ‘hundreds of thousands of social organisations and quasi-administrative units created by the state’ to cope with the complex changing society and economy.7 While commentators predict that eventually civil society will grow to become independent of the state in China,8 it is important to recognise that civil society is not always synonymous with a wholly autonomous ‘third sector’.

As globalisation and inter-connectedness increasingly permeate state and society, the global aspect of civil society becomes more evident; consequently the term ‘global civil society’ has found its way into the common lexicon.\(^9\) Most basically, since 1968 there has been a new wave of international social movements where interest groups have been formed across borders campaigning for peace, human rights, women’s rights, the environment and other areas of protest.\(^10\) Similarly, faith and religions can be recognised as a globalised civil society grouping due to their international character, given that more people share a religion or faith than membership to an international non-governmental organisation (INGO).

INGOs are increasingly playing a specific role in national civil societies to support and work alongside the existing network of national CSOs to enhance political participation and improve the political process in general. INGOs are no new phenomenon as both the International Committee of the Red Cross, founded in 1863, and the Anti-Slavery Society, founded in 1823, for example, have played key international roles for centuries. Yet there has been a dramatic increase in the number of registered INGOs over the 1990s in correlation with increased globalisation and funding sources.\(^11\) A 2001 study found that there were an estimated 5,000 world congresses held annually and some 50,000 non-governmental,
not-for-profit organisations operating at the global level. Other well-known INGOs include Amnesty International and Oxfam, but many others have specific regional or issue mandates. As a result of the pervasiveness of INGOs and their proactive activities in conflict-affected nations, their role must be considered within civil society efforts.

Generally speaking there is a positive rhetoric surrounding ‘civil society’ terminology and political discourse, and there is a common association made between CSOs and a high moral standard. Commentators dispute that organisations such as the Ku Klux Klan, which is a far-right organisation that traditionally expresses itself through terrorism and illegitimate means, can be grouped alongside the League of Women Voters which unlike the former, acts within international standards of equality, justice and the rule of law. The United Nations Department for Public Information, that has over 1,300 NGOs affiliated to it, has a specific criteria for association which includes: ‘support and respect [for] the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to be a reputable NGO with national, regional and international standing’ and to ‘operate solely on a not-for-profit basis’. Similarly many non-affiliated NGOs have comparable commitments to democracy, equal rights and the rule of law.

What are civil society’s main functions?

Civil society performs a number of functions that are essential in any state. While civil society is by no means an alternative to government action, and cannot guarantee democracy, it is ‘necessary for democracy and can serve important democratic functions’.15 The main functions of civil society are:

- Holds governments to account for their actions by acting as a check on the state’s power especially in times of conflict or political unrest
- Encourages transparent governance
- Undertakes advocacy
- Public participation, for example engaging in consultations or negotiations during a peace process
- Mediation between different protagonists in a conflict

Civil society has been described as a ‘mediating institution’ with the ability to bridge differences, and it is an this area that this report will focus.

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Mediation in conflict resolution

Mediation is a very important tool that can be widely employed in conflict resolution, particularly when parties are unable or unwilling to compromise from their position and negotiate directly.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, it is usually needed when there is a great deal of distrust between parties regarding the other’s intentions, or where there are cultural differences which present an additional barrier, or where at least one of the parties refuses to recognise the other.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed in May 2012, the United Nations in a day-long meeting of the General Assembly concluded that ‘mediation plays a vital role in preventing conflicts’, and should receive greater focus.\textsuperscript{18}

The definition of mediation, much like any other politically charged term, is open to debate, yet the main characteristics of mediation can generally be listed as:

- The extension and continuation of peaceful conflict management
- The intervention of an outsider, whether that is an individual, group or organisation, into a conflict between protagonists

\textsuperscript{16} G. R. Berridge (2010), \textit{Diplomacy: Theory and Practice} (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan)

\textsuperscript{17} G. R. Berridge (2010), \textit{Diplomacy: Theory and Practice} (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan)

• A non-coercive, non-violent and non-binding form of intervention

• Having the aim of affecting change through resolving, modifying or influencing it in some way

• Voluntary form of conflict management which allows the protagonists to remain in control of the outcome of the conflict with the freedom to reject mediation and its outcome

• An ad-hoc procedure.\textsuperscript{19}

The role of mediation and facilitation is to create a platform to address issues through dialogue and political means rather than relying on violence, the use of force and mutual coercion. It helps mitigate the parties’ attitudes of mutual distrust and hostility while encouraging them to accept certain principles of fairness, justice and sustainability. Mediation can help the parties to re-examine their positions, which in turn may steer them towards a more reasonable and flexible position, exploring options and solutions that had not previously been considered. The mediator can focus the parties on the process and the need to find common ground and mutual interests, to steer the conflict to a peaceful resolution.\textsuperscript{20}

Government-sourced or backed mediators may not always be the


most suitable for every conflict resolution situation, depending on the perspectives of the protagonists; civil society may be more suitable to work alongside, within or in place of an established government-led peace process. Protracted internal conflicts are particularly well-suited to civil society mediation because of the inter-connectedness and self-sustaining dynamic at the community level.21 At this local level, the state-based international system is ‘comparatively ill-equipped to deal with people involved in localised armed violence’ because civil society actors generally have greater access within the community, a better understanding of the conflict as they are directly affected by it and can act with greater flexibility.22 Furthermore, local polarised forces that are unwilling to negotiate directly with each other, and will not allow a government-led outsider to intervene, may permit a local NGO or civil society leader to provide neutral services.23

The fundamental point to consider with regards to mediation is that the protagonists must want to enter into the mediation and be ready to talk to the other side; part of this decision rests on the protagonists’ perspective of the mediator. Some of the considerations that must be taken into account are listed below, and the advantages and disadvantages of civil society mediation are weighed in comparison to state mediation.

Acceptability of mediators to the parties to the conflict

The acceptability of the mediator to all parties to the conflict is a key condition for a successful mediation effort; civil society can often be an acceptable pool from which to draw mediators especially when armed groups are deterred from engaging in talks because they fear domination by a government with more resources and negotiation skills. By involving a civil society mediator within an official or independent peace process, the armed non-state actor may not feel as overwhelmed as they might if two of the three parties were states. This feeling may occur in particular if the state mediator is applying leverage or utilising their special relationship with the government party. There are however many specific considerations that need to be made, many of which are discussed below.

The problem of neutrality and impartiality

One of the central debates surrounding mediation is whether the mediator should be impartial, or whether it is acceptable for them to carry their own agenda. As mentioned previously, every conflict situation is different, and either may be acceptable in a given situation. Mediators can be broadly grouped into two categories: ‘neutral mediators’ and ‘principled mediators’. The former often refers to NGOs, charities and other civil society groups, whereas the latter mainly refers to governments and inter-governmental

organisations (IGOs), such as the United Nations or the European Union. Nevertheless, these groupings are not clearly defined and individuals groups or states may fall into the both category.

It is generally believed that ‘neutrality’ helps mediators establish trust, credibility and respect from both sides and mediating attempts are overall more successful. It is moreover important because both parties must believe that the mediator will convey messages between them without distortion and that their confidences can be kept. However, it is important to underline that in reality, complete neutrality of the mediator remains an ideal which is often quickly broken when attempting to effectively manage a conflict. Even though the ideal may not be achievable, generally speaking it is important that there is not a clear favouring of one side by the mediator during the process and that they are substantially impartial regarding the issues at hand.

When a mediator’s neutrality is brought into question, it may take more time to establish effective talks because time will need to be taken to demonstrate this quality. It is therefore an advantage if a mediator is already established in the region or nation, including

their stated position on the issues and the parties. The downside to an established figure however, is that their historic legacy may be more closely scrutinised, which may impact the parties’ perceptions of the individual’s or organisation’s neutrality and impartiality.\(^{30}\) This in turn may also slow down the process.

A third-party mediator that has close ties to only one of the parties may be an attractive mediator in some circumstances. Civil society actors in particular will be particularly inviting for non-governmental actors that lack trust in the government. While the mediator will have to draw away from its traditional relationship to an extent, they can on the one hand play on the fears of desertion of the allied party; while on the other hand, they can build the hopes of consolidating a new friendship on the part of the other.\(^{31}\) This can largely depend on the standing of the mediator, and on what each side seeks to gain. The criticism of this tactic however may be that the mediator becomes more of a ‘manipulator’, which may be beneficial in some circumstances although should be used with caution. Nonetheless, for a partial mediator to be accepted, it is likely to be important that the mediator demonstrates their ability to act impartially on the issues on the table, and that they are able to deliver the party they are traditionally close to.\(^{32}\)


Importance of leadership

While Civil Society Organisations can play a key role in facilitating mediation between warring parties, it is important to have a degree of leadership and an individual that both parties can look to as an authoritative third party. President Al-Nasser of the United Nations General Assembly encapsulates this idea in stressing that the essential elements for successful mediation are ‘strong leadership and coordinated action’. He moreover emphasises that for the ‘sake of coordination and efficiency’, there should be one ‘lead mediator and one lead mediation team for each specific case’, which is supported by others where necessary.

Mediators are often leaders in their own right and the outcome of a mediation effort is often linked to their prestige. While there are many contributing factors to successful or unsuccessful mediation, the mediator will take a degree of responsibility and the subsequent consequences depending on the outcome. This gives the individual mediator a greater incentive to try to ensure success as opposed to larger contact groups or collective civil society where the blame can be passed to another more easily. As one of many activities a state will be involved in, a failed mediation effort may not drastically damage their standing; failure for a civil society leader may be more

35 A contact group is an informal grouping of influential states that work together to resolve a conflict and usually to apply pressure on the parties.
detrimental to their local influence so once they commit to being a mediator, they may have more incentive to go to extra lengths to guarantee success.

**Skills of the mediator**

A proven track record of successful mediation will undoubtedly instil confidence in both parties that they are investing their trust in a worthwhile third party. This may be either through previous conflict resolution attempts, or demonstrated through the mediator’s profession. States have more opportunities to demonstrate their abilities by drawing on past efforts, but civil society is not excluded from doing so as well. Yet given the large number of personnel employed by the state, a state’s reputation may not match the mediator’s skills depending on the individual that is representing the state. In both cases, a lack of skill may worsen the conflict. Nevertheless, new mediators may bring a fresh approach to the process without any past judgements being made on their performance by the parties. This will largely depend on their legitimacy and authority, especially in the case of civil society leaders, and the skills the civil society mediator can draw from their profession to the negotiating table. Faith-based actors for example, are well suited for mediation as this a key part of their every-day job.

Language skills can be especially important in any mediation effort and can ease the process; local civil society has an advantage over
international organisations and external states because they are more likely to the native language with greater ease. On the whole, it is bad practice to conduct peace-making, or any relations, purely through translation as it can impede communication.\textsuperscript{36}

Personal skills are also important for successful mediation, and include attributes such as ‘empathy, analytical ability, excellent political judgement and problem-solving skills; superb communication and facilitation skills; and a sense of quiet confidence and authority’.\textsuperscript{37} These skills can be fostered by individuals from within and outside civil society, but those within civil society should not be overlooked simply because they are not professionally trained diplomats.

**Time available for mediation**

Governments, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and regional organisations generally have little opportunity to specialise in specific regions or conflicts because they have to respond to a number of crises and issues simultaneously, each of which may vary considerably. Civil society on the other hand, in particular NGOs and charities, has the luxury of being able to specialise in specific areas and can thus dedicate a more comprehensive effort to mediation efforts.

\textsuperscript{36} Laurie Nathan, ‘Towards a New Era in International Mediation (2010), http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/Policy%20Directions/Towards%20a%20new%20era%20in%20international%20mediation.pdf, accessed 10 September 2012

\textsuperscript{37} Laurie Nathan, ‘Towards a New Era in International Mediation (2010), http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/Policy%20Directions/Towards%20a%20new%20era%20in%20international%20mediation.pdf, accessed 10 September 2012
Continuous involvement and attention to negotiations is essential for any mediation effort: this produces familiarity with the problems and the personalities involved; it enables relationships of personal trust to develop, that reinforce calculations of interest, and fosters a routine that reduces the likelihood of false expectations being generated.38 This is generally where civil society has an advantage over states. States may have the capabilities of pursuing consistent policies over long periods, but ‘electoral cycles tend to condemn their mediations to being episodic rather than continuous affairs’.39 High-profile state mediators will also find it more difficult to commit themselves on a full-time basis due to the multitude of other commitments they have. Former U.S. President, Jimmy Carter, for example had only thirteen days, an unusually long time for a President, to secure the Camp David Accords between Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Specialist CSOs will not have the same demands on their time, and will often be able to focus more fully on one area.

Deadlines are a common feature of mediation processes and can often be beneficial in a process to encourage progress; nevertheless, sometimes there needs to be greater flexibility regarding deadlines to ensure a comprehensive agreement that has been thoroughly negotiated. State mediators are likely to be more rigidly bound to these deadlines due to their political masters and general domestic pressures, whereas civil society actors often do not have the same time pressures and can allow for greater flexibility and appropriate deadlines.

Empirically, a mediator’s timeframe tends to expire once an agreement has been signed, but the mediator can, if the conditions allow, perform a continued and essential mediating role in the implementation period of an agreement to ensure that no misunderstandings or misinterpretations of the agreement arise. This may be especially beneficial during a transition as the roots of the causes of conflict are often being targeted, which will inevitably create new tensions: those that have ‘unduly benefited from unequal access to resources are likely to resist some of these changes, while those that have been denied access may lose patience with the slow pace of transition’.\footnote{Shauna Mottiar and Salomé van Jaarsveld (2009), ‘Mediating Peace in Africa: Securing Conflict Prevention’, http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/reports/ACCORD_Mediating_Peace_Africa.pdf, accessed 06 September 2012} Civil society mediators, especially at the local and national level, are usually better equipped to sustain mediation following a peace process because they have greater access to the situation unlike an external state or inter-governmental organisation (IGO), for instance. These states would also be more reluctant to stay in the region as they have constituents to answer to. Some INGOs do have long-term engagements with post-conflict countries that work well with local civil society partners.\footnote{Shauna Mottiar and Salomé van Jaarsveld (2009), ‘Mediating Peace in Africa: Securing Conflict Prevention’, http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/reports/ACCORD_Mediating_Peace_Africa.pdf, accessed 06 September 2012} Furthermore, ‘principled mediators’, which tend to be states, have constituents to answer to so, which makes them more reluctant to stay in the region as third-parties because of the costs and political implications involved.\footnote{James Larry Taulbee and Marion V. Creekmore Jr. (2003), ‘NGO Mediation: The Carter Centre,’ \textit{International Peacekeeping}, Vol.10, No.1, pp.156-171 (p.158)}
Resources of the mediator

The resources needed for a peace process are a very important consideration which can often fall on the mediator if a process is being pursued independently from government efforts, or if resources are finite in an official peace process. States undoubtedly have greater access to resources, but depending on the size and scope of a CSO, the latter may be able to provide the necessary resource for a sustained process. The costs involved can be vast in a formal mediation effort, ranging from venue hire, accommodation, travel, catering and materials, additional personnel costs for research, logistics, and administration amongst other areas. Informal mediation processes can also be successful to bring about an arrangement and may only require a venue, which could be free of charge if a community or religious building is used; and the representatives of the parties to the conflict take the burden of transportation costs or are local enough to convene easily.

Civil society has many avenues available to it to raise the necessary funds, including private donations, trusts and foundations, self-generated activities and prizes. Faith-based actors for example can draw resources from the wider faith community and can bypass the localism inherent in faith-based efforts; likewise INGOs can draw on international resources to support local efforts. Civil Society also has the option to seek direct and indirect government funding for projects which is the most common avenue for funding; while this blurs the lines of separation between civil society and the government, the autonomy and impartiality of the CSO can still hold.
Civil society faces many restrictions by seeking funding however, including the possibility of conditions being dictated by the funder, for example specific deadlines. Independent funding sources cannot be relied on to sustain a process until an agreement is reached, which may lead it to break down. It may be beneficial where these circumstances prevail for a civil society mediation effort to run alongside a formal state-driven process, so that resources can be drawn from this official process and so that a duplication of efforts is avoided.

One of the key resources of civil society is the knowledge that they can share with the peace process, and the utilisation of this knowledge to guide the mediation process. President Al-Nasser of the UN General Assembly underlined the need for a mediator to have ‘deep knowledge and a sound understanding’ of the parties, the situation, the history of the conflict, as well as relevant cultural and other values.\(^43\) Unlike governments, IGOs, and regional organisations that rarely specialise due to a vast number of simultaneous conflicts, civil society often has a greater opportunity to consider conflicts and issues in more depth. Moreover, the capacity of civil society to specialise in the intricacies of specific conflicts provides governments and organisations with a ready repository of expertise; often mediators and mediation support staff will move between governmental and non-governmental worlds with ease.\(^44\)


\(^44\) Shauna Mottiar and Salomé van Jaarsveld (2009), ‘Mediating Peace in Africa: Se-
Leverage

Leverage is generally discussed in terms of what a mediator can offer to the warring parties, and is most closely associated with Track I diplomatic efforts, namely state-led processes. The leverage exercised by governments or inter-governmental organisations such as the United Nations has traditionally had a substantial impact on the prospects of an agreement. The leverage a mediator brings to the table can be a contributing factor for success, and is viewed by some commentators as being more important than impartiality; thus it is an important consideration for the suitability of civil society mediators.

The following areas are the different types of leverage that a mediator can apply which will assist in considering how civil society can contribute to a peace process:

• Reward power: when the mediator has something to offer to the parties in exchange for changes in behaviour

• Coercive power: relies on threats and sanctions, and includes military options

• Expert power: based on the mediator’s knowledge and experience with certain issues

• Legitimate power: that is based on certain rights and legally sanctioned authority under international law

• Referent power: based on the desire of the parties to the conflict to maintain a valued relationship with the mediator

• Informational power: works on the content of the information conveyed as in the case of a go-between or message carrier.\textsuperscript{46}

Many of these options are available to civil society mediators despite the common belief that they do not hold as much power as state-derived mediators. They can employ ‘expert power’, ‘legitimate power’, ‘information power’ and in some cases ‘referent power’ especially when a faith-based actor is involved. Civil society mediations need to rely more on a problem-solving approach which can be employed through these different areas.\textsuperscript{47}

The most popular formula for employing leverage is the ‘carrot and stick approach’ which often presents more compelling offers. Threats and coercion generate resistance that can be offset by incentives that foster cooperation.\textsuperscript{48} While states can more easily utilise this model, civil society is not precluded from also doing so,


albeit with a different set of ‘carrots and sticks’. Even some states do not have the tangible resources commonly associated with the ‘carrot and stick approach’; Algeria for example mediated between the United States and Iran during the Iran Hostage Crisis in January 1981 and had only goodwill and persuasiveness as its leverage tools, yet the mediation was successful. Civil society should look to this as an example of a high profile conflict being resolved with non-traditional leverage power.

**Motivation to mediate**

The prospect of mediation is sometimes unpopular due to the inherent dangers and difficulties found in a conflict situation; therefore the motivation to mediate can be very complex. This is especially the case if parties to the conflict see themselves as the sole legitimate representative of the community they claim to represent; and resent the participation of any other community actor that claims to be urging peace on behalf of the community. Fundamentally, mediators enter the conflict to help ‘those involved achieve a better outcome than they would be able to achieve by themselves’.  

Civil society mediators may be motivated for the following reasons:  

- The desire to be instrumental in changing the course of a long-standing or escalating conflict through charitable or religious  

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instincts

- To gain access to major political leaders and open channels of communication
- To put into practice a set of ideas on conflict management
- To spread one’s own ideas and thus enhance personal stature and professional status
- The desire to bolster one’s prestige.\(^{50}\)

If the mediator is skilled, respected by the parties and the effort is successful then the motivation of the mediator may not be important. However, if the mediator’s legitimacy is in question by one or both of the parties then the potential mediator’s motivation may play a role in establishing their legitimacy. A motivation to change the course of a long-standing conflict through charitable or religious reasons will most likely make the mediator more acceptable. Irrespective of this, the mediator must crucially have a strong desire to obtain a settlement, and must not be discouraged by setbacks.\(^{51}\) This desire does not have to be mutually exclusive of the above motivations.


Categories of Civil Society Mediators

NGO mediation efforts

a) Local NGOs

Local NGOs can bring with them a wealth of knowledge and understanding of the conflict; however there is the potential for a confusion of roles as the mediators will be directly affected by the conflict and may favour a specific outcome. Their local involvement however may increase the perception of them as trustworthy actors, as the mediator will remain in place following the termination of the conflict and live through its difficulties, unlike many international NGOs which will leave the conflict-affected region following a settlement. Nonetheless, this may also impact how the parties perceive the mediator’s neutrality and impartiality, especially when dealing with movements were when one of the principles of the movement is territorial integrity. This will largely differ between conflicts, and depend on the circumstances of the mediator. Nevertheless, the local NGO will have to demonstrate that they have a ‘high level of integrity, discipline, and restraint, and [be sure] that they do not interject their own preferences in their role as a third party’. The perception of neutrality is very difficult in

54 Hizkias Addefa (2004), ‘The Challenges of Influencing Policy in Conflict Situations’, in Mari Fitzduff and Cheyanne Church (eds.), NGOs at the Table: Strategies for
the case of local NGOs and may be used by a conflict party as an excuse not to engage in the mediation process;\(^{55}\) this is a major hurdle to overcome but local NGOs can still act with the greatest degree of impartiality possible. Local NGOs may draw a greater degree of legitimacy than international actors if they are known by the conflicting parties. Furthermore, if the motivation to mediate is predominantly the desire to live in a peaceful community, they share the same mandate as an international NGO and should be treated equally.

b) International NGOs

International NGOs, especially the larger, well-established ones, may have the advantage of already being perceived as impartial and neutral arbiters with established mediation abilities because of their work in previous situations. Moreover, international NGOs tend to be outside the sphere of conflict which reduces the possibility of accusations that a certain circumstance beneficial to the organisations is sought. Well-known international organisation must tread carefully in local conflicts however as the non-governmental parties may become intimidated by an INGO’s experience. Many of these are also part-funded by powerful countries with economic, political or security issues in the conflict societies.\(^{56}\) This may be

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more apparent than if local and smaller NGOs were funded by the same countries. This does not automatically affect the perception of the mediator though, and each conflict situation will differ substantially.

**Track 1 ½ mediation**

This is a unique form of mediation, and although unconventional civil society mediation, it does play a specific role that can assist in conflict resolution. Track I diplomacy refers to traditional diplomacy conducted by governments; whereas Track II diplomacy tends to be carried out by NGOs and civil society as a whole. Track 1 ½ diplomacy refers to the diplomacy conducted by ex-political figures that have direct access to decision makers and insurgency groups. The Carter Centre and President Carter role in the NGO is a prime example of Track 1 ½ diplomacy. Other examples include Kofi Annan’s role as special envoy in Syria when he acted as an impartial mediator, motivated by the desire for peace, and gained the legitimacy and necessary access to public figures due to his international standing as former Secretary General of the United Nations.

**Faith-based mediation**

The number of ethno-religious conflicts has sharply risen since the end of the Cold war; and faith-based actors are increasingly being

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called on to mediate conflicts, not without success. These faith-based actors can best be categorised as organisations, institutions or individuals that ‘are motivated and inspired by their spiritual and religious traditions, principles, and values to undertake peace work’.\(^\text{58}\) Much like NGOs, some of these faith-based actors work on an international scale such as the Catholic Relief Services;\(^\text{59}\) some at a regional level such as Wajir Peace and Development Agency that operates in Kenya and its neighbouring countries;\(^\text{60}\) or at a local level for example the Žene Ženama in Bosnia.\(^\text{61}\) All can play a vital role in mediating conflicts at an appropriate level.

Faith-based actors are likely to enjoy a high degree of credibility, legitimacy and respect in the community, which is closely linked to their neutrality and impartiality in their pursuit to find a peaceful settlement. Irrespective of their specific faith, faith-based actors will often act within a common ‘values-based’ framework which will likely find acceptance across all sections of the community. Local faith-based actors, such as local priests, sheikhs, imams or rabbis, will in particular be able to draw on this credibility and knowledge of the parties and their backgrounds; furthermore, they know the ‘physical and emotional needs of their communities’ learnt through

their standing which will make them effective mediators.\textsuperscript{62}

Depending on the nature of the faith-based actor, they may be able to employ a great deal of resources to the conflict to help sustain the process. They generally have access to vast financial and human resources within the general faith community, for example the Quakers and Islamic Relief Services have well-established regional and global networks from which they can draw upon.\textsuperscript{63} While these resources are important, the major recourse that faith-based actors can provide is time. Generally speaking, these faith groups and individuals have greater flexibility and can continue to play a role in their communities once the conflict has ended to help ease and facilitate the transition process.

**Women in mediation**

The role of women in peace and security has been firmly rooted by the United Nations Security Council through resolution 1325 (2000) and its four accompanying resolutions, 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1960 (2010).\textsuperscript{64} Despite this grounding, the participation


of women in conflict resolution has remained small. The degree to which the Security Council Resolutions have been embraced has varied between regions: the African Union and the European Union have most evidently grasped the 1325 imperative and have developed their own policy frameworks in this area.65

The experience women and men have in war differs greatly, and each gender is likely to have a different perspective on conflict resolution and reconciliation; these diverse perspectives would greatly assist mediation efforts. More specifically, the different experiences would be beneficial in the role of a mediator as this may offer alternative perspectives and lead both sides to think differently about their position. The question must be raised however whether women should remain impartial if mediating, or take the opportunity to ensure women’s rights are on the negotiation agenda. The answer to this question is largely dependent on the nature of the conflict, and the parties involved. If there is flexibility for the female mediator to pursue an agenda without affecting the parties’ perceptions of their ability to mediate between the parties impartially then it may be appropriate to pursue.

The main barrier to achieving this is the often unequal status of women in many communities. As previously discussed, it is very important for the civil society mediator to have a certain standing

in the community which some women may not be able to attain due to fundamental societal inequalities. Efforts are being made through Resolution 1325 and other mechanisms to include women in conflict resolution through participation and this is a key stepping stone for a more proactive role. This can be more easily be achieved as it a valid voice amongst many; this will in turn help change mind-sets and address the social imbalance in some regions.

A few women have taken the lead on peace operations in the past two decades, for example in Angola and South Africa. Margaret Anstee was appointed special representative of the secretary-general to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) in 1992 and served as chief of mission for some time; in South Africa, Angela King occupied the position of chief administrator and deputy secretary-general special representative. Other women mediators are being used in more Western-dominated states too and can help to set the example to the rest of the world. It is important for INGOs to use women mediators in their conflict resolution efforts, or for female Track 1 ½ actors to set an example in communities where local women are not given the same opportunities. These moves can help to promote gender equality in mediation.

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Case Study 1: Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland was struck by a bitter sectarian conflict that lasted from 1969 until 1998 and resulted in the death of 3,526 people, which given the size of the region is extremely significant. As a sovereign part of the United Kingdom, the British government played an integral role in Northern Ireland in an attempt to resolve the conflict; however, after sending troops into the region in 1969 to help curtail the violence, they became an intrinsic physical actor in the conflict. The principle issue at stake was the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. Generally speaking, the Protestants, and majority community, of Northern Ireland wanted to remain part of the United Kingdom; whereas, the Catholics, and majority minority community, wanted British withdrawal and union with the Republic of Ireland. Moreover, preceding what became known as the Troubles, a clear sectarian divide had developed with clear social and economic inequalities. Since the Civil Rights marches of 1968 and subsequent escalating violence in 1969, many efforts were made to address the societal inequalities. Furthermore, government-led and civil society attempts were made to mediate between the different sides to move towards resolving the conflict. The British were in a difficult position due to their involvement

68 It must be noted that this is a generalisation however; see DPI (2011), Turkey: Comparative visit to the United Kingdom Conflict Resolution for more information on how the different groupings could be split.
69 The “Troubles” is commonly used to describe the period of conflict in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1998 when the Good Friday Agreement was signed.
in the conflict however; Secretary of State Peter Brooke articulated in 1991 for the first time that the role of the government was to act as a ‘neutral broker’ rather than as a party to the talks. The government’s neutrality was not accepted as the British had a direct interest in the security of the region. It nevertheless paved the way for more open discussions during the 1990s peace process. The culmination of all of these efforts was the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, in 1998 which has been deemed by some as a strong model of conflict resolution that other nations can learn from.

The nature of civil society in Northern Ireland

The Northern Ireland Centre for European Cooperation report on civil society and peace building stresses that civil society in the region had developed in the ‘shadow of division’. ‘Civil Society Organisations have nevertheless provided a large measure of the glue that has held Northern Ireland society together’ since the start of the Troubles according to another report. Civil society in Northern Ireland has always been diverse, but its largest membership belongs to religious groupings due to the historical

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divides in the region spanning back to the 1600s when large numbers of Protestants settled in the predominantly Catholic region.\textsuperscript{75} A European Values Study published in 1999, compiled the percentage of people belonging to at least one Civil Society Organisation (CSO) in a range of different areas; although this does not reflect civil society today, it gives a good indication as to how civil society was constructed during the latter years of the Troubles.

\textsuperscript{75} John Bew, Martyn Frampton and Inigo Gurruchaga (2009), \textit{Talking to Terrorists} (London: Hurst & Company), p.22
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belong to:</th>
<th>NI:</th>
<th>UK:</th>
<th>EU:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social services for elderly, handicapped or deprived</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious or church organisation</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade unions</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political parties or groups</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local community action (poverty, housing, employment, racial equality)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third world development or human rights</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation, environment, ecology, animal rights</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth work (scouts, guides, youth, clubs, etc.)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sports or recreation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voluntary organisations concerned with health</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other groups</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

European Values Study (1999)¹

Although much can be interpreted from this data, the much higher membership numbers of religious affiliation demonstrate how important this grouping was in local and national civil society. Indeed, it is not surprising following almost 30 years of conflict that society was still relatively divided along religious lines. This paved the way for faith-based actors in particular to play a direct role in conflict resolution and reconciliation. The British government had largely been unable to present itself as an objective party in any negotiation or mediation attempt, especially before the 1990s, because of their intrinsic role in the conflict.\textsuperscript{76} Civil society actors had the potential to offer a viable intermediary route to build trust and come to a compromised settlement. Faith-based actors in particular took the lead by ‘focusing on the inclusion of all parties to a final agreement’.\textsuperscript{77}

**Civil society’s role in the back-channel negotiations**

Much of the Northern Ireland peace process was conducted in secret between the different parties to the conflict. This occurred between all parties to the conflict. The British government begun to engage in back-channel negotiations with the Provisional IRA\textsuperscript{78} from around 1970,\textsuperscript{79} which allowed the parties to gain an


\textsuperscript{78} The Provisional Irish Republican Army is an Irish Republican paramilitary organisation with its roots dating back to 1969 when the Irish Republican Army split. It became the largest Republican paramilitary group over the course of the Troubles.

understanding of the motives, capacities and direction of the adversary, away from the gaze of the media. The British also talked privately with the Loyalist paramilitary groups over the course of the period; however given the extensive Protestant representation in mainstream politics, these talks were not as prominent. The channel created a forum to discuss contentious issues without evoking public sensitivities, or morality questions about the government talking to terrorists. The back-channel negotiations for example facilitated an agreement which ended the first Provisional IRA hunger strikes in 1981. Furthermore, channels were created between the Nationalist and Republican parties of Northern Ireland to settle regional policy differences; all of which contributed toward finding a lasting settlement.

The back-channel negotiations were important because they demonstrated that the government was genuinely willing to come to a negotiated settlement while contributing towards a process of confidence building measures. The process would not have been as successful without the involvement of key intermediaries to mediate between the different sides; the pivotal role of Brendan Duddy and Farther Alec Reid are discussed below.

81 Northern Ireland Loyalists oppose a united Ireland and most Loyalists wish to uphold Northern Ireland’s status as a constituent part of the United Kingdom. In response to Republican violence, many Loyalist paramilitary organisations began to organise more formally, such as the Ulster Defence Force which was the largest in Northern Ireland during the Troubles.
83 Jonathan Powell (2008), Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland (London: The Bodley Head), p.70
The role of Brendan Duddy

Brendan Duddy, a Derry-based businessman, played an intrinsic role in the back-channel negotiations between the British Government and the Republican Movement. This process occurred alongside official government-led efforts and remained in the background as all parties kept their roles in relative secrecy. In addition to being a businessman, Duddy was an active member of Northern Ireland civil society as a Catholic resident of Derry. As a fervent pacifist, he was motivated by a desire for peace in the region and an end to violence. Duddy was by no means impartial however, and was described as having strong Republican leanings, but because of his motivation for peace he was accepted on both sides. For the Republicans in particular, it was important to have a mediator that was sympathetic to their cause because of the unequal power relations with the government. It would have been difficult for the Republican Movement to trust an unknown individual that could potentially be favouring the British perspective. Duddy was a known individual within the community and a personal friend to the 1970s Sinn Féin leader Ruari O’Bradaigh. As a result of this standing within society, time could be invested in the process rather than in establishing the credibility of the mediator.

Brendan Duddy is a prime example of a civil society mediator without the vast resources that states often plough into a similar process.

84 Derry and Belfast were two key centres of Republican violence in Northern Ireland, and where many of the movement’s leaders were based.
Duddy’s house served as the venue for the majority of the talks in the early years of the Troubles for example;\(^{86}\) with Duddy’s trusted friend Bernadette Mount’s house being used as accommodation, where she would provide basic food for the representatives of the Republican movement.\(^ {87}\) It was not necessary to have expensive venues or accommodation for a successful mediation effort to take place, merely goodwill and determination from the parties. Moreover, Duddy could be flexible with his time given that he was self-employed, and could employ the skills developed as a business man into mediation. Duddy and the parties had meetings at all hours of the day with many taking place during the night to maintain secrecy.\(^ {88}\) Duddy was also able to sustain the role of mediator for a long time while he was located and worked within the community. He played an active role from the early 1970s through to the 1990s and was able to adapt to the current need at the time whether it required an almost constant role, as during the 1975 ceasefire, or a low level of involvement for example in the period following the ceasefire up to the 1981 Hunger Strikes.

Duddy personally had a degree of leverage as an individual, and throughout 1975 for example he threatened to end his role as a mediator, which both sides knew would be detrimental to concluding peaceful negotiations.\(^ {89}\) While the Republicans sought


\(^{89}\) National University of Ireland, Galway: James Hardiman Library Archives:
to maintain Duddy’s friendship, the British were seeking to gain it. There was no-one else as well placed or privy to the intricacies of the negotiations therefore he was in a very pivotal and influential position to keep the mediation on track.

While Duddy’s efforts did not directly lead to the 1990s peace process or the Good Friday Agreement, he played a contributing factor in bringing about sustained peace in the long run. Without his initial involvement, the process would not have been likely to have materialised when it did, with the conflict potentially continuing for longer.

The role of Father Alec Reid

Father Alec Reid was a member of the Redemptorist Order\textsuperscript{90} based in West Belfast’s Clonard Monastery, and had been close to the Republicans since the start of the Troubles in 1969. He has a personal relationship with Gerry Adams which led to him becoming an intermediary and mediator between the Republican Movement and a number of other parties to the conflict. In parallel with the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement talks, the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP)\textsuperscript{91} began talks with Sinn Féin at Reid’s instigation, which took place until September 1988 when

\begin{small}
\textsuperscript{90} The Redemptorists Order is a Roman Catholic missionary Congregation; they seek to put into action the examples of Christ.
\textsuperscript{91} The Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) is a nationalist party in Northern Ireland, and was traditionally an adversary of the Republicans due to their perceived associations with violent action through the Irish Republican Army.
\end{small}
they collapsed.\textsuperscript{92} The contact between Gerry Adams\textsuperscript{93} and John Hume\textsuperscript{94} continued however as the official negotiations began to stagnate.\textsuperscript{95} Reid also helped facilitate and mediate talks between the Republicans and the British government on occasion: for example, during talks around decommissioning he was able to communicate the Republicans’ message to the British government, and to the British Ambassador in Dublin in particular, that to give up all arms before an agreement would risk the emergence of a new IRA which would lead to more problems.\textsuperscript{96} Reid was able to use his knowledge to mediate between the two sides, and to help each side understand the other.

In addition to Reid’s work with the Republican movement, he, along with Father Gerry Reynolds, helped facilitate a truce between the Irish National Liberation Army and the Irish People’s Liberation Organisation by mediating between the two to settle their differences. This was essential for progress to be made on peace in Northern Ireland.

Some are critical of Reid’s conduct, as he also undertook advocacy in an attempt to mould the process in a way he saw fit rather than

\textsuperscript{92} Jonathan Powell (2008), \textit{Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland} (London: The Bodley Head), p.63
\textsuperscript{93} Gerry Adams was president of Sinn féin from 1978 and was an instrumental figure in the lead up to and during the Northern Ireland Peace Process of the 1990s.
\textsuperscript{94} John Hume was the leader of the SDLP between 1979 and 2001, and played a key role in the lead up to and during the Northern Ireland Peace Process of the 1990s.
\textsuperscript{95} Jonathan Powell (2008), \textit{Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland} (London: The Bodley Head), p.63
\textsuperscript{96} Jonathan Powell (2008), \textit{Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland} (London: The Bodley Head), p.167
acting simply as an unbiased mediator. While his ideas of a united nationalist front were rejected, this did not dramatically impact his role as a mediator, demonstrating that every conflict situation is different. Reid’s standing in the community and his religious motivations for peace would be likely to make him acceptable even when he was pursuing his own agenda in this manner.

Numerous accounts praise the role that Reid played in the Northern Ireland peace process, with some arguing that he was responsible for starting it. Indeed, he has been described as an ‘unsung hero’ who had done more than ‘practically anyone else involved’. While he was just one contributing factor to bringing peace to Northern Ireland, he was an important individual and is an excellent example of successful civil society mediation by a faith-based actor.

**The role of faith-based actors in conflict resolution**

**1974 Feakle Talks**

In the early 1970s, several government initiatives were taken to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland, most notably the signing of the Sunningdale Agreement in December 1973. This sought to establish a Northern Ireland Power Sharing Executive where the

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Republic of Ireland had a say in a limited number of Northern Ireland’s affairs. Nevertheless this broke down because it was not unanimously acceptable to all sectors of society; in this case, the most resistance was received from the Loyalists. Further to this, a Northern Ireland Office white paper was published on 4 July 1974, which considered the idea of a Constitutional Convention, setting out plans for elections of a body to consider constitutional issues concerning Northern Ireland. This was realised in 1975 but quickly broke down due to a lack of support from the Catholic Community. There was little cross-community belief in the British government’s abilities to mediate at this time.

By December 1974, over a thousand people had lost their lives in shootings and bombings, and a new creative initiative needed to be undertaken. In November 1974, an unprecedented wave of revulsion spread across the Catholic community in response to an IRA bombing in Birmingham. This desire for peace made the conditions ripe for peace talks, which the British could not capitalise on due to their poor standing with certain community groups in the region. The Republicans in particular distrusted the British, and were at constant odds with them because the British withdrawal from Northern Ireland was not forthcoming. A group of Protestant clergymen, including Church of Ireland Bishop Dr. Arthur Butler, filled the dialogue vacuum and initiated a meeting with leading members of the Republican leadership in an attempt to ‘halt the campaign of violence that had then been carried out.

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by the Provisional IRA for nearly five years’. The group as whole were important in this instance, and leadership was not a dominant factor given the informality of the talks.

Dr. Arthur Butler noted that the ‘meeting grew out of a feeling among Churchmen in the north that in the present situation it was up to us to go to extreme lengths to see if we could get peace’. The churchmen appealed to the Republicans on humanitarian grounds, arguing that violence would not bring about their goals. The meeting was productive to the extent that the Republicans produced a document outlining their own aims and justifications for their methods. In the following weeks, the clergymen ‘shuffled’ between the two sides, relaying the necessary assurances and information, and applying some pressure for concessions. On 18 December, the clergymen met with Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees and his Permanent Secretary of the Northern Ireland Office, Frank Cooper, to discuss the meetings and relay the Republican’s demands. It is important to note that both sides accepted the clergymen as mediators and allowed this ‘shuffling’ to occur. This may have largely been as a result of their perceived impartiality as they were driven by a desire to end the conflict and further deaths irrespective of the politics involved.

Many criticised the Feakle churchmen, most notably Rev. Ian Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), who claimed that the talks would ‘lead the Protestants of Ulster astray’.¹⁰⁵ One churchman was also publicly reprimanded by his church as a result of his role in the talks.¹⁰⁶ No one came out to praise the churchmen publicly for their brave actions which showed a lack of understanding and appreciation for what civil society actors can achieve that governments cannot, due to the political concerns driven by their constituents.

The Feakle initiative provided a space for more constructive talks and with a ‘timely, face-saving way’ to try to secure a ceasefire.¹⁰⁷ This is especially important, and often a role only a third party can provide because the two parties are too intrinsically linked by their roles in a conflict. Moreover, this space was easily provided with little resources required due to its informality.

One of the Protestant participants is believed to have introduced two leading Republicans to British officials Michael Oatley and James Allan, both of which were key British representatives during the back-channel negotiations over the course of the 1975 ceasefire.¹⁰⁸ This mediation, even though minor, assisted in developing the links

that spurred the 1990s peace process into action. Moreover, the Feakle talks played a contributing role towards the announcement of the IRA temporary ceasefire over Christmas and New Year of 1974-5.

Fitzroy-Clonard Fellowship

The Fitzroy-Clonard Fellowship was established between the Fitzroy Presbyterian Church and the Clonard Catholic Monastery, both of which are located in Belfast, initially as an inter-church Bible study group in 1981. It was formed whilst the 1981 Hunger Strikes were developing, which resulted in the death of ten prisoners that starved themselves to death in protest. At this time, it was evident that new efforts and initiatives had to be made to draw the conflict to a conclusion. The Fellowship encouraged its members to recognise the ‘other’ as a fellow Christian, and gradually their work expanded into areas of mediation and reconciliation to provide a new and necessary effort. The aim of the Fellowship which still applies today is to ‘promote mutual understanding, respect and a common witness between people from various Christian traditions in Northern Ireland through [its] programmes, friendships and activities’.

The Fellowship was driven by the belief that it had been called to peace-making, adopting the ethos: ‘Blessed are the peacemakers,

for they shall be called sons of God’. ¹¹¹ Their religious and charitable motivations contributed to their acceptance by the parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland and added to their image of genuineness and impartiality. This image was also bolstered by the cross-religious character of the Fellowship which provided it with a degree of leverage during mediation attempts. As faith-based actors, the Fellowship had a number of resource pools to draw from as part of their faith network and also local church facilities for the venues of mediation.

The Fellowship, and more specifically the individuals involved, was instrumental in mediating between Sinn Féin and Unionists in private, before they believed they could meet publicly. In 1993 following the organisation of peace workshops with Sinn Féin and Loyalist Party members, the Fellowship asked both sides to discuss and call ceasefires. Although many other contributing factors led the ceasefires being called in 1994, the Fellowship played a key mediating role in securing these.¹¹² The Fellowship’s work complimented the official and back-channel dialogue that was concurrently occurring between the government and different paramilitaries leading up to the 1990s peace process.

The Fellowship received the Pax Christi International Peace Award in 1999 for its ‘exemplary grass-roots peacemaking work


in Belfast’. It is also an exemplary civil society mediation effort, bringing together different protagonists, in a conflict to discuss their differences and possible ways forward. Due to the nature of Northern Ireland, the religious basis of the Fellowship was particularly effective as lessons from the Bible could be drawn from by the mediators that were familiar to both sides in the conflict.

**Corrymeela Centre for Reconciliation**

The Corrymeela Centre for Reconciliation, today known as simply the Corrymeela Community, was founded by Presbyterian minister, Ray Davey. It was initially founded in 1965 to provide a safe space for both Protestant and Catholics to come together and engage in a dialogue and to focus on Christ’s forgiveness of his enemies as a model to follow. Early participants were Christians from across Northern Ireland, from both religious communities, that wanted to open up new possibilities and counter apathy and complacency they felt existed in Northern Ireland with regard to communal differences.

The Centre organised multidenominational workshops in its own centre, as they continue to do in the post-conflict environment, to mediate between different communities and to provide grass-

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roots conciliatory efforts. This in turn filtered to the leaders of the different communities to effect change. This civil society led and participation effort is a key demonstration of the way in which communities can own the process and contribute in a valuable way to conflict resolution.

**International Mediation: The role of George Mitchell**

Senator George Mitchell largely falls into the Track 1½ diplomacy category even though he was acting as the United States Special Envoy for Northern Ireland between 1995 and 2001. Mitchell became an effective mediator during the 1990s Northern Ireland Peace Process and led a ground-breaking commission to assess how decommissioning might take place in Northern Ireland. What resulted were the ‘Mitchell Principles’ which offered a potential solution for the parties to move forward in a non-violent way, on their seemingly incompatible standpoints, these were a ‘total and absolute commitment’:

- To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues
- To the total disarming of all paramilitary organisations
- To agree that such disarmaments must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission
- To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, to threaten to use force, to influence the course or
the outcome of all-party negotiations

• To agree to abide the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree

• To urge that ‘punishment’ killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.\(^{116}\)

The role played by Mitchell was significant because he was able to mediate a solution, while the parties were able to proceed with decommissioning and negotiations in parallel. The parties accepted these principles and they played an instrumental role in steering the peace process to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Given his continued role in Northern Irish affairs following his involvement in establishing the ‘Mitchell Principles’, he was able to continue in his mediation post to ensure that both parties followed the principles in a way suited to them.\(^{117}\) He also had the resources and leverage to encourage all sides to accept the principles. Given his narrowly appointed remit however, he was unable to address many of the other issues that concerned the Northern Irish communities.

**Civic Forum for Northern Ireland**

The Civic Forum for Northern Ireland is a noteworthy outcome


of the Northern Ireland peace process, and it engaged civil society in different policy areas such as arts and sports, churches, culture and education. While it had no legislative or government powers, it acted as a consultative body and played an important role during the transition from violence to peace. It was chaired by a civil society leader in the first instance: Chris Gibon, a very active individual in Northern Irish industry that was awarded an OBE for his services in this sector. While the Forum did not last very long and was suspended, along with the Northern Ireland Assembly in 2002, it is a good example of civil society mediation in the transition period following a peace process.

Case Study 2:
The case of civil-society mediation in Darfur

The conflict in Darfur can best be categorised as an identity conflict that has its roots in the 1980s when complex protracted, violent tribal disputes began to break out; these disputes however were not ‘heeded nationally’ or ‘noticed internationally’ despite mass human suffering and the destruction of many livelihoods.118 These protracted disputes contributed to the build-up of the present armed conflict.

The armed conflict in Darfur has two interwoven and inseparable dynamics; on the one hand it is characterised by the tribal conflicts that include intra and inter-tribal conflict and on the other hand, there

is the conflict that it linked to the Darfur national identity dynamic and the political decision-making process. The former concerned issues regarding the ‘quest of rival individuals, groups or clans for economic privileges such as land ownership or access to natural resources including rich pastureland’. The latter is directly linked to issues of ‘social justice, exclusion, alienation, underdevelopment, marginalisation, disproportionate representation in public service and the exclusion of, and discrimination against, the people of the region in the political and economic life of the country’.

Given the lack of mainstream political representation in the Darfur region of Sudan, civil society was key to filling this vacuum. Indeed, ‘Seeking peace and reconciliation through dialogue and mediation to resolve conflict within and between communities is a deeply rooted Darfurian tradition.’ The importance of civil society in Africa in particular has been entrenched since the early 1990s, when the Organisation of African Union (OAU), United Nations agencies and African civil society organisation convened the International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa in Arusha, Tanzania.

122 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in May 1963 with 32 signatory governments and was disbanded in 2002 and replaced with the African Union (AU).
in February 1990. The outcome, which resulted in the Arusha Charter on Public Participation, ‘highlighted the need for African governments to integrate African civil society into governance structures of key institutions to ensure their participation in defining long term development policies’. Their potential to also mediate was formally developed here.

**Deadline diplomacy for Darfur**

The African Union (AU) mediated peace talks for Darfur over the course of 2005 and 2006 with support from the UN, the US, the UK and other international partners. These talks were driven by what is termed ‘deadline diplomacy’, in an attempt to broker a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of Sudan and the two main rebel movements in Darfur. The term ‘deadline diplomacy’ refers to negotiations that are dictated by externally imposed, specific deadlines. The talks were dictated by a stream of unfeasible deadlines that came from the AU headquarters, the UN and other donors. While the rebels and the Sudanese government could ignore the deadlines, the mediators were obliged to adhere to them because their inter-governmental organisations had set them. This fundamentally inhibited a programmatic effort to

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126 Laurie Nathan (2010), ‘Towards a New Era in International Mediation’, http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/Policy%20
build momentum gradually over time, and prevented the flexibility needed to discuss the issues of the conflict comprehensively. The deadline also prevented the mediators from consulting with civil society which made it difficult for widespread acceptance and ownership of the peace agreement, something which is vital if peace is to be sustained in the long term.

As a result of the deadlines set, the mediators were increasingly viewed as arbitrators rather than facilitators of dialogue and negotiation as they began to put their efforts into drafting the Darfur Peace Accord (DPA). Therefore much of the time was spent in the talks either accepting the parts of the mediator’s draft the parties involved in the negotiations liked, rejecting what they disagreed with and devoting much energy to lobbying the mediators, rather than talking to each other.127 Furthermore, the parties felt little ownership of the agreement because they had not produced it. In the final days of the talks, African and foreign leaders put significant pressure on the rebel leaders to sign the document, ‘berating them and threatening them with sanctions’.128 The document however was very long, and the Darfur rebels’ delegation struggled to fully consider the document before being asked to make a final and binding decision, in part because it was not translated in time, nor

Directions/Towards%20a%20new%20era%20in%20international%20mediation.pdf, accessed 10 September 2012

had they had the opportunity to consult with the people of Darfur which they claimed to represent. Only one of the leaders signed the document, but the other two rebel groups left the talks without signing the DPA.

The document was essentially never accepted as a legitimate peace agreement because of this lack of ownership. The parties had little opportunity to comprehensively discuss the issues which were maintaining the conflict and to come to a settled and widely-consulted position. While external pressures for deadlines may have been in place had civil society mediators been employed, there would have perhaps been less pressure on the civil society mediators personally to find a solution within the set timeframe and any timetable could have been devised more appropriately and realistically. Instead greater flexibility and time could have been given to the process. Furthermore, there would have been greater ownership of the process within the Darfurian communities were more civil society actors have been involved.

**Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC)**

The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) was a by-product of the Darfur Peace Accord (DPA) which attempted to provide civil society with the opportunity to discuss the terms of the DPA and issues pertaining to the Darfurian conflict. The DDDC describes itself as an ‘autonomous and non-politicised process owned by Darfurians to voice their opinions and view to

achieve sustainable peace and reconciliation in Darfur’. There were lost opportunities in this initiative however, and due to the lack of cross-party acceptance of the DPA, the DDDC had only limited success.

Responsibility for the DDDC lay with the African Union (AU) in the first instance, making the process a positive civil society participation effort even though the process was not able to achieve full inclusiveness. The DDDC set out four main aims for itself:

1. Broadly communicate the consultation process and outcomes to stakeholders and others

2. Innovatively engage civil society

3. Play an active role in the Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund

4. Clarify and communicate relationships with stakeholders and strategic partners.

The initiative had the backing at the international and national level. Crucially, the DDDC was specifically named in Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006) which concerns the UN mission in Sudan and Darfur. The AU Commissioner for Peace

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Civil Society Mediation in Conflict Resolution

and Security Ambassador Said Djinnit formally launched the Preparatory Committee of the DDDC and introduced its new Chairman Mr. Abdul Mohammed. The new Chair had previously had experience in negotiations during the Darfur Peace Talks in Abuja, in particular with regard to the Darfur Dialogue.

Despite the DDDC’s good intentions and limited successes, the opportunity to engage civil society in the mediation process was lost. Civil society mediation would have increased the ownership that the Darfurians felt they had of the process. The mediators stressed that they would remain impartial and the process would remain non-politicised, but doubt could not be eradicated because other states were essentially still involved.

Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue

The Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue began in 2006 originating out of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public and International Law (MPIL) in Germany in an attempt to bring the widest cross section of actors together from the region of Darfur. The MPIL worked in collaboration with the Peace Research Institute at the University of Khartoum to organise a symposium with lawyers, academics and civil society representatives from the region.


This was chaired by two leading academics, Professor Wolfrum and Professor Al-Tayeb Haj Ateya. Its aim was to ‘work towards reaching a consensus that could be discussed with the Sudanese government in the official peace process’. What resulted following the symposium which successfully brought together different sectors of Darfurian civil and political life, was the production of the Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue Outcome Document. This document was accepted by the Liberation and Justice Movement, but rejected by the government. The importance the former placed on this initiative is evident in a statement by Abdullah Mursal, the rebel movement’s official spokesman that ‘the government’s rejection of the document will result in a return to war between the parties, unless the government meets the demands of the people of Darfur’.

The document was presented officially in Berlin in May 2010, where the civil society effort was widely recognised including by Secretary General of the United Nations Ban-Ki Moon, who stated that he ‘strongly supported the initiative’ and ‘congratulated all involved in launching’ the Outcome Document, which he described as representing a ‘valuable social process. The Secretary

138 The Liberation and Justice Movement is one of the rebel groups involved in the Darfur conflict in Sudan.
General acknowledged the role of civil society as ‘an important contribution to the settlement of the conflict and the cause of peace’.\textsuperscript{140} The effort was also backed by Djibril Yipene Bassole, the Joint African Union United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur, showing the legitimacy of the civil society mediation effort.

A delegation of the Heidelberg Committee was invited to present its draft at the mediation meeting in Doha in June 2010; however this was met with objection by the Sudanese government delegation. The government objected on the grounds that if the delegation were present, they would interrupt the peace process. Moreover, the Heidelberg Committee delegation were branded as being part of the opposition and supporting the rebels.\textsuperscript{141} What is important to note however is the opinion of the main rebel leader, Tigani Sese, who believed that the delegation of the Heidelberg Committee’s presence ‘supported the peace process’.\textsuperscript{142} Furthermore, Sese stated that the Framework Agreement on the talks allowed for the presence of the group but only as ‘consultants’.\textsuperscript{143}

While this was a civil society effort from both a participation and a mediating point of view, the German Foreign Ministry provided funding for the event but did not play an active role.\textsuperscript{144} It is evident

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\textsuperscript{141} Radio Dabanga, ‘Sudan negotiator object to Heidelberg delegation Darfur peace talks’, http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/1440, accessed 31 August 2012
\textsuperscript{142} Radio Dabanga, ‘Sudan negotiator object to Heidelberg delegation Darfur peace talks’, http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/1440, accessed 31 August 2012
\textsuperscript{143} Radio Dabanga, ‘Sudan negotiator object to Heidelberg delegation Darfur peace talks’, http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/1440, accessed 31 August 2012
\textsuperscript{144} Max Plank Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, ‘Heidel-
from this process that Germany’s involvement did not impact the autonomy of the process or the impartiality of the civil society effort, and it should be pointed to as an example where government funding can assist civil society mediation efforts without blurring the lines between civil society and the government. The EU also supported this specific initiative as it afforded a greater role to civil society.145

**Concordis International**

Concordis International is a UK-based NGO that works alongside and supports official processes, where they exist, to improve the potential for lasting peace. One of their key areas of focus is Sudan with some specific projects in the Darfur region. This project is titled ‘Common Ground in Darfur’ which seeks to develop Darfurian unity.

The NGO was able to overcome the common barriers of funding and built the appropriate resources by successfully raising funds from private donations, churches, charities and community groups.146 These were channelled into holding a series of consultations for key Darfurians from armed opposition groups, government and

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civil society. The process began with a consultation on land use and tenure in September 2004, and importantly a further consultation was planned in December 2004 at the participants’ request, on culture, political and economic marginalisation in the region. This demonstrates the participants’ acceptance of the NGO and its activities as a credible mediator. A further meeting was organised in August 2005 on enabling the sustainable and safe return and reintegration of the displaced in Darfur. Crucially, these consultations were able to bring together leaders from all sides, who would not normally have been able to talk to each other, and helped them to work out constructive solutions to many crucial issues.

The findings and conclusions of these consultations were presented in September 2005 to both the parties and African mediators involved in the formal negotiations at Abuja, Nigeria. These meetings provide a key example showing how an independent process can work in parallel with but also feed into a formal process further down the line. The documents taken together represented consensus between key individuals from all sectors of Darfurian society on a few of the most crucial causes of the conflict. However, many of these issues did not feature in the official negotiation process. Concordis’ mediation during the consultations was therefore very important to address some of the key issues that...
should have been discussed during the official process. 149

Concordis maintained close contact with the official negotiators, and tried to encourage a broader view during the process. The NGO’s work included expert workshops for negotiating teams on power-sharing arrangements, but essentially the conclusions of the Concordis-led consultation were not taken into full consideration. The Darfur Peace Accord (DPA) was signed in May 2006 without unanimous consensus, with two of three rebel groups refusing to sign it claiming that it had been forced on them prematurely. 150 Fighting broke out following the de facto failure of the DPA; Concordis tried to engage the parties in dialogue but found the situation very difficult because the assistance they could offer was very limited.

Importantly, Concordis worked alongside the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) unit of the African union in an attempt to design and implement a series of consultation within its ‘Common Ground’ process. This example demonstrates the feasibility of civil society mediation efforts working within an official government-driven and originated process. Two Darfurian consultations were organised in this partnership, and extensive materials were produced by Concordis in both English and Arabic to help conceptualise and implement the DPA and DDDC processes by engaging community leaders, youth leaders, women’s

groups and other civil society groupings.\textsuperscript{151}

Most recently in June 2008, Concordis was asked by an inclusive non-official group of Darfurians to facilitate and mediate a strategic consultation on ‘Developing Darfurian Unity’. It built on the NGO’s earlier work and brought together senior Darfurians from a range of social, political and ethnic backgrounds. The result of the consultation was an articulated common vision that all Darfurians’ efforts should be combined and directed towards a ‘united, secure, stable, advanced and developed Darfur within a united Sudan’. Concordis continued its mediation role, and worked with a representative coordinating committee to extend this vision further with the aim of engaging the full range of Darfurian tribes, political parties, civil society groups and opposition movements ‘in developing a case for Darfurian unity and coexistence in a way that would provide hope to demoralised populations and inject some momentum and credibility into the moribund peace process’.\textsuperscript{152}

This was a key civil society mediation and participation process and should be looked to as an example of good practice. While Concordis’ role was taken over by civil society within Darfur, they continued to play an advisory role as Darfurians began to take control of the process.


Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre

The Switzerland-based Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre (DRDC) is an apolitical NGO established in May 2004 with the aim of ‘injecting an independent and impartial civil society perspective for a peaceful resolution of armed conflict in the Darfur region’.\(^{153}\) ‘DRDC [aims to] brings together a panoply of individuals from different backgrounds including intellectuals, scholars, community leaders, human rights and pro-democracy activists and groups from Darfur and other parts of the world and engages them in an effort to help the people of Darfur put an end to the conflict in the region and rebuild their destroyed lives and livelihood’.\(^{154}\) It mainly achieved this through the production of reports which investigate the different views of the relevant stakeholders which can then be disseminated to relevant parties once produced. Unlike other organisations, they have not facilitated meetings, conferences, roundtables or seminars, and therefore do not strictly follow the traditional mediation model; nevertheless they play an important role through publications to help each side understand the other party by communicating the other’s point of view.

Conclusion

This report has explored the important role that civil society can play in conflict resolution and how civil society can be acceptable, and sometimes more appropriate, mediators between parties to a conflict that cannot negotiate directly with one another. It must be recognised that every conflict is different, and the degree to which civil society can become involved depends on the make-up and the suitability of candidates for civil society mediation. Even though professional diplomats are trained to mediate, civil society actors should not be precluded from any process of conflict resolution as many will have developed relevant skills through their profession or through working within the community.

It has been demonstrated that faith-based actors can at times be a very important grouping from which to draw mediators because of their standing in the community; their perceived legitimacy, credibility and impartiality. This group often also has a vast pool of funds from which to draw, which will be beneficial for sustaining any mediation effort; and often have the time necessary to dedicate to a mediation process both to prevent deadline diplomacy and also once an agreement has been reached and the nation is in transition. It is not necessary for all parties to the conflict to share the same faith as often all actors mediate on a ‘values-based’ basis which can be related to across faiths. The Fitzroy-Clonard Fellowship in Northern Ireland is a key example of how cross-religious groups can be extremely effective and create a significant impetus to encourage different parties to the conflict to mediate. The importance of
faith-based actors is that they have a unique leverage position that can appeal to the parties to stop violence on humanitarian grounds.

Local NGOs and charities can play an extremely important role in mediating because of their local knowledge and specialities, including their understanding of the conflict and access to the parties. They too, like faith-based actors, will usually have more opportunities to remain in the role of mediation following the conclusion of a peace agreement compared to governments. That is not to say that international NGOs do not have a significant role to play; major organisations with a significant amount of funds, can play a crucial role in any civil society effort. Local and international NGOs can work together to steer peace to a non-violent conclusion; they may also be more acceptable to the non-governmental actors to the conflict that may be intimidated by a government derived mediator.

Track 1 ½ mediators have a demonstrable importance in civil society, as predominately shown by the pivotal role that George Mitchell played in the Northern Ireland process, and his establishment of the ‘Mitchell Principles’ which fed into the Good Friday Agreement. While caution should be taken so that the non-governmental parties to the conflict are not intimidated by the Track 1 ½ actor if they have close links to the governmental actor, these mediators have significant access to resources and can apply a degree of leverage on the parties to reach a successful conclusion.
The case studies of Northern Ireland and Darfur have demonstrated that independent efforts to bring parties together can be very successful, but that these independent efforts should, if appropriate, be fed into a government-led official peace process to have the greatest effect. The Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue and the work by Concordis International both demonstrate how civil society efforts have the potential to have a dramatic impact on the official process. In the case of Darfur, however, these efforts were not fully adopted by the African Union mediators and therefore their potential could not be fully realised.

It is essential that any peace process is owned by the people whom it affects; civil society participation and consultation in a process is essential for this to happen. Civil society mediation can contribute to this sense of ownership, and it is likely that government-led processes are facilitated and strengthened if civil society mediators are involved at all stages of the conflict resolution process.
Acronyms

AU – African Union

CSO – Civil Service Organisation

DDDC – Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation

DPA – Darfur Peace Accord

DRDC – Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre

DUP – Democratic Ulster Party

IGO – Inter-governmental organisation

INGO – International non-governmental organisation

IRA – Irish Republican Army

MPIL – Max Plank Institute for Comparative Public and International Law

NGO – Non-governmental organisation

OAU – Organisation of African Unity

SDLP – Social and Democratic Labour Party

UN – United Nations
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Appendix:
DPI Board and Council of Experts

Director:

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Kerim Yildiz is Director of DPI. He is an expert in international human rights law and minority rights, and is the recipient of a number of awards, including from the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights for his services to protect human rights and promote the rule of law in 1996, the Sigrid Rausing Trust’s Human Rights award for Leadership in Indigenous and Minority Rights in 2005, and the Gruber Prize for Justice in 2011. Kerim has written extensively on human rights and international law, and his work has been published internationally.

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Professor of International Political Affairs at the University of Ottawa, Canada. Expert and author on human rights, humanitarian law and conflict resolution issues, former Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of Amnesty International, consultant to United Nations.

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**DPI Council of Experts**

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